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Annette Zimmermann
Princeton University
  1.  4
    The Historical Rawls: Introduction.Sophie Smith, Teresa M. Bejan & Annette Zimmermann - forthcoming - Modern Intellectual History:1-7.
    John Rawls and his work are now squarely a subject for history. In the more than fifteen years since his death, a rich body of scholarship has emerged which attempts, in different ways, to understand the nature, development, and impact of Rawls's thought from a variety of historical perspectives. With 2021 marking fifty years since A Theory of Justice was first published, this special forum examines what we here call the “historical Rawls.”.
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  2.  22
    Criminal Disenfranchisement and the Concept of Political Wrongdoing.Annette Zimmermann - 2019 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 47 (4):378-411.
    Disagreement persists about when, if at all, disenfranchisement is a fitting response to criminal wrongdoing of type X. Positive retributivists endorse a permissive view of fittingness: on this view, disenfranchising a remarkably wide range of morally serious criminal wrongdoers is justified. But defining fittingness in the context of criminal disenfranchisement in such broad terms is implausible, since many crimes sanctioned via disenfranchisement have little to do with democratic participation in the first place: the link between the nature of a criminal (...)
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  3.  9
    Democratic Enfranchisement Beyond Citizenship: The All-Affected Principle in Theory and Practice.Annette Zimmermann - 2018 - Dissertation, Oxford University
    This is a collection of four papers about the All-Affected Principle (AAP): the view that every person whose morally weighty interests are affected by a democratic decision has the right to participate in that decision. -/- The first paper (“Narrow Possibilism about Democratic Enfranchisement”) examines how we should distribute democratic participation rights: a plausible version of AAP must avoid treating unlike cases alike, which would be procedurally unfair. The solution is to distribute participation rights proportionately to the risk that a (...)
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  4. Economic Participation Rights and the All-Affected Principle.Annette Zimmermann - 2017 - Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 10 (2):1-21.
    The democratic boundary problem raises the question of who has democratic participation rights in a given polity and why. One possible solution to this problem is the all-affected principle, according to which a polity ought to enfranchise all persons whose interests are affected by the polity’s decisions in a morally significant way. While AAP offers a plausible principle of democratic enfranchisement, its supporters have so far not paid sufficient attention to economic participation rights. I argue that if one commits oneself (...)
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  5.  9
    Economic Participation Rights and the All-Affected Principle.Annette Zimmermann - 2018 - Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric 10 (2).
    The democratic boundary problem raises the question of who has democratic participation rights in a given polity and why. One possible solution to this problem is the all-affected principle, according to which a polity ought to enfranchise all persons whose interests are affected by the polity’s decisions in a morally significant way. While AAP offers a plausible principle of democratic enfranchisement, its supporters have so far not paid sufficient attention to economic participation rights. I argue that if one commits oneself (...)
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  6.  54
    Proceed with Caution.Annette Zimmermann & Chad Lee-Stronach - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy FirstView.
    It is becoming more common that the decision-makers in private and public institutions are predictive algorithmic systems, not humans. This article argues that relying on algorithmic systems is procedurally unjust in contexts involving background conditions of structural injustice. Under such nonideal conditions, algorithmic systems, if left to their own devices, cannot meet a necessary condition of procedural justice, because they fail to provide a sufficiently nuanced model of which cases count as relevantly similar. Resolving this problem requires deliberative capacities uniquely (...)
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