10 found
Order:
  1.  58
    In Defense of Donnellan on Proper Names.Antonio Capuano - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1289-1312.
    Kripke’s picture of how people use names to refer to things has been the dominant view in contemporary philosophy of language. When it is mentioned at all, Donnellan’s view of proper names is considered the same as Kripke’s. It is certainly true that both Donnellan and Kripke rejected descriptivism about proper names and appealed to historical facts to determine whom a speaker is referring to by using a proper name. However, the relevant historical facts Kripke and Donnellan appeal to are (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  2.  32
    From Having in Mind to Direct Reference.Antonio Capuano - 2012 - In Kabasenche - O'Rourke - Slater (ed.), Reference and Referring. MIT Press. pp. 189-208.
  3. The Ground Zero of Semantics.Antonio Capuano - 2012 - In J. - Leonardi Almog (ed.), Having In Mind. New York, US: Oxford University Press.
  4.  44
    Reference and incomplete descriptions.Antonio Capuano - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1669-1687.
    In “On Referring” Peter Strawson pointed out that incomplete descriptions pose a problem for Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions. Howard Wettstein and Michael Devitt appealed to incomplete descriptions to argue, first, that Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions fails, and second, that Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction has semantic bite. Stephen Neale has defended Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions against Wettstein’s and Devitt’s objections. In this paper, my aim is twofold. First, I rebut Neale’s objections to Wettstein’s and Devitt’s argument and argue that (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5.  36
    Naming and analyticity.Antonio Capuano - 2022 - Theoria 89 (1):57-72.
    My aim in this paper is to connect naming and analyticity and to argue that, like “Hesperus is Hesperus”, “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is analytic. In the paper, I also discuss several other unexpected cases of analytic truth like “Aristotle existed”.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Idee e universali. IV.Guido Bonino & Antonio Capuano - 2004 - Rivista di Estetica 44 (25):97-111.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Iv-idee E Universali.Guido Bonino & Antonio Capuano - 2004 - Rivista di Estetica 44 (1).
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Il realismo anomalo di Sartre.Antonio Capuano - 2002 - Rivista di Estetica 42 (21):71-85.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  25
    Kripkenstein on Belief.Antonio Capuano - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:249-258.
    I offer a skeptical reading of Saul Kripke’s “A Puzzle about Belief.” I maintain that Kripke formulates a skeptical paradox about belief that is analogous to the skeptical paradox about meaning and rule-following that, according to Kripke, Wittgenstein formulates in his Philosophical Investigations.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  28
    On Referring: Donnellan versus Strawson.Antonio Capuano - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):1091-1110.
    In ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions', Keith Donnellan claimed that Bertrand Russell and Peter Strawson ignored referential uses of definite descriptions. The intense debate that followed Donnellan's paper focused on the contrast between Donnellan and Russell, leaving Strawson aside. In this paper, I focus on the contrast between Donnellan and Strawson. By focusing on this contrast, my aim is, first, to clarify the nature of Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions and, second, to argue that a proper (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark