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  1.  38
    Review: Melnick, Kant's Theory of Self. [REVIEW]Apaar Kumar - 2010 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):535-536.
    Melnick interprets the Kantian self from the first-person perspective as real abiding intellectual action. It unfolds in time but does not arise in inner or outer attending. Hence, it is neither a noumenal entity nor Kantian intuitable substance. Melnick thinks that his interpretation not only clarifies Kant’s arguments in the Paralogisms of the first Critique, but also illuminates Kant’s positive theory of self.Melnick argues that a thought is inchoate, unformed, and unsettled until the thinking self as intellectual marshaling action brings (...)
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  2.  19
    Kant's Idealism: New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine Ed. By Dennis Schulting, Jacco Verburgt (Review).Apaar Kumar - 2013 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (3):492-494.
    The literature on transcendental idealism is vast and controversy-ridden. Some interpreters view this puzzling doctrine as detracting from Kant’s real contribution—his theory of experience. Those who take the doctrine seriously debate whether or not appearances and things-in-themselves constitute two ontologically discrete worlds. Currently, the discussion centers around whether the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction should be read epistemologically, as referring to two different aspects of the same object, or as a metaphysical distinction, since Kant thinks of appearances as non-ultimate reality. The essays in (...)
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    Kant and the Subject of Critique: On the Regulative Role of the Psychological Idea by Avery Goldman.Apaar Kumar - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (1):175-176.
  4.  1
    Kant's Theory of Self (Review).Apaar Kumar - 2010 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):535-536.
    Melnick interprets the Kantian self from the first-person perspective as real abiding intellectual action. It unfolds in time but does not arise in inner or outer attending. Hence, it is neither a noumenal entity nor Kantian intuitable substance. Melnick thinks that his interpretation not only clarifies Kant’s arguments in the Paralogisms of the first Critique, but also illuminates Kant’s positive theory of self.Melnick argues that a thought is inchoate, unformed, and unsettled until the thinking self as intellectual marshaling action brings (...)
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