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Anne Sophie Meincke (Spann)
University of Southampton
  1. Persons as Biological Processes: A Bio-Processual Way Out of the Personal Identity Dilemma.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2018 - In Daniel J. Nicholson & John Dupre (eds.), Everything Flows. Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology. Oxford, UK: pp. 357-378.
    Human persons exist longer than a single moment in time; they persist through time. However, so far it has not been possible to make this natural and widespread assumption metaphysically comprehensible. The philosophical debate on personal identity is rather stuck in a dilemma: reductionist theories explain personal identity away, while non-reductionist theories fail to give any informative account at all. This chapter argues that this dilemma emerges from an underlying commitment, shared by both sides of in the debate, to an (...)
     
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  2. Human Persons – A Process View.Anne Sophie Meincke - forthcoming - In Jörg Ulrich Noller (ed.), Was sind und wie existieren Personen? Münster, Germany: pp. 53-76.
    What are persons and how do they exist? The predominant answer to this question in Western metaphysics is that persons, human and others, are, and exist as, substances, i.e., ontologically independent, well-demarcated things defined by an immutable (usually mental) essence. Change, on this view, is not essential for a person's identity; it is in fact more likely to be detrimental to it. In this chapter I want to suggest an alternative view of human persons which is motivated by an appreciation (...)
     
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  3.  9
    Autopoiesis, Biological Autonomy and the Process View of Life.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-16.
    In recent years, an increasing number of theoretical biologists and philosophers of biology have been opposing reductionist research agendas by appealing to the concept of biological autonomy which draws on the older concept of autopoiesis. In my paper, I investigate some of the ontological implications of this approach. The emphasis on autonomy and autopoiesis, together with the associated idea of organisational closure, might evoke the impression that organisms are to be categorised ontologically as substances: ontologically independent, well-individuated, discrete particulars. However, (...)
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  4. Auf dem Kampfplatz der Metaphysik. Kritische Studien zur transtemporalen Identität von Personen.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2015 - Mentis.
    In this monograph, I systematically analyse the debate in recent analytic metaphysics, with a special focus on recent biologically inspired (so-called animalist) theories of personal identity. I argue that the debate is stuck in a dilemma which is neither harmless nor new: the modern antagonism between the reductionist elimination of personal identity on the one hand and its non-reductionist mystification on the other rather repeats the antagonism between rationalist dogmatism and empirical scepticism in the 18th century’s debates on the soul. (...)
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  5. Bio-Agency and the Possibility of Artificial Agents.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2018 - In Alexander Christian, David Hommen, Nina Retzlaff & Gerhard Schurz (eds.), Philosophy of Science - Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities. Selected Papers from the 2016 conference of the German Society of Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Netherlands: pp. 65-93.
    Within the philosophy of biology, recently promising steps have been made towards a biologically grounded concept of agency. Agency is described as bio-agency: the intrinsically normative adaptive behaviour of human and non-human organisms, arising from their biological autonomy. My paper assesses the bio-agency approach by examining criticism recently directed by its proponents against the project of embodied robotics. Defenders of the bio-agency approach have claimed that embodied robots do not, and for fundamental reasons cannot, qualify as artificial agents because they (...)
     
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  6.  39
    The Disappearance of Change: Towards a Process Account of Persistence.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (1):12-30.
    This paper aims to motivate a new beginning in metaphysical thinking about persistence by drawing attention to the disappearance of change in current accounts of persistence. I defend the claim that the debate is stuck in a dilemma which results from neglecting the constructive role of change for persistence. Neither of the two main competing views, perdurantism and endurantism, captures the idea of persistence as an identity through time. I identify the fundamental ontological reasons for this, namely the shared commitment (...)
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  7.  41
    Autopoiesis, Biological Autonomy and the Process View of Life.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):5.
    In recent years, an increasing number of theoretical biologists and philosophers of biology have been opposing reductionist research agendas by appealing to the concept of biological autonomy which draws on the older concept of autopoiesis. In my paper, I investigate some of the ontological implications of this approach. The emphasis on autonomy and autopoiesis, together with the associated idea of organisational closure, might evoke the impression that organisms are to be categorised ontologically as substances: ontologically independent, well-individuated, discrete particulars. However, (...)
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  8. Personale Identität Ohne Persönlichkeit? Anmerkungen Zu Einem Vernachlässigten Zusammenhang.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2016 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 123 (1):114-145.
    Recent decades have seen an increasing tendency to exclude the phenomenon of personality from the metaphysical investigation of personal identity. We are advised not to confuse personal identity as a philosophical subject, namely as the metaphysical issue of specifying what it is that makes a person staying numerically self-identical over time, with the psychological question of 'personal identity' which asks what makes someone the individual person they are with their particular character and history. However, one might be unsatisfied with this. (...)
     
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  9.  16
    Derek M. Jones, The Biological Foundations of Action. [REVIEW]Anne Sophie Meincke - 2018 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 40 (2):36.
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  10. Körper oder Organismus? Eric T. Olsons Cartesianismusvorwurf gegen das Körperkriterium transtemporaler personaler Identität.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2010 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 117 (1):88-120.
    Eric Olson distinguishes his animalistic account of transtemporal personal identity from the apparently similar Bodily Criterion, among other things, by accusing the latter of being contaminated with Cartesian implications owing to its usage of the term ‚body‘. In contrast, Olson argues, Animalism is able to avoid these implications by substituting the concept of body for the concept of organism, which makes Animalism not only a distinct position, but also the better alternative to the Bodily Criterion. The paper critically reconstructs Olson’s (...)
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  11. Adorno und Descartes, programmatisch versöhnt: Der wissenschaftliche Essay als Form.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2009 - Merkur. Deutsche Zeitschrift Für Europäisches Denken 63 (11):1077-1081.
    In his famous essay „Der Essay als Form“ („The Essay as Form"), Adorno accuses Descartes of committing science to the ideal of absolute certainty (“zweifelsfreie Gewissheit”), thereby preluding the modern organized science (“organisierte Wissenschaft”), which in Adorno’s view has become alienated from real intellectual experience (“geistige Erfahrung”). In my essay, I criticize Adorno’s critique, showing that what Descartes in fact thinks about task and method of science comes much closer to the programmatical essayism of Critical Theory than Adorno supposed.
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  12. Bio-agency: Können Organismen handeln?Anne Sophie Meincke - 2014 - In Meincke & Daniel Wehinger (eds.), Vermögen und Handlung. Der dispositionale Realismus und unser Selbstverständnis als Handelnde. Münster, Germany: pp. 191-224.
  13. Dispositionalism: Between Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science.Anne Sophie Meincke - forthcoming - In Meincke (ed.), Dispositionalism. Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Netherlands:
    According to dispositional realism, or dispositionalism, the entities inhabiting our world possess irreducibly dispositional properties – often called ‘powers’ – by means of which they are sources of change. Dispositionalism has become increasingly popular among metaphysicians in the last three decades as it offers a realist account of causation and provides novel avenues for understanding modality, laws of nature, agency, free will and other key concepts in metaphysics. At the same time, dispositionalism is receiving growing interest among philosophers of science. (...)
     
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  14. Dualität im Horizont des Physischen. Thomas Buchheims ‘horizontaler Dualismus’ als Antwort auf das Problem mentaler Verursachung.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2013 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 120 (1):142-151.
    Can mental causation be naturalised without being eliminated? Thomas Buchheim argues that it can, proposing a neo-Aristotelian account dubbed "Horizontal Dualism". In this paper I assess this proposal. This article is part of a series of articles commenting on Thomas Buchheim's target article "Neuronenfeuer und seelische Tat. Ein neoaristotelischer Vorschlag zum Verständnis mentaler Kausalität", published in Philosophisches Jahrbuch 119,2 (2012), 332-346. The article was reprinted in: Mentale Verursachung [Mental Causation], ed. by Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, (Jahrbuch-Kontroversen 1), Freiburg: Alber, 2014.
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  15. Dispositionalism. Perspectives From Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science.Anne Sophie Meincke - forthcoming - Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.
    According to dispositional realism, or dispositionalism, the entities inhabiting our world possess irreducibly dispositional properties – often called ‘powers’ – by means of which they are sources of change. Dispositionalism has become increasingly popular among metaphysicians in the last three decades as it offers a realist account of causation and provides novel avenues for understanding modality, laws of nature, agency, free will and other key concepts in metaphysics. At the same time, it is receiving growing interest among philosophers of science. (...)
     
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  16. Endlichkeit ohne Unendlichkeit? Anmerkungen zu Heideggers Wegkreuzung mit Hegel im Seinsproblem.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2012 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 119 (2):283-316.
    In destructing traditional metaphysics, Heidegger accuses German Idealism of eliminating the finite in favour of the infinite. Particularly Hegel is criticized for ignoring the true finitude of Dasein and thereby misinterpreting being as infinite absolute. The paper explores this criticism in three steps. First, the main features of Heidegger’s early metaphysics of finite Dasein as developed in Being and Time will be traced, followed, second, by an examination of Heidegger’s claim that Hegel’s absolute has a temporal-finite origin. Taking a closer (...)
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  17. Haben menschliche Embryonen eine Disposition zur Personalität?Anne Sophie Meincke - 2018 - In Markus Rothhaar, Martin Hähnel & Roland Kipke (eds.), Der manipulierbare Embryo. Münster, Germany: pp. 147-171.
    Do human embryos have a disposition to personhood? This has been argued within recent attempts to reformulate the classical argument from potentiality for the protection of human embryos with the help of the concept of disposition. In this paper, I analyse the central ontological premise of this new approach and show that any hopes of rehabilitating in dispositionalist terms the idea of a potential to personhood inherent in human embryos are mistaken. The dispositionalist version of the potentiality argument navigates in (...)
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  18. Michael Quante, Person (Grundthemen Philosophie). [REVIEW]Anne Sophie Meincke - 2009 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 116:221-225.
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  19. Ohne Metaphysik, bitte!? Transtemporale personale Identität als praktische Wirklichkeit (Without Metaphysics?! Transtemporal Personal Identity as Practical Reality).Anne Sophie Meincke - 2013 - In Georg Gasser & Martina Schmidhuber (eds.), Personale Identität, Narrativität und praktische Rationalität. Münster, Germany: pp. 241-265.
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  20. Cordula Brand, Personale Identität oder menschliche Persistenz? Ein naturalistisches Kriterium. [REVIEW]Anne Sophie Meincke - 2012 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 119:418-424.
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  21. Powers, Persistence and Process.Anne Sophie Meincke - forthcoming - In Meincke (ed.), Dispositionalism. Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Netherlands:
    Stephen Mumford has argued that dispositionalists ought to be endurantists because perdurantism, by breaking down persisting objects in sequences of static discrete existents, is at odds with a powers metaphysics. This has been contested by Neil Williams who offers his own version of ‘powerful’ perdurance where powers function as links between the temporal parts of persisting objects. Weighing up the arguments given by both sides, I show that the profile of ‘powerful’ persistence crucially depends on how one conceptualises the processes (...)
     
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  22. Potentialität und Disposition in der Diskussion über den Status des menschlichen Embryos: Zur Ontologie des Potentialitätsarguments.Anne Sophie Meincke - 2015 - Philosophisches Jahrbuch 122 (2):271-303.
    The argument from potentiality for embryo protection relies on the assumption of a specific developmental potential of human embryos: as human embryos under normal conditions naturally developing into beings whose strong moral status is uncontroversial, namely into human persons, they likewise enjoy strong moral status. In my paper, I endeavour to spell out the ontological foundations of the argument from potentiality and to discuss them critically in the light of new empirical findings in embryology. Particular attention is hereby paid to (...)
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  23. Persönlichkeit und personale Identität. Zur Fragwürdigkeit eines substanztheoretischen Vorurteils (Personality and Personal Identity. On a Dubious Substance Ontological Prejudice).Anne Sophie Meincke - 2014 - In Orsolya Friedrich & Michael Zichy (eds.), Persönlichkeit. Neurowissenschaftliche und neurophilosophische Fragestellungen. Münster, Germany: pp. 163-187.
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  24. Substanz, Relation oder beides: Augustinus und Heidegger zur Frage ‘Was sind Personen?’ (Substance, Relation or Both: Augustine and Heidegger on the Question ‘What are Persons?’).Anne Sophie Meincke - 2012 - Crossing Borders. Grenzen (Über)Denken. Beiträge Zum 9. Internationalen Kongress der Österreichischen Gesellschaft Für Philosophie in Wien.
    What are persons? There are two traditional answers: the relation model of person according to which a person is nothing more than a function of her relationships to other persons and the substance model which construes the person as persisting independently of relations and accidental properties. In my paper, I explore two interesting intersections of these models occurring in Augustine's speculative doctrine of trinity and in Heidegger’s early Theory of Dasein. Are Augustine’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of person convincing reconciliations of (...)
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  25. Von der Wirklichkeit des Wirklichen. Eine kritische Verteidigung der Metaphysik als philosophischer Disziplin (On the Reality of the Real: A Critical Defence of Metaphysics as a Philosophical Discipline).Anne Sophie Meincke - 2017 - In Christopher Erhard, David Meißner & Jörg Ulrich Noller (eds.), Wozu Metaphysik? Historisch-systematische Perspektiven. Freiburg, Germany: pp. 96-130.
    What is metaphysics? And what do we need it for? In this paper I argue that if we answer the first question appropriately, the second question becomes pointless. To understand what metaphysics is means to understand what it is for. I shall propose that metaphysics, as a philosophical discipline, is the addressing of reality with respect to the intelligibility of reality as a whole and, i.e., the addressing of reality's being-addressed in various contexts (everyday and scientific). Insofar as reason is (...)
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