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Anthony F. Peressini [12]Anthony Francis Peressini [1]
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Anthony F. Peressini
Marquette University
  1. Consciousness as Integrated Information: A Provisional Philosophical Critique.Anthony F. Peressini - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (1-2):180-206.
    Giulio Tononi (2008) has offered his integrated information theory of consciousness (IITC) as a “provisional manifesto.” I critically examine how the approach fares. I point out some (relatively) internal concerns with the theory and then more broadly philosophical ones; finally I assess the prospects for IITC as a fundamental theory of consciousness. I argue that the IITC’s scientific promise does carry over to a significant extent to broader philosophical theorizing about qualia and consciousness, though not as directly as Tononi suggests, (...)
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  2.  90
    Otávio Bueno* and Steven French.**Applying Mathematics: Immersion, Inference, Interpretation. [REVIEW]Anthony F. Peressini - 2020 - Philosophia Mathematica 28 (1):116-127.
    Otávio Bueno* * and Steven French.** ** Applying Mathematics: Immersion, Inference, Interpretation. Oxford University Press, 2018. ISBN: 978-0-19-881504-4 978-0-19-185286-2. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198815044. 001.0001. Pp. xvii + 257.
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  3. Blurring Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience: Folk Versus Philosophical Phenomenality.Anthony F. Peressini - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):862-889.
    Philosophers and psychologists have experimentally explored various aspects of people’s understandings of subjective experience based on their responses to questions about whether robots “see red” or “feel frustrated,” but the intelligibility of such questions may well presuppose that people understand robots as experiencers in the first place. Departing from the standard approach, I develop an experimental framework that distinguishes 20 between “phenomenal consciousness” as it is applied to a subject (an experiencer) and to an (experiential) mental state and experimentally test (...)
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  4.  44
    Troubles with Indispensability: Applying Pure Mathematics in Physical Theory.Anthony F. Peressini - 1997 - Philosophia Mathematica 5 (3):210-227.
    Much of the current thought concerning mathematical ontology in volves in some way the Quine/Putnam indispensability argument. The indispensability approach needs to be more thoroughly specified, however, before substantive progress can be made in assessing it. To this end I examine in some detail the ways in which pure mathematics is applied to physical theory; such considerations give rise to three specific issues with which the indispensability approach must come to grips.
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  5.  39
    Applying Pure Mathematics.Anthony F. Peressini - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):13.
    Much of the current thought concerning mathematical ontology and epistemology follows Quine and Putnam in looking to the indispensable application of mathematics in science. A standard assumption of the indispensability approach is some version of confirmational holism, i.e., that only "sufficiently large" sets of beliefs "face the tribunal of experience." In this paper I develop and defend a distinction between a pure mathematical theory and a mathematized scientific theory in which it is applied. This distinction allows for the possibility that (...)
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  6.  78
    The Indispensability of Mathematics. [REVIEW]Anthony F. Peressini - 2003 - Philosophia Mathematica 11 (2):208-223.
    The subject with which Mark Colyvan's book deals is timely indeed. While discussions of mathematical ontology have been a mainstay in philosophy of mathematics for the last century (at least), for the last thirty years or so this discussion has begun with (and often not left) the Quine/Putnam indispensability argument. Though the argument is widely cited, to my knowledge this is the first book-length project exclusively dedicated to articulating and defending the Quine/Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical platonism. In the first (...)
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  7.  10
    Cumulative Versus Noncumulative Ramified Types.Anthony F. Peressini - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (3):385-397.
    In this paper I examine the nature of Russell's ramified type theory resolution of paradoxes. In particular, I consider the effect of construing the types in Church's cumulative sense, that is, the range of a variable of a given type includes the range of every variable of directly lower type. Contrary to what seems to be generally assumed, I show that the decision to make the levels cumulative and allow this to be reflected in the semantics is not neutral with (...)
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  8.  13
    Turn Taking, Team Synchronization, and Non-Stationarity in Physiological Time Series.Stephen J. Guastello, David E. C. Marra, Julian Castro, Michael Equi & Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Nonlinear Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences 21:319-334.
    This study investigated the stationarity of electrodermal time series collected in situations where turn taking in human interactions are involved. In this context, the stationarity of the time series is the extent to which a simple model can be used to fit the entire time series. The experiment involved seven participants in an emergency response simulation against one opponent. They generated 48 time series across six simulations, which were split and re-spliced to separate the team’s turns and the opponent’s turns. (...)
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  9.  78
    Causation, Probability, and the Continuity Bind.Anthony F. Peressini - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (3):881-909.
    Analyses of singular causation often make use of the idea that a cause increases the probability of its effect. Of particular salience in such accounts are the values of the probability function of the effect, conditional on the presence and absence of the putative cause, analysed around the times of the events in question: causes are characterized by the effect’s probability function being greater when conditionalized upon them. Put this way, it becomes clearer that the ‘behaviour’ of probability functions in (...)
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  10.  14
    Causation, Probability, and the Continuity Bind.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw030.
    Analyses of singular (token-level) causation often make use of the idea that a cause increases the probability of its effect. Of particular salience in such accounts are the values of the probability function of the effect, conditional on the presence and absence of the putative cause, analysed around the times of the events in question: causes are characterized by the effect’s probability function being greater when conditionalized upon them. Put this way, it becomes clearer that the ‘behaviour’ (continuity) of probability (...)
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  11.  31
    Psychological Explanation and Behavior Broadly Conceived.Anthony F. Peressini - 1997 - Behavior and Philosophy 25 (2):137-159.
    I argue that a broad conception of behavior makes considerable headway toward an account of psychological explanation that preserves the intuitive correctness of belief/desire psychological explanations and whose explanatory utility is not undercut by neurophysiological explanations. The rough idea behind a broad conception of behavior is that the basic units of behavior, which constitute the primary explananda of psychology, are themselves essentially goal-directed. As such, behavior supervenes on more than the physical properties of the bodily motions which comprise it; it (...)
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  12.  56
    There is Nothing It is Like to See Red: Holism and Subjective Experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese:1-30.
    The Nagel inspired “something-it-is-like” conception of conscious experience remains a dominant approach in philosophy. In this paper I criticize a prevalent philosophical construal of SIL consciousness, one that understands SIL as a property of mental states rather than entities as a whole. I argue against thinking of SIL as a property of states, showing how such a view is in fact prevalent, under-warranted, and philosophically pernicious in that it often leads to an implausible reduction of conscious experience to qualia. I (...)
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