Judith Jarvis Thomson holds that we have a right not be be caused distressful feelingsÑbut only if they are "non-belief- mediated"; we have no right not to be caused belief-mediated distress. I suggest that this view is highly counter-intuitive; and I argue that it is not supported by Thomson's arguments which, if they serve to exclude belief-mediated feelings would equally serve to exclude non-belief-mediated ones. I also suggest that some of the work that Thomson wants this distinction to do can (...) be done in other ways. (shrink)

Si oblitus fuero tui, Jerusalem, oblivioni detur dextera mea.” When Jerome commented on Ps. 136.5, he interpreted the passage allegorically. Sitting in exile by the waters of Babylon, the Israelites had hung their harps on the willows and, in a foreign land, would not sing the songs of Zion. Yet they refused to forget their origin, preferring, as King James's translators put it, that “my right hand forget her cunning.” Jerome observes that this is always the hand whose work remembers (...) the Lord. Yet clearly, by the early fifth century, the idea of manual dexterity had become a trope, a figure in some higher argument. Augustine compares the “lower gods”, reduced to performing menial tasks in the administration of the universe, to workers in the silversmiths' quarter through whose many hands a vessel passes before it is finished, even if it could have been perfected by any skilled member of their team. Slightly more pragmatically, Justinian's Digest mentions a piece of silver plate, brought on approval to a client's house by a uascularius but then inadvertently destroyed, as an instance actionable under the laws of contract. (shrink)

The paper questions Binmore’s identification of justice with fairness and his corresponding focus on bargains to the neglect of conventions, notably of ownership. Section 1 deals mainly with the role ascribed to man’s earliest genetic heritage in shaping fairness norms and the putative effect of such norms on bargaining solutions. Section 2 argues that the scope of fairness as opposed to justice in determining the social order is quite narrow, It sketches a theory of fairness distinct from justice, derived from (...) the principle of treating like cases alike. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 44 Heft: 1 Seiten: 462-486.

_Thinking Through Questions_ is an accessible and compact guide to the art of questioning, covering both the use and abuse of questions. Animated by wide-ranging and engaging exercises and examples, the book helps students deepen their understanding of how questions work and what questions do, and builds the skills needed to ask better questions. Cowritten by two of today's leading philosopher-teachers, _Thinking Through Questions_ is specifically designed to complement, connect, and motivate today’s standard curricula, especially for classes in critical thinking, (...) philosophical questioning, and creative problem- solving (called here "expansive questioning"). Offering students a wide and appreciative look at questions and questioning, this small book will also appeal to faculty and students across the disciplines: in college writing courses, creativity workshops, education schools, introductions to college thinking, design thinking projects, and humanities and thinking classes. Open-ended, creative, and critically self-possessed thinking is its constant theme—what field doesn’t need more of that? (shrink)

In ‘Semantic Foundations for the Logic of Preference’ (Rescher, ed.,The Logic of Decision and Action, University Press, Pittsburgh, 1967), Nicholas Rescher claims that, on the semantics developed in that paper, a certain principle - call it ‘Q’ turns out to be ‘unacceptable’. I argue, however, that, given certain assumptions that Rescher invokes in that same paper,Q can in fact be shown to be a ‘preference-tautology’, and henceQ should be classified as ‘acceptable’ on Rescher's theory.

The beating heart of democratic politics is a set of paradoxes revolving around the issues of popular identity and sovereignty. Populist ideology appeals to the sovereign people, consequently engaging the democratic paradox in a manner akin to either moving an immoveable object or catching something in constant flux. Marginal consideration has been given by scholars to populism’s relationship with the democratic paradox, with current notions of the former seeing it more as a result of the latter. Thus, by recasting the (...) democratic paradox as a question and analysing its relationship with populist ideology, this article seeks to clarify the supposedly ambiguous relationship between populism and democracy. In analysing the transformative processes within populism by using early Peronism and Italian Fascism as case studies, it argues that as the ideological embodiment of the democratic paradox populist ideology preserves and expresses the paradox in the public sphere. (shrink)

Montesquieu, Hume, Voltaire, Diderot, Smith, Gibbon, Bentham... These are among the great thinkers who contributed to the dramatic developments in religion, science, and philosophy that we now call the Enlightenment. Written by a world authority, this brief history of the Enlightenment concludes with a perceptive assessment of the cultural, religious, ethical, and political dimensions of its legacy.

Spirituality and Dialectics is a passionate and rigorous argument against nihilism and a manifesto for the party of meaning and hope. It demonstrates how we can ground principles of meaning and value, against the aesthetic and intellectual hegemony of the enlightenment—culminating most currently through postmodernity, as a basis for the critique of all present injustice. What emerges is a vision of a new social order that permits the full development of human social capacities.

This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the ways in which the five resemble each other and the reasons for grouping them all together as senses. It then traces the history of the philosophy of sensation from its beginnings in the philosopher who was both the first systematic psychologist and the first systematic physiologist, namely Aristotle. It is argued that sensation is not the same thing as the acquisition of information about sensible objects; a sense is essentially a modality (...) for acquiring information in a modality which admits of pleasure and pain. The distinction between the intellectual knowledge that p and the sensation that p is to be sought, as Aristotle said, in the different relationship of each mode of cognition to pain and pleasure understood in the widest sense. (shrink)

My title, as it stands, is not very informative. The two terms that occur in it are so commonly conjoined, in the philosophical world, at any rate, that it can be no surprise to find them together. My aim, however, is to go some way, at least, towards disconnecting them. My thesis is, to put it briefly, that it is a mistake to see political philosophy as a subordinate part of moral philosophy and thus to suppose that the characteristic problems (...) of the former are of the same kind as those of the latter. More concretely, the problems of politics itself are not generally or primarily, let alone exclusively, moral in nature. We all know that political problems are not, to any great extent, approached by those involved with them, from a moral point of view. I shall argue that it is not reasonable that they should be. But the philosophical habit of running the two things together encourages a kind of moral absolutism in political thinking, and from time to time in political practice, which has bad results, not necessarily morally bad, just bad. (shrink)

This is a collection of writings by the late Lord Quinton, one of the wittiest and most versatile philosophers of his generation.