Smiling can be interpreted as a costly signal of future benefits from cooperation between the individual smiling and the individual to whom the smile is directed. The target article by Niedenthal et al. gives little attention to the possible mechanisms by which smiling may have evolved. In our view, there are strong reasons to think that smiling has the key characteristics of a costly signal.

From the viewpoint of the independence axiom of expected utility theory, an interesting empirical dynamic choice problem involves the presence of a “global risk,” that is, a chance of losing everything whichever safe or risky option is chosen. In this experimental study, participants have to allocate real money between a safe and a risky project. Treatment variable is the particular decision stage at which a global risk is resolved: (i) before the investment decision; (ii) after the investment decision, but before (...) the resolution of the decision risk; (iii) after the resolution of the decision risk. The baseline treatment is without global risk. Our goal is to investigate the isolation effect and the principle of timing independence under the different timing options of the global risk. In addition, we examine the role played by anticipated and experienced emotions in the choice problem. Main findings are a violation of the isolation effect, and support for the principle of timing independence. Although behavior across the different global risk cases shows similarities, we observe clear differences in people’s affective responses. This may be responsible for the conflicting results observed in earlier experiments. Dependent on the timing of the global risk different combinations of anticipated and experienced emotions influence decision making. (shrink)

From the viewpoint of the independence axiom of expected utility theory, an interesting empirical dynamic choice problem involves the presence of a “global risk,” that is, a chance of losing everything whichever safe or risky option is chosen. In this experimental study, participants have to allocate real money between a safe and a risky project. Treatment variable is the particular decision stage at which a global risk is resolved: (i) before the investment decision; (ii) after the investment decision, but before (...) the resolution of the decision risk; (iii) after the resolution of the decision risk. The baseline treatment is without global risk. Our goal is to investigate the isolation effect and the principle of timing independence under the different timing options of the global risk. In addition, we examine the role played by anticipated and experienced emotions in the choice problem. Main findings are a violation of the isolation effect, and support for the principle of timing independence. Although behavior across the different global risk cases shows similarities, we observe clear differences in people’s affective responses. This may be responsible for the conflicting results observed in earlier experiments. Dependent on the timing of the global risk different combinations of anticipated and experienced emotions influence decision making. (shrink)

This paper investigates the influence that social ties can have on behavior. After defining the concept of social ties that we consider, we introduce an original model of social ties. The impact of such ties on social preferences is studied in a coordination game with outside option. We provide a detailed game theoretical analysis of this game while considering various types of players, i.e., self-interest maximizing, inequity averse, and fair agents. In addition to these approaches that require strategic reasoning in (...) order to reach some equilibrium, we also present an alternative hypothesis that relies on the concept of team reasoning. After having discussed the differences between the latter and our model of social ties, we show how an experiment can be designed so as to discriminate among the models presented in the paper. (shrink)