16 found
Order:
See also
Artūrs Logins
University of Zürich
  1. Two-State Solution to the Lottery Paradox.Artūrs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.
    This paper elaborates a new solution to the lottery paradox, according to which the paradox arises only when we lump together two distinct states of being confident that p under one general label of ‘belief that p’. The two-state conjecture is defended on the basis of some recent work on gradable adjectives. The conjecture is supported by independent considerations from the impossibility of constructing the lottery paradox both for risk-tolerating states such as being afraid, hoping or hypothesizing, and for risk-averse, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Normative Reasons Without (Good) Reasoning.Artūrs Logins - 2019 - Ethics 130 (2):208-210.
    According to the good reasoning view of normative reasons, p is a reason to F, just in case p is a premise of a good pattern of reasoning. This article presents two counterexamples to the most promising version of the good reasoning view.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  3.  68
    Graded Epistemic Justification.John Hawthorne & Artūrs Logins - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1845-1858.
    The adjective ‘is justified’ has all the hallmarks of a gradable adjective. But the relationship between gradable uses and straightforward predications of the form ‘x is justified’ has been underexplored by epistemologists. In this paper we undertake to do some ground clearing as a prelude to better understanding this relationship.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Save the Children!Artūrs Logins - 2016 - Analysis 76 (4):418-422.
  5.  76
    Is an Increase in Probability Always an Increase in Evidential Support?Artūrs Logins - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-25.
    Peter Achinstein has argued at length and on many occasions that the view according to which evidential support is defined in terms of probability-raising faces serious counterexamples and, hence, should be abandoned. Proponents of the positive probabilistic relevance view have remained unconvinced. The debate seems to be in a deadlock. This paper is an attempt to move the debate forward and revisit some of the central claims within this debate. My conclusion here will be that while Achinstein may be right (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Common Sense and Evidence: Some Neglected Arguments in Favour of E=K.Artūrs Logins - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):120-137.
    In this article I focus on some unduly neglected common-sense considerations supporting the view that one's evidence is the propositions that one knows. I reply to two recent objections to these considerations.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. Necessary Truths, Evidence, and Knowledge.Artūrs Logins - 2016 - Filosofia Unisinos 17 (3):302-307.
    According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing about (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8.  33
    On Williamson's Account of Propositional Evidence.Artūrs Logins - 2013 - Logique Et Analyse 56 (223):347-354.
    In this paper I examine Williamson’s (2000) claim that all evidence is propositional. I propose to reject this claim. I give two objections to two premises of Williamson’s argument. The first is a critique of Williamson’s claim that we choose between hypotheses on the basis of our evidence. The second objection is that Williamson’s claim that evidence is an explanandum of an hypothesis leads to counter-intuitive consequences and thus is not central to what evidence is, at least on an ordinary (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9. How to Argue with a Pragmatist.Artūrs Logins - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    According to recently popular pragmatist views it may be rational for one to believe p when one’s evidence doesn’t favour p over not-p. This may happen according to pragmatists in situations where one can gain something practically important out of believing p. In this paper I argue that given some independently plausible assumptions about the argumentative nature of philosophy and the irrelevance of bribes for good arguments, pragmatism leads to a contradiction.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  32
    Justification Épistémique.Arturs Logins - 2018 - L’Encyclopédie Philosophique (Version Grand Public).
    Certaines croyances sont justifiées tandis que d’autres ne le sont pas. Si je crois que la Terre est ronde, on peut considérer que ma croyance est justifiée, alors que si je crois qu’elle est plate, elle ne l’est pas. Qu’est-ce qui différencie les unes des autres ? Une croyance justifiée doit-elle toujours être fondée sur une autre croyance justifiée ? Comment pouvons-nous éviter la conclusion sceptique selon laquelle nous ne sommes pas justifiés à croire quoi que ce soit ? Ces (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  27
    Knowledge, Practice, and Merit.Arturs Logins - 2012 - Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):133-152.
    In this paper I discuss the role that knowledge plays with regard to rational action. It has been recently argued that knowledge determines appropriate action. I examine this proposal, consider objections against it, and finally propose a defense of it.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  56
    Mark McBride, Basic Knowledge and Conditions on Knowledge, Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2017, 228 Pp., £16.95 , ISBN 978‐1‐78374‐283‐7. [REVIEW]Artūrs Logins - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):280-285.
  13. On Having Evidence: A Reply to Neta.Arturs Logins - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3): 367-370.
    According to one line of thought only propositions can be part of one’s evidence, since only propositions can serve the central functions of our ordinary concept of evidence. Ram Neta has challenged this argument. In this paper I respond to Neta’s challenge.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  40
    Scepticisme, Fidéisme Et Évidentialisme : Oppositions Et Origines.Artūrs Logins - 2013 - Dialogue 51 (4):613-642.
    Les principales attitudes adoptées devant les questions centrales de l’épistémologie générale sont selon nous l’évidentialisme, le scepticisme et le fidéisme. Dans cet article, nous présentons d’une part les arguments permettant d’accepter une forme de l’évidentialisme selon laquelle aucune croyance fausse ne peut être justifiée sur la base de raisons probantes. D’autre part, nous proposons de considérer l’aspect historique de l’émergence de l’évidentialisme au début des Lumières. Nous explorons un cas particulier qui témoigne de l’émergence de l’évidentialisme moderne comme opposition au (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Subjective Unpossessed Reasons.Arturs Logins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):262-270.
    A common assumption in contemporary debates about normative reasons is that ‘subjective’ and ‘possessed’ are two names for the same sort of reason. This paper challenges that assumption. Given our cognitive limitations, it is unsurprising that normative reasons that derive from what we know and reasons that we are in a position to use in our deliberation are not always one and the same.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  72
    The Problem of Massive Deception for Justification Norms of Action.Arturs Logins - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):457-468.
    In this paper, I argue against recent versions of justification norms of action and practical deliberation . I demonstrate that these norms yield unacceptable results in deception cases. However, a further modification of justification norms in the light of these results appears to be ad hoc. Hence, I claim, we should reject justification norms of action and practical deliberation.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark