This article focuses on the question of how we perceive and represent ourselves at the most minimal, pre-reflective level. We first review recent work emphasizing the multisensory basis of our perceptual experiences and the embodied nature of self-awareness. We then focus on interoceptive and tactile signals, as key components of bodily self-consciousness, and discuss one crucial yet overlooked aspect of our embodiment, namely the fact that bodily self-consciousness emerges from the outset within the body of another experiencing subject. Next, (...) we review empirical findings highlighting the developmental primacy of tactile and interoceptive over visual experiences, in shaping the foundations of perceptual awareness. Building upon the influential predictive processing framework in philosophy and theoretical neuroscience, we argue that self-awareness is not only embodied, but also that perceptual experiences are fundamentally 'selfish', that is, imperatively driven by basic constraints of physiological regulation that subserve self-preservation. We then evaluate. (shrink)

We argue performance in the serial reaction time task is associated with gradations of awareness that provide examples of fringe consciousness [Mangan, B. . Taking phenomenology seriously: the “fringe” and its implications for cognitive research. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 89–108, Mangan, B. . The conscious “fringe”: Bringing William James up to date. In B. J. Baars, W. P. Banks & J. B. Newman , Essential sources in the scientific study of consciousness . Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.], and address (...) limitations of the traditional SRT procedure, including criticism of exclusion generation tasks. Two experiments are conducted with a modified SRT procedure where irrelevant stimulus attributes obscure the sequence rule. Our modified paradigm, which includes a novel exclusion task, makes it easier to demonstrate a previously controversial influence of response stimulus interval on awareness. It also allows identification of participants showing fringe consciousness rather than explicit sequence knowledge, as reflected by dissociations between different awareness measures. The NEO-PI-R variable Openness to Feelings influenced the diversity of subjective feelings reported during two awareness measures, but not the degree of learning and awareness as previously found with traditional SRT tasks [Norman, E., Price, M. C., & Duff, S. C. . Fringe consciousness in sequence learning: the influence of individual differences. Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 723–760.]. This suggests possible distinctions between two components of fringe consciousness. (shrink)

The ability to reflect on and monitor memory processes is one of the most investigated metamemory functions, and one of the important ways consciousnesses interacts with memory. The feeling-of-knowing is one task used to evaluate individual’s capacity to monitor their memory. We examined this reflective function of metacognition in older adults. We explored the contribution of metacognition to episodic memory impairment, in relation to the idea that older adults show a reduction in memory awareness characteristic of episodic memory. A (...) first experiment showed that age affects the accuracy of FOK when predictions are made on an episodic memory task but not on a semantic memory task, suggesting a particular role for episodic memory awareness in metacognitive evaluations. A second experiment showed that the age-difference in episodic FOK accuracy was removed if one took into account subjective reports of memory awareness, or recollection. We argue that the FOK deficit specific to episodic memory is based on a lack of memory awareness manifest as a recollection deficit. (shrink)

SummaryThis paper is an account of Kepler's explicit awareness of the problem of experimental error. As a study of the Astronomia nova shows, Kepler exploited his awareness of the occurrences of experimental errors to guide him to the right conclusion. Errors were thus employed, so to speak, perhaps for the first time, to bring about a major physical discovery: Kepler's laws of planetary motion. ‘Know then’, to use Kepler's own words, ‘that errors show us the way to truth.’ (...) With a survey of Kepler's revolutionary contribution to optics, the paper demonstrates that Kepler's awareness of the problem of experimental error extended beyond discrepancies between calculations and observations to types of error which pertain to observations and instruments. It emerges that Kepler's belief in the unity of knowledge and physical realism, facilitated—indeed created—the right philosophical posture for comprehending the problem of error in an entirely novel way. (shrink)

Comparison of behavioural measures of consciousness has attracted much attention recently. In a recent article, Szczepanowski et al. conclude that confidence ratings predict accuracy better than both the perceptual awareness scale and post-decision wagering when using stimuli with emotional content . Although we find the study interesting, we disagree with the conclusion that CR is superior to PAS because of two methodological issues. First, the conclusion is not based on a formal test. We performed this test and found no (...) evidence that CR predicted accuracy better than PAS . Second, Szczepanowski et al. used the present version of PAS in a manner somewhat different from how it was originally intended, and the participants may not have been adequately instructed. We end our commentary with a set of recommendations for future studies using PAS. (shrink)

Schizophrenia as a pathology of self-awareness has attracted much attention from philosophical theorists and empirical scientists alike. I view schizophrenia as a basic self-disturbance leading to a lifeworld of solipsism adopted by the sufferer and explain how this adoption takes place, which then manifests in ways such as first-rank psychotic symptoms. I then discuss the relationships between these symptoms, not as isolated mental events, but as end-products of a loss of agency and ownership, and argue that symptoms like thought (...) insertion and other ego-boundary disorders are by nature a multitude of paradoxes created by a fragmented awareness. I argue that such fragmentation does not always require or lead to a delusional elaboration as the definitive feature of its phenomenology, and present reasons for the role of the first-person pronoun as a mere metaphor used to represent the patient’s bizarre experiences where sensory perception and thinking processes converge. Further, I discuss the initi... (shrink)

What has the self to be like such that introspective awareness of it is possible? The paper asks if Descartes’s idea of an inner self can be upheld and discusses this issue by invoking two principles: the phenomenal transparency of experience and the semantic compositionality of conceptual content. It is assumed that self-awareness is a second-order state either in the domain of experience or in the domain of thought. In the former case self-awareness turns out empty if (...) experience is transparent. In the latter, it can best be conceived of as a form of mental quotation. Various proposed analyses of direct and indirect quotation are discussed and tested regarding their applicability to thought. It is concluded that, on the assumption of compositionality, the inner self is only insofar accessible to awareness as it has an accessible phonological structure, as apparently only inner speech does. (shrink)

Developmental psychopathology holds promise for elucidating the structure of self-awareness. Here we studied social emotions in matched groups of children and adolescents with and without autism. Our aims were to determine whether there are potentially dissociable aspects of self-awareness, and to reconsider how the qualities of young children's engagement with other persons influences the development of their sense of self.

ABSTRACTEvaluative conditioning procedures change people’s evaluations of stimuli that are paired with pleasant or unpleasant items. To test whether influence awareness allows people to resist such...

Some philosophers of mind, cognitive scientists, phenomenologists as well as Buddhist philosophers have claimed that an awareness of an object is not just an experience of that object but also involves self-awareness. It is sometimes argued that being aware of an object without being aware of oneself is pathological. As anyone who has been involved in martial arts, as well as any sports requiring quick responses such as cricket and tennis, can testify, however, awareness of the self (...) at the time of acting becomes problematic: you would not be able to respond to the slight movement of your opponent if you were aware of yourself responding to it. This suggests that it must be possible for us to be aware without being aware of ourselves. The aim of this paper is to clarify the notion of self-awareness and its relation to the self by investigating the phenomenology of the martial artist who is ‘in the act’. I shall argue that we can make sense of self-awareness without invoking awareness of oneself. (shrink)

This paper sketches a phenomenological-structural account of consciousness that distinguishes phenomenal consciousness, subjectivity, and the self. On this account, minimal subjectivity is an inherent feature of human phenomenal consciousness. This minimal subjectivity is then understood as, in Indian Buddhist terms, mere reflexive awareness (svasamvedanamātra), or in Western phenomenological terms, minimal pre-reflective self-awareness. This minimal subjectivity is also distinguished from the richer phenomenon of the sense of self. It is possible to have consciousness without a sense of self, but (...) that consciousness would still be minimally subjective. (shrink)

Patients with somatoparaphrenia articulate a disavowal of ownership over a extremity. In philosophy, somatoparaphrenia serves as a focal point for discussions concerning the intricacies of self-awareness, specifically the sense of ownership inherent in all mental experiences. Additionally, this disorder prompts reflections on bodily self-awareness, namely, the perception of a body part as an integral component of bodily spatiality. I extend beyond conventional discussions, positing that somatoparaphrenia introduces an anomalous intercorporeal dimension. Diverging from other pathologies associated with bodily spatiality, (...) in somatoparaphrenia the subject establishes a sense of otherness beyond the confines of their organic body: the alien extremity becomes ascribed to another. The exposition is done in two parts. First, I engage in philosophical discourse on bodily awareness, utilizing somatoparaphrenia as an illustrative example. Subsequently, I discuss the issue of otherness within the context of somatoparaphrenia, elucidating the rationale behind conceptualizing this disorder as an intercorporeal experience. (shrink)

ABSTRACTEmotion regulation substantially develops during the childhood years. This growth includes an increasing awareness that certain ER strategies are more appropriate in some contexts than...

I. The Paradox of “Judgment” and Pre-reflective Self-AwarenessIn “Fichte’s Original Insight” (1982), Dieter Henrich, the founder of the Heidelberg School, delivered a diagnosis of why three hundred years of Western explication of the internal structure of subjectivity proved to be fruitless. As Manfred Frank noted, “Seldom has so much food for thought been put in a nutshell.”1 Fichte had the “insight” that his predecessors, in their totality (and “nearly all his successors”2), including Kant, misconceived the reality of our self-consciousness as (...) reflection, and thus fell prey to circular reasoning. A subject’s reflection on its own identity is impossible, since it can gain awareness of this identity only if it previously possessed some immediate knowledge of itself. Therefore, (self-)consciousness should not be conceived within the framework of the “reflection model,” which possesses an inherent contradiction, but rather as pre-reflective in nature, and as such it must be postulated by our thought. This is not to say that reflective consciousness—“egological” consciousness, the “reflection model of consciousness,” the “higher-order” theory of consciousness—i.e., the cogito, is impossible, but merely to highlight that its logical foundation cannot be justified by itself and that it essentially depends on the pre-reflective sphere of our psychic lives.3. (shrink)

This essay identifies two kinds of awareness of one’s body that occur in a variety of literatures: awareness as psychologically or spiritually enabling or therapeutic, and awareness as undesirable self-consciousness of the body. Drawing on Foucault’s account of normalizing judgment, it argues that these two forms of awareness are impossible to separate, if that separation is into authentic versus extrinsic somatic experience. Nonetheless, awareness is an important component of embodied freedom, but a freedom understood with (...) Spinoza and Nietzsche as grounded in necessity rather than only in the will, and with Arendt and Foucault as a practice rather than an achievement of a sovereign subject. Somatic practices grounded in awareness and acceptance of the body’s necessities, along with attention to the I-can cultivate a form of embodied freedom that bridges care of the self and the political. (shrink)

We argue that cognitive empathy and other instances of mental state attribution are a byproduct of self-awareness. Evidence is brought to bear on this proposition from comparative psychology, early child development, neuropsychology, and abnormal behavior.

Each of us enjoys a special awareness of (some) of her mental states. The adverbial model of first-person awareness claims that to be aware of a mental state is for it to be conscious, where ‘conscious’ describes the kind of state it is, rather than denoting a form of awareness directed at it. Here, I present an argument for construing first-person awareness of intentions adverbially, by showing that this model can meet a serious challenge posed by (...) the simulation hypothesis, which draws on data about schizophrenia. (shrink)

An advertiser develops visual associations of signs and symbols to create a product image that motivates consumers. Today is characterized by a solid consumer culture based on visual identity consumption that articulates and interacts with each consumer's daily actions, words, and visual perceptions. The frequent use of female role portrayals and physical attractiveness in advertising contributes to an increase in society's awareness of women. Some scholars have developed an ethical discussion out of the phenomenon of female role portrayals not (...) matching the public expectations because the portrayals are too narrowly defined and women are unfavorably depicted. But another group has studied the product-type match-up hypothesis, which emphasizes effectively employing attractive female endorsers that closely match the product type. The shift in female social status in Taiwan contributes to the importation of foreign ideas such as feminine values, rituals, and esthetics. Women in Taiwan have been introduced to a new feminism, a modified perception of appropriate personal appearance and behavior. This current research utilizes content analysis and in-depth interviews to explore contemporary female role portrayals in advertising. In addition, this article examines the relationship between the formation of contemporary physical attractiveness and visual consumption in advertising. The results reveal that most endorsers were celebrities, with fit bodies and pleasant expressions, portrayed as product users who offer personal experiences to deliver product knowledge. Conservation classical beauty was the most common depiction, while sexual expression was the least common. Finally, this article recommends that different types of beauty, posture, and appeal should be carefully selected to match domestic and foreign magazines' readers. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that later Nishida's analysis of self-awareness (jikaku) provides a new perspective on the nature of self-awareness as understood in the philosophical literature today. I argue that the contemporary literature deals with two kinds of self-awareness; the higher-order theory understands self-awareness to be an objectified awareness and the phenomenological tradition generally understands self-awareness to be, at least primarily, a non-objectified awareness. In light of this, I first give an account (...) of Nishida's ?acting-intuition? with reference to the ?historical body.? Then I argue that later Nishida's analysis of self-awareness depicts the inadequacy of the two kinds of self-awareness as both being stuck in the subject-object dichotomy which, according to Nishida, is but one mode of experience, namely the mode of difference. Nishida provides an account that ultimately foregrounds the experiential mode of unity that negates any sense of differentiation between the subject and object. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to investigate climate change awareness and mitigation effort and their associated motivating and limiting factors to pro-environmental behavior and firm demographics in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Switzerland. For this purpose, a questionnaire was developed, conducted, and analyzed on motivating and limiting factors along with firm demographics, using descriptive statistics and ordinary least squares (OLS) and ordered probit regression models. The results show that Swiss SMEs are in general aware of climate change (...) and their resulting consequences. SMEs have taken steps to help mitigate greenhouse gas emissions through recycling, reduction of energy and water consumption, and use of recycled packaging. SMEs could however improve their environmental impact through low-carbon means of transport and use of public transport, sustainable raw material inputs, sustainable energy sources, and setting environmental goals and audits. There was a positive association between climate change awareness and mitigation. Motivating factors to pro-environmental behavior included financial advantage and responsibility towards the environment, while firm size and human resources were limiting factors. Lastly, different mitigation measures might be influenced by different motivating and limiting factors including financial advantage and pressure from interest groups, as well as firm size. (shrink)

Research on ethical formation in engineering has largely focused on assessing students’ abilities to recognize ethical issues and reason through ethical dilemmas. In this paper, we depict a conceptual framework for understanding how students develop into ethical engineers that involves dimensions beyond ethical awareness and judgment. In particular, we explore the role of ethical motivation in engineering students’ ethical formation. Ethical motivation is the process of deciding to act upon an ethical decision based on one’s valuing of ethics, as (...) well as one’s ability to prioritize moral concerns and professional values over personal interests. To prepare students to prioritize ethical and professional obligations, ethical training needs to help students become aware of and prepared to act upon both personal and professional values. This paper demonstrates how ethical motivation can be operationalized and assessed in engineering ethics curriculum by sharing findings from assessments implemented during an interdisciplinary engineering ethics course across two semesters. Findings from this study will provide insights into how students internalize professional values into their views of engineers’ roles and ultimately into their future practice as engineers. The approach used in this study can guide instructors interested in assessing ethical motivation and related constructs in their curriculums. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide insights into how information practitioners can develop further their awareness on ethical issues. In the context of the paper, awareness means able to identify and deal with issues of ethics in activities of information systems planning, development and use. The paper begins by presenting two areas which IS practitioners can initially explore to develop their ethical awareness. These areas are: IS Methodologies and Codes. The first area emphasises ethical (...) class='Hi'>awareness by using methodologies. The second element aims to encourage ethical awareness by following principles. In both areas, self‐reflection is identified as a key element for awareness. Using Foucault’s ideas on power and ethics, a critical understanding of ethical awareness based on self‐reflection is presented to complement ethical awareness developments. This understanding is defined in terms of two elements of inquiry: Power relations analysis and ways of being ethical. With these two elements, the paper argues that IS practitioners can exert their critical thinking and create their own ethics, while still following IS methodologies and codes. (shrink)