In my contribution, I discuss the important role of moral anthropological questions in the development of Schiller’s theoretical thought. I underline the fact that Schiller’s philosophical questions in Jena are much closer to those he confronted in Stuttgart – much closer than is considered to be the case in contemporary Schiller scholarship. I show how this continuity becomes evident when we take into consideration the moral anthropological topics that continued to interest Schiller throughout his life. To ground my argument, I (...) show that the concept of the“whole human being” constitutes the continuous characteristic of Schiller’s philosophical considerations. (shrink)
In the past few decades a remarkable change occurred in Kant scholarship: the "other" Kant has been discovered, i.e. the one of the doctrine of virtue and the anthropology. Through the rediscovery of Kant's investigations into the empirical and sensuous aspects of knowledge, our understanding of Kant's philosophy has been enriched by an important element that has allowed researchers to correct supposed deficiencies in Kant's work. In addition, further questions concerning the nature of Kant's philosophy itself have been formulated: the (...) more the "other" Kant comes to the fore, the stronger the question concerning the connection between pure philosophy and empirical investigation becomes. The aim of this study is to show that the psychological and anthropological interpretations of Kant's pure philosophy are not convincing and at the same time to illustrate some connections between his critical and anthropological investigations by means of an analysis of the theory of the faculties. Against both a "transcendental psychological" and an "anthropological" reading, the book presents Kant's theory of the facultiesas a constitutive part of his critical philosophy andshows that there is a close connection between Kant's pure philosophy and his moral aesthetic. (shrink)
In this paper, my aim is to furnish a possible interpretation of “independence” in terms of “self-dependence or dependence on our proper self” in the context of Kant’s philosophy. In order to do this, I will primarily focus on the concept of independence as based on the human being’s noumenal personality and as expression of the human being’s “proper self” (_eigentliches Selbst_). This concept will be contrasted with the one of dependence upon the human being’s animality (_Tierheit_). In this way, (...) I will present independence in terms of the human being’s independence from its sensible, animal nature, but nonetheless as a form of _dependence_: namely, the human being’s dependence on its rational nature. (shrink)
Während in den letzten Jahrzehnten der Begriff der Armut immer mehr ins Zentrum von detaillierten philosophischen Analysen systematischer Natur rückte und die Ausführungen von u. a. John Rawls, Peter Singer, Thomas Pogge, Amartya Sen, Robert Nozick und Martha Nussbaum eine einflussreiche und facettenreiche Diskussion bezeugen, wird die historische Untersuchung der philosophischen Auseinandersetzung mit dem Thema in der Neuzeit im Allgemeinen vernachlässigt. Im Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe fehlt der Begriff ›Armut‹. Im neuen Historischen Wörterbuch der Philosophie findet sich kein der Armut (...) gewidmetes Lemma. Auch wenn im neuen Wörterbuch dank des Pauperismus- Lemmas zumindest ein Aspekt der Armutsdiskussion vertreten ist, scheint sich die »Armutsvergessenheit « angesichts des verbreiteten Leidens und Sterben armer Menschen noch »als blind, wenn nicht gar als kalt und zynisch« zu erweisen. (shrink)
