This essay aims at defining to what extent our friends are involved in our personal identity. Our thesis is that friends share a common identity which occupies a larger or smaller part of their personal identity, depending on the depth of their relationship. Yet, friendship does not merely consists in the shaping of ourselves: as it appears more obvious, we remain separate entities and my friend can help me in the understanding of my own self thanks to what he has (...) learnt in our intimate and long-lasting relationship. The other consequence of this individuation is that friendship is based on a metaphysical desire which cannot be fulfilled: I will never be able to feel exactly what my friend feels, even if I rationally come close to it by sharing his life. (shrink)
Is there a link between how a firm manages its internal and external stakeholders? More specifically, are firms that give employees stock ownership and more say in running the enterprise more likely to engage with external stakeholders? This study seeks to answer these questions by elaborating on mechanisms that link employees to external stakeholders, such as the community, suppliers, and the environment. It tests these relationships using a sample of 347 private, mostly small-to-medium size firms, which completed a stakeholder impact (...) assessment organized by the non-profit B Lab. The results support the hypotheses that both employee ownership and employee involvement are positively associated with external stakeholder engagement. Further, we found that certification plays a role, as employee ownership contributes to external stakeholder engagement only in certified B Corporations, and not in firms that merely completed the B Lab Impact assessment. Our findings have import for stakeholder engagement frameworks, as we show that there is interplay between internal employee stakeholders and external stakeholders that may be important to overall firm–stakeholder management. (shrink)
Quel est le destin de toute traduction appliquée au texte biblique, compte tenu de l’organisation de la langue hébraïque selon le principe de « davar »? En effet, la Bible, en tant que poème, fait intervenir le langage créateur, lequel ne peut d’aucune manière être traduit. Quelle perte, ou quel gain, faut-il alors mettre en œuvre pour transmettre l’intraduisible, de telle sorte que la traduction se fasse transmission de l’intraduisible?
Les titres donnés à la parabole de Luc 15,11-32 évoquent le plus souvent l’un de ses personnages, le fils cadet. Les deux frères ont cependant chacun leur importance. L’élément inattendu du récit n’est ni le retour du cadet ni l’accueil qui lui est fait. Les v. 12-24, centrés sur lui, ont suscité l’empathie du lecteur et certains acquis de lecture l’ont préparé à cet accueil. La surprise du récit se trouve dans l’intervention du fils aîné: son arrivée et le sommaire (...) du v. 27 révèlent le décalage entre cette fête et celles évoquées au début du chapitre 15: la thématique ‘perdu / trouvé’ et la dimension collective de la fête ont ici disparu. Alors que l’aîné est pris dans une logique de rétribution, le père évoque la fraternité en plus de la filiation, le basculement de valeurs en plus de la rétribution. L’irruption du fils aîné, en provoquant un décalage entre l’attente du lecteur et la situation racontée, est l’occasion de réaffirmer l’importance du retournement provoqué par «trouvé / perdu». Ce changement-là permet d’entrer dans la vraie joie, celle du royaume. Le retour du cadet n’est donc pas ce qui exclut l’aîné de la fête, mais au contraire ce qui permet la fête, et permet à l’aîné d’y être invité. (shrink)
Anne Conway rejects the view that creatures are essentially members of any natural kind more specific than the kind 'creature'. That is, she rejects essentialism about species membership. This chapter provides an analysis of one of Anne Conway's arguments against such essentialism, which (as I argue) is drawn from metaethical rather than metaphysical premises. In her view, if a creature's species or kind were inscribed in its essence, that essence would constitute a limit on the creature's potential to participate in (...) the divine good. It is this consideration that ultimately leads her to reject essentialism about species membership. The chapter concludes with an examination of some of the metaethical consequences of Conway's view as well as a lesson it can teach us about ideal adviser accounts of the good. (shrink)
In chapter IX of the Principles, Anne Conway claims that her metaphysics is diametrically opposed to those of Descartes and Spinoza. Scholars have analyzed her rejection of Cartesianism, but not her critique of Spinoza. This paper proposes that two central points of Conway’s metaphysics can be understood as direct responses to Spinoza: (1) the relation between God, Christ, and the creatures in the tripartite division of being, and (2) the individuation of beings in the lowest species. I will argue that (...) Conway, in criticizing Spinoza’s identification between God and nature, defends a paradoxical monism, and that her concept of individuation is a reductio ad absurdum of Spinoza’s criterion of identity in the individuation of finite modes. (shrink)
In her book, Moral Status, Mary Anne Warren defends a comprehensive theory of the moral status of various entities. Under this theory, she argues that animals may have some moral rights but that their rights are much weaker in strength than the rights of humans, who have rights in the fullest, strongest sense. Subsequently, Warren believes that our duties to animals are far weaker than our duties to other humans. This weakness is especially evident from the fact that Warren believes (...) that it is frequently permissible for humans to kill animals for food. Warren’s argument for her view consists primarily in the belief that we have inevitable practical conflicts with animals that make it impossible to grant them equal rights without sacrificing basic human interests. However, her arguments fail to justify her conclusions. In particular, Warren fails to justify her beliefs that animals do not have an equal right to life and that it is permissible for humans to kill animals for food. (shrink)
This article deals with the impact of governmental assistance on insurance demand under ambiguity, i.e., in situations where probabilities are uncertain. First, using a model of insurance demand under ambiguity, we derive theoretical predictions about the impact of several governmental assistance programmes on optimal insurance demand. For example, governmental assistance through a fixed public support scheme implies that partial insurance is always optimal under fair insurance with ambiguity. Second, we present the results of an experiment designed to test these predictions. (...) We find support for several of our theoretical predictions. For example, the presence of governmental assistance through a fixed public support scheme decreases individuals’ willingness to pay to be fully insured. Finally, we compare these results with those obtained for a risk situation. We find that, regardless of the form of governmental assistance, participants in the ambiguity context are consistently willing to pay more to be fully insured than participants in the risk situation. (shrink)
A scholarly edition of letters by Anne, Viscountess Conway, Henry More, and their friends. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.
This essay provides some historical background for, and considers the philosophical importance of, the collection of Anne Berkeley’s letters to Adam Gordon. The primary philosophical significance of the letters is her arguments against the so-called “free thinkers.” She discusses the philosophical view and the behavior of five prominent free-thinkers: Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Hume. Her discussion of Shaftesbury is particularly illuminating and can be read as a commentary on Alciphron III.13-14. Because the work of the other four were published (...) mainly after the Bishop’s death, the letters also show Anne ’s independent lifelong interest in matters theological, philosophical, and moral. (shrink)
ABSTRACTWhat follows is an interview with William Damon and Anne Colby, pioneers in the fields of moral psychology and education. Throughout their careers, they have studied, moral identity, moral ideals, positive youth development, purpose, good work, vocation, character development in higher education, and professional responsibility. In their words, they are interested in the ‘best of humankind’—not only the competencies, but also the character necessary for living a good life—not only for the sake of the individual, but also for society. They (...) have received numerous academic and civic awards and honors. Their publications include Some Do Care, Greater Expectations, Educating Citizens, The Path to Purpose, and most recently, The Power of Ideals—in addition to editing, for example, New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development and The Handbook of Child Psychology. As a married couple, their vocational journeys have mostly been separate, but have always complemented each other and sometimes converged. This interview asks about reflections on their careers, their own sense of purpose, their greatest contributions, current needs in our field, and advice to emerging scholars. (shrink)
American Indian Thought is a contemporary collection of twenty-two essays written by Indigenous persons with Western philosophical training, all attempting to formulate, and/or contribute to a sub-discipline of, a Native American Philosophy. The contributors come from diverse tribal, educational, philosophical, methodological, etc., backgrounds, and there is some tension among aspects of the collection, but what is more striking is the harmony and the singularity of the collection’s intent. Part of this singularity may derive from the solidarity among its authors. In (...) addition to the fact that all belong to Indigenous tribes, there is also a striking sensitivity to the interconnection between distinct Western disciplines—particularly between philosophy and poetry. I take the latter to be a thread which can be strategically woven into the center of the anthology’s weave. In this book discussion, I aim to draw out the poetic aspects of five of the anthology’s essays, which deal with philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and aesthetics, respectively. In this way, I hope to illuminate a poetic quality at the heart of the collection, and thus also of the burgeoning field of Native American or Indigenous philosophy in general. In the process, I will also consider ways in which Indigenous philosophy resonates with the Western philosophical traditions of phenomenology and American pragmatism. With the latter tradition in particular this connection has become more fully appreciated, especially through the work of Bruce Wilshire and Scott Pratt. (shrink)
ABSTRACTMany scholars have drawn attention to the way that elements of Anne Conway’s system anticipate ideas found in Leibniz. This paper explores the relationship between Conway and Leibniz’s work with regard to time, space, and process. It argues – against existing scholarship – that Conway is not a proto-Leibnizian relationist about time or space, and in fact her views lie much closer to those of Henry More; yet Conway and Leibniz agree on the primacy of process. This exploration advances our (...) understanding of Conway’s system, and the intellectual relationships between Conway, More, and Leibniz. (shrink)
In the contemporary debate on moral status, it is not uncommon to find philosophers who embrace the the Principle of Full Moral Status, according to which the degree to which an entity E possesses moral status is proportional to the degree to which E possesses morally relevant properties until a threshold degree of morally relevant properties possession is reached, whereupon the degree to which E possesses morally relevant properties may continue to increase, but the degree to which E possesses moral (...) status remains the same. One philosopher who has contributed significantly to the contemporary debate on moral status and embraces the Principle of Full Moral Status is Mary Anne Warren. Warren holds not only that it is possible for some entities to possess full moral status, but that some entities actually do, e.g., normal adult human beings. I argue that two of Warren’s primary arguments for the Principle of Full Moral Status—the Argument from Pragmatism and the Argument from Explanatory Power—are significantly flawed. (shrink)
So begins "For Anne Gregory," published by W. B. Yeats in 1933. It is surely one of his most charming poems.1 The poem's lilting rhythm and affectionate tone effectively soften—even disguise—what is arguably a dark and dismaying message. Anne is destined to be loved not for herself alone, but for an accidental physical attribute—her blond hair. Why do I claim that the poem's message is dark? Why should it dismay Anne if she is loved for the beauty of her hair? (...) Is that not better, after all, than not being loved in the first place? And what would it be to love Anne for herself "alone"? Love Anne for her sweet disposition; for her ability always to say the right thing; for her kindness; but for her yellow hair? .. (shrink)