One of the most basic questions an ontology can address is: How many things, or substances, are there? A monist will say, ‘just one’. But there are different stripes of monism, and where the borders between these different views lie rests on the question, ‘To what does this “oneness” apply?’ Some monists apply ‘oneness’ to existence. Others apply ‘oneness’ to types. Determining whether a philosopher is a monist and deciphering what this is supposed to mean is no easy task, especially (...) when it comes to those writing in the early modern period because many philosophers of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries include God in their ontologies. InThe Principles,Anne Finch Conway offers an ontology that is often described as being both ‘vitalist’ and ‘monist’. I take this to mean that, for Conway, all that exists is in some way alive and that if asked ‘How many things, or substances, are there?’ Conway would say, ‘Just one’. But to what does this ‘oneness’ apply? And where does the point of disagreement between Conway and her interlocutors, Hobbes, Spinoza, More, and Descartes lie? In this paper, I argue that determining the answer to this first question turns out to be quite difficult. Nevertheless, we can still make sense of the second. (shrink)

This 2004 book was the first intellectual biography of one of the very first English women philosophers. At a time when very few women received more than basic education, Lady Anne Conway wrote an original treatise of philosophy, her Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, which challenged the major philosophers of her day - Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza. Sarah Hutton's study places Anne Conway in her historical and philosophical context, by reconstructing her social and (...) intellectual milieu. She traces her intellectual development in relation to friends and associates such as Henry More, Sir John Finch, F. M. van Helmont, Robert Boyle and George Keith. And she documents Conway's debt to Cambridge Platonism and her interest in religion - an interest which extended beyond Christian orthodoxy to Quakerism, Judaism and Islam. Her book offers an insight into both the personal life of a very private woman, and the richness of seventeenth-century intellectual culture. (shrink)

Anne Finch Conway es una de las filósofas del siglo XVII que discutió con los filósofos destacados de su época. La única obra con la que contamos de esta autora es Principia Philosophiae Anticissimae et Recentissimae o The Principle of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy. En este artículo me propongo dar cuenta del rol que la naturaleza humana tiene en su metafísica, de modo de encontrar un lugar más específico para el dolor y el sufrimiento en (...) un mundo que parece ante todo gobernado por el amor recíproco y la simpatía. El concepto de hombre microcosmos y la relación de este con Cristo tiene una importancia poco destacada por la bibliografía sobre nuestra filósofa. Con esta meta, presentaré su metafísica prestando especial atención a la sustancia creada y su relación con la sustancia media, Cristo, y la sustancia primera, Dios. De este modo, además, daré cuenta de la responsabilidad que la naturaleza humana tiene con el mundo de la creación, por lo cual me permito mencionar también lo “ecológico” en el pensamiento de Conway, ya que el perfeccionamiento de la naturaleza humana es el perfeccionamiento de toda la naturaleza. (shrink)

In an age when women were not formally admitted to Cambridge, Conway was tutored by mail by Henry More, who had also taught her half-brother John Finch. Her notebooks, now lost, were published post-humously in 1690 in Latin translation by men who respected her and who with self-effacement introduced her work without mentioning their own names. Conway proposed replacing the doctrine of the Trinity with a metaphysical metaphor in which God is the Creator, Christ is mediating “Middle (...) Nature,” and the third element is Creation. Hobbes and Spinoza she critiques for failing to distinguish between Creator and creation. She also criticized the dualism of Descartes and of More, developing instead a “vitalistic monism”. More himself had written of “Monad or Unite” in 1653. (shrink)

Anne Conway, née Finch, is arguably one of the most important British philosophers of the seventeenth century. Her main work, published posthumously, in 1690, "Principia Philosophiae Antiquissimae et Recentissimae", translated two years later into English as "The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy: Concerning God, Christ, and the Creature; that is, concerning Spirit and Matter in General", engages critically with most relevant thinkers of her time, in particular Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and her friend and mentor (...) Henry More. As the sub-title of the English translation suggests, the "Principia" are also influenced by Christian, and especially early Christian - Patristic, teaching. The chapter studies the "Principia" with a view to the way in which they use or engage with these teachings. Anne Conway was not a specialist historical theologian or Patristic scholar and no specific sources are explicitely referenced in her work. However, the way in which she approaches her main themes suggests that she was influenced by very specific early Christian thinkers, in particular Origen, whom she may have known through George Rust's "Letter of Resolution", which Henry More recommended to her in a letter in 1660. At the same time she also developed elements of early Christian thought independently, creatively, pursuing her very own agenda. Studying the "Principia" with a view to their exposure to early Christian thought reveals Anne Conway once more as a fascinating early modern philosopher who indeed combines very ancient with very recent thinking. (shrink)

La filosofía de Anne Finch, Viscondesa de Conway ha sido estudiada desde la perspectiva del papel crítico de su monismo vitalista frente a la filosofía de sus contemporáneos, así como en la valoración de su papel en la historia de la filosofía. No obstante, la atención que han recibido sus tesis epistemológicas ha sido escasa en razón del carácter fragmentario de sus Principios de la más antigua y moderna filosofía. El presente artículo parte de la idea de (...) que es posible sistematizar la filosofía de esta autora moderna, lo cual, implica la reconstrucción de sus tesis epistemológicas a través de los conceptos de percepción sensible e imaginación. Lo anterior, nos permitirá no sólo comprender estas tesis bajo la lógica de su correlación con la ontología y la filosofía moral de Conway, también permite acceder a una propuesta original alterna a los modelos mecanicistas imperantes en la época. (shrink)

Copyright ©2010–2015 All rights reserved. Jonathan Bennett [Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth. (...) Longer omissions are reported within [brackets] in normal-sized type.—This work was posthumously published in a Latin translation, and the original (English) manuscript was lost; so the Latin is all we have to work with.—The division into chapters and sections is presumably Lady Conway’s; the titles of chapters 2–9 are not. (shrink)

The work of Spinoza, Descartes and Leibniz is cited in an attempt to develop, both expositorily and critically, the philosophy of Anne Viscountess Conway. Broadly, it is contended that Conway's metaphysics, epistemology and account of the passions not only bear intriguing comparison with the work of the other well-known rationalists, but supersede them in some ways, particularly insofar as the notions of substance and ontological hierarchy are concerned. Citing the commentary of Loptson and Carolyn Merchant, and alluding (...) to other commentary on the Cambridge Platonists whose work was done in tandem with Conway's, it is contended that Conway's conception of the "monad" preceded and influenced Leibniz's, and that her monistic vitalism was in many respects a superior metaphysics to the Cartesian system. It is concluded that we owe Conway more attention and celebration than she has thus far received. (shrink)

A scholarly edition of letters by Anne, Viscountess Conway, Henry More, and their friends. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

Anne Conway argues that all substances are spiritual. Yet, she also claims that all created substance has some type of body. Peter Loptson has argued that Conway didn’t carefully consider her view that all created beings have bodies for it seems God could have created only disembodied spirits. There are several reasons to think Loptson is right. First, Conway holds that God is all‐good and will do the best for his creation. She also holds that spirit (...) is better than body. So, how is it that creatures always have bodies? Second, although she maintains that incorporation is punishment for sin, Conway holds that some creatures can fall without acquiring visible corporality. I argue that when we examine these views more closely, we will see that not only did Conway give them careful consideration, but that there is no inconsistency. Finally, I show that Conway’s views concerning the nature and function of body provides further evidence of her carefully crafted system. Conway holds that bodies play an important role in a finite beings’ ability to change and interact with others. Even more surprising is Conway’s view that the body is the repository of thoughts, memories, and knowledge. (shrink)

Revised edition by Sarah Hutton.The revised edition contains some important letters not included in the first edition, plus a new introduction.

For early modern metaphysician Anne Conway, the world comprises creatures. In some sense, Conway is a monist about creatures: all creatures are one. Yet, as Jessica Gordon-Roth has astutely pointed out, that monism can be understood in very different ways. One might read Conway as an ‘existence pluralist’: creatures are all composed of the same type of substance, but many substances exist. Alternatively, one might read Conway as an ‘existence monist’: there is only one created (...) substance. Gordon-Roth has done the scholarship a great favor by illuminating these issues in Conway. However, this article takes issue with Gordon-Roth's further view that Conway ‘oscillates’ between the extremes of existence pluralism and monism. In its place, I argue we should read Conway as a priority monist: the whole of creation is ontologically prior to its parts. (shrink)

The main goal of this chapter is to present the basic components of Anne Conway’s metaphysics of sympathy. To that end, I will explicate her concepts of God or first substance and second substance or Christ with special emphasis on the key role that the second substance plays in her philosophy. I argue that one of the keys to Conway’s system lies in her reinterpretation of the Christian narrative about suffering. She combines Christian imagery with ancient and (...) modern ideas in an attempt to create a philosophy that will appeal to people of all faiths and explain ‘all phenomena in the entire universe’ ). Christ’s role as a metaphysical and moral figure is crucial to Conway’s philosophy and helps explain her views about suffering and the importance of sympathy in her philosophy. (shrink)

This paper aims to resolve an unremarked-upon tension between Anne Conway’s commitment to the moral responsibility of created beings, or creatures, and her commitment to emanative, constant creation. Emanation causation has an atemporal aspect according to which God’s act of will coexists with its effect. There is no before or after, or past or future in God’s causal contribution. Additionally, Conway’s constant creation picture has it that all times are determined via divine emanation. Creaturely agency, by contrast, (...) is fundamentally temporal, occurring successively over time. It is unclear how creatures can count as emanative causes, which coexists with its effect, given that their agency is limited by time, proceeding from before to after, or past to future. Conway’s account of divine justice in the progress of time, however, requires that creatures are causally responsible. That is, moral responsibility requires causal responsibility. I propose that Conway’s distinction between vital motion and local motion enables a resolution of the tension. Vital motion contributes an atemporal aspect to creaturely agency so that creatures can count as secondary emanative causes. (shrink)

In chapter IX of the Principles, Anne Conway claims that her metaphysics is diametrically opposed to those of Descartes and Spinoza. Scholars have analyzed her rejection of Cartesianism, but not her critique of Spinoza. This paper proposes that two central points of Conway’s metaphysics can be understood as direct responses to Spinoza: (1) the relation between God, Christ, and the creatures in the tripartite division of being, and (2) the individuation of beings in the lowest species. I (...) will argue that Conway, in criticizing Spinoza’s identification between God and nature, defends a paradoxical monism, and that her concept of individuation is a reductio ad absurdum of Spinoza’s criterion of identity in the individuation of finite modes. (shrink)

Anne Conway was an extraordinary figure in a remarkable age. Her mastery of the intricate doctrines of the Lurianic Kabbalah, her authorship of a treatise criticising the philosophy of Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza, and her scandalous conversion to the despised sect of Quakers indicate a strength of character and independence of mind wholly unexpected (and unwanted) in a woman at the time. Translated for the first time into modern English, her Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (...) is the most interesting and original philosophical work written by a woman in the seventeenth century. Her radical and unorthodox ideas are important not only because they anticipated the more tolerant, ecumenical, and optimistic philosophy of the Enlightenment, but also because of their influence on Leibniz. This fully annotated edition includes an introduction which places Conway in her historical and philosophical contexts, together with a chronology of her life and a bibliography. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper seeks to shed light on the often-overlooked account of divine and human freedom presented by Anne Conway in her Principles of the Most Ancient Modern Philosophy, partly through a...

This paper considers the conception of the Triune God, soteriology and eschatology in Anne Conway’s metaphysics. After outlining some of the key features of her thought, including her account of a timeless God who is nevertheless intimately present in creation, I will argue that her conception of the Trinity offers a distinctive role for Christ and the Holy Spirit to play in her philosophical system. I also propose an interpretation of Conway’s eschatology, in which time is understood (...) as grounded in a never-ending soteriological process of the overall movement of creatures towards perfection and a state of spirituality. (shrink)

Anne Conway (1631–1679) was one of the most intellectually adventurous and well-read philosophers of religion in the seventeenth century. Her unfinished systematic treatise, posthumously published as The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, moves from the divine attributes through a theodicy based on universal salvation to a rejection of substance dualism. Her approach demonstrates a syncretist approach to religion that blends multiple intellectual traditions, including Cambridge Platonism, Quakerism, and the Kabbalah. Her admirers included Henry More, Francis (...) von Helmont, and G.W. Leibniz. (shrink)

in the steadily growing body of secondary literature on Anne Conway, it has frequently been claimed that Conway anticipated, and maybe even influenced, Leibniz's theory of monads. This trend got going with a 1979 article by Carolyn Merchant, entitled "The Vitalism of Anne Conway: Its Impact on Leibniz's Concept of the Monad."1 It subsequently came to dominate the field; even now, many commentors still just take it for granted that Conway believed in monads. For (...) example, this commitment is considered sufficiently central to her philosophy to earn a mention in the opening paragraph of the preface to Carol Wayne White's book on Conway, listed among just three things that are supposed to mark her out as... (shrink)

Princess Elisabeth and Anne Conway were contemporaries whose lives present many striking parallels. From their early interest in Descartes’ philosophy to their encounter with Van Helmont and the Quakers in their maturity, both were brought into contact with the same sets of ideas and forms of spirituality at similar points in their lives. Despite their common interest in philosophy, and their many mutual acquaintances, it is difficult to ascertain what either knew about the other, and whether either knew (...) anything about the other’s philosophy. This paper reviews the evidence for connections between them and their knowledge of one another. After outlining the parallels in their personal circumstances and the sources for their knowledge of each other, I discuss key intermediaries: Henry More, the Hartlib Circle, Francis Mercury van Helmont and the Quaker leaders Robert Barclay and George Keith. Although they were certainly aware of one another, the answer to the question of whether there was any philosophical inter-change between them remains especially elusive. (shrink)

Anne Conway’s Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, first published in 1690, is probably the most ambitious contribution to early modern metaphysics by a woman writing in the English language. This beautifully prepared edition makes Conway’s treatise available to twentieth-century readers in an accessible English translation of the 1690 Latin text—itself a translation of an original English manuscript that has long been lost.

Anne Conway produced only one short treatise – The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy – but addressed key problems in the philosophy of religion which are still much discussed today. The most significant of these are the problem of religious diversity and the problem of evil. Although the sources of her ideas may be found in the Kabbalah of Isaac Luria and the work of the Cambridge Platonists and the Quaker George Keith, among others, she (...) offers her own unorthodox solutions to these problems. The idea of Christ as an indwelling mediator of the divine who assists us in our moral endeavours is designed to appeal to those of all religions and none, while her claim that God created creatures knowing that they would eventually be redeemed, and that suffering promotes moral development which leads to redemption offers a novel response to the problem of evil. Conway's work is also important for its influence on the work of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and some have argued that it prefigures, at least in outline, the field theory of modern physics. (shrink)

Eileen O'Neill - Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.1 122-124 Sarah Hutton. Anne Conway: A Woman Philosopher. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. viii + 271. Cloth, $75.00. In 1690 a Latin translation of a philosophical treatise, originally written in English by Anne Conway , was published anonymously. The English manuscript did not survive, but in 1692 the Latin version (...) of Conway's text was translated into English as The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Conway was widely known by seventeenth-century philosophers and religious writers, including the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More; Descartes's correspondent, Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia; Robert Boyle; physician and vitalist philosopher, Francis Mercury van Helmont; as well as numerous Quaker leaders. And her Principles were read with critical approbation by such figures as Leibniz. Further, Conway's text is probably the most anthologized of the writings of seventeenth-century women philosophers. It is curious, then, to discover a dearth of critical literature on the Principles. When Peter Loptson produced the first modern edition of the Principles , he attempted to interest contemporary philosophers in Conway's essentialist metaphysics. He did a superb job of elucidating Conway's position that: there are individual essences.. (shrink)

Anne Conway is an English philosopher (1631-1679) whose only work, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, was published posthumously in 1690. Although her philosophy is a highly original response to the period's main philosophical problems and although her contemporaries offered the work high praise, Conway was left out of the history of philosophy by later thinkers, like so many other significant early modern women. Her treatise is a highly original philosophical work that contains her (...) wide ranging and heterodox ideas on divine justice, moral perfection, animal generation and many other issues that were at the forefront of philosophical debates at that time. The present volume contains a new Latin edition of the work as well as the first Lithuanian translation by Laurynas Adomaitis (Scuola Normale Superiore) and an introduction by Christia Mercer (Columbia University). (shrink)