Results for 'Attention'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Attention is Rational-Access Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 247--273.
    This chapter argues that attention is a distinctive mode of consciousness, which plays an essential functional role in making information accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. The main line of argument can be stated quite simply. Attention is what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action. But what makes information fully accessible for use in the rational control of thought and action is a distinctive mode of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  2. Attention as Structuring of the Stream of Consciousness.Sebastian Watzl - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 145.
    This paper defends and develops the structuring account of conscious attention: attention is the conscious mental process of structuring one’s stream of consciousness so that some parts of it are more central than others. In the first part of the paper, I motivate the structuring account. Drawing on a variety of resources I argue that the phenomenology of attention cannot be fully captured in terms of how the world appears to the subject, as well as against an (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  3. Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology.Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Sometime around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in relatively sustained bouts of attending together with their caretakers to objects in their environment. By the age of 18 months, on most accounts, they are engaging in full-blown episodes of joint attention. As developmental psychologists (usually) use the term, for such joint attention to be in play, it is not sufficient that the infant and the adult are in fact attending to the same object, nor that the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  4. The Grain of Vision and the Grain of Attention.Ned Block - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):170-184.
    Often when there is no attention to an object, there is no conscious perception of it either, leading some to conclude that conscious perception is an attentional phenomenon. There is a well-known perceptual phenomenon—visuo-spatial crowding, in which objects are too closely packed for attention to single out one of them. This article argues that there is a variant of crowding—what I call ‘‘identity-crowding’’—in which one can consciously see a thing despite failure of attention to it. This conclusion, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  5. Joint Attention: Its Nature, Reflexivity, and Relation to Common Knowledge.Christopher Peacocke - 2005 - In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 298.
    The openness of joint awareness between two or more subjects is a perceptual phenomenon. It involves a certain mutual awareness between the subjects, an awareness that makes reference to that very awareness itself. Properly characterized, such awareness can generate iterated awareness ‘x is aware that y is aware that x is aware...’ to whatever level the subjects can sustain. The openness should not be characterized in terms of Lewis–Schiffer common knowledge, the conditions for which are not met in many basic (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  6.  21
    Attention in Early Scientific Psychology.Gary Hatfield - 1998 - In Richard D. Wright (ed.), Visual Attention. Oxford University Press. pp. 3-25.
    Attention only "recently"--i.e. in the eighteenth century--achieved chapter status in psychology textbooks in which psychology is conceived as a natural science. This report first sets this entrance, by sketching the historical contexts in which psychology has been considered to be a natural science. It then traces the construction of phenomenological descriptions of attention from antiquity to the seventeenth century, noting various aspects of attention that were marked for discussion by Aristotle, Lucretius, Augustine, and Descartes. The chapter goes (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  7. Introduction: Toward a Theory of Attention That Includes Effortless Attention.Brian Bruya - 2010 - In Effortless Attention: A New Perspective in the Cognitive Science of Attention and Action. MIT Press.
    In this Introduction, I identify seven discrete aspects of attention brought to the fore by by considering the phenomenon of effortless attention: effort, decision-making, action syntax, agency, automaticity, expertise, and mental training. For each, I provide an overview of recent research, identify challenges to or gaps in current attention theory with respect to it, consider how attention theory can be advanced by including current research, and explain how relevant chapters of this volume offer such advances.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  8.  61
    The Metaphysics of Attention.Christopher Mole - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 60-77.
    This paper gives a brief presentation of adverbialism about attention, and explains some of the reasons why it gives an appealing account of attention's metaphysics.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  9.  91
    Joint Attention and Common Knowledge.John Campbell - 2005 - In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 287--297.
    This chapter makes the case for a relational version of an experientialist view of joint attention. On an experientialist view of joint attention, shifting from solitary attention to joint attention involves a shift in the nature of your perceptual experience of the object attended to. A relational analysis of such a view explains the latter shift in terms of the idea that, in joint attention, it is a constituent of your experience that the other person (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  10.  80
    Apertures, Draw, and Syntax: Remodeling Attention.Brian Bruya - 2010 - In Effortless Attention: A New Perspective in the Cognitive Science of Attention and Action. MIT Press. pp. 219.
    Because psychological studies of attention and cognition are most commonly performed within the strict confines of the laboratory or take cognitively impaired patients as subjects, it is difficult to be sure that resultant models of attention adequately account for the phenomenon of effortless attention. The problem is not only that effortless attention is resistant to laboratory study. A further issue is that because the laboratory is the most common way to approach attention, models resulting from (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  11.  79
    Joint Attention and the Problem of Other Minds.Johannes Roessler - 2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    The question of what it means to be aware of others as subjects of mental states is often construed as the question of how we are epistemically justified in attributing mental states to others. The dominant answer to this latter question is that we are so justified in virtue of grasping the role of mental states in explaining observed behaviour. This chapter challenges this picture and formulates an alternative by reflecting on the interpretation of early joint attention interactions. It (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12.  82
    Joint Attention, Communication, and Mind.Naomi M. Eilan - 2005 - In N. Elian, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 1.
    This chapter argues that a central division among accounts of joint attention, both in philosophy and developmental psychology, turns on how they address two questions: What, if any, is the connection between the capacity to engage in joint attention triangles and the capacity to grasp the idea of objective truth? How do we explain the kind of openness or sharing of minds that occurs in joint attention? The chapter explores the connections between answers to both questions, and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  57
    Joint Attention and Understanding the Mind.Jane Heal - 2005 - In N. Elian, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Oxford University PressJoint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 34--44.
    It is plausible to think, as many developmental psychologists do, that joint attention is important in the development of getting a full grasp on psychological notions. This chapter argues that this role of joint attention is best understood in the context of the simulation theory about the nature of psychological understanding rather than in the context of the theory. Episodes of joint attention can then be seen not as good occasions for learning a theory of mind but (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. Attention, Visual Consciousness and Indeterminacy.James Stazicker - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (2):156-184.
    I propose a new argument showing that conscious vision sometimes depends constitutively on conscious attention. I criticise traditional arguments for this constitutive connection, on the basis that they fail adequately to dissociate evidence about visual consciousness from evidence about attention. On the same basis, I criticise Ned Block's recent counterargument that conscious vision is independent of one sort of attention (‘cognitive access'). Block appears to achieve the dissociation only because he underestimates the indeterminacy of visual consciousness. I (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   37 citations  
  15. Attention and Mental Paint1.Ned Block - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
    Much of recent philosophy of perception is oriented towards accounting for the phenomenal character of perception—what it is like to perceive—in a non-mentalistic way—that is, without appealing to mental objects or mental qualities. In opposition to such views, I claim that the phenomenal character of perception of a red round object cannot be explained by or reduced to direct awareness of the object, its redness and roundness—or representation of such objects and qualities. Qualities of perception that are not captured by (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   39 citations  
  16. Attention and Effort.Daniel Kahneman - 1973 - Prentice-Hall.
  17. Confronting Many-Many Problems: Attention and Agentive Control.Wayne Wu - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):50-76.
    I argue that when perception plays a guiding role in intentional bodily action, it is a necessary part of that action. The argument begins with a challenge that necessarily arises for embodied agents, what I call the Many-Many Problem. The Problem is named after its most common case where agents face too many perceptual inputs and too many possible behavioral outputs. Action requires a solution to the Many-Many Problem by selection of a specific linkage between input and output. In bodily (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  18. Attention and Perceptual Content.Bence Nanay - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):263-270.
    I argue that perceptual content is always affected by the allocation of one’s attention. Perception attributes determinable and determinate properties to the perceived scene. Attention makes (or tries to make) our perceptual attribution of properties more determinate. Hence, a change in our attention changes the determinacy of the properties attributed to the perceived scene.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  19. The Structure of Episodic Memory: Ganeri’s “Mental Time Travel and Attention”.Susanna Siegel & Nicholas Silins - forthcoming - Australasian Philosophical Review.
    We offer a framework for assessing what the structure of episodic memory might be, if one accepts the Buddhist denial of persisting selves. This paper is a response to Jonardon Ganeri's paper "Mental time travel and attention", which explores Buddhaghosa's ideas about memory. (It will eventually be published with a reply by Ganeri).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Shaking Up the Mind’s Ground Floor: The Cognitive Penetration of Visual Attention.Wayne Wu - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (1):5-32.
    In this paper, I argue that visual attention is cognitively penetrated by intention. I present a detailed account of attention and its neural basis, drawing on a recent computational model of neural modulation during attention: divisive normalization. I argue that intention shifts computations during divisive normalization. The epistemic consequences of attentional bias are discussed.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  21. Attention and Consciousness.Christopher Mole - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):86-104.
    According to commonsense psychology, one is conscious of everything that one pays attention to, but one does not pay attention to all the things that one is conscious of. Recent lines of research purport to show that commonsense is mistaken on both of these points: Mack and Rock (1998) tell us that attention is necessary for consciousness, while Kentridge and Heywood (2001) claim that consciousness is not necessary for attention. If these lines of research were successful (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  22. What is Conscious Attention?Wayne Wu - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):93-120.
    Perceptual attention is essential to both thought and agency, for there is arguably no demonstrative thought or bodily action without it. Psychologists and philosophers since William James have taken attention to be a ubiquitous and distinctive form of consciousness, one that leaves a characteristic mark on perceptual experience. As a process of selecting specific perceptual inputs, attention influences the way things perceptually appear. It may then seem that it is a specific feature of perceptual representation that constitutes (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  23.  61
    Attention and Consciousness: Two Distinct Brain Processes.Christof Koch & Naotsugu Tsuchiya - 2007 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (1):16-22.
  24.  88
    Attention and Internal Monitoring: A Farewell to HOP.W. Sauret & W. G. Lycan - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):363-370.
    Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theories in the philosophy of mind are offered as explanations of what it is that makes a mental state a conscious state. According to HOP, a mental state is conscious just in case it is itself represented in a quasi-perceptual way by an internal monitor or scanning device. We start with one of the more popular objections to HOP and a seemingly innocuous concession to it: identifying the internal monitor with the faculty of attention. We conclude (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  25. Attention: Some Theoretical Considerations.J. A. Deutsch & D. Deutsch - 1963 - Psychological Review 70 (1):80-90.
    The selection of wanted from unwanted messages requires discriminatory mechanisms of as great a complexity as those in normal perception, as is indicated by behavioral evidence. The results of neurophysiology experiments on selective attention are compatible with this supposition. This presents a difficulty for Filter theory. Another mechanism is proposed, which assumes the existence of a shifting reference standard, which takes up the level of the most important arriving signal. The way such importance is determined in the system is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   125 citations  
  26. Attention in Bodily Awareness.Gregor Hochstetter - 2016 - Synthese 193 (12):3819-3842.
    The aim of this paper is to develop and defend an Attentional View of bodily awareness, on which attention is necessary for bodily awareness. The original formulation of the Attentional View is due to Marcel Kinsbourne. First, I will show that the Attentional View of bodily awareness as formulated by Kinsbourne is superior to other accounts in the literature for characterizing the relationship between attention and bodily awareness. Kinsbourne’s account is the only account in the literature so far (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  27.  19
    Does Mole's Argument That Cognitive Processes Fail to Suffice for Attention Fail?Kranti Saran - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Is attention a cognitive process? I reconstruct and critically assess an argument first proposed by Christopher Mole that it cannot be so. Mole’s argument is influential because it creates theoretical space for a unifying analysis of attention at the subject level (though it does not entail it). Prominent philosophers working on attention such as Wayne Wu and Philipp Koralus explicitly endorse it, while Sebastian Watzl endorses a related version, this despite their differing theoretical commitments. I show that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  30
    Subjective Experience and the Attentional Lapse: Task Engagement and Disengagement During Sustained Attention.J. Smallwood, J. B. Davies, D. Heim, F. Finnigan, M. Sudberry & Obonsawin M. O'Connor R. - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4):657-90.
    Three experiments investigated the relationship between subjective experience and attentional lapses during sustained attention. These experiments employed two measures of subjective experience to examine how differences in awareness correspond to variations in both task performance and psycho-physiological measures . This series of experiments examine these phenomena during the Sustained Attention to Response Task . The results suggest we can dissociate between two components of subjective experience during sustained attention: task unrelated thought which corresponds to an absent minded (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   32 citations  
  29.  74
    Attention is Cognitive Unison: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology.Christopher Mole - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
    Highlights of a difficult history -- The preliminary identification of our topic -- Approaches -- Bradley's protest -- James's disjunctive theory -- The source of Bradley's dissatisfaction -- Behaviourism and after -- Heirs of Bradley in the twentieth century -- The underlying metaphysical issue -- Explanatory tactics -- The basic distinction -- Metaphysical categories and taxonomies -- Adverbialism, multiple realizability, and natural kinds -- Adverbialism and levels of explanation -- Taxonomies and supervenience relations -- Rejecting the process : first view (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  30.  76
    Immersion is Attention / Becoming Immersed.Shen-yi Liao - manuscript
    Children sometimes lose themselves in make-believe games. Actors sometimes lose themselves in their roles. Readers sometimes lose themselves in their books. From people's introspective self-reports and phenomenological experiences, these immersive experiences appear to differ from ordinary experiences of simply playing a game, simply acting out a role, and simply reading a book. What explains the difference? My answer: attention. -/- [Unpublishable 2007-2017. This paper was referenced in Liao and Doggett (2014).].
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays.Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.) - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Attention has been studied in cognitive psychology for more than half a century, but until recently it was largely neglected in philosophy. Now, however, attention has been recognized by philosophers of mind as having an important role to play in our theories of consciousness and of cognition. At the same time, several recent developments in psychology have led psychologists to foundational questions about the nature of attention and its implementation in the brain. As a result there has (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  32. Meditative Attention to Bodily Sensations: Conscious Attention Without Selection?Kranti Saran - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    Prominent figures in the philosophical literature on attention hold that the connection between attention and selection is essential (Mole, 2011), necessary (Wu, 2011; 2014), or conceptual (Smithies, 2011). I argue that selection is neither essentially, necessarily, nor conceptually tied to attention. I first isolate the target conception of selection that I deny is so tightly coupled with attention: graded intramodal selection within consciousness. I analyse two visual cases: analysis of the first case shows that there can (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Attention, Fixation, and Change Blindness.Tony Cheng - 2017 - Philosophical Inquiries 5 (1):19-26.
    The topic of this paper is the complex interaction between attention, fixation, and one species of change blindness. The two main interpretations of the target phenomenon are the ‘blindness’ interpretation and the ‘inaccessibility’ interpretation. These correspond to the sparse view (Dennett 1991; Tye, 2007) and the rich view (Dretske 2007; Block, 2007a, 2007b) of visual consciousness respectively. Here I focus on the debate between Fred Dretske and Michael Tye. Section 1 describes the target phenomenon and the dialectics it entails. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Attention and Intentionalism.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):325-342.
    Many alleged counter-examples to intentionalism, the thesis that the phenomenology of perceptual experiences of a given sense modality supervenes on the contents of experiences of that modality, can be avoided by adopting a liberal view of the sorts of properties that can be represented in perceptual experience. I argue that there is a class of counter-examples to intentionalism, based on shifts in attention, which avoids this response. A necessary connection between the contents and phenomenal characters of perceptual experiences can (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  35. Virtue, Emotion, and Attention.Michael S. Brady - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):115-131.
    The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  36. Structuring Mind. The Nature of Attention and How It Shapes Consciousness.Sebastian Watzl - 2017 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    What is attention? How does attention shape consciousness? In an approach that engages with foundational topics in the philosophy of mind, the theory of action, psychology, and the neurosciences this book provides a unified and comprehensive answer to both questions. Sebastian Watzl shows that attention is a central structural feature of the mind. The first half of the book provides an account of the nature of attention. Attention is prioritizing, it consists in regulating priority structures. (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  37. Is the Grain of Vision Finer Than the Grain of Attention? Response to Block.J. H. Taylor - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1).
    In many theories in contemporary philosophy of mind, attention is constitutively linked to phenomenal consciousness. Ned Block has recently argued that ‘identity crowding’ provides an example of subjects consciously seeing something to which they are unable to attend. Here I examine the reasons that Block gives for thinking that this is a case of a consciously perceived item that we are unable to attend to, and I offer a different interpretation.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  38.  38
    Knowledge as Process: Contextually Cued Attention and Early Word Learning.Linda B. Smith, Eliana Colunga & Hanako Yoshida - 2010 - Cognitive Science 34 (7):1287-1314.
    Learning depends on attention. The processes that cue attention in the moment dynamically integrate learned regularities and immediate contextual cues. This paper reviews the extensive literature on cued attention and attentional learning in the adult literature and proposes that these fundamental processes are likely significant mechanisms of change in cognitive development. The value of this idea is illustrated using phenomena in children's novel word learning.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  39. Why Visual Attention and Awareness Are Different.Victor A. F. Lamme - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):12-18.
  40. Attention and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):303-318.
    One sceptical rejoinder to those who claim that sensory perception is cognitively penetrable is to appeal to the involvement of attention. So, while a phenomenon might initially look like one where, say, a perceiver’s beliefs are influencing her visual experience, another interpretation is that because the perceiver believes and desires as she does, she consequently shifts her spatial attention so as to change what she senses visually. But, the sceptic will urge, this is an entirely familiar phenomenon, and (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. Modesty as a Virtue of Attention.Nicolas Bommarito - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):93-117.
    The contemporary discussion of modesty has focused on whether or not modest people are accurate about their own good qualities. This essay argues that this way of framing the debate is unhelpful and offers examples to show that neither ignorance nor accuracy about the good qualities related to oneself is necessary for modesty. It then offers an attention-based account, claiming that what is necessary for modesty is to direct one’s attention in certain ways. By analyzing modesty in this (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  42. Conscious Attitudes, Attention, and Self-Knowledge.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 83.
    What is involved in the consciousness of a conscious, "occurrent" propositional attitude, such as a thought, a sudden conjecture or a conscious decision? And what is the relation of such consciousness to attention? I hope the intrinsic interest of these questions provides sufficient motivation to allow me to start by addressing them. We will not have a full understanding either of consciousness in general, nor of attention in general, until we have answers to these questions. I think there (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  43.  20
    Attention, Perceptual Content, and Mirrors: Two Medieval Models of Active Perception in Peter Olivi and Peter Auriol.Lukáš Lička - 2017 - Perception in Scholastics and Their Interlocutors.
    In the paper I argue that medieval philosophers proposed several notions of the senses’ activity in perception. I illustrate the point using the example of two Franciscan thinkers – Peter Olivi (ca. 1248–1298) and Peter Auriol (ca. 1280–1322). Olivi’s notion of active perception assumes that every perceptual act demands a prior focusing of the mind’s attention. Furthermore, Olivi is partially inspired by the extramissionist theories of vision and reinterprets the notion of a visual ray postulated by them as a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Attention.Wayne Wu - 2014 - Routledge.
    The phenomenon of attention fascinated the psychologist and philosopher William James and human experience is unimaginable without it. Yet until recently it has languished in the backwaters of philosophy. Recent years, however, have witnessed a resurgence of interest in attention, driven by recognition that it is closely connected to consciousness, perception, agency and many other problems in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. This is the first book to introduce and assess attention from a philosophical perspective. Wayne (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  45. Pre-Frontal Executive Committee for Perception, Working Memory, Attention, Long-Term Memory, Motor Control, and Thinking: A Tutorial Review.Bill Faw - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (1):83-139.
    As an explicit organizing metaphor, memory aid, and conceptual framework, the prefrontal cortex may be viewed as a five-member ‘Executive Committee,’ as the prefrontal-control extensions of five sub-and-posterior-cortical systems: the ‘Perceiver’ is the frontal extension of the ventral perceptual stream which represents the world and self in object coordinates; the ‘Verbalizer’ is the frontal extension of the language stream which represents the world and self in language coordinates; the ‘Motivator’ is the frontal cortical extension of a subcortical extended-amygdala stream which (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  46. Action Without Attention.Carolyn Dicey Jennings & Bence Nanay - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):29-36.
    Wayne Wu argues that attention is necessary for action: since action requires a solution to the ‘Many–Many Problem’, and since only attention can solve the Many–Many Problem, attention is necessary for action. We question the first of these two steps and argue that it is based on an oversimplified distinction between actions and reflexes. We argue for a more complex typology of behaviours where one important category is action that does not require a solution to the Many–Many (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  47.  70
    Attention and Inscrutability: A Commentary on John Campbell, Reference and Consciousness.Austen Clark - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (2):167-193.
    We assemble here in this time and place to discuss the thesis that conscious attention can provide knowledge of reference of perceptual demonstratives. I shall focus my commentary on what this claim means, and on the main argument for it found in the first five chapters of "Reference and Consciousness". The middle term of that argument is an account of what attention does: what its job or function is. There is much that is admirable in this account, and (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  48. The Philosophical Significance of Attention.Sebastian Watzl - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (10):722-733.
    What is the philosophical significance of attention? The present article provides an overview of recent debates surrounding the connections between attention and other topics of philosophical interest. In particular, it discusses the interplay between attention and consciousness, attention and agency, and attention and reference. The article outlines the questions and contemporary positions concerning how attention shapes the phenomenal character of experience, whether it is necessary or sufficient for consciousness, and whether it plays a special (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  49.  65
    Singular Thought, Cognitivism, and Conscious Attention.Heimir Geirsson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):613-626.
    The focus of this paper will be on singular thoughts. In the first section I will present Jeshion’s cognitivism; a view that holds that one should characterize singular thoughts by their cognitive roles. In the second section I will argue that, contrary to Jeshion’s claims, results from studies of object tracking in cognitive psychology do not support cognitivism. In the third section I will discuss Jeshion’s easy transmission of singular thought and argue that it ignores a relevant distinction between general (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50. Representation of Change: Separate Electrophysiological Markers of Attention, Awareness, and Implicit Processing.Diego Fernandez-Duque, Giordana Grossi, Ian Thornton & Helen Neville - 2003 - Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 15 (4):491-507.
    & Awareness of change within a visual scene only occurs in subjects were aware of, replicated those attentional effects, but the presence of focused attention. When two versions of a.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000