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Profile: Axel Seemann
  1.  20
    Joint Attention: New Developments in Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, and Social Neuroscience.Axel Seemann (ed.) - 2012 - MIT Press.
    Academic interest in the phenomenon of joint attention -- the capacity to attend to an object together with another creature -- has increased rapidly over the past two decades. Yet it isn't easy to spell out in detail what joint attention is, how it ought to be characterized, and what exactly its significance consists in. The writers for this volume address these and related questions by drawing on a variety of disciplines, including developmental and comparative psychology, philosophy of mind, and (...)
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  2.  32
    Joint Agency: Intersubjectivity, Sense of Control, and the Feeling of Trust.Axel Seemann - 2009 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):500-515.
    In this paper, I am going to be concerned with the capacity of human beings to act jointly. In particular, I will focus on the phenomenal aspect of collective action. I shall suggest that the experience of being jointly engaged with another is complex: it comprises both a practical grasp of oneself and of the other person as single agents participating in the joint pursuit, and an experience of collective immersion in the activity, which includes a sense of joint control. (...)
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  3.  39
    The Other Person in Joint Attention: A Relational Approach.Axel Seemann - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):161-182.
    John Campbell recommends a relational view on joint attention. In this paper, I ask what his position implies for the perceptual experience of jointly engaged persons, and suggest that this experience can be accounted for by taking seriously the notion of intersubjectivity. I provide an account of what I call the 'direct acquaintance' of jointly engaged persons with one another. To be so acquainted is to enjoy an experience of feelings that are shared in a particular way. I spell out (...)
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  4.  27
    Person Perception.Axel Seemann - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):245 – 262.
    Peter Strawson holds that on a proper conception of personhood, the problem of Other Minds does not arise. I suggest that the viability of his proposal depends on a particular account of person perception. I argue that neither the theory theory nor the simulation theory of mindreading constitutes a suitable basis for this account. I then go on to defend Peter Hobson's notion of 'feeling perception' as an intersubjectivist alternative that, if properly developed, delivers a basis for a viable account (...)
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  5.  63
    Joint Motor Action and Cross-Creature Embodiment.Axel Seemann - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):279-301.
    The question of what is shared in joint action has been discussed mainly with reference to the notion of collective intentionality. The problem of how to account for intentional states that are shared between two or more jointly engaged creatures is particularly relevant for actions that involve distal intentions. Yet there is another important kind of joint action, which so far has received less interest, at least by philosophers. This kind of action can be described in terms of a shared (...)
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  6.  55
    Joint Attention, Collective Knowledge, and the "We" Perspective.Axel Seemann - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):217 – 230.
    In this paper, I am concerned with the practical aspect of joint attention. In particular, I ask what enables us to engage in joint activities, and go on to suggest that on a representational account of joint attention, this question cannot be satisfactorily answered. I explore John Campbell's "relational" approach and suggest that if one couples it with Peter Hobson's notion of "feeling perception", one may be in a position to account for the action-enabling aspect of joint engagements. This approach (...)
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  7.  33
    Why We Did It: An Anscombian Account of Collective Action.Axel Seemann - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (5):637-655.
    In this paper, I am concerned with persons' capacity for joint action. I start by suggesting that approaches which seek to account for that capacity in terms of collective intentionality face a problem: there are actions that clearly seem to qualify as collective even though the involved persons cannot be said to entertain an overarching 'We'-intention (however one characterizes this notion). I then go on to develop an alternative account of action that loosely draws on Elizabeth Anscombe's action theory and (...)
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  8.  10
    Rational Trust: An Interview with Onora O’Neill.Axel Seemann - 2008 - Philosophy of Management 6 (2):3-8.
    Onora O’Neill was Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge from 1992 to 2006. She studied philosophy, psychology and physiology at Oxford and earned a PhD from Harvard, with John Rawls as supervisor. She taught at Barnard College, the women’s college at Columbia University, New York, before taking up a post at the University of Essex, where she became Professor of Philosophy in 1987. She lectures in the faculties of Philosophy and History and Philosophy of Science at Cambridge, and has written widely (...)
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  9.  9
    Reminiscing Together: Joint Experiences, Epistemic Groups, and Sense of Self.Axel Seemann - forthcoming - Synthese:1-16.
    In this essay, I consider a kind of social group that I call ‘epistemic’. It is constituted by its members’ possession of perceptually grounded common knowledge, which endows them with a particular kind of epistemic authority. This authority, I argue, is invoked in the activity of ‘joint reminiscing’—of remembering together a past jointly experienced event. Joint reminiscing, in turn, plays an important role in the constitution of social and personal identity. The notion of an epistemic group, then, is a concept (...)
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  10.  17
    The Role of Joint Experience in Historical Narratives.Axel Seemann - 2011 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (2):201-229.
    There are historical events which cannot easily be made sense of by reference to the actions of single individuals. I suggest that one way to understand such events is by building on the involved agents' joint experience, or reports thereof. The phenomenology of joint involvement, so my suggestion, is of use in a particular kind of sense making that combines hermeneutical and explanatory elements. Such sense making, I argue, is narrative in character. I suggest a particular conception of historical narratives (...)
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  11.  8
    Language, Mind and Social Reality.Axel Seemann - 2009 - Philosophy of Management 7 (2):3-11.
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  12.  8
    Rational Trust.Axel Seemann - 2008 - Philosophy of Management 6 (2):3-8.
    Onora O’Neill was Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge from 1992 to 2006. She studied philosophy, psychology and physiology at Oxford and earned a PhD from Harvard, with John Rawls as supervisor. She taught at Barnard College, the women’s college at Columbia University, New York, before taking up a post at the University of Essex, where she became Professor of Philosophy in 1987. She lectures in the faculties of Philosophy and History and Philosophy of Science at Cambridge, and has written widely (...)
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  13.  19
    Lifeworld, Discourse, and Realism: On Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Truth.Axel Seemann - 2004 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 30 (4):503-514.
    In this paper, I give a systematic account of the core features of Jürgen Habermas’s revised approach to truth that comprises both realist and epistemic components. While agents in the lifeworld are pragmatic realists and work on the basic assumption that their beliefs about the world are true, beliefs that have become problematic can be scrutinized only in the form of validity-claims in rational discourses. Thus Habermas introduces a discursive truth predicate that involves a procedural idealization of the conditions of (...)
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  14.  3
    Strategy.Axel Seemann - 2007 - Philosophy of Management 6 (1):123-134.
    In this paper, I explore the nature of strategic decision making. In particular, I am concerned with the interplay of rational reflection and intuitive insight in strategic contexts. I argue that it is in the very nature of strategic situations that they cannot be exhaustively analysed in terms of the available evidence, and that hence there always is an intuitive element to strategic decision making. I consider a variety of ways to explain the notion of intuition and conclude that intuition (...)
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  15.  1
    Daniel D. Hutto, Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons Reviewed By.Axel Seemann - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (2):93-94.
  16. Language, Mind and Social Reality: An Interview with John Searle.Axel Seemann - 2009 - Philosophy of Management 7 (2):3-11.
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  17. Strategy: Rationality, Intuition, and Accountability.Axel Seemann - 2007 - Philosophy of Management 6 (1):123-134.
    In this paper, I explore the nature of strategic decision making. In particular, I am concerned with the interplay of rational reflection and intuitive insight in strategic contexts. I argue that it is in the very nature of strategic situations that they cannot be exhaustively analysed in terms of the available evidence, and that hence there always is an intuitive element to strategic decision making. I consider a variety of ways to explain the notion of intuition and conclude that intuition (...)
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