Results for 'Anti-Luminosity'

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  1. Anti-Luminosity.Murali Ramachandran - manuscript
    Timothy Williamson (2000) reckons that hardly any mental state is luminous, i.e. is such that if one were in it, then one would invariably be in a position to know that one was. This paper examines an argument he presents against the luminosity of feeling cold, which he claims generalizes to other phenomenal states, such as e.g. being in pain. As we shall see, the argument fails. However, our deliberations do yield two anti-luminosity results: a simple refutation of the (...)
     
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  2. Anti-Luminosity: Four Unsuccessful Strategies.Murali Ramachandran - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):659-673.
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  3. Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument.Anthony Brueckner & M. Oreste Fiocco - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):285–293.
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    Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument.Brueckner Anthony - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):285-293.
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  5. What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is.Wai-hung Wong - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):536-543.
    Abstract: Williamson argues that when one feels cold, one may not be in a position to know that one feels cold. He thinks this argument can be generalized to show that no mental states are such that when we are in them we are in a position to know that we are in them. I argue that his argument is a sorites argument in disguise because it relies on the implicit premise that warming up is gradual. Williamson claims that his (...)
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    On Williamson's Argument for (Ii) in His Anti-Luminosity Argument.Thomas A. Blackson - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):397-405.
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  7. What Williamson's Anti-Luminosity Argument Really Is.Carmelo di Primo, Gaston H. U. I. Bon Hoa, Pierre Douzou & Stephen Sligar - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
     
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    On Williamson’s Argument for in His Anti-Luminosity Argument.Thomas A. Blackson - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):397-405.
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    Luminosity Guaranteed.Wolfgang Barz - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):480-496.
    This article aims to show that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument does not succeed if we presuppose a constitutive connection between the phenomenal and the doxastic. In contrast to other luminists, however, my strategy is not to critically focus on the refined safety condition in terms of degrees of confidence that anti-luminists typically use in this context. Instead, I will argue that, given a certain conception of what Chalmers calls ‘direct phenomenal concepts,’ luminosity is guaranteed even if the refined safety condition (...)
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  10. Margins for Error and Sensitivity: What Nozick Might Have Said. [REVIEW]Kelly Becker - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (1):17-31.
    Timothy Williamson has provided damaging counterexamples to Robert Nozick’s sensitivity principle. The examples are based on Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments, and they show how knowledge requires a margin for error that appears to be incompatible with sensitivity. I explain how Nozick can rescue sensitivity from Williamson’s counterexamples by appeal to a specific conception of the methods by which an agent forms a belief. I also defend the proposed conception of methods against Williamson’s criticisms.
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  11.  24
    Luminosity in the Stream of Consciousness.David Jenkins - forthcoming - Synthese:1-14.
    Williamson’s “anti-luminosity” argument aims to establish that there are no significant luminous conditions. “Far from forming a cognitive home”, luminous conditions are mere “curiosities”. Even supposing Williamson’s argument succeeds in showing that there are no significant luminous states his conclusion has not thereby been established. When it comes to determining what is luminous, mental events and processes are among the best candidates. It is events and processes, after all, which constitute the stream of consciousness. Judgment, for instance, is plausibly (...)
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    Luminosity and Determinacy.Elia Zardini - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):765-786.
    The paper discusses some ways in which the phenomenon of borderline cases may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are fully open to our view. The discussion focusses on a very influential argument (due to Tim Williamson) to the effect that, roughly, no such domains of luminous facts exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts that are best candidates for being luminous plays an (...)
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  13. Judgment as a Guide to Belief.Nicholas Silins - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
  14. Just Do It? When to Do What You Judge You Ought to Do.Julien Dutant & Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    While it is generally believed that justification is a fallible guide to the truth, there might be interesting exceptions to this general rule. In recent work on bridge-principles, an increasing number of authors have argued that truths about what a subject ought to do are truths we stand in some privileged epistemic relation to and that our justified normative beliefs are beliefs that will not lead us astray. If these bridge-principles hold, it suggests that justification might play an interesting role (...)
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  15. Luminosity Regained.Selim Berker - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-22.
    The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, (...)
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  16.  99
    Rationality as a Virtue.Ralph Wedgwood - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):319-338.
    A concept that can be expressed by the term ‘rationality’ plays a central role in both epistemology and ethics -- and especially in formal epistemology and decision theory. It is argued here that when the term is used in this way, the concept of “rationality” is the concept of a kind of virtue, with all the central features that are ascribed to the virtues by Plato and Aristotle, among others. Interpreting rationality as a kind of virtue helps to solve several (...)
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  17. Inexact Knowledge, Margin for Error and Positive Introspection.Julien Dutant - 2007 - Proceedings of Tark XI.
    Williamson (2000a) has argued that posi- tive introspection is incompatible with in- exact knowledge. His argument relies on a margin-for-error requirement for inexact knowledge based on a intuitive safety prin- ciple for knowledge, but leads to the counter- intuitive conclusion that no possible creature could have both inexact knowledge and posi- tive introspection. Following Halpern (2004) I put forward an alternative margin-for-error requirement that preserves the safety require- ment while blocking Williamson’s argument. I argue that the infallibilist conception of knowledge (...)
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  18.  57
    Luminosity and Vagueness.Elia Zardini - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):375-410.
    The paper discusses some ways in which vagueness and its phenomena may be thought to impose certain limits on our knowledge and, more specifically, may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are luminous, i.e., roughly, fully open to our view. The discussion focuses on a very influential argument to the effect that almost no such interesting domains exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts (...)
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  19. Affective Ignorance.Christoph Jäger - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):123 - 139.
    According to one of the most influential views in the philosophy of self-knowledge each person enjoys some special cognitive access to his or her own current mental states and episodes. This view faces two fundamental tasks. First, it must elucidate the general conceptual structure of apparent asymmetries between beliefs about one’s own mind and beliefs about other minds. Second, it must demarcate the mental territory for which first-person-special-access claims can plausibly be maintained. Traditional candidates include sensations, experiences (of various kinds), (...)
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    Luminosity and Vagueness.Elia Zardini - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):375-410.
    The paper discusses some ways in which vagueness and its phenomena may be thought to impose certain limits on our knowledge and, more specifically, may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are luminous, i.e., roughly, fully open to our view. The discussion focuses on a very influential argument to the effect that almost no such interesting domains exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the facts (...)
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  21. The Comforts of Home.Earl Conee - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):444–451.
    The paper argues against Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument. It also offers an argument against luminosity from the possibility of defeat of introspective justification.
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  22. The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    The value problem -- Unpacking the value problem -- The swamping problem -- fundamental and non-fundamental epistemic goods -- The relevance of epistemic value monism -- Responding to the swamping problem I : the practical response -- Responding to the swamping problem II : the monistic response -- Responding to the swamping problem III : the pluralist response -- Robust virtue epistemology -- Knowledge and achievement -- Interlude : is robust virtue epistemology a reductive theory of knowledge? -- Achievement without (...)
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  23. Are We Luminous?Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):294-319.
    Since its appearance over a decade ago, Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument has come under sustained attack. Defenders of the luminous overwhelmingly object to the argument's use of a certain margin-for-error premise. Williamson himself claims that the premise follows easily from a safety condition on knowledge together with his description of the thought experiment. But luminists argue that this is not so: the margin-for-error premise either requires an implausible interpretation of the safety requirement on knowledge, or it requires other equally (...)
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  24. The Structure of Justification.Sven Rosenkranz - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):629-629.
    The paper explores a structural account of propositional justification in terms of the notion of being in a position to know and negation. Combined with a non-normal logic for being in a position to know, the account allows for the derivation of plausible principles of justification. The account is neutral on whether justification is grounded in internally individuated mental states, and likewise on whether it is grounded in facts that are already accessible by introspection or reflection alone. To this extent, (...)
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    Against Right Reason.Robert Steel - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    I argue against ‘right reason’ style accounts of how we should manage our beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence. I start from the observation that such views seem to have bad practical consequences when we imagine someone acting on them. I then catalogs ways that Williamson, Weatherson, and Lasonen-Aarnio have tried to block objections based on these consequences; I argue all fail. I then move on to offer my own theoretical picture of a rational ‘should believe,’ and show that, (...)
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    Skeptics Without Borders.Kevin Meeker & Ted Poston - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3):223.
    Timothy Williamson’s anti luminosity argument has received considerable attention. Escaping unnoticed, though, is a strikingly similar argument from David Hume. This paper highlights some of the arresting parallels between Williamson’s reasoning and Hume’s that will allow us to appreciate more deeply the plausibility of Williamson’s reasoning and to understand how, following Hume, we can extend this reasoning to undermine the “luminosity” of simple necessary truths. More broadly the parallels help us to identify a common skeptical predicament underlying both arguments, which (...)
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  27. Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays.Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.) - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    Written by an international team of leading scholars, this collection of thirteen new essays explores the implications of semantic externalism for self-knowledge and skepticism, bringing recent developments in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and epistemology to bear on the issue. Structured in three parts, the collection looks at self-knowledge, content transparency, and then meta-semantics and the nature of mental content. The chapters examine a wide range of topics in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, (...)
     
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  28.  90
    Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.
    Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy, Priest, Russell, and Williamson. Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, (...)
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  29.  57
    Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
    Sanford C. Goldberg argues that a proper account of the communication of knowledge through speech has anti-individualistic implications for both epistemology and the philosophy of mind and language. In Part I he offers a novel argument for anti-individualism about mind and language, the view that the contents of one's thoughts and the meanings of one's words depend for their individuation on one's social and natural environment. In Part II he discusses the epistemic dimension of knowledge communication, arguing that the epistemic (...)
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  30.  88
    The Anti-Induction for Scientific Realism.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):329-342.
    In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are regarded as the strongest arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively. In this paper, I construct a new argument for scientific realism which I call the anti-induction for scientific realism. It holds that, since past theories were false, present theories are true. I provide an example from the history of science to show that anti-inductions sometimes work in science. The anti-induction for scientific realism has several advantages over (...)
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  31. Success and Truth in the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate.K. Brad Wray - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1719-1729.
    I aim to clarify the relationship between the success of a theory and the truth of that theory. This has been a central issue in the debates between realists and anti-realists. Realists assume that success is a reliable indicator of truth, but the details about the respects in which success is a reliable indicator or test of truth have been largely left to our intuitions. Lewis (Synthese 129:371–380, 2001) provides a clear proposal of how success and truth might be connected, (...)
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  32. (Anti)-Anti-Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis.J. Adam Carter & Bolesław Czarnecki - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):374-397.
    Anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti-intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge-how to φ. John Bengson & Marc Moffett (2009; 2011a; 2011b) and Carlotta Pavese (2015a; 2015b) have embraced precisely this strategy (...)
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  33. Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths.Jeffrey Roland & Jon Cogburn - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):547-561.
    That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that two ways of responding (...)
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  34.  40
    Meditation Matters: Replies to the Anti-McMindfulness Bandwagon!Rick Repetti & and Adam Burke Ron Purser, David Forbes - 2016 - In David Forbes Ron Purser (ed.), Handbook of Mindfulness: Culture, Context and Social Engagement. New Work, USA: Springer. pp. 473-494.
    A critical reply to the anti-mindfulness critics in the collection, who oppose the popular secularized adoption of mindfulness on various grounds (it is not Buddhism, it is Buddhism, it is a tool of neo-capitalist exploitation, etc.), I argue that mindfulness is a quality of consciousness, opposite mindlessness, that may be cultivated through practice, and is almost always beneficial to those who cultivate it.
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  35. Spinoza's Anti-Humanism.Yitzhak Y. Melamed - 2010 - In Smith Justin & Fraenkel Carlos (eds.), The Rationalists. Springer/Synthese.
    A common perception of Spinoza casts him as one of the precursors, perhaps even founders, of modern humanism and Enlightenment thought. Given that in the twentieth century, humanism was commonly associated with the ideology of secularism and the politics of liberal democracies, and that Spinoza has been taken as voicing a “message of secularity” and as having provided “the psychology and ethics of a democratic soul” and “the decisive impulse to… modern republicanism which takes it bearings by the dignity of (...)
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  36.  46
    Can the Empirical Sciences Contribute to the Moral Realism/Anti-Realism Debate?Thomas Pölzler - forthcoming - Synthese:1-24.
    An increasing number of moral realists and anti-realists have recently attempted to support their views by appeal to science. Arguments of this kind (such as evolutionary debunking arguments or arguments from moral disagreement) are typically criticized on the object-level. In addition, however, one occasionally also comes across a more sweeping meta-theoretical skepticism. Scientific contributions to the question of the existence of objective moral truths, it is claimed, are impossible in principle; most prominently, because (1) such arguments impermissibly derive normative from (...)
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  37. Anti-Meaning and Why It Matters.Stephen M. Campbell & Sven Nyholm - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4): 694-711.
    It is widely recognized that lives and activities can be meaningful or meaningless, but few have appreciated that they can also be anti-meaningful. Anti-meaning is the polar opposite of meaning. Our purpose in this essay is to examine the nature and importance of this new and unfamiliar topic. In the first part, we sketch four theories of anti-meaning that correspond to leading theories of meaning. In the second part, we argue that anti-meaning has significance not only for our attempts to (...)
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  38.  7
    A Renewed Challenge to Anti-Criterialism.Matt Duncan - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    In virtue of what do things persist through time? Are there criteria of their identities through time? Anti-criterialists say no. One prominent challenge to anti-criterialism comes in two steps. The first step is to show that anti-criterialists are committed specifically to the claim that there are no informative metaphysically sufficient conditions for identity through time. The second step is to show that this commitment yields absurd results. Each step of this challenge is open to objection. However, in what follows, I (...)
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  39. Minimal Anti-Humeanism.Harjit Bhogal - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):447-460.
    There is a tension in our theorizing about laws of nature: our practice of using and reasoning with laws of nature suggests that laws are universal generalizations, but if laws are universal generalizations then we face the problem of explanatory circularity. In this paper I elucidate this tension and show how it motivates a view of laws that I call Minimal Anti-Humeanism. This view says that the laws are the universal generalizations that are not grounded in their instances. I argue (...)
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  40. What Anti-Realism in Philosophy of Mathematics Must Offer.Feng Ye - 2010 - Synthese 175 (1):13 - 31.
    This article attempts to motivate a new approach to anti-realism (or nominalism) in the philosophy of mathematics. I will explore the strongest challenges to anti-realism, based on sympathetic interpretations of our intuitions that appear to support realism. I will argue that the current anti-realistic philosophies have not yet met these challenges, and that is why they cannot convince realists. Then, I will introduce a research project for a new, truly naturalistic, and completely scientific approach to philosophy of mathematics. It belongs (...)
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    The Impact of Anti-Intellectualism Attitudes and Academic Self-Efficacy on Business Students' Perceptions of Cheating.Rafik Z. Elias - 2009 - Journal of Business Ethics 86 (2):199 - 209.
    College cheating represents a major ethical problem facing students and educators, especially in colleges of business. The current study surveys 666 business students in three universities to examine potential determinants of cheating perceptions. Anti-intellectualism refers to a student’s negative view of the value and importance of intellectual pursuits and critical thinking. Academic self-efficacy refers to a student’s belief in one’s ability to accomplish an academic task. As hypothesized, students high in anti-intellectualism attitudes and those with low academic self-efficacy were least (...)
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  42.  13
    Risk, Anti-Reflexivity, and Ethical Neutralization in Industrial Food Processing.Diana Stuart & Michelle R. Worosz - 2012 - Agriculture and Human Values 29 (3):287-301.
    While innovations have fostered the mass production of food at low costs, there are externalities or side effects associated with high-volume food processing. We focus on foodborne illness linked to two commodities: ground beef and bagged salad greens. In our analysis, we draw from the concepts of risk, reflexive modernization, and techniques of ethical neutralization. For each commodity, we find that systems organized for industrial goals overlook how production models foster cross-contamination and widespread outbreaks. Responses to outbreaks tend to rely (...)
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  43. The Paradox of Consciousness and the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate.Eric Dietrich & Julietta Rose - 2009 - Logos Architekton 3 (1):7-37.
    Beginning with the paradoxes of zombie twins, we present an argument that dualism is both true and false. We show that avoiding this contradiction is impossible. Our diagnosis is that consciousness itself engenders this contradiction by producing contradictory points of view. This result has a large effect on the realism/anti-realism debate, namely, it suggests that this debate is intractable, and furthermore, it explains why this debate is intractable. We close with some comments on what our results mean for metaphysics and (...)
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  44. Enacting Anti-Representationalism. The Scope and the Limits of Enactive Critiques of Representationalism.Pierre Steiner - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):43-86.
    I propose a systematic survey of the various attitudes proponents of enaction (or enactivism) entertained or are entertaining towards representationalism and towards the use of the concept “mental representation” in cognitive science. For the sake of clarity, a set of distinctions between different varieties of representationalism and anti-representationalism are presented. I also recapitulate and discuss some anti-representationalist trends and strategies one can find the enactive literature, before focusing on some possible limitations of eliminativist versions of enactive anti-representationalism. These limitations are (...)
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  45.  47
    Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Divine Revelation.Christopher Bobier - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):309-320.
    Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (ALVE) states that for S to have knowledge, S must have a virtuously formed safe true belief. S’s belief that p is safe if, in most near-by possible worlds where S’s belief is formed in the same manner as in the actual world, S’s belief is true. S’s safe belief that p is virtuously formed if S’s safe belief is formed using reliable and well-integrated cognitive processes and it is to S’s credit that she formed the belief. (...)
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  46.  91
    Rationally Self-Ascribed Anti-Expertise.Nicolas Bommarito - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):413-419.
    I argue that self-ascribed anti-expertise, taking our own beliefs to be false, is not always irrational.
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  47. Consciousness and its Transcendental Conditions: Kant’s Anti-Cartesian Revolt.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2007 - In Lähteenmäki & Remes Heinämaa (ed.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Springer.
    Kant was the first great anti-Cartesian in epistemology and philosophy of mind. He criticised five central tenets of Cartesianism and developed sophisticated alternatives to them. His transcendental analysis of the necessary a priori conditions for the very possibility of self-conscious human experience invokes externalism about justification and proves externalism about mental content. Semantic concern with the unity of the proposition—required for propositionally structured awareness and self-awareness—is central to Kant’s account of the unity of any cognitive judgment. The perceptual ‘binding problem’ (...)
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  48. Carnap, the Necessary a Priori, and Metaphysical Anti-Realism.Stephen Biggs & Jessica M. Wilson - 2016 - In Stephen Blatti & Sandra Lapointe (eds.), Ontology after Carnap. Oxford: pp. 81-104.
    In Meaning and Necessity (1947/1950), Carnap advances an intensional semantic framework on which modal claims are true in virtue of semantical rules alone, and so are a priori. In 'Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology' (1950), Carnap advances an epistemic-ontological framework on which metaphysical claims are either trivial or meaningless, since lacking any means of substantive confirmation. Carnap carried out these projects two decades before Kripke influentially argued, in Naming and Necessity (1972/1980), that some modal claims are true a posteriori. How should (...)
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  49.  14
    Lucky Math: Anti-Luck Epistemology and Necessary Truth.Danilo Suster - 2017 - In Thought Experiments between Nature and Society. A Festschrift for Nenad Miščević. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 119-133.
    I addresses the problem of accommodating the possibility of lucky true beliefs in necessary (or armchair) truths within contemporary modal epistemology. According to modal epistemology luck consists in the modal proximity of a false belief, but a belief in a true mathematical proposition could not easily be false because a proposition believed could never be false. According to Miščević modal stability of a true belief under small changes in the world is not enough, stability under small changes in the cognizer (...)
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  50. Negation, Anti-Realism, and the Denial Defence.Imogen Dickie - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):161 - 185.
    Here is one argument against realism. (1) Realists are committed to the classical rules for negation. But (2) legitimate rules of inference must conserve evidence. And (3) the classical rules for negation do not conserve evidence. So (4) realism is wrong. Most realists reject 2. But it has recently been argued that if we allow denied sentences as premisses and conclusions in inferences we will be able to reject 3. And this new argument against 3 generates a new response to (...)
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