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Anne Meylan
University of Zürich
  1.  57
    The Legitimacy of Intellectual Praise and Blame.Anne Meylan - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Research 40:189-203.
    We frequently praise or blame people for what they believe or fail to believe as a result of their having investigated some matter thoroughly, or, in the case of blame, for having failed to investigate it, or for carelessly or insufficiently investigating. for instance, physicists who, after years of toil, uncover some unknown fact about our universe are praised for what they come to know. sometimes, in contrast, we blame and may even despise our friends for being ignorant of certain (...)
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  2. Passing the Epistemic Buck.Anne Meylan & Davide Fassio - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Daniel Whiting & Jonathan Way (eds.), Metaethical Problems in the Epistemic Domain. Oxford, Royaume-Uni: pp. 46-66.
    While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly few attempts to apply buck-passing analyses to specific normative domains such as aesthetics and epistemology. In particular, there have been very few works which have tried to provide complete and detailed buck-passing analyses of epistemic values and norms. These analyses are, however, both interesting and important. On the one hand, they can bring to the surface the advantages and difficulties of extending the buck-passing account to specific normative (...)
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  3.  42
    Epistemic Emotions: A Natural Kind?Anne Meylan - 2014 - Philosophical Inquiries 2 (1):173-190.
    The general aim of this article is to consider whether various affective phenomena – feelings like the feeling of knowing, of familiarity, of certainty, etc., but also phenomena like curiosity, interest, surprise and trust – which have been labelled “epistemic emotions” in fact constitute a unified kind, i.e., the kind of the so-called “epistemic emotions”. Obviously, for an affective phenomenon to belong to the kind of the epistemic emotions, it has to meet two conditions: it has to qualify, first, as (...)
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  4. A Virtue Epistemology. Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge - by E. Sosa. [REVIEW]Anne Meylan - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (1):85-89.
  5.  4
    Self-Deception: New Angles: Introduction.Anne Meylan - 2018 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (2):4-10.
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  6.  48
    The Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility.Anne Meylan - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4):4-28.
    We are occasionally responsible for our beliefs. But is this doxastic responsibility analogous to any non-attitudinal form of responsibility? What I shall call the consequential conception of doxastic responsibility holds that the kind of responsibility that we have for our beliefs is indeed analogous to the kind of responsibility that we have for the consequences of our actions. This article does two things, both with the aim of defending this somewhat unsophisticated but intuitive view of doxastic responsibility. First, it emphasizes (...)
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  7. The Hedonic Value of Justification.Olivier Massin & Anne Meylan - manuscript
    Our thesis is that there is a notion of justification, corresponding to the active exercise of a competence in order to attain truth, whose value is explained neither by reliabilism, nor by the usual versions of credit theory.
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  8.  17
    The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility.Anne Meylan - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):877-893.
    In several papers (2013, 2014, 2015) Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic responsibility, viz. our responsibility for our beliefs, is grounded in a specific form of reasons-responsiveness. The main purpose of this paper is to show that a subject’s belief can be responsive to reasons in this specific way without the subject being responsible for her belief. While this specific form of reasons-responsiveness might be necessary, it is not sufficient for doxastic responsibility.
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  9.  98
    The Value Problem of Knowledge.Anne Meylan - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):261-275.
    The value problem of knowledge is one of the prominent problems that philosophical accounts of knowledge are expected to solve. According to the creditsolution, a well-known solution to this problem, knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because the former is creditable to a subject’s cognitive competence. But what is “credit value”? How does it connect to the already existing distinctions between values? The purpose of the present paper is to answer these questions. Its most important conclusion is that (...)
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  10.  48
    The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility and the Basing Relation.Anne Meylan - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):877-893.
    In several papers Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic responsibility, viz. our responsibility for our beliefs, is grounded in a specific form of reasons-responsiveness. The main purpose of this paper is to show that a subject’s belief can be responsive to reasons in this specific way without the subject being responsible for her belief. While this specific form of reasons-responsiveness might be necessary, it is not sufficient for doxastic responsibility.
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  11.  19
    The Value Problem of Knowledge. Against a Reliabilist Solution.Anne Meylan - 2007 - Proceedings of the Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy:85-92.
    A satisfying theory of knowledge has to explain why knowledge seems to be better than mere true belief. In this paper, I try to show that the best reliabilist explanation (ERA+) is still not able to solve this problem. According to an already elaborated answer (ERA), it is better to possess knowledge that p because this makes likely that one’s future belief of a similar kind will also be true. I begin with a metaphysical comment which gives birth to ERA (...)
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  12.  32
    In Support of the Knowledge-First Conception of the Normativity of Justification.Anne Meylan - 2017 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 246-258.
    The knowledge-first solution to the New Evil Demon Problem (NEDP) goes hand in hand with a particular conception of the normativity of justification, one according to which a justified belief is one that satisfies some sort of ought or should (Williamson forthcoming). This claim is incompatible with another, well accepted, view that regards the normativity of justification. According to this established view, a justified belief is rather something that is neither obligatory, nor forbidden (see e.g. Alston 1989, 1993, 2006; Ginet (...)
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  13.  14
    Justification et rationalité des émotions.Anne Meylan - 2018 - Philosophiques 45 (2):477-487.
    A la manière des expériences perceptuelles qui nous présentent des formes, des couleurs, des sons, des textures, etc. les émotions nous présentent des propriétés évaluatives. Ainsi, les émotions constituent un type d’expérience perceptuelle spécifique, un type qui nous donne accès à des valeurs (plutôt qu’à des propriétés non axiologiques). Cette théorie d’origine meinongienne doit beaucoup Christine Tappolet qui y consacre un second livre Emotions, Values and Agency que tous les amoureux des choses vraiment bien faites ne pourront qu’apprécier. Cet article (...)
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  14.  33
    Introduction.Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio & Anne Meylan - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1427-1431.
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  15.  19
    Rationalité et affectivité des intuitions.Anne Meylan - 2017 - Philosophiques 44 (1):31-47.
    Cette contribution a deux objectifs principaux. Le premier est de montrer que les intuitions sont caractérisées par ce que j’appellerai « une capacité rationnelle », c’est-à-dire, qu’elles sont susceptibles d’être évaluées quant à leur rationalité ou leur irrationalité. Le second objectif de cet article est d’étayer l’hypothèse selon laquelle les intuitions seraient des états affectifs proches des émotions — et non pas des états doxastiques ou des expériences perceptuelles —, en montrant qu’une telle conception affective des intuitions est seule capable (...)
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  16. The Pluralism of Justification.Anne Meylan - 2017 - In Nikolaj Jang Pedersen & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism. New York, État de New York, États-Unis: pp. 129-142.
    This article argues that “justification” denotes distinct technical properties in contemporary epistemology. It is structured as follows. Section 1 spells out a distinction between two ways of tackling the traditional question: “what is a justified belief?”. Sections 2 and 3 exploit some of the upshots of section 1 in order to show that classical reliabilism, accessibilism and presumably many other accounts of justification use the predicate “justified” in distinct technical ways. As we shall see, the careful vindication of the latter (...)
     
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  17.  51
    Epistemic Circularity and the Problem of Cheap Credit.Anne Meylan - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (3):327-340.
    Abstract This article raises a worry concerning Ernest Sosa's way of solving the problem of epistemic circularity. Sosa's solution to the problem of epistemic circularity relies on the following claim of sufficiency: for S to deserve to be credited for his true belief, it is sufficient that his belief is, in a sense to be made clear, ?apt?. I argue that this solution undersells the notion of credit. I present three kinds of cases in which the attribution of credit to (...)
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  18.  21
    Introduction: The Providential Bad Luck of Justification.Anne Meylan - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):483-491.
  19. Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio & Anne Meylan (eds.) - 2014 - University of Geneva.
  20. Aristote chez les Helvètes: Douze essais de métaphysique helvétique.Olivier Massin & Anne Meylan (eds.) - 2014 - Ithaque.
    À l’origine de la philosophie comme des sciences, il y a, selon Aristote, « l’étonnement de ce que les choses sont ce qu’elles sont ». Nul doute qu’Aristote aurait trouvé en Suisse maints sujets d’étonnement. Qu’est-ce qu’une vache ? Qu’est-ce qu’une montagne ? Qu’est-ce que le Röstigraben ? Qu’est-ce qu’une fondue ? Qu’est-ce qu’un trou dans l’emmental ? Qu’est-ce que l’argent ? Qu’est-ce qu’une banque ? Qu’est-ce qu’une confédération ? Qu’est-ce qu’une horloge ? Qui est Roger Federer ? Qu’est-ce qu’est (...)
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  21.  14
    Foundations of an Ethics of Belief.Anne Meylan - 2013 - De Gruyter.
    In the course of our daily lives we make lots of evaluations of actions. We think that driving above the speed limit is dangerous, that giving up one’s bus seat to the elderly is polite, that stirring eggs with a plastic spoon is neither good nor bad. We understand too that we may be praised or blamed for actions performed on the basis of these evaluations. The same is true in the case of certain beliefs. Sometimes we blame people for (...)
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  22. Knowledge is Extrinsically Apt Belief. Virtue-Epistemology and the Temporal Objection.Anne Meylan - forthcoming - In Chris Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue Epistemology. Cambridge, Royaume-Uni:
    According to Sosa’s virtue epistemological account, an instance of (animal) knowledge is a belief that instantiates the property of being apt. The purpose of this contribution is, first, to show why this claim is, without further clarification, problematic. Briefly, an instance of knowledge cannot be identified to an apt belief because beliefs are states and aptness is a property that only actions —and no states— can exemplify. Second, I present the metaphysical amendment that the tenants of virtue epistemology can adopt (...)
     
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  23. L'intéressant.Anne Meylan - 2017 - In Julien Deonna & Emma Tieffenbach (eds.), Petit dictionnaire des valeurs. Paris, France: Ithaque. pp. 178-186.
  24. Le contrôle des croyances: une défense de la conception déontologique de la justification.Anne Meylan - 2008 - Klesis 9:129-136.
  25. L’évaluation de l’auto duperie : Butler, Clifford et la philosophie contemporaine.Anne Meylan - 2018 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 143:357-370.
  26. La justification des croyances testimoniales: le malentendu.Anne Meylan - 2014 - In Jean-Marie Chevalier & Benoît Gaultier (eds.), Connaître. Questions d'épistémologie contemporaine. pp. 231-252.
    Ce chapitre discute de la justification des croyances testimoniales, c’est-à-dire de la justification des croyances que nous adoptons en nous appuyant sur le témoignage d’autrui. Plus précisément, la question à laquelle cette contribution s’intéresse est celle des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes de la justification des croyances testimoniales. Il y a deux manières classiques, et soi-disant antagonistes, d’y répondre: la réponse réductionnisme et la réponse non-réductionniste. L’objectif de ce chapitre est d’une part de présenter ces deux réponses, d’autre part, d’expliquer pourquoi (...)
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  27. La justification des croyances. Mentalisme, accessibilisme et déontologisme.Anne Meylan - 2012 - Repha 5:1-13.
    L’objectif de cet article est de clarifier les relations qu’entretiennent trois théories de la justification des croyances, toutes considérées comme des théories internalistes 1 : la conception déontique (le déontologisme), la conception accessibiliste (l’accessibilisme) et la conception mentaliste (le mentalisme). Nous expliquerons qu’en dépit de ce que l’on pourrait penser à première vue l’adoption de l’accessibilisme n’implique pas celle du mentalisme. Dans un second temps, nous montrerons pourquoi on ne peut être un défenseur de la conception déontique de la justification (...)
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  28. La métaphysique, c’est la science de l’être en tant qu’être, ou bien?Anne Meylan & Olivier Massin - 2014 - In Massin Olivier & Meylan Anne (eds.), Aristote chez les Helvètes. Douze essais de métaphysique helvétique. Ithaque. pp. 1-3.
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  29. Qu'est-ce que la justification?Anne Meylan - 2015 - Vrin.
    Il existe plusieurs façons de mettre en doute ce que nous tenons pour vrai, c’est-à-dire ce que nous croyons. Tout d’abord, nous pouvons, évidemment, nous demander si ces croyances sont vraies. Une autre manière cruciale d’évaluer le mérite de nos croyances consiste à nous interroger sur leur justification. Autrement dit, quelle que soit leur vérité ou leur fausseté, sommes-nous justifiés à entretenir les croyances en question? Et, plus fondamentalement, qu’est-ce qu’être justifié à croire? Dans Qu’est-ce que la justification?, je tente (...)
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  30. Responsabilité de croire et impossibilité de croire à volonté.Anne Meylan - 2013 - In Laurent Jaffro (ed.), Croit-on comme on veut? Histoire d'une controverse. Collection: Analyse et Philosophie. Vrin. pp. 223-239.
    Sommes-nous, au moins occasionnellement, responsables de nos croyances ? Une chose est sûre, en pratique, nous considérons souvent que tel est le cas. Mais l’attribution d’une telle responsabilité est problématique dans la mesure où les croyances ne sont pas des états mentaux que nous contrôlons comme nous contrôlons, par exemple, nos actions. Cet article est consacré à préciser, à expliquer et à défendre l’affirmation selon laquelle les croyances ne sont pas des états mentaux que nous pouvons acquérir « à volonté (...)
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  31. Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Practical Stance.Anne Meylan - forthcoming - Brill Studies in Skepticism.
    That we have practical reasons to believe certain propositions even if sceptical arguments are cogent is nothing new. As Hume puts it, if sceptical principles were steadily accepted, “men would remain in a total lethargy until their miserable lives came to an end through lack of food, drink and shelter.” (Enquiry, 12, 2). This heart-breaking projection fails to move contemporary epistemologists who, for the most part, brush off pragmatist stances on scepticism. In this paper, I argue that the pragmatist stance (...)
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  32. The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought.Anne Meylan - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain & S. Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, État de New York, États-Unis:
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  33. Virtue-Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge: Classical and New Problems.Anne Meylan - 2018 - In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. New York, État de New York, États-Unis: Routledge. pp. 317-329.
    This first part of this chapter presents the virtue-reliabilist answer to the classical value problems of knowledge. According to this solution, the reason why knowledge is a better cognitive state than what falls short of it —viz. mere true and true+Gettierized beliefs— is as follows: when a subject knows, she deserves credit for her true belief. The second part of this chapter is devoted to showing that this solution cannot be extended to solve the " new " value problem, that (...)
     
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