In “The Law of Peoples,” John Rawls proposes a model for multi-culural dialogue based upon agreement. In liberal societies, we find agreement on issues such as human rights. However, I argue here that this proposal overcomes neither Eurocentrism nor Western-centrism, as liberal nations would decide which nations are “well organized hierarchical societies.” This second circle of nations would be merely invited peoples, who would not be allowed to contribute new proposals but only to accept the proposals of the liberal nations. (...) I propose a model for attaining human rights through truly universal dialogue in which the representatives of all peoples are able to speak, make proposals, and accept the proposals of others on an equal basis. (shrink)

Se hace un análisis comparativo de los conceptos de ciencia, maestro y discípulo tal como aparecen en el De Magistro de san Agustín y en la cuestión 11, "De Magistro", de la disputación De Veritate de santo Tomás de Aquino. La ciencia agustiniana de las verdades inteligibles y eternas se adquiere por una visión mental del entendimiento y la razón y supone la buena voluntad del sujeto ; la tomista consiste más bien en el conjunto de formas inteligibles adquiridas a (...) partir de un proceso deductivo, lógico-necesario, que se inicia con los primeros principios y axiomas evidentes. Para Agustín, hay sólo un maestro de las verdades inteligibles que se encuentra en el interior de cada alma racional y que se manifiesta sólo al hombre interior o aquel en el que domina la buena voluntad. Para Tomás de Aquino, existen dos maestros: uno principal e interior, que es Dios, y otro secundario y externo, pero también maestro, el cual ayuda al discípulo a adquirir la habilidad y el hábito de deducir verdades a partir de los primeros principios y axiomas evidentes y con él el número de formas inteligibles. Para Agustín todos somos discípulos del único maestro de la Verdad que es Cristo y seremos buenos o malos discípulos de acuerdo con la buena o mala voluntad que lo domine. Para Tomás de Aquino, el discípulo posee a medias las nociones o verdades que va a aprender, es decir, en sus primeros principios o axiomas evidentes y adquirirá con la ayuda importante del maestro a adquirir la habilidad y el hábito de deducir y desplegar las nociones y verdades encerradas en los primeros principios y axiomas evidentes. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to underline Heidegger’s intellectual interest and deep relation to Duns Scotus’ modern and close to life thought. At the same time, it is pointed out that Scotus’ fundamental ideas such as haecceity, the cognoscibility of the individual, possibility and contingency, impossibility of thinking without naming, will be retaken and transformed into Heidegger’s parental ideas such as Dasein, Dasein as possibility and project, being as something unveiled, identity of knowledge and language. KEY WORDS – History (...) of Philosophy. Duns Scotus. Heidegger. Transformation of Concepts. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to underline Heidegger’s intellectual interestand deep relation to Duns Scotus’ modern and close to life thought. At the same time, it is pointed out that Scotus’ fundamental ideas such as haecceity, the cognoscibility of the individual, possibility and contingency, impossibility of thinking without naming, will be retaken and transformed into Heidegger’s parental ideas such as Dasein, Dasein as possibility and project, being as something unveiled, identity of knowledge and language.

In this article Duns Scotus 'concept of ' heceidad' is looked at, a subject open to discussion. The subject is focussed on his Lectura Oxoniensis, Ordinatio and Reportata Parisiensia.

Duns Scotus, following the saying that "without the phantasma there is no sensible knowledge and without the intelligible species there is no intellection", argues for the need of an active intellect in order to explain the transit from the particular to the universal knowledge. The universal knowledge from experience takes place in two different moments: first, the active intellect, as the main effective cause, together with the common nature in the phantasma, as the co-effective cause, produce the intelligible species, that (...) is, the indeterminate universal in act or the metaphysical universal; second, the passive intellect, as the main effective cause, and the intelligibible species, as the effective instrumental cause, produce the intellection, that is, the full universal or the logic universal, that is a universal concept and name. The full universal or logical universal, is only a concept and a name that can be said of many individuals. It is a second intention that refers, immediately, to the first intention or intelligible species and, indirectly, to the phantasma, the representative of the physical individual. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza el paso lingüístico de la razón moderna de su monologicidad al diálogo inter-subjetivo con el otro. La razón no es sólo una experiencia para objetivar el mundo, sino para comprenderlo y comunicarnos entre nosotros. Ello implica una pragmática inter-subjetiva donde el mundo de vida alcance ese relieve comunicacional que nos hace viable un diálogo que nos permita razonar con argumentos éticos-políticos y consensuar prácticas comunicativas democráticas más liberadoras.

A vontade humana, em razão da sua indeterminação e da sua capacidade interna de produzir atos volitivos contrários e de querer objetos contrários, é aquilo que nos distingue como seres humanos em relação à natureza e nos faz semelhantes a Deus. A vontade divina, por ser infinitamente perfeita, pode, com um único ato volitivo, querer simultaneamente e produzir objetos contrários (a e -a). Portanto, Deus, no mesmo instante da eternidade, pôde, com a sua potência absoluta, ter querido a e/ou -a, (...) o que implica que pôde ter querido este mundo e/ou outro e outros mundos, que são lógica e realmente possíveis. Esta potência divina para, com um único ato volitivo, querer objetos contrários é a causa da contingência radical de todos os entes criados. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Vontade. Dndeterminação. Contingência. Vontade divina. Mundos possíveis. ABSTRACT Human will, because of its indetermination and internal capacity for producing contrary volitive acts e for willing contrary objects, is that which makes us different from nature and similar to God. The divine will, since it is infinitely perfect, with a sole volitive act can will simultaneously and produce contrary objects (a and -a). Therefore, God could have willed in the same instant of eternity, with his absolute potency, a and/or -a, what implies that he could have willed this world and/or another and other worlds, which are logically and really possible. This divine potency for willing, with a sole volitive act, contrary objects is the cause of the radical contingency of all created beings. KEY WORDS – Will. Indetermination. Contingency. Divine will. Possible worlds. (shrink)

La materia prima existe desde siempre y es en potencia, es decir, tiene un ser que esta en disposición de ser después en acto no puede existir sola sin la forma, pero es en si misma una sustancia. Es la causa inmediata de todo cambio sustancial en el universo. El ser de la materia no parece identificarse con su potencia (ser material=potencia de la materia) sino que el ser de la materia es una sustancia que posee una potencia múltiple de (...) recibir formas y de convertirse sucesivamente en acto(ser material=sustancia de la materi+potencia multiple). La materia es sujeto de potencias o posibilidades que se convertirán necesariamente después en seres actuales. Existe entre lo posible y lo actual una relación necesaria por la que lo posible se convertirá necesariamente en acto y lo actual en posible. Existen dos especies de materia distintas: la materia sensible y la celeste con características esencialmente distintas. (shrink)

Para Enrique de Gante, la materia prima, en contra de la opinión de Tomás de Aquino y de Egidio Romano, es algo sustancial con una esencia propia distinta de la forma y con un ser esencial propio que proviene directamente de Dios. De la forma recibe el ser en acto en el compuesto sustancial. De hecho, para Enrique de Gante la materia en toda sustancia compuesta posee un triple ser: el ser simplemente en cuanto criatura, el ser capaz de recibir (...) formas que proviene de su esencia, y el ser en acto proveniente de la forma. Por medio de una intervención milagrosa de Dios, que diera al ser esencial una subsistencia suficiente, la materia prima podría existir sin forma alguna. La materia, aun siendo simple, encierra en su esencia una doble razón: la razón de sustancia y la razón de relación . La materia en sí misma no encierra ninguna fuerza activa o razón seminal capaz de trasmutarse en formas; las razones seminales, como fuerza activa, se encuentran encerradas en la forma del agente que prepara la materia previa informada e introduce en ella una nueva forma sustancial. (shrink)

This essay proves that Duns Scotus did not undestand rightly Henry of Ghent’s doctrine on prime matter. In fact, of the three beings Doctor Solidus gives to prime matter, Duns Scotus discovers only the two last ones, that is the essential being and the formal being in act. Besides, he makes Henry of Ghent saying that prime matter can exist alone, without form, due to the fact that it receives directly from God the subsistent being per se, a being that (...) is not analogous to the being in act of form. In that case, prime matter would exist or would be in act without owning the being in act, which is contradictory. (shrink)

En los textos del Comentario a la Física de Aristóteles, Tomás de Aquino se esfuerza en destacar la distinción entre materia prima y privación. La materia prima es el sujeto del cambio sustancial; la privación es la carencia de forma que afecta a un sujeto de cambio, ya sea éste una sustancia natural ya sea la materia prima. Ambos son no-entes, es decir ambos están fuera del ámbito del ser formal o del ser en acto. Pero, mientras la materia prima (...) es en potencia, la privación simplemente no-es. La materia prima posee una confusa entidad ubicada entre el ser en acto o ser formal y el no-ser; abarca al ámbito del ser en potencia. La privación simplemente no es y, en consecuencia, es solo un ente de razón, elaborado por la mente humana con fundamento en la realidad. La materia prima con su ser en potencia es el fundamento ontológico del incesante cambio en el universo y de la esencial temporalidad de toda sustancia individual.Thomas Aquinas in the text of his Commentary to Aristotle´s Physics tries to point out the distinction between prime matter and privation. Prime matter is the subject of any substantial change; privation is the lack of a form affecting a subject of change, either a natural substance or prime matter. Both -prime matter and privation- are non-beings, that is, both are outside the scope of formal being or of being in act. But, if prime matter is in potency, privation simply is not. Prime matter owns a confused entity, located in between being in act or formal being and non-being; it belongs to the sphere of being in potency. Privation simply is not and, so, it is only a being of reason, built by human intellect with basement in reality. Prime matter with its being in potency is the ontological background of continuous change in the world and of the essential temporality of any individual substance. (shrink)

The problem that underlies Rawls' The Law of Peoples is the problem of how something particular—western— may become universal and human. Rawls claims that he solves this problem by means of extending particular western rights to other non western peoples. The extension of western liberal rights is done by a second original position similar to the first one in A Theory of Justice. The paper tries to prove that the second original position, in its second step, is not similar to (...) the first one and the parties taking part in this second original position are not symmetrically situated. Rawls' proposal falls into ethnocentrism and eurocentrism. The only way to transform particular rights into universal rights is by means of a universal multicultural dialogue where all peoples can make proposals and listen to other peoples' proposals. (shrink)

The problem that underlies Rawls' The Law of Peoples is the problem of how something particular—western— may become universal and human. Rawls claims that he solves this problem by means of extending particular western rights to other non western peoples. The extension of western liberal rights is done by a second original position similar to the first one in A Theory of Justice. The paper tries to prove that the second original position, in its second step, is not similar to (...) the first one and the parties taking part in this second original position are not symmetrically situated. Rawls' proposal falls into ethnocentrism and eurocentrism. The only way to transform particular rights into universal rights is by means of a universal multicultural dialogue where all peoples can make proposals and listen to other peoples' proposals. (shrink)

Desde sus primeros escritos, Nietzsche asumió una posición crítica hacia el sujeto moderno. Criticó su separación y enfrentamiento con la naturaleza y su soledad. En sus últimos escritos, profundizó su crítica. Tachó al sujeto moderno de heredero del hombre judío y cristiano, producido por el res..

Para Tomás de Aquino, varón y mujer manifiestan distintamente la racionalidad humana. La hembra-madre, razón material e incorporada, se identifica con la naturaleza y semeja la materia prima. El macho-varón semeja a la forma, encierra la plenitud del ser, e intenta ser una razón pura y desincorporada separada de la naturaleza, y necesaria para completar a la mujer. Axiológicamente, mujer es lo indecente, sucio, moralmente, es el instrumento para hacer caer al varón en el mal, mientras que el varón es (...) el bien, lo apetecible, pues fue creado antes que la mujer para significar su superioridad en dignidad y gobierno. (shrink)