This book is about the interweaving between cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of the two stages of perception, namely early and late vision, in justifying perceptual beliefs. It examines the impact of the epistemic role of perception in defining cognitive penetrability and the relation between the epistemic role of perceptual stages and the kinds of cognitive effects on perceptual processing. The book presents the argument that early vision is cognitively impenetrable because neither is it affected directly by cognition, nor (...) does cognition affect its epistemic role. It also argues that late vision, even though it is cognitively penetrated and, thus, affected by concepts, is still a perceptual state that does not involve any discursive inferences and does not belong to the space of reasons. Finally, an account is given as to how cognitive states with symbolic content could affect perceptual states with iconic, analog content, during late vision. (shrink)

Dartnall claims that visual short-term memory stores nonconceptual content , in the form of compressed images. In this paper I argue against the claim that NCC can be stored in VSTM. I offer four reasons why NCC cannot be stored in visual memory and why only conceptual information can: NCC lasts for a very short time and does not reach either visual short-term memory or visual long-term memory; the content of visual states is stored in memory only if and when (...) object-centered attention modulates visual processing and this modulation signifies the onset of the conceptualization of that content; only categorical high-level information that characterizes conceptual content and not metric and precise iconic information that characterizes NCC can be stored in visual memory for long periods; and if NCC were stored in visual memory then this would allow recognitional judgments pertaining to NCC—one could recognize the precise shade of a color that one had seen before. However NCC does not allow such recognitional judgments. (shrink)

One of the perennial themes in philosophy is the problem of our access to the world around us; do our perceptual systems bring us into contact with the world as it is or does perception depend upon our individual conceptual frameworks? This volume of new essays examines reference as it relates to perception, action and realism, and the questions which arise if there is no neutral perspective or independent way to know the world. The essays discuss the nature of referring, (...) concentrating on the way perceptual reference links us with the observable world, and go on to examine the implications of theories of perceptual reference for realism and the way in which scientific theories refer and thus connect us with the world. They will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of psychology, cognitive science and action theory. (shrink)

To comprehend the world around us, we first have to decipher how our brains work. This book outlines a new approach to knowledge and understanding based on the elucidation of several basic neuronal mechanisms. This book explores the crucial fact that unconscious processes and conscious experiences form a continuum, which introduces the concept of 'rerepresentations'. Examples of rerepresentations can be seen in language, mathematics, technology and the arts. This fundamental notion captures the essence of being human, namely what separates us (...) from our evolutionary predecessors. For this reason, an effort has been made to present all notions from first principles, without assuming any background specialized knowledge. Although this volume will be more easily accessible to individuals with a background in sciences and medicine, Ways of Comprehending presents, in an accessible manner, important information which should be common knowledge, but is lacking among the vast majority of scientists, technocrats, and humanities scholars. The interdisciplinary, integrative approach presented in this book implies that different disciplines and notions which appear disconnected, are actually closely related. This approach elucidates how we think about topics such as mathematics, physics, painting, music, and philosophy. More importantly, it helps us understand the origin of our thoughts, feelings and actions. This finally brings deep insight and fulfilment or, more precisely, eudemonia. (shrink)

European identity is a complex, multi-faced and inherently imprecise concept relating to a range of socio-political and psychological factors. Addressing this topic in educational practice, particularly with respect to Higher Education students, constitutes a complex and open problem for research. This paper reports on an experimental study designed to explore the effectiveness of the educational game “RUEU?” in supporting university students in understanding the key socio-political issues regarding European identity. Quantitative data regarding Greek university students’ attitudes to European identity, before (...) and after playing the game, were collected. Students’ performance of the game group was compared with that of a control group who explored the same issues about European identity through a tutor-guided discussion. The findings showed that both instructional interventions were effective but in different ways. The participants in the game-based group appeared more attached to the EU after the intervention and moved toward a more balanced description of their Greek and European identity. On the other hand, the students in the control group rated higher what “European identity” and being EU citizen means to them. The findings indicated the potential of game-based interventions to deliver not only academic content but also to promote students’ reflection and influence them at an attitudinal and emotional level. (shrink)

According to the cognitive penetrability hypothesis, our beliefs, desires, and possibly our emotions literally affect how we see the world. This book elucidates the nature of the cognitive penetrability and impenetrability hypotheses, assesses their plausibility, and explores their philosophical consequences. It connects the topic's multiple strands (the psychological findings, computationalist background, epistemological consequences of cognitive architecture, and recent philosophical developments) at a time when the outcome of many philosophical debates depends on knowing whether and how cognitive states can influence perception. (...) All sixteen chapters were written especially for the book. The first chapters provide methodological and conceptual clarification of the topic and give an account of the relations between penetrability, encapsulation, modularity, and cross-modal interactions in perception. Assessments of psychological and neuroscientific evidence for cognitive penetration are given by several chapters. Most of the contributions analyse the impact of cognitive penetrability and impenetrability on specific philosophical topics: high-level perceptual contents, the epistemological consequences of penetration, nonconceptual content, the phenomenology of late perception, metacognitive feelings, and action. The book includes a comprehensive introduction which explains the history of the debate, its key technical concepts (informational encapsulation, early and late vision, the perception-cognition distinction, hard-wired perceptual processing, perceptual learning, theory-ladenness), and the debate's relevance to current topics in the philosophy of mind and perception, epistemology, and philosophy of psychology. (shrink)

Transforming growth factor‐β (TGF‐β) and its related proteins regulate broad aspects of body development, including cell proliferation, differentiation, apoptosis and gene expression, in various organisms. Deregulated TGF‐β function has been causally implicated in the generation of human fibrotic disorders and in tumor progression. Nevertheless, the molecular mechanisms of TGF‐β action remained essentially unknown until recently. Here, we discuss recent progress in our understanding of the mechanism of TGF‐β signal transduction with respect to the regulation of gene expression, the control of (...) cell phenotype and the potential usage TGF‐β for the treatment of human diseases. (shrink)

We present a formal first-order theory of artificial objects, i.e., objects made out of a finite number of parts and subject to assembling and dismantling processes. These processes are absolutely reversible. The theory is an extension of the theory of finite sets with urelements. The notions of transformation and identity are defined and studied on the assumption that the objects are homogeneous, that is to say, all their atomic parts are of equal ontological importance. Particular emphasis is given to the (...) behavior of classes of artifacts in time. We call such classes satisfying certain preservation conditions worlds. Various results concerning the existence, extension, and completeness of worlds are proved. (shrink)

We give a necessary and sufficient condition in order that a type-shifting automorphism be constructed on a model of the Theory of Simple Types (TST) by forcing. Namely it is proved that, if for every n ≥ 1 there is a model of TST in the ground model M of ZFC that contains an n-extendible coherent pair, then there is a generic extension M[G] of M that contains a model of TST with a type-shifting automorphism, and hence M[G] contains a (...) model of NF. The converse holds trivially. It is also proved that there exist models of TST containing l-extendible coherent pairs. (shrink)

An argument that there are perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in cognitively and conceptually unmediated ways and that this sheds light on various ...

[v. 2.] Opseis tou Neoellēnikou diaphōtismou.

In the context of a distributive lattice we specify the sort of mappings that could be generally called ''negations'' and study their behavior under iteration. We show that there are periodic and nonperiodic ones. Natural periodic negations exist with periods 2, 3, and 4 and pace 2, as well as natural nonperiodic ones, arising from the interaction of interior and quasi interior mappings with the pseudocomplement. For any n and any even , negations of period n and pace s can (...) also be constructed, but in a rather ad hoc and trivial way. (shrink)

In this paper I propose to link [Hesiod] fr. 276 M.-W. with the mythological narrative preserved on PSI 14. 1398, which relates the death of Teiresias. This narrative belong to a work that drew on the lost Melampodia and provides information regarding this Hesiodic poem that had hitherto escaped our notice. Regarding the type of text preserved on PSI 14. 1398, the scanty remnants of the papyrus’ second column, where we read traces of what appears to be κeuqein and dendroκomov, (...) both poetic words, suggest that it must have been a prose text quoting poetry. Possibilities include a text on the history of divination, such as Philochorus peri mantiκnv, which offered a historical overview of famous exponents of the mantic art and included poetic quotations, or alternatively a text that belongs to the commentary genre broadly conceived, perhaps even a text akin to the so-called ‘Homeric anthologies’. (shrink)

We discuss at some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a (...) type of awareness called phenomenal awareness constitute the phenomenal content of experience. The phenomenal content of perception contains the existence of objects as separate things that persist in time and time, spatiotemporal information, and information regarding relative spatial relations, motion, surface properties, shape, size, orientation, color, and their functional properties. (shrink)

Fodor has argued that observation is theory neutral, since the perceptual systems are modular, that is, they are domain‐specific, encapsulated, mandatory, fast, hard‐wired in the organism, and have a fixed neural architecture. Churchland attacks the theoretical neutrality of observation on the grounds that (a) the abundant top‐down pathways in the brain suggest the cognitive penetration of perception and (b) perceptual learning can change in the wiring of the perceptual systems. In this paper I introduce a distinction between sensation, perception, and (...) observation and I argue that although Churchland is right that observation involves top‐down processes, there is also a substantial amount of information in perception which is theory‐neutral. I argue that perceptual learning does not threaten the cognitive impenetrability of perception, and that the neuropsychological research does not provide evidence in favor of the top‐down character of perception. Finally, I discuss the possibility of an off‐line cognitive penetrability of perception. (shrink)

I elaborate on Pylyshyn's definition of the cognitive impenetrability (CI) of early vision, and draw on the role of concepts in perceptual processing, which links the problem of the CI or cognitive penetrability (CP) of early vision with the problem of the nonconceptual content (NCC) of perception. I explain, first, the sense in which the content of early vision is CI and I argue that if some content is CI, it is conceptually encapsulated, that is, it is NCC. Then, I (...) examine the definitions of NCC and argue that they lead to the view that the NCC of perception is retrieved in a stage of visual processing that is CI. Thus, the CI of a state and content is a sufficient and necessary condition for the state and its content to be purely NCC, the CI?≡?NCC thesis. Since early vision is CI, the purely NCC of perception is formed in early vision. I defend the CI?≡?NCC thesis by arguing against objections raised against both the sufficient and the necessary part of the thesis. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for the cognitive impenetrability of perception by undermining the argument from reentrant pathways. To do that I will adduce psychological and neuropsychological evidence showing that (a) early vision processing is not affected by our knowledge about specific objects and events, and (b) that the role of the descending pathways is to enable the early-vision processing modules to participate in higher-level visual or cognitive functions. My thesis is that a part of observation, which I will call (...) perception, is bottom-up and theory neutral. As such, perception could play the role of common ground on which a naturalized epistemology can be built and relativism avoided. (shrink)

In this paper, I claim that since there is a cognitively impenetrable stage of visual perception, namely early vision, and cognitive penetrability and theory-ladenness are coextensive, the CI of early vision entails that early vision content is theory neutral. This theory-neutral part undermines relativism. In this paper, I consider two objections against the thesis. The one adduces evidence from cases of rapid perceptual learning to undermine my thesis that early vision is CI. The other emphasizes that the early perceptual system, (...) in order to solve various underdetermination problems, relies on certain principles, which may be taken to constitute a sort of a theory about the world that affect early vision, rendering it theory-laden. Both objections purport to show that early vision is CP and theory-laden. Against this thesis, I argue that the evidence on which the two objections are based does not show that early vision is CP and is fully compatible with the view that early vision is CI. (shrink)

We discuss in some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottom‐up from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. The representational contents of the states induced by these mechanisms that are available to a (...) type of awareness called phenomenal awareness constitute the phenomenal content of experience. The phenomenal content of perception contains the existence of objects as separate things that persist in time and time, spatiotemporal information, and information regarding relative spatial relations, motion, surface properties, shape, size, orientation, color, and their functional properties. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Newton's first optical paper. My aim is to examine the type of argument which Newton uses in order to convince his readers of the truth of his theory of colors. My claim is that this argument is an induction by elimination, and that the Newtonian method of justification is a kind of “generative justification”, a term due to T. Nickles. To achieve my aim I analyze in some detail the arguments in Newton's first optical paper, (...) relating the paper with Newton's other writings in optics, and especially his early correspondence in defence of his theory of colors. (shrink)

The Macpherson :24–62, 2012) argued that the perceptual experience of colors is cognitively penetrable. Macpherson also thinks that perception has nonconceptual content because this would provide a good explanation for several phenomena concerning perceptual experience. To have both, Macpherson must defend the thesis that the CP of perception is compatible with perception having NCC. Since the classical notion of CP of perception does not allow perception to have NCC, Macpherson proposes CP-lite. CP-lite makes room for an experience to have content (...) determined by concepts because the perceptual processes that produce the experience are affected by concepts rendering the experience, CP, while the same type of experience could have been had without any conceptual influences, in which case it would be CI. Macpherson then proceeds to show that CP-lite is compatible with some of the definitions of NCC. To do so, she argues that even when an experience is CP owing to the fact that it is produced by means of the mechanism posited by CP-lite, that is, through the interaction between bottom–up pure perception and top–down perceptual imagery, its content is NCC because it has the basic properties that characterize NCC. Based on this, Macpherson proceeds to criticize and undermine the definitions of NCC that are incompatible with CP-lite. In this paper, I argue that the possibility of CP-lite rests on the erroneous assumption that a state with conceptual content and a state with NCC can have the same phenomenology or content, and that the compatibility of CP-lite with NCC presupposes a view of NCC that does not conform to the usual construal of NCC. (shrink)

'Epistemological constructivism' holds that vision is mediated by background preconceptions and is theory-laden. Hence, two persons with differing theoretical commitments see the world differently and they could agree on what they see only if they both espoused the same conceptual framework. This, in its turn, undermines the possibility of theory testing and choice on a common theory-neutral empirical basis. In this paper, I claim that the cognitive sciences suggest that a part of vision may be only indirectly penetrated by cognition (...) in a way that does not threaten retrieval of information from a visual scene in a bottom-up way. That blocks the constructivist epistemological thesis. However, since spatial attention, which can be cognitively driven, seems to permeate all stages of visual processes, one is led to conclude that there is no part of vision immune to direct cognitive interference. Against this, I elaborate on the role of spatial attention and argue that it does influence vision in a top-down manner, but it does so only in an indirect way. I then argue that the existence of visual processes that are only indirectly penetrated by cognition undermines the epistemological conclusions of constructivism. (shrink)

Studies on the syndrome called ‘unilateral visual or spatial neglect’ have been used by philosophers in discussions concerning perceptual phenomenology. Nanay , based on spatial neglects studies, argued that the property of being suitable for action is part of the perceptual phenomenology of neglect patients. In this paper, I argue that the studies on visual neglect conducted thus far do not support Nanay’s thesis that when patients succeed in detecting the neglected object, it’s action properties are part of their perceptual (...) phenomenology; instead, the support the view that the patients consciously see low-level properties such as color and shape. In the first section, I discuss unilateral neglect and extinction. In the second section, I analyze Nanay’s argument. In the third section, I explain why Nanay’s thesis does not follow from the studies on visual neglect. Nanay argues that when neglect patients are cued with an action-property of an object and succeed in perceiving the object in the contralesional side they are phenomenally aware of an action-property of it but they are not phenomenally aware of its low-level properties. Since the patients detect the object, they must be phenomenally aware of some of its properties. Failing to see the low-level properties, the patients should be phenomenally aware is the action-property. Against this, I argue that research on spatial neglect shows that the patients come to see the low-level properties. I also explain why my discussion also supports the more general claim that the studies on neglect and extinction conducted thus far do not establish that the action-properties are part of the patients’ phenomenology. Finally, in section four, I examine a possible objection against my account. My arguments do not entail that the action properties are not part of perceptual phenomenology; only that the neglect studies do not establish this. (shrink)

The chapters in this book address directly the issue of the cognitive penetrability of perception.

We reformulate slightly Russell's notion of typicality, so as to eliminate its circularity and make it applicable to elements of any first‐order structure. We argue that the notion parallels Martin‐Löf (ML) randomness, in the sense that it uses definable sets in place of computable ones and sets of “small” cardinality (i.e., strictly smaller than that of the structure domain) in place of measure zero sets. It is shown that if the domain M satisfies, then there exist typical elements and only (...) non‐typical ones. In particular this is true for the standard model of second‐order arithmetic. By allowing parameters in the defining formulas, we are led to relative typicality, which satisfies most of van Lambalgen's axioms for relative randomness. However van Lambalgen's theorem is false for relative typicality. The class of typical reals is incomparable (with respect to ⊆) with the classes of ML‐random, Schnorr random and computably random reals. Also the class of typical reals is closed under Turing degrees and under the jump operation (both ways). (shrink)

Let be a countable first‐order language and be an ‐structure. “Definable set” means a subset of M which is ‐definable in with parameters. A set is said to be immune if it is infinite and does not contain any infinite definable subset. X is said to be partially immune if for some definable A, is immune. X is said to be totally non‐immune if for every definable A, and are not immune. Clearly every definable set is totally non‐immune. Here we (...) ask whether the converse is true and prove that it is false for every countable structure whose class of definable sets satisfies a mild condition. We investigate further the possibility of an alternative construction of totally non‐immune non‐definable sets with the help of a subclass of immune sets, the class of cohesive sets, as well as with the help of a generalization of definable sets, the semi‐definable ones (the latter being naturally defined in models of arithmetic). Finally connections are found between totally non‐immune sets and generic classes in nonstandard models of arithmetic. (shrink)

We examine what happens if we replace ZFC with a localistic/relativistic system, LZFC, whose central new axiom, denoted by Loc(ZFC), says that every set belongs to a transitive model of ZFC. LZFC consists of Loc(ZFC) plus some elementary axioms forming Basic Set Theory (BST). Some theoretical reasons for this shift of view are given. All ${\Pi_2}$ consequences of ZFC are provable in LZFC. LZFC strongly extends Kripke-Platek (KP) set theory minus Δ0-Collection and minus ${\in}$ -induction scheme. ZFC+ “there is an (...) inaccessible cardinal” proves the consistency of LZFC. In LZFC we focus on models rather than cardinals, a transitive model being considered as the analogue of an inaccessible cardinal. Pushing this analogy further we define α-Mahlo models and ${\Pi_1^1}$ -indescribable models, the latter being the analogues of weakly compact cardinals. Also localization axioms of the form ${Loc({\rm ZFC}+\phi)}$ are considered and their global consequences are examined. Finally we introduce the concept of standard compact cardinal (in ZFC) and some standard compactness results are proved. (shrink)

We show that the notion of cardinality of a set is independent from that of wellordering, and that reasonable total notions of cardinality exist in every model of ZF where the axiom of choice fails. Such notions are either definable in a simple and natural way, or non-definable, produced by forcing. Analogous cardinality notions exist in nonstandard models of arithmetic admitting nontrivial automorphisms. Certain motivating phenomena from quantum mechanics are also discussed in the Appendix.

This paper aims to provide an explication of the meaning of ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’ in Descartes’ writings. In the first part I claim that Descartes’ method is entirely captured by the term ‘analysis’, and that it is a method of theory elaboration that fuses the modern methods of discovery and confirmation in one enterprise. I discuss Descartes’ methodological writings, assess their continuity and coherence, and I address the major shortcoming of previous interpretations of Cartesian methodology. I also discuss the Cartesian (...) method in the context of other conceptions of scientific method of that era and argue that Descartes’ method significantly transforms these conceptions. In the second part I argue that mathematical and natural-philosophical writings exhibit this kind of analysis. To that effect I examine in Descartes’ writings on the method as used in mathematics, and Descartes’ account of the discovery of the nature of the rainbow in the Meteors. Finally, I briefly assess Descartes’ claim regarding the universality of his method.Author Keywords: Cartesian method; Theory elaboration; Analysis; Synthesis; Simple natures; Rainbow. (shrink)