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Ayoob Shahmoradi
University of California, San Diego
  1. A representationalist reading of Kantian intuitions.Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2169-2191.
    There are passages in Kant’s writings according to which empirical intuitions have to be (a) singular, (b) object-dependent, and (c) immediate. It has also been argued that empirical intuitions (d) are not truth-apt, and (e) need to provide the subject with a proof of the possibility of the cognized object. Having relied on one or another of the a-e constraints, the naïve realist readers of Kant have argued that it is not possible for empirical intuitions to be representations. Instead they (...)
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    Seeing Without Discriminating.Ayoob Shahmoradi - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    I distinguish five types of discrimination, three of which are personal-level and distinctively visual. I explain their implication relations. Then I argue that the plausibility of the claim that seeing something requires discriminating it, as opposed to simply attributing some properties to it, hinges on the type of discrimination under consideration. A weak form of discrimination trivializes the debate. Stronger notions of discrimination, however, cannot be understood without attribution (i.e., representation-as). Attribution appears to form the fundamental level of personal-level representation.
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  3. Why do we need perceptual content?Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):776-788.
  4.  25
    A Critique of Non-Descriptive Cognitivism.Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2014 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 21:76-86.
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  5. On Schellenberg’s The Unity of Perception[REVIEW]Ayoob Shahmoradi - manuscript
    My general worry is that Schellenberg’s arguments against naive realism, generalism, and Russellian representationalism do not seem to be successful. Thus her attempt at ruling these views out fails. Her main arguments rely on a shared premise whose plausibility, in the absence of an appropriate theory of particulars, is hard to assess (§2.1). Apart from that, these arguments rely on an under-specified notion of constitution; there seems to be no sense of the term that makes all the premises of her (...)
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