The reality of the thinking subject -- The paralogisms and transcendental idealism -- The first paralogism -- The second paralogism -- Transcendental self-consciousness -- Other interpretations of the paralogisms -- Empirical apperception -- Pure apperception -- The person as subject -- Apperception and inner sense -- The third paralogism and Kant's conception of a person -- The embodied subject -- The fourth paralogism.

The contemporary discussion of non-conceptual content inaugurated by Gareth Evans and John McDowell has generated a range of differing views as to Kant's position on the issues raised. I argue that for Kant perception is prior to thought and that it is as being prior that perception connects us to reality in outer intuition. I then argue that for Kant thought relates to perception by being the rule for perceptual procedures. This accounts for thought's extending in scope beyond what we (...) actually perceive to all that is manifest in space and time. As against Merleau-Ponty this Kantian understanding of thought beyond perception does not distort the nature of reality which remains essentially that which can be engaged. (shrink)

Intended for those interested in Kant's contribution to philosophy, this volume provides an overview of Kant's arguments concerning central issues in metaphysics and ethics.

To be happy is to be satisfied with one’s life according to a standard that one can claim as a reasonable being. Being moral and being held morally responsible are shown to be essential to being happy in this sense.

Introduction The predominant positive view among philosophers and scientists is that consciousness is something realized in brain activity. ...

IN THE FIRST EDITION TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION of the categories Kant does not mention the logical functions of judgment. In the second edition the Deduction can be said to be dominated by the logical functions of judgment. A transcendental deduction supplies a method for showing that pure concepts can have applicability. My contention is that the two deductions constitute exactly the same method, and so are the exact same deduction. The difference between them, rather, is in the characterization of the pure (...) concepts that the method is supposed to be a method for. The undifferentiated categories of the A edition become the logical functions together with their schemata in the B edition. This does not mean that Kant has split the A edition notion of categories since the A edition categories are equivalent to just the schemata themselves. (shrink)

We have thoughts of the world by having thoughts of spatio-temporal positioning which, as naturalized, are mechanisms for spatio-temporal constructive output. Even thoughts of past time are such thoughts of positioning by being mechanisms for being beyond stages of temporal constructions. This allows a naturalized realist semantics in which the content of thoughts that are in the head is purported existence anywhere in space and time. A correspondence theory of truth and a truth-conditional theory of meaning derive naturalistically from this (...) basis. (shrink)

According to Kant's theory of thought or cognition, thoughts are rules for empirical reactions in the compass of spatial and temporal constructions. Theses rules function to represent our situation in relation to all the ways it is proper to interact with reality. After outlining Kant's theory, I present a modified version in which rules are identified with executive mechanisms for behavioural output. Following Kant, I show how such rules can pertain to the past in terms of mechanisms for being beyond (...) or past stages of temporal constructions. This identification of rules with mechanisms allows for a real definition of the truth of thoughts as the active realizability of the mechanisms that thoughts are. I show how this modified version can encompass the full scope of even relativistic spatio-temporal reality, and indicate why this theory deserves consideration as against rival descriptive and causal theories of cognition. (shrink)