abstract I consider the putative originality of applied philosophy and seek to defend a version of it often called 'bottom up'. I review ways in which imagined cases may cause us to reconsider our normative commitments, and endorse a general attentiveness to the matter of how the world is and how it might reasonably be imagined. This is important if practical philosophers want to form the correct normative judgements, to be able to recognize the sui generis character of (...) some moral theorising in particular domains, practically to enact their considered judgments, and properly to acknowledge how the real world, in the form of institutions, practices and a cultural framework, constrains, or facilitates, practical enactment. Throughout I illustrate my abstract claims by reference to the moral judgement and legal regulation of sexual behaviour. (shrink)

This is a reprint of an article in a collection edited by Cristopher Cowton and Roger Crisp, Business Ethics: Perspectives on the Practice of Theory (1998). The article reflects on (a) the tension between aprioristic applied philosophy --geared to thought experiments constructible in the armchair-- and applied philosophy informed by contact with relevant practitioners; and (b) the tension between the content of business ethics and the receptiveness of a business audience to its moralising messages. The contrast (...) between business ethics and medical ethics in these respects is discussed at some length. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that applied philosophers hoping to develop a stronger role in public policy formation can begin by aligning their methods with the tools employed in the policy sciences. I proceed first by characterizing the standard view of policymaking and policy education as instrumentally oriented toward the employment of specific policy tools. I then investigate pressures internal to philosophy that nudge work in applied philosophy toward the periphery of policy debates. I capture the (...) dynamics of these pressures by framing them as the “dilemma dilemma” and the “problem problem.” Seeking a remedy, I turn to the interdisciplinarity of a unique approach to policymaking generally known as the “policy sciences.” Finally, I investigate the case of bioethics, an instance where philosophy has made decent headway with policymakers. From this I draw parallels to public policy. I suggest that because the policy sciences are essentially analchemist’s brew of academic fields, and because philosophy covers many of the foundational questions associated with these fields, it is only natural that applied philosophers should begin collaborations with other applied academics by adopting the strategies that have so successfully applied in other theoretical fields. (shrink)

Designed to bring the concepts and methods of philosophy to bear on practical concerns, the essays in this volume discuss the environment, personal relationships, war, terrorism and violence, social justice and medicine. Contributors emphasize the metaphysical and ethical dimensions.

I stumbled into my interpretation of Wittgenstein as an advocate of what is now termed applied philosophy. In doing research for an essay on linguistic violence, [2] I decided to read more by and about Ferrucio Rossi Landi because I had already made use of his work on linguistic alienation. [3] One source, in particular, caught my attention because of its clever, though sexist, subtitle. In 1991, Ranjit Chatterjee published an essay titled "Rossi Landi's Wittgenstein: 'A philosopher's meaning (...) is his use in the.. (shrink)

Contributed articles presented at the National Workshop on "Innovative Courses on Applied/Practical Philosophy" held on Dec. 10-12, 2001 organized by Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

In 1793, Kant published an essay entitled On the Common Saying: “That May be Correct in Theory, but It is of No Use in Practice.” The saying purports to express the superior wisdom of the worldly and experienced person, conveying a justified disdain of impractical philosophers with their abstract theories. (Its intended target is conjectured to be Edmund Burke's Reflections on the French Revolution, and Burke's claim that philosophical theorists were to blame for what went disastrously wrong in France.) In (...) the context of Kant's essay, ‘theory’ means philosophy, and ‘practice’ means its application. The common saying could thus be taken as an attack on the very idea of ‘applied philosophy’, or else as advocating the view that philosophy may be applied only with ad hoc exceptions. Kant argues, however, that when accurately understood, the Common Saying is not wisdom at all. Instead, in relation to non‐moral cases, it represents only ludicrous ignorance, while in relation to morality it exhibits an attitude of self‐deceptive moral corruption. Kant argues this last point at length in relation first, to personal morality, second, to the duties of politicians, and third, to our outlook in relation to the question whether the human species is morally progressing. The present chapter sympathetically expounds Kant's arguments in relation to morality, emphasizing especially the application of his argument to politics. (shrink)

This paper provides a critical discussion of the concept of applied philosophy. Writers specializing in applied philosophy (e.g., in the various fields of applied ethics) often assume what is here called the traditional concept of applied philosophy, i.e., they think of themselves as applying a “pure” (in itself nonapplied) philosophical theory to some humanly important practical problem area. If understood along these lines, applied philosophy can be taken to be analogous toapplied (...) science. However, this analogy collapses as soon as we realize that the “results” of applied philosophy cannot usually be regarded as instantiations of the von Wrightian technical norm, which can be considered the basic form of the results of applied scientific research. On the other hand, the postmodernist, antiscientific rival of traditional applied philosophy, viz., “media philosophy,” is argued to be little more than a relativist, degraded version of the traditional conception. Finally, it is suggested that the dichotomy between pure and applied philosophy should be abandoned in favor of a pragmatist view, which urges that all significant philosophical problems are always already embedded in human practice. (shrink)

Ancient philosophy is “applied” in a number of ways, and for distinctive reasons, some perhaps rather different from those to be found in contemporary philosophy. In the case of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, one important basis for this lies in their views about the scope and purpose of philosophy. A second ground derives from their reflections on method. The methodological approaches discussed and implemented in the works of both Plato and Aristotle have significant implications for ideas (...) about applied philosophy. They also cast doubt on the possibility of a sharp distinction, or clear dividing line, between “pure” and “applied” philosophy. But they do not imply a conservative approach to applied philosophy. (shrink)

Thinking in Education Research examines the resources available from philosophy and theory that can be practically applied to any educational research project. Nick Peim argues that the current well-established divide between theory and the empirical in research methods is unhelpful to students. Instead, Thinking in Education Research looks at major lines of thinking in modern European philosophy, from Kant to Freud and Derrida to Malabou, and how they provide a rich resource for every stage of conducting research. (...) By getting students engaged in 'how to think' and 'how to do', Peim illustrates that thinking is in fact a vital part of how you do research and is not an aside. Essential aspects of the research endeavour are re-examined in the light of key philosophical positions to offer constructive potential, including: defining the object; giving an account of the field; the relation to truth; the process of writing and constructing a case; and the value attributed to formal knowledge. Thinking in Education Research does not try to resolve the unresolved issues of research thinking but rather encourages readers to productively engage with them so that we can enhance the possibilities of research practice and find opportunities for its expansion and refinement. Throughout the chapters, clear and concise summaries of key philosophical positions and ideas are complemented with boxed accounts of how the philosophical debates discussed can be applied to real research projects. These features encourage the reader to consider how they can develop thinking and apply theory at every stage of their own research. This is essential reading for any educational research methods student or practicing researcher for important ways of thinking afresh about research methodology"--Publisher's description. (shrink)

Applied philosophy is experiencing its “golden days,” as Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen says in his insightful introduction to A Companion to Applied Philosophy. Applied philosophy seems to be distinguished from its opposite, pure philosophy, usually understood as traditional philosophy, which deals with subjects such as free will, consciousness, or knowledge in philosophical subdisciplines like ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology. To embrace applied philosophy could thus mean to advocate for a philosophy that deals (...) with questions “relevant to ‘the important questions of everyday life,’” as Leslie Stevenson puts it, as opposed to questions that arise from within the subdisciplines of pure philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter explores the extent to which philosophy of language can be considered an applied discipline. I consider, first, ways in which sub-sections of philosophy of language may be considered as applied in terms of their subject matter and/or the kinds of questions being addressed (e.g. philosophy of language which deals with derogatory or inflammatory uses of language, or the role of philosophy of language within feminist philosophy). Then, in the second part of (...) the chapter, I turn to consider a more general (and perhaps more controversial) conception of philosophy of language as applied, which arises from the methodology adopted and the relationship of the discipline to empirical data. (shrink)

This paper draws an earlier book (with Evans and Higgins) entitled _Bad Call: Technology’s Attack on Referees and Umpires and How to Fix It_ (hereafter _Bad Call_) and its various precursor papers. These show why it is that current match officiating aids are unable to provide the kind of accuracy that is often claimed for them and that sports aficianados have been led to expect from them. Accuracy is improving all the time but the notion of perfect accuracy is a (...) myth because, for example, lines drawn on sports fields and the edges of balls are not perfectly defined. The devices meant to report the exact position of a ball—for instance ‘in’ or ‘out’ at tennis—work with the mathematically perfect world of virtual reality, not the actuality of an imperfect physical world. Even if ball-trackers could overcome the sort of inaccuracies related to fast ball speeds and slow camera frame-rates the goal of complete accuracy will always be beyond reach. Here it is suggested that the purpose of technological aids to umpires and referees be looked at in a new way that takes the viewers into account. (shrink)

Given the socio‐economic incentives for academic relevance, the sceptic may well challenge the academic integrity of the evolving discipline of business ethics. For, the question is, how could such an emerging field of enquiry constitute applied philosophy? I critically examine certain arguments, principally advanced by Michael Oakeshott and Stephen Clark, which might be thought to underwrite such scepticism, via a wholesale suspicion of applied ethics. Yet, I argue, philosophy can be and is properly concerned with our (...) practical experience and actions. The significance of more general, abstract ethical questions derives, in great part, from their bearing upon our practical deliberations and actions. Moreover, reflection about the nature and role of ethical principles need not deny a role for moral judgement. Although for contingent reasons we may be right to be worried, I present an argument to show that, as a matter of principle, the sceptical challenge regarding business ethics can be refuted. (shrink)

If ‘applied philosophy’is really to be applied it is necessary for its practical implications to be spelled out in some detail: both the specific goals implied if not entailed, and the life‐style that would be expected to support such goals. To be as specific as this would only be to emulate the ancient Greek philosophers whose influence may still be discerned and is often claimed. Contributions to a recent issue of this Journal are taken as a basis (...) for the discussion. (shrink)

Applied philosophy has been a growing area of research for the last 40 years. Until now, however, almost all of this research has been centered around the field of ethics. A Companion to Applied Philosophy breaks new ground, demonstrating that all areasof philosophy, including epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind, can be applied, and are relevant to questions of everyday life. This perennial topic in philosophy provides an overview (...) of these various applied philosophy developments, highlighting similarities and differences between various areas of applied philosophy, and examining the very nature of this topic. It is an area to which many of the towering figures in the history of philosophy have contributed, and this timely Companion demonstrates how various historical contributions are actually contributions within applied philosophy, even if they are not traditionally seen as such. The Companion contains 42 essays covering major areas of philosophy; the articles themselves are all original contributions to the literature and represent the state of the art on this topic, as well as offering a map to the current debates. (shrink)

This essay aims to explore the ways in which a philosophical account of humor can contribute to the explanation of the application of humor in the course of everyday day life. After providing a conceptual analysis of comic amusement ‐‐ the psychological state that takes humor as it's object ‐‐ and defending the thesis that it is an emotion, I will go on to show how this emotion functions productively in various situations in terms of the non‐exhaustive and non‐exclusive categories (...) of bonding, coping, and perspectival modification (or frame changing). I will not, however, discuss the frequent claims that humor contributes to health because the evidence for this claim is highly contested. (shrink)

This volume collects thirteen of David Schmidtz's essays on the question of what it takes to live a good life, given that we live in a social and natural world. Part One defends a non-maximizing conception of rational choice, explains how even ultimate goals can be rationally chosen, defends the rationality of concern and regard for others (even to the point of being willing to die for a cause), and explains why decision theory is necessarily incomplete as a tool for (...) addressing such issues. Part Two uses the tools of analytic philosophy to explain what we can do to be deserving, what is wrong with the idea that we ought to do as much good as we can, why mutual aid is good, but why the welfare state does not work as a way of institutionalizing mutual aid, and why transferring wealth from those who need it less to those who need it more can be a bad idea even from a utilitarian perspective. Most ambitiously, Part Two offers an overarching, pluralistic moral theory that defines the nature and limits of our obligations to each other and to our individual selves. Part Three discusses the history and economic logic of alternative property institutions, both private and communal, and explains why economic logic is an indispensable tool in the field of environmental conflict resolution. In the final essay, Schmidtz brings the volume full circle by considering the nature and limits of our obligations to nonhuman species, and how the status of nonhuman species ought to enter into our deliberations about what sort of life is worth living. (shrink)

This essay characterises applied philosophy of religion as a certain sort of engagement with what religion means in the private and public lives of its practitioners. After emphasising continuities with the past, such as Hume's critique of miracles and Hobbes and Spinoza's discussions of scriptural meanings, it then discusses John Cottingham's recent work on spirituality and religious sensibility, followed by a section on new explorations of religious epistemology citing Linda Zagzebski's work on individual and communal epistemic authority, and (...) Leonore Stump's elaboration of a form of non‐propositional knowledge gained from narrative. Debates about the role of religion in liberal democratic politics are then addressed, with special attention to the contentious idea of a religion‐free “secular” or “public” reason as advocated respectively by Robert Audi and John Rawls. The significance of interdisciplinary input for dispelling religious stereotypes leads to a discussion of common gaps between proclamations of religious leaders and the sincere religious beliefs of their flocks. A section follows on the complex idea of religious experience, before the essay concludes with an account of relevant issues in religious ethics. (shrink)

The value of applied philosophy is often taken to consist in its contribution to our understanding of practical issues with which applied philosophy engages and in its contribution to their satisfactory resolution. This chapter examines the relationship between the nature of applied philosophy and its value. It regards the value of applied philosophy as dependent both on its philosophical quality and on its contribution to the understanding and (potential) resolution of practical issues (...) with which it engages. These dual points of reference are difficult simultaneously to fulfill and arguably sometimes in tension with one another. The chapter takes issue with the idea that the value of applied philosophy consists, or ought to consist, in its direct impact on actual policy or practice. (shrink)

The methodology of applied philosophy may consist in its mode of application; or it may serve applied philosophy's purpose of speaking to practical matters. There may be no single method that is shared by all sub‐fields of applied philosophy; applied ethics, the dominant form of applied philosophy, should be thought of as neither “top‐down” nor “bottom‐up” in its methods. The use of far‐fetched examples is arguably in tension with the concerns and (...) intended audience of applied philosophy. Finally, applied philosophers may not be able to claim the status of experts; and moral expertise, in particular, is subject to moral worries. (shrink)

"Applied" is a technical term describing a variety of new philosophical enterprises. The author examines and rejects the view that these fields are derivative. Whatever principles, judgments, or background theories that are employed to solve problems in these areas are either changed by how they are used, or at least the possibility exists of their being changed. Hence we ought to stop calling these endeavors "applied", or agree that the meaning of "apply" will have to include the possibility (...) that what is applied may be changed. The socalled applied fields of philosophy, therefore, are not derivative. The strongest cases to the contrary are the foundationalist views that what we apply is epistemically privileged. Different foundationalist views take different principles, judgments, or background theories to be epistemically privileged. Strong and weak versions of each of these foundationalist views are considered but none establish these fields as derivative. Keywords: applied ethics, background theories, casuistry, epistemic privilige, foundationalism, principles, reflective equilibrium CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)