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Profile: Danny Armstrong (University of Warwick)
  1. D. M. Armstrong (2004). Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge University Press.
    Truths are determined not by what we believe, but by the way the world is. Or so realists about truth believe. Philosophers call such theories correspondence theories of truth. Truthmaking theory, which now has many adherents among contemporary philosophers, is the most recent development of a realist theory of truth, and in this book D. M. Armstrong offers the first full-length study of this theory. He examines its applications to different sorts of truth, including contingent truths, modal truths, truths about (...)
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  2. D. M. Armstrong (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press.
    Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the "logical atomism" of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts (or states of affairs, as the author calls them) the ...
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  3. D. M. Armstrong (1983). What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge University Press.
    This is a study of a crucial and controversial topic in metaphysics and the philosophy of science: the status of the laws of nature. D. M. Armstrong works out clearly and in comprehensive detail a largely original view that laws are relations between properties or universals. The theory is continuous with the views on universals and more generally with the scientific realism that Professor Armstrong has advanced in earlier publications. He begins here by mounting an attack on the orthodox and (...)
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  4. D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (3):429-440.
    In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and (...)
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  5. D. M. Armstrong (1989). Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Westview Press.
    In this short text, a distinguished philosopher turns his attention to one of the oldest and most fundamental philosophical problems of all: How it is that we are able to sort and classify different things as being of the same natural class? Professor Armstrong carefully sets out six major theories—ancient, modern, and contemporary—and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of each. Recognizing that there are no final victories or defeats in metaphysics, Armstrong nonetheless defends a traditional account of universals as the (...)
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  6. D. M. Armstrong (1963). Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible? Philosophical Review 72 (4):417.
  7. David M. Armstrong (2005). Four Disputes About Properties. Synthese 144 (3):309-320.
    In considering the nature of properties four controversial decisions must be made. (1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars, or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, or is it necessary? These choices seem to be in a great degree independent of each other. The author indicates his own choices.
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  8.  50
    D. M. Armstrong (1978). Universals and Scientific Realism. Cambridge University Press.
    v. 1. Nominalism and realism.--v. 2. A theory of universals.
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  9. David Malet Armstrong (1978). A Theory of Universals. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume Ii. Cambridge University Press.
  10.  65
    David M. Armstrong & Norman Malcolm (1984). Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind. Blackwell.
  11. David M. Armstrong (2007). How Do Particulars Stand to Universals? In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. OUP Oxford
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  12.  75
    D. M. Armstrong (1996). Dispositions: A Debate. Routledge.
    Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. IDispositions: A Debate is an extended dialogue between three distinguished philosophers - D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place - on the many problems associated with dispositions, which reveals their own distinctive accounts of the nature of dispositions. These are then linked to other issues such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and causation.
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  13. David M. Armstrong (1970). The Nature of Mind. In Clive V. Borst (ed.), The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan
  14. D. M. Armstrong (1980). Against Ostrich Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61.
    In my reply to michael devitt, It is argued, First, That quine fails to appreciate the force of plato's "one over many" argument for universals. It is argued, Second, That quine's failure springs in part at least from his doctrine of ontological commitment: from the view that predicates need not be treated with ontological seriousness. Finally, An attempt is made to blunt the force of devitt's contention that realists cannot give a coherent explanation of the way that universals stand to (...)
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  15. David M. Armstrong (1999). The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction. Westview Press.
    The emphasis is always on the arguments used, and the way one position develops from another. By the end of the book the reader is afforded both a grasp of the state of the controversy, and how we got there.
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  16.  35
    David M. Armstrong (1961). Perception And The Physical World. Humanities Press.
  17. David Malet Armstrong (1978). Nominalism and Realism. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume I. Cambridge University Press.
  18.  78
    David Malet Armstrong (1999). The Causal Theory of Properties: Properties According to Shoemaker, Ellis, and Others. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):25-37.
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  19.  37
    David M. Armstrong (1968). The Nature of Mind and Other Essays. Humanities Press.
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  20.  59
    David Armstrong (2005). Reply to Simons and Mumford. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):271 – 276.
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  21. D. M. Armstrong (1986). In Defence of Structural Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):85 – 88.
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  22.  64
    D. M. Armstrong (1971). Meaning and Communication. Philosophical Review 80 (4):427-447.
  23.  23
    John Heil & D. M. Armstrong (1999). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Review 108 (1):115.
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  24. David Armstrong, Combinatorialism Revisited.
    The object of this paper is to argue once again for the combinatorial account of possibility defended in earlier work. But there I failed fully to realise the dialectical advantages that accrue once one begins by assuming the hypothesis of logical atomism, the hypothesis that postulates simple particulars and simple universals at the bottom of the world. Logical atomism is, I incline to think, no better than ‘speculative cosmology’ as opposed to ‘analytic ontology’, to use Donald Williams’ terminology. It is, (...)
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  25. David M. Armstrong (1981). What is Consciousness? In John Heil (ed.), The Nature of Mind. Cornell University Press
  26. David M. Armstrong (1999). The Open Door: Counterfactual Versus Singularist Theories of Causation. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer 175--185.
  27.  43
    D. M. Armstrong (1988). Are Quantities Relations? A Reply to Bigelow and Pargetter. Philosophical Studies 54 (3):305 - 316.
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  28. Adrian Heathcote & D. M. Armstrong (1991). Causes and Laws. Noûs 25 (1):63-73.
  29.  21
    David Armstrong, Revisions, and Quiddities.
    I used to think of the connection between a particular and a universal that it instantiates as a contingent one. Now I think that this is not quite right. This revision, as I now see it, is not a very large one. I still think that the states of affairs that unite particulars and universals are contingent beings. But the connection within states of affairs is, in a certain way, necessary.
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  30.  96
    David M. Armstrong (1962). Bodily Sensations. Routledge.
  31. David M. Armstrong (1996). Qualia Ain't in the Head. Psyche 2 (1):31--4.
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  32. Peter Forrest & D. M. Armstrong (1984). An Argument Against David Lewis' Theory of Possible Worlds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):164 – 168.
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  33.  87
    D. M. Armstrong (1991). Classes Are States of Affairs. Mind 100 (2):189-200.
  34. D. M. Armstrong, Revisions and Quiddities.
    I used to think of the connection between a particular and a universal that it instantiates as a contingent one. Now I think that this is not quite right. This revision, as I now see it, is not a very large one. I still think that the states of affairs (Russell’s facts in his great Lectures on Logical Atomism) that unite particulars and universals are contingent beings. But the connection within states of affairs is, in a certain way, necessary.
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  35. D. M. Armstrong (1988). Are Dispositions Ultimate? Reply to Franklin. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (150):84-86.
  36.  80
    David Armstrong (2003). Truthmakers for Modal Truths. In Hallvard Lillehammer Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (ed.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. Routledge 12-24.
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  37. D. M. Armstrong (1978). Naturalism, Materialism and First Philosophy. Philosophia 8 (2-3):261-276.
    First, The doctrine of naturalism, That reality is spatio-Temporal, Is defended. Second, The doctrine of materialism or physicalism, That this spatio-Temporal reality involves nothing but the entities of physics working according to the principles of physics, Is defended. Third, It is argued that these doctrines do not constitute a "first philosophy." a satisfactory first philosophy should recognize universals, In the form of instantiated properties and relations. Laws of nature are constituted by relations between universals. What universals there are, And what (...)
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  38.  86
    David Armstrong (1980). Identity Through Time. In Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor. Reidel 67-78.
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  39.  46
    D. M. Armstrong (2006). Reply to Heil. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):245 – 247.
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  40. D. M. Armstrong (1997). Properties. In D. H. Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. OUP Oxford
     
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  41. David Malet Armstrong (1991). What Makes Induction Rational? Dialogue 30 (4):503-11.
  42. D. M. Armstrong (1982). Laws of Nature as Relations Between Universals and as Universals. Philosophical Topics 13 (1):7-24.
  43. David M. Armstrong (1987). Smart and the Secondary Qualities. In Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & J. Norman (eds.), Metaphysics And Morality. Blackwell
     
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  44.  64
    D. M. Armstrong (1999). A Naturalist Program: Epistemology and Ontology. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 73 (2):77 - 89.
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  45.  94
    Leonard Angel, D. M. Armstrong, Cambridge Cambridge & M. C. Banner (1990). Appearance in This List Does Not Preclude a Future Review of the Book. Where They Are Known Prices Are Given Either in $ US or in£ UK. Books Which Are Not, Centrally, Academic Philosophy Appear in a Supplementary List at the End. Al Azmeh, Aziz, Ibn Khaldun, London, Routledge, 1990, 191pp., Paper£ 8.95 Aldwinckle, Stella, Christ's Shadow in Plato's Cave, Oxford, The Amate Press. [REVIEW] Mind 99:395.
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  46. D. Armstrong, C. B. Martin & U. T. Place (1996). In T. Crane. In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge
  47.  72
    D. M. Armstrong (2006). The Scope and Limits of Human Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):159 – 166.
    This paper argues that the foundations of our knowledge are the bed-rock certainties of ordinary life, what may be called the Moorean truths. Beyond that are the well-established results within the empirical sciences, and whatever has been proved in the rational sciences of mathematics and logic. Otherwise there is only belief, which may be more or less rational. A moral drawn from this is that dogmatism should be moderated on all sides.
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  48.  86
    Storrs McCall & D. M. Armstrong (1989). God's Lottery. Analysis 49 (4):223 - 224.
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  49.  74
    David Malet Armstrong (1969). Dispositions Are Causes. Analysis 30 (1):23-26.
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  50.  83
    D. M. Armstrong (1999). Comment on Smart. In Howard Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature. Kluwer 171--172.
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