Anthony J. Lisska presents a new analysis of Thomas Aquinas's theory of perception. While much work has been undertaken on Aquinas's texts, little has been devoted principally to his theory of perception and less still on a discussion of inner sense. The thesis of intentionality serves as the philosophical backdrop of this analysis while incorporating insights from Brentano and from recent scholarship. The principal thrust is on the importance of inner sense, a much-overlooked area of Aquinas's philosophy of mind, with (...) special reference to the vis cogitativa. Approaching the texts of Aquinas from contemporary analytic philosophy, Lisska suggests a modest 'innate' or 'structured' interpretation for the role of this inner sense faculty. He argues that were it not for the vis cogitativa, Aquinas would be unable to account for an awareness of the principal ontological category in his metaphysics. (shrink)
Aquinas needs no introduction as one of the greatest minds of the middle ages. Highly influential on the development of Christian doctrine, his ideas are still of fundamental philosophical importance. This new critique of his natural law theory discusses the theory's background in Aristotle and advances new interpretations of contemporary legal issues which hark back to Aquinas.
This study investigates the function of the common good in the political theory of thomas aquinas. it concludes that at every point in his political theory the concept of the common good plays a significant, if not determinative role. his moderate position between collectivism and individualism recognizes that the individual lives in social relationships which include social responsibilities.
This essay is an analysis of the theory of human rights based on the writings of Thomas Aquinas, with special reference to the Summa Theologiae. The difference between a jus naturale found in Aquinas and the theory of human rights developed by the sixteenth century scholastic philosophers is articulated. The distinction between objective natural rights—“what is right”—and subjective natural rights—“a right”—is discussed noting that Aquinas held the former position and that later scholastic philosophers beginning with the Salamanca School of the (...) Second Scholasticism developed the latter position. The subjective theory of rights evolved into the modern and contemporary account of individual human rights. The essay ends with an argument suggesting that Aquinas’s theory of objective human rights can serve as the ontological foundation for a robust theory of both positive and negative subjective natural rights. (shrink)
The last third of the twentieth century witnessed a burst of energy by philosophers sorting out the many-faceted claims of natural law theory. Natural law theory, rooted in the Nicomachean Ethics with some modifications by the Stoics, was studied in the twentieth century mainly through the writings of Thomas Aquinas, followed by those of the Salamanca school, which was central to the Second Scholasticism. The horrors of the Second World War and the trials following it, with their charges of “crimes (...) against humanity,” prompted a renewed interested by English-speaking philosophers in natural law jurisprudence. Analytic philosophers followed Elizabeth Anscombe’s urging to venture beyond the limits of early twentieth-century moral philosophy; Alasdair MacIntyre’s writings buttressed the return to ethical naturalism; John Finnis’s “new natural law” theory also contributed to this renaissance. These many avenues form the conceptual backdrop to the eight books reviewed in this essay. (shrink)
This paper investigates Aquinas’s thought on the vis cogitativa, in order to determine whether Aquinas’s use of the inner sense of the vis cogitative is an embarrassment , or whether it is rather an important element in Aquinas’s philosophy of mind that calls for serious study . An examination of Aquinas’s theory of inner sense reveals that, for Aquinas, the vis cogitativa has two cognitive functions: to be aware of an individual as an individual, and to recognize an individual as (...) a member of a kind. If Aquinas’ philosophy of mind did not include some account of the vis cogitativa, then it would not be able to accommodate what for Aquinas is a principal ontological category. (shrink)
This paper investigates Aquinas’s thought on the vis cogitativa, in order to determine whether Aquinas’s use of the inner sense of the vis cogitative is an embarrassment (as Dorothea Frede recently suggested), or whether it is rather an important element in Aquinas’s philosophy of mind that calls for serious study (as John Haldane argued several years ago in an ACPA plenary address). An examination of Aquinas’s theory of inner sense (as found in the Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima) reveals that, (...) for Aquinas, the vis cogitativa has two cognitive functions: (1) to be aware of an individual as an individual, and (2) to recognize an individual as a member of a kind. If Aquinas’ philosophy of mind did not include some account of the vis cogitativa, then it would not be able to accommodate what for Aquinas is a principal ontological category (namely, primary substance). (shrink)
The last third of the twentieth century witnessed a burst of energy by philosophers sorting out the many-faceted claims of natural law theory. Natural law theory, rooted in the Nicomachean Ethics with some modifications by the Stoics, was studied in the twentieth century mainly through the writings of Thomas Aquinas, followed by those of the Salamanca school, which was central to the Second Scholasticism. The horrors of the Second World War and the trials following it, with their charges of “crimes (...) against humanity,” prompted a renewed interested by English-speaking philosophers in natural law jurisprudence. Analytic philosophers followed Elizabeth Anscombe’s urging to venture beyond the limits of early twentieth-century moral philosophy; Alasdair MacIntyre’s writings buttressed the return to ethical naturalism; John Finnis’s “new natural law” theory also contributed to this renaissance. These many avenues form the conceptual backdrop to the eight books reviewed in this essay. (shrink)
This is an important book for philosophers interested in working out a realist philosophy of religion and much that such a project entails. The foil against which Denys Turner addresses his realist theory is that found in the late nineteenth century writings of Nietzsche and developed in the twentieth century by Heidegger and the later postmodernists in philosophy and religion. Of course, much of this trend is rooted in the Kantian thrust in modern philosophy, a thrust that the late Henry (...) Veatch once referred to as “The Transcendental Turn.” The shadow of Heidegger’s “onto-theology” hovers throughout this discussion, which results in Turner’s analysis of the differences between univocity of meaning in Scotus and analogous use in Aquinas. Turner remarks that one purpose of his extended essay is “to clear away the clutter of misconception” that surrounds discussions of these issues central to religious belief. Part of this conceptual muddle is, Turner argues, found in authors like John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, who have adroitly proposed a nonrealist account of theological propositions. (shrink)