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Ari Maunu
University of Turku
  1. Jumalan ennaltatietäminen ja luotujen vapaus molinismin mukaan (in Finnish) [God's Foreknowledge and Creaturely Freedom according to Molinism].Ari Maunu - 2014 - Ajatus 71:143-172.
  2.  63
    Kaikkitietävä ajaton Jumala: Aikaindeksikaalien ongelma (in Finnish) ["Omniscient Timeless God: The Problem of Temporal Indexicals"].Ari Maunu - 2016 - Teologinen Aikakauskirja 2016 (2):121-127.
    Is God a timeless God? One standard argument against the supposition that He is is that it appears to be incompatible with God’s posited omniscience. If God is timeless, He cannot know truths involving temporal indexicals, such as the one I express right now by ”I am sitting now”. In this article, I discuss this argument and consider some replies to it. I focus on the denial of the view according to which knowledge expressed with temporally indexical true statements is (...)
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  3.  13
    Frege and the Description Theory: An Attempt at Rehabilitation.Ari Maunu - 2015 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 92 (1):109-116.
    I question the received view that Frege advocates the description theory of proper names. First, I argue that the textual evidence for this view from Frege’s writings is not conclusive. Secondly, I propose that the Fregean Sinne (of proper names) may be understood nondescriptionally in terms of symbolhood. Finally, I suggest that in the notorious passages where Frege is apparently supporting the description theory he is just indicating the potential problems with communication with proper names.
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  4.  39
    Leibnizin vastaväitteitä molinistiselle voluntarismille (in Finnish) [Leibniz's Objections to Molinist Voluntarism].Ari Maunu - 2015 - Ajatus 72:53-69.
    The purpose of this paper is to explain and discuss Leibniz’s main objections to the Molinist-Suárezian voluntarist (libertarian) conception of freedom, i.e., the conception involving the supposition of “freedom of indifference” of the will to make contrary choices in exactly the same circumstances. Leibniz’s main objections to the voluntarist conception are the following: (i) it violates the Principle of Sufficient Reason; (ii) it is based on a mistaken picture of the nature of the will.
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  5. Leibnizian Soft Reduction of Extrinsic Denominations and Relations.Ari Maunu - 2004 - Synthese 139 (1):143-164.
    Leibniz, it seems, wishes to reduce statements involving relations or extrinsic denominations to ones solely in terms of individual accidents or, respectively, intrinsic denominations. His reasons for this appear to be that relations are merely mental things (since they cannot be individual accidents) and that extrinsic denominations do not represent substances as they are on their own. Three interpretations of Leibniz''s reductionism may be distinguished: First, he allowed only monadic predicates in reducing statements (hard reductionism); second, he allowed also `implicitly (...)
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  6.  92
    Leibniz's Theory of Universal Expression Explicated.Ari Maunu - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):247-267.
    According Leibniz's thesis of universal expression, each substance expresses the whole world, i.e. all other substances, or, as Leibniz frequently states, from any given complete individual notion (which includes, in internal terms, everything truly attributable to a substance) one can "deduce" or "infer" all truths about the whole world. On the other hand, in Leibniz's view each (created) substance is internally individuated, self-sufficient and independent of other (created) substances. What may be called Leibniz's expression problem is, how to reconcile these (...)
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  7. Modal Logic From Kant to Possible Worlds Semantics.Tapio Korte, Ari Maunu & Tuomo Aho - 2009 - In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The Development of Modern Logic. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter begins with a discussion of Kant's theory of judgment-forms. It argues that it is not true in Kant's logic that assertoric or apodeictic judgments imply problematic ones, in the manner in which necessity and truth imply possibility in even the weakest systems of modern modal logic. The chapter then discusses theories of judgment-form after Kant, the theory of quantification, Frege's Begriffsschrift, C. I. Lewis and the beginnings of modern modal logic, the proof-theoretic approach to modal logic, possible world (...)
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  8.  18
    Necessary A Posteriori Identity Truths: Fregeanism Beats Direct Reference Theory.Ari Maunu - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (1):73-80.
    I argue that Fregeanism with respect to proper names—the view that modes of presentation are relevant to the contents of proper names—is able to account for the thesis that there are necessarily true a posteriori identity propositions such as the one expressed in “Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus”, whereas the Direct Reference Theory—according to which the semantic function of certain expressions, e.g., proper names, is only to pick out an object —is able to deal with only their necessary truth. Thus, (...)
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  9.  30
    Leibnizian Rejection of Standard Thought Experiments Against Identity of Indiscernibles.Ari Maunu - 2015 - Metaphysica 16 (2):189-193.
    It is argued that from a genuine Leibnizian point of view the well-known thought experiment, call it BTE, involving a possible world with only two exactly similar objects, cannot be used to refute Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (LIdI). If the claim that there are two objects in BTE is based on primitive thisnesses, the Leibnizian objection is that there are no such things; and even if there were, then, quite generally, something true of one object – that (...)
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  10.  10
    The Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals Requires No Restrictions.Ari Maunu - forthcoming - Synthese:1-8.
    There is a certain argument against the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, or the thesis that whatever is true of a thing is true of anything identical with that thing. In this argument, PInI is used together with the self-evident principle of the necessity of self-identity to reach the conclusion Open image in new window, which is held to be paradoxical and, thus, fatal to PInI. My purpose is to show that the argument in question does not have this (...)
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  11. On a Misguided Argument for the Necessity of Identity.Ari Maunu - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.
    There is a certain popular argument, deriving from Ruth Barcan and Saul Kripke, from the conjunction of the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals (PInI, for short) and the Principle of the Necessity of Self-Identity to the Thesis of the Necessity of Identity. My purpose is to show that this argument does not work, not at least in the form it is often presented. I also give a correct formulation of the argument and point out that PInI is not even (...)
     
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  12.  79
    Generalist Transworld Identitism (or, Identity Through Possible Worlds Without Nonqualitative Thisnesses).Ari Maunu - 2005 - Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):151-158.
    A certain argument has been given in the literature to the effect that generalism (the view that all facts about all possible worlds can (in principle) be given in general terms, that is, without resorting to nonqualitative thisnesses) excludes transworld identitism (the view that there are numerical identities through possible worlds). It follows from this argument, among other things, that transworld identitism entails Scotistic haecceitism (acceptance of nonqualitative thisnesses), and that generalists subscribing to de reism (the view that there are (...)
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  13.  87
    A Problem with De Re Belief Ascriptions, with a Consequence to Substitutivity.Ari Maunu - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):411-421.
    It is shown that the coherence of de re belief ascriptions is doubtful in view of certain plausible principles. Subsequently, it is argued, the standard argument against substitutivity in de dicto ascriptions loses some of its power. Also, some possible reactions to these results are considered.
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  14.  3
    Leibniz’s Theory of Universal Expression Explicated.Ari Maunu - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):247-267.
    According Leibniz's thesis of universal expression, each substance expresses the whole world, i.e. all other substances, or, as Leibniz frequently states, from any given complete individual notion (which includes, in internal terms, everything truly attributable to a substance) one can "deduce" or "infer" all truths about the whole world. On the other hand, in Leibniz's view each (created) substance is internally individuated, self-sufficient and independent of other (created) substances. What may be called Leibniz's expression problem is, how to reconcile these (...)
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  15.  66
    Frege's Gedanken Are Not Truth Conditions.Ari Maunu - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4 (2):231-238.
    Michael Dummett has advanced, very influentially, the view that Frege means truth conditions by his notion of thought (Gedanke). My aim in this paper is to argue that Dummett and others are mistaken in this claim. First, Frege's aversion of the correspondence theory of truth does not square well with Dummett's claim. Secondly, and more importantly, Grundgesetze I, §32, is the only place where Frege even appears to be talking about truth conditions in connection with his notion of thought -- (...)
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  16.  17
    A Sound Cartesian Argument From Doubt for Dualism.Ari Maunu - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):461-465.
    I put forward a version of the Cartesian Argument from Doubt for mind–body dualism. My version utilizes de re statements, which means that it is not vulnerable to the usual charge of intensional fallacy. The key de re statement is, ‘Body is such that its existence is entailed by Mind’s believing that Body does not exist’, which is false, whereas the respective ‘Mind is such that its existence is entailed by Mind’s believing that Body does not exist’ is true.
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  17.  52
    Indiscernibility of Identicals and Substitutivity in Leibniz.Ari Maunu - 2002 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 19 (4):367-380.
    It is shown that typical arguments from intensionality against the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals (InI) misconstrue this principle, confusing it with the Principle of Substitution (PS). It has been proposed that Leibniz, in his statements like, "If A is the same as B, then A can be substituted for B, salva veritate, in any proposition", is not applying InI to objects nor PS to signs, but is talking about substitution of concepts in propositions, or applying InI to concepts. It (...)
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  18.  49
    Natural Kind Terms Are Similar to Proper Names in Being World-Independent.Ari Maunu - 2002 - Philosophical Writings 19:51-68.
    According to the New Theory of Reference, proper names (and indexicals) and natural kind terms are semantically similar to each other but crucially different from definite descriptions and “ordinary” predicates, respectively. New Theorists say that a name, unlike a definite description, is a directly referential nondescriptional rigid designator, which refers “without a mediation of the content” and is not functional (i.e. lacks a Carnapian intension). Natural kind terms, such as ‘horse’ and ‘water’, are held to have similar distinctions, in contrast (...)
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  19.  46
    Alethic Statements Are Not Intensional.Ari Maunu - 2006 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):53-61.
    According to the standard view, alethic (or modal) statements are intensional in that the Principle of Substitution (PS) fails for them -- e.g. substituting 'nine' in "Necessarily, nine is composite" with the co-referring 'the number of planets' turns this statement from true to false. It is argued in the paper that we could avoid ascribing intensionality to alethic statements altogether by separating between singular and functional uses of definite descriptions: on the singular use the description given above amounts to 'the (...)
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  20.  45
    Extrinsic Denominations and Universal Expression in Leibniz.Ari Maunu - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):83-97.
    The paper discusses Leibniz's theory of denominations, expression, and individual notions, the central claim being that the key to many of Leibniz's fundamental theses is to consider his argument, starting from his predicate-in-subject account of truth (that in a true statement the notion of the predicate is contained in that of the subject), against purely extrinsic denominations: this argument shows why there is an internal foundation for all denominations, why everything in the world is interconnected, why each substance expresses all (...)
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  21.  53
    Some Fregean Considerations on Predicates and Their Reference.Ari Maunu - 2006 - Tabula Rasa 25.
    The aim of this paper is (i) to defend Frege's view that the referents of predicates are certain kinds of functions, or "concepts", i.e. incomplete entities, and not their extensions (i.e. sets of objects described by those predicates); and (ii) to justify, by a natural augmentation of Frege's semantic theory with modal ingredients, Frege's position that the sameness between concepts, or property-sharing, turns only on the sameness of extensions. Several problems with the doctrine that a predicate's extension is its referent (...)
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  22.  38
    No Belief Is Contingently True.Ari Maunu - 2003 - Auslegung 26 (2):67-75.
    It is commonly held, plausibly, that many true beliefs are true only contingently, that is, are actually true (or true with respect to the actual world) but would be false were the world in some relevant ways otherwise (i.e. are false with respect to some other possible worlds). However, a radically different approach, according to which no belief is contingently true, is entirely defensible. The key point in this alternative approach is that each belief concerns the world in which the (...)
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  23.  26
    A Simple Solution to the Problem of De Se Belief Ascriptions.Ari Maunu - 2000 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 33 (3-4):199-226.
    I show how a de se belief ascription such as "Privatus believes that he himself is rich" may be dealt with by means of a scope distinction over and above that one separating de dicto and de re ascriptions. The idea is, roughly, that 'Privatus...himself' forms in this statement a unity, a single "spread" sign that is at the same time in a de re and de dicto position. If so, H-N. Castañeda's contention that the "quasi-indicator" 'he himself' ('she herself', (...)
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  24.  4
    Extrinsic Denominations and Universal Expression in Leibniz.Ari Maunu - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):83-98.
    The paper discusses Leibniz's theory of denominations, expression, and individual notions, the central claim being that the key to many of Leibniz's fundamental theses is to consider his argument, starting from his predicate-in-subject account of truth (that in a true statement the notion of the predicate is contained in that of the subject), against purely extrinsic denominations: this argument shows why there is an internal foundation for all denominations, why everything in the world is interconnected, why each substance expresses all (...)
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  25. Extrinsic Denominations and Universal Expression in Leibniz.Ari Maunu - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (1):83-98.
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  26. Leibniz and Spinozist Necessitarianism.Ari Maunu - 2018 - Studia Leibnitiana 26 (2):261-267.
    It is sometimes argued that Leibniz’s metaphysical commitments lead to Spinozist Necessitarianism, i.e., the view, in Spinoza’s words, that “Things could not have been produced by God in any way or in any order other than that in which they have been produced”. Leibniz comments on this passage as follows: “This proposition may be true or false, depending on how it is explained”. I suggest in this paper that what Leibniz means by this comment can be fleshed out by making (...)
     
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  27.  44
    Worldlessness, Determinism and Free Will.Ari Maunu - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Turku (Finland)
    I have three main objectives in this essay. First, in chapter 2, I shall put forward and justify what I call worldlessness, by which I mean the following: All truths (as well as falsehoods) are wholly independent of any circumstances, not only time and place but also possible worlds. It follows from this view that whatever is actually true must be taken as true with respect to every possible world, which means that all truths are (in a sense) necessary. However, (...)
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