Man kann wohl keinen zweifel daruber aufkommen lassen, da"b" das problem der "kunst" in seiner ganzen philosophischen gedankenfulle eine der wichtigsten rollen spielt. dieses problem hangt unablosbar mit ontologie des philosophen zusammen, die ihm die zentrale aufgabe des denkens ist. in seinem ganzen denkprozess hat der begriff "kunst" zwei fundamentale bedeutungen. "kunst" ist einerseits eben nicht die technik, womit man schone dinge herstellt, sondern der "entwurf" des menschlichen seins, also des seinzum-seinkonnens. anderseits ist sie "techne" im ursprunglichen sinne, die das (...) wissen unter anderem das selbst-wissen bedeutet, indem "techne" im "physis", d.h., im aufgehen des seienden im ganzen funktioniert. sie ist am ende die "ontologischen verfassungen" des menschen. der mensch mu"b" diese "kunst" haben, um den eigentlichen sinn seines eigenen seins, den sinn seines in-der-welt-seins zu verstehen. die sogenannte "schone kunst" ist hierbei als "techne" im weitesten sinne des wortes gedacht. durch solche identifizierung der "kunst" mit dem wesen des menschen versucht heidegger den echten grund der "schonen kunst" zu erhellen. (shrink)

This article considers Socrates's conception of courage in Plato's Socratic dialogues. Although the Laches, which is the only dialogue devoted in toto to a pursuit of the definition of courage, does not explicitly provide Socrates's definition of courage, I shall point out clues therein which contribute to an understanding of Socrates's conception of courage. The Protagoras is a peculiar dialogue in which Socrates himself offers a definition of courage. Attending to the dramatic structure and personalities of the dialogue, I will (...) point out that Socrates does not commit to the definition and that the hedonism and the definition of courage are used to disclose Protagoras's confusion regarding virtue. Following one of the clues within the Laches I will turn to the Apology and indicate Socrates's conception of courage which is based on his awareness of lack of knowledge of death and his religious conviction that nothing will happen for the good in life or in death. Finally I will show that such conception of Socratic courage satisfies the criteria in the Laches. (shrink)

In theLysisSocrates deals with the problem of what is a friend and what is friendship. After giving an introduction and a synopsis of theLysisin section one, I explain, in section two, Socrates’ view that a true friend is “what is akin” or “what is belonging to oneself” which is what is taken from oneself and discovered in another person. When this happens among two persons, they become friends to each other. The content of what is akin is either a good (...) characteristic or ways or form of the soul. Friendship is the desire for what is akin. In section three I show that Socrates remains inaporiawhile he faces several problems. Unless he is able to answer such problems, he will not be truly confident about what is a friend. In section four I deal with and refute Penner’s and Rowe’s view that a true friend means wisdom. In section five I examine the view of friendship which occurs among people who share common deficit. As a conclusion, in section six, I reflect on the significance of my interpretation and the role of theLysisin Plato’s philosophy. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to reveal Socrates as a thorough democrat. In the first section, I will disprove the credibility of Xenophon's Memorabilia, a common source for scholars who view Socrates as an antidemocratic thinker. I will then argue, in the second section, that the views of a few scholars who portray Socrates as a prodemocratic thinker represent a far-from-satisfactory depiction of his political views. In the third section, I will then demonstrate that Socrates' criticism of democracy is (...) not of democracy itself nor of Athenian laws, but instead a criticism of a particular sort of democracy seen in the period of Athenian imperialism, and that it derives from his fundamental recognition of human ignorance. After pointing out Socrates' special preference for the democratic laws of Athens, seen in the Crito, I will establish, in the fourth section, a preference in his philosophy showing him as a staunch democrat who upheld the concept of the rule of law. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to reveal Socrates as a thorough democrat. In the first section, I will disprove the credibility of Xenophon’s Memorabilia, a common source for scholars who view Socrates as an antidemocratic thinker. I will then argue, in the second section, that the views of a few scholars who portray Socrates as a prodemocratic thinker represent a far-from-satisfactory depiction of his political views. In the third section, I will then demonstrate that Socrates’ criticism of democracy is (...) not of democracy itself nor of Athenian laws, but instead a criticism of a particular sort of democracy seen in the period of Athenian imperialism, and that it derives from his fundamental recognition of human ignorance. After pointing out Socrates’ special preference for the democratic laws of Athens, seen in the Crito, I will establish, in the fourth section, a preference in his philosophy showing him as a staunch democrat who upheld the concept of the rule of law. (shrink)

As an introduction to this paper, I refer to a controversy among scholars. Socrates said in the Apology (29d) that he would continue philosophizing even if the state forbade him, while he declared in the Crito (50a-53a) that every citizen should do whatever the state commands him to do. To solve this inconsistency, Vlastos is opposed to taking Socrates' remark in the Crito literally, regarding it as �inflated rhetoric�. According to Woozley, Socrates' remark in the Crito has a �permitted exception�, (...) and philosophizing is the exception. Young insists that Socrates does not believe in his own remark uttered in the Crito, and said it only to persuade Crito who had, Young believes, no ability to understand Socrates� real view. These interpretations seem to be attempts to adjust Socrates' remark in the Crito to that in the Apology. On the other hand, Euben considers the inconsistency to be a real one, reflecting �a tension� between philosophy and politics. (shrink)

The concept of cuteness, which can evoke positive emotions in people, is an essential aspect to consider in artificial intelligence design. This study aimed to investigate whether the use of baby schema designed avatars in computer-mediated communication elicits higher positive attitudes than neutral avatars and whether the ethnicity of the cute avatars influences individuals' perceived level of cuteness. 485 participants from Israel and Japan viewed six avatar images, including three baby schema avatars of different visual characteristics and ethnicities (Caucasian, Asian, (...) and Black) and three neutral avatars. Participants rated their attitudes on each avatar, and the results revealed that the baby schema designed avatars were rated cuter, more likable, approachable, and pleasant than the neutral mature avatars. Cultural differences were also evident, as the Caucasian baby schema avatar was rated cuter among Japanese participants, while the Asian and Black baby schema avatars were rated cuter among Israeli respondents. The study findings suggest that cute avatar design can serve as a powerful tool for promoting positive interactions in computer-mediated communication, especially in cultures that highly value cuteness, such as Japan. However, the subjective nature of cuteness is evident as attitudes toward cuteness varied significantly across cultures and individuals. This research highlights the significance of cultural diversity and emphasizes the importance of considering cuteness as a crucial aspect of artificial intelligence design, particularly when creating avatars intended to elicit positive emotions from users. Therefore, designers should be mindful of potential cultural and individual differences in the perception of cuteness while developing avatars for various applications. (shrink)