We present an implementation of a discourse parsing system for alexicalized Tree-Adjoining Grammar for discourse, specifying the integrationof sentence and discourse level processing. Our system is based on theassumption that the compositional aspects of semantics at thediscourse level parallel those at the sentence level. This coupling isachieved by factoring away inferential semantics and anaphoric features ofdiscourse connectives. Computationally, this parallelism is achievedbecause both the sentence and discourse grammar are LTAG-based and the sameparser works at both levels. The approach to an (...) LTAG for discourse has beendeveloped by Webber and colleagues in some recent papers. Our system takes a discourseas input, parses the sentences individually, extracts the basic discourseconstituent units from the sentence derivations, and reparses the discoursewith reference to the discourse grammar while using the same parser usedat the sentence level. (shrink)

Using the philosophy of non-duality as a framework, with a Foreword from Deepak Chopra, Anoop Kumar takes us on an exploration of identity. You are not who you think you are.

In his magnum opus, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (1989), Charles Taylor gives an exhaustive and teleologically interpretive history of the modern self. He, in fact, is in search of the core of the modern identity. By ‘identity’ Taylor means the ensemble of the understanding of what is to be a ‘human agent’, a ‘person’, a ‘self’. Taylor in generating the ontology of the self is greatly inspired by the understanding of Dasein in Heidegger. This paper (...) also focuses on how Taylor uses Heidegger’s hermeneutics of the self in several ways to give to modernity a base that is not Cartesian. Taylor’s central argument is ‘how the assertion of the modern individual has spawned an erroneous understanding (identity) of the self’, where one experiences a loss of horizon. He has turned our attention, more than anyone else, towards the communitarian constitution of the self, and pointed out the limitations of insights within liberal individualism. For Taylor, as for early Heidegger, the self is not neutral or atomic. The self exists only in terms of questions and constitutive concerns, and it is not amenable to arbitrary determination, but can be made sense of only in terms of its life as a whole at any moment. (shrink)

A preoccupation with technology has helped bury the philosophical question: What is the point of education? I attempt to answer this question. Various answers to the question are surveyed and it is shown that they depend upon different conceptions of the self. For example, the devotional-self of the 12th century (which was about becoming master of the self) gave way to the liberal-self (which was to facilitate social change). Education can only be satisfactorily justified, I argue, by appeal to transcendent (...) values such as mastery of the self, which is incipient in liberal education. (shrink)

Is it possible to found a Heideggerian ethic around the notion of a relationship to being (Bezug zum Seyn)? Going against much of the Western tradition, Gupta considers if the being-relationship could result in a feeling or mystical experience that is the basis of ethics. Along the way, such an affective and embodied approach to ethics brings us into dialogue with a range of thinkers, such as Kant and Schweitzer. Further, it is suggested that an environmental philosophy is consistent with (...) a Heideggerian ethics. Finally, recent research in the neurosciences is marshaled to at least show the plausibility of Heidegger's brand of moral realism as it is developed. (shrink)

My ultimate goal has always been to illuminate artistry at its greatest heights. Howard Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences provided a theoretical framework for his life-long study of creativity, especially in prodigies like Picasso.1 According to Gardner, Picasso was weak in the scholastics and strong in the spatial, bodily, and personal spheres, characterizing the artist even as “frankly sadistic.”2 And Gardner developed a general framework for understanding the prodigy in terms of one’s proclivity toward meta-cognition as well as other commonalities (...) related to intrapersonal and interpersonal relations in various ways: childlike, few friends, one-minded, productivity, sacrifice, episodic .. (shrink)

This article discusses the importance of human beings ‘material’ (matter) and ‘spiritual’ (spirit) advancement in Rammanohar Lohia’s concept of modernity and modern civilization. Lohia consistently defended materialism (reason) and spirituality as pivotal human values in his writing and speeches. This article engages with his ideas through a detailed reading of his works, focusing particularly on his essays: ‘Materiality and Spirituality’ and ‘Meaning of Modern Civilisation’. According to him, rational thinking emerges from materialism. He believed spiritual instinct keeps a check on (...) the malicious employment of rationality and science; similarly, rationality prevents the perversion of spirituality into superstition and dogmatism. This article articulates two aspects of interpreting modernity: first, it reframes the epistemological understanding of materialism and spirituality, challenging and clarifying prevailing misconceptions; second, it advocates a comprehensive reconstruction of Indian society, which we understand as praxis. His concept of modernity is an amalgamation of theory and praxis. Lohia unequivocally emphasizes that Indian society would reach the height of development by simultaneously engaging in the spiritual and material development of Indian civilization. (shrink)

And in general it is a sign of the man who knows and of the man who does not know that the former can teach, and therefore we think art more truly knowledge than experience is; for the artist can teach, and men of experience cannot. When pragmatism first gained favor in the early twentieth century, some British philosophers like Russell regarded it as evidencing their perception of America’s crude and enterprising spirit.1 The Imperial jab lay in this: that just (...) as business indicates the exchange of products and services to meet basic needs as well as others, for the pragmatist, knowledge is tied to social practices and instrumentality (that is, being able to effect changes in the world). The slight lies .. (shrink)

Contributed research papers presented at state level workshop under programme of the Department of Philosophy, University of Calcutta in 2010.

estimated surrogates for biodiversity. Using data setsfrom Quebec and Queensland, zve applied four methods to assess the extent to zvhich environmental surrogates can represent biodiversity components: (1) surrogacy graphs; (2) marginal representation plots; (3) Hamming distance function; and (4) Syj rala statistical test for..

Study of the educational philosophy of Sir Rabindranath Tagore, 1861-1941, and Shanti Niketan, West Bengal.

BackgroundStudies on different methods to supplement the traditional informed consent process have generated conflicting results. This study was designed to evaluate whether participants who received group counseling prior to administration of informed consent understood the key components of the study and the consent better than those who received individual counseling, based on the hypothesis that group counseling would foster discussion among potential participants and enhance their understanding of the informed consent.MethodsParents of children participating in a trial of nutritional supplementation were (...) randomized to receive either group counseling or individual counseling prior to administration of the informed consent. To assess the participant's comprehension, a structured questionnaire was administered approximately 48-72 hours afterwards by interviewers who were blinded to the allocation group of the respondents.ResultsA total of 128 parents were recruited and follow up was established with 118 (90.2%) for the study. All respondents were aware of their child's participation in a research study and the details of sample collection. However, their understanding of study purpose, randomization and withdrawal was poor. There was no difference in comprehension of key elements of the informed consent between the intervention and control arm.ConclusionsThe results suggest that the group counseling might not influence the overall comprehension of the informed consent process. Further research is required to devise better ways of improving participants' understanding of randomization in clinical trials.Trial RegistrationClinical Trial Registry - India (CTRI): CTRI/2009/091/000612. (shrink)

With the advent of the Human Genome Project there have been many claims for the genetic origins of complex human behavior including insanity, criminality, and intelligence. But what does it really mean to call something 'genetic'? This is the fundamental question that Sahotra Sarkar's book addresses. The author analyses the nature of reductionism in classical and molecular genetics. He shows that there are two radically different kinds of reductionist explanation: genetic reduction (as found in classical genetics) and physical reduction (...) (found in molecular genetics). This important book clarifies the meaning of the term 'genetic', shows how molecular studies have affected genetics, and provides the philosophical background necessary to understand the debates over the Human Genome Project. It will be of particular interest to professionals and students in the philosophy of science, the history of science, and the social studies of science, medicine, and technology. (shrink)

By now it has become commonplace to note that the early Carnap was strongly influenced by Kant and the neo-Kantianism of his day.1 As early as 1977 Haack noted some striking similarities between the Aufbau and the first Critique; since then, Haack’s observation has been underscored by documenting the explicit role of the neo-Kantians in Carnap’s early education and intellectual development.2 Whether or not Carnap in the Aufbau was at all interested in traditional empiricism, or even strongly influenced by Russell, (...) remains debatable.3 However, a decisive early influence of Kant cannot be persuasively denied. Nevertheless, Kant and the neo-Kantians do not comprise the whole story. An equally important influence on Carnap in Der Raum, though perhaps slightly less so in the Aufbau, was Husserl.4 This paper begins the project of tracing the precise extent and nature of that influence.KeywordsPhysical SpaceFormal SpaceLogical EmpiricismVienna CircleLogical SyntaxThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves. (shrink)

A natural realist approach to the philosophy of arithmetic is defended by way of considering and arguing against contemporary attempts to solve Paul Benacerraf's dilemma . The first horn of the dilemma concerns the existence of abstract mathematical objects, which seems necessitated by a desire for a unified semantics. Benacerraf adopts an extensional semantics whereby the reference of terms for natural numbers must be abstract objects. The second horn concerns a desirable causal constraint on knowledge, according to which "for X (...) to know that S is true requires some causal relation to obtain between X and the referents of the names, predicates, and quantifiers of S". Within the philosophical tradition, Benacerraf's dilemma crystallizes the tension between realists and empiricists . It is shown that natural realism and naturalism meet. ;Both horns of the dilemma are amended.objects are conceived along conceptualist lines such that their existence is not mind-independent. The causal constraint is refined by drawing upon the work of Mark Steiner . Natural realism is the notion that the truth-values of arithmetical statements are recognition-transcendent. Natural realism explains why one and only one arithmetic is applicable. It is in some sense discovered, which is captured by the idea that arithmetical statements have truth-values even if one is not able to adduce what they are. ;It is argued that with proper emendation, like that of Philip Kitcher , empiricism as envisioned by J. S. Mill is defensible. Furthermore, the epistemology of arithmetical knowledge is divided into two tiers. The first principles of arithmetic are acquired by causal interaction with physical objects. As Kitcher has shown, empiricism functions at the first-tier. The a priori is revised such that arithmetical knowledge generated from the first-tier is considered non-empirical. ;It is argued that pragmatists' indispensability argument, once qualified, allows that arithmetic's applicability is one reason to consider natural realism for that domain . Furthermore, this thesis provides a case where aspects of Hilary Putnam's early and later views are rendered consistent. By way of utilizing both Putnam's writing in favour of realism , and those that break with them , it is suggested that he should not have abandoned his earlier view. In a nutshell, the realization of knowledge can depend upon agents' values, methods, and so on, without forcing the abandonment of realism . Putnam's early view sets the criteria for when one can be a realist about a given domain. (shrink)

An attempt was made to show how we can plausibly commit to mathematical realism. For the purpose of illustration, a defence of natural realism for arithmetic was developed that draws upon the American pragmatist’s, Hillary Putnam’s, early and later writings. Natural realism is the idea that truth is recognition-transcendent and knowable. It was suggested that the natural realist should embrace, globally, what N. Tennant has identified as M-realism (Tennant 1997, 160). M-realism is the idea that one rejects bivalence and assents (...) to the recognition-transcendent requirement. It was argued that over-all—for all domains—the natural realist should be a M-realist, with the aim of clarifying the realist debate for arithmetic. (shrink)

Study on religious and social values of people as influenced by the philosophical views of Ramakrishna, 1836-1886 in his time.

Maynard Smith’s defenses of adaptationism and of the value of optimization theory in evolutionary biology are both criticized. His defense does not adequately respond to the criticism of adaptationism by Gould and Lewontin. It is also argued here that natural selection cannot be interpreted as an optimization process if the objective function to be optimized is either (i) interpretable as a fitness, or (ii) correlated with the mean population fitness. This result holds even if fitnesses are frequency-independent; the problem is (...) further exacerbated in the frequency-dependent context modeled by evolutionary game theory. However, Eshel and Feldman’s new results on “long-term” evolution may provide some hope for the continuing relevance of the game-theoretic framework. These arguments also demonstrate the irrelevance of attempts by Intelligent Design creationists to use computational limits on optimization algorithms as evidence against evolutionary theory. It is pointed out that adaptation, natural selection, and optimization are not equivalent processes in the context of biological evolution. (shrink)

The first in-depth reference to the field that combines scientific knowledge with philosophical inquiry, this encyclopedia brings together a team of leading scholars to provide nearly 150 entries on the essential concepts in the philosophy of science. The areas covered include biology, chemistry, epistemology and metaphysics, physics, psychology and mind, the social sciences, and key figures in the combined studies of science and philosophy. (Midwest).

Philosophers are drawn to the Atomic Theory like a dog to an old shoe, but my results about realism and anti-realism in Tracking Truth, and the distinctive position I have carved out on their basis, are independent of the fate of my comments about that historical case. I will defend those comments against Stanford’s objections below, but first I will explain the argument of my chapter, because its results undermine not only historically important antirealist positions, but also the approach via (...) unconceived conceivables that Stanford’s criticisms (and his pessimistic induction) depend on. The issue is claims about equal evidential support that empiricist defenses of epistemological anti-realism, including Stanford’s, must and do appeal to. In Chapter 6 of Tracking Truth, I show that the best known probabilistic definitions of evidential support imply the anti-realist’s key equalsupport claims are either false or inconsistent with the view he wants to base on them. There are reasons to think that it is not even possible to define a probabilistic notion of support that will do the job the anti-realist needs. It follows from this, as I explain below, that the anti-realist has not defended the claim that we are in principle, or even probably, unable to confirm high-level theories – for this, I say, we must wait and see, and make our best estimates. This, and my claim that we have actually gotten beyond observables – a point made with pregnancy tests and tests for medical conditions – make room for realism. I do not endorse the kind of realist claim that says we generally have a right to believe our successful hypotheses that go beyond observables. Some successful hypotheses are better confirmed than others, and some are not at all. However, since the anti-realist’s general skeptical arguments fail, I also do not think we need such general claims in order to have a right to confidence in those particular hypotheses for which we do have good evidence. I call my approach to the epistemological realism-anti-realism debate “evidential.” The nub of the issue between the two camps has always been whether we have a right to believe our scientific theories – in some sense that includes at least some of their claims about unobservable matters – on the basis of our evidence.1 Answers to this question depend on what our evidence actually is, and on the definition or criteria for evidential support.. (shrink)

This book provides a richly interdisciplinary assessment of the thought and work of Bryan Norton, one of most innovative and influential environmental philosophers of the past thirty years. In landmark works such as Toward Unity Among Environmentalists and Sustainability: A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem Management, Norton charted a new and highly productive course for an applied environmental philosophy, one fully engaged with the natural and social sciences as well as the management professions. A Sustainable Philosophy gathers together a distinguished group (...) of scholars and professionals from a wide array of fields to engage Norton’s work and its legacy for our shared environmental future. A study in the power of intellectual legacy and the real-world influence of philosophy, the book will be of great interest scholars and students in environmental philosophy, public policy and management, and environmental and sustainability studies. By considering the value and impact of Norton’s body of work it will also chart a course for the next generation of pragmatic environmental philosophers and sustainability scholars grappling with questions of environmental value, knowledge, and practice in a rapidly changing world. (shrink)