A decade on after it first published to international acclaim, the seminal Handbook of Organization Studies has been updated to capture exciting new developments in the field. Providing a retrospective and prospective overview of organization studies, this Handbook continues to challenge and inspire readers with its synthesis of knowledge and literature. As ever, contributions have been selected to reflect the diversity of the field. New chapters cover areas such as organizational change, knowledge management and organizational networks.

This book is a comprehensive account of what it means to try to quantify health in distributing resources for health care. It examines the concept of QALYs which supposedly makes it more accurate to talk about life in terms of both quality and quantity of years lived when referring to health care policy. It offers an elegant new approach to comparing the costs and benefits of medical interventions. Cost-Utility Analysis is a method designed by economists to aid decision makers distribute (...) scarce resources to areas of health care where they will yield the greatest benefits. Erik Nord questions the feasibility of measuring patients' quality of life meaningfully in numerical terms, as CUA presupposes. He presents an alternative approach called cost-value analysis in which representative samples of the general public express preferences between different health-care programs. In this approach, subjects are allowed to include concerns for fairness that go beyond concerns for efficiency of conventional health economics. (shrink)

This book is a comprehensive account of what it means to try to quantify health in distributing resources for health care. It examines the concept of QALYs which supposedly makes it more accurate to talk about life in terms of both quality and quantity of years lived when referring to health care policy. It offers an elegant new approach to comparing the costs and benefits of medical interventions. Cost-Utility Analysis is a method designed by economists to aid decision makers distribute (...) scarce resources to areas of health care where they will yield the greatest benefits. Erik Nord questions the feasibility of measuring patients' quality of life meaningfully in numerical terms, as CUA presupposes. He presents an alternative approach called cost-value analysis in which representative samples of the general public express preferences between different health-care programs. In this approach, subjects are allowed to include concerns for fairness that go beyond concerns for efficiency of conventional health economics. (shrink)

In QALY-thinking, an activity that takes N people from a bad state (including 'dying') to the state of healthy for X years should have priority over an activity that takes N other people from the same bad state to a state of moderate illness for the same number of years (given equal costs). An empirical study indicates that this view may not be shared by the general public in Norway. Subjects tended to emphasise equality in value of life and in (...) entitlement to treatment rather than level of health after treatment. The relevance of costs per QALY in prioritising between different health care programmes in Norway is thereby brought in to doubt. While the sample in the study is too small to support firm policy conclusions, the results should contribute to an increased interest among health economists in actually measuring people's ethical preferences in matters of prioritising, rather than taking it for granted that their own values are shared by the general public. (shrink)

First published in 1986, Knowledge, Belief, and Witchcraft remains the only analysis of indigenous discourse about an African belief system undertaken from within the framework of Anglo-American analytical philosophy. Taking as its point of departure W. V. O. Quine's thesis about the indeterminacy of translation, the book investigates questions of Yoruba epistemology and of how knowledge is conceived in an oral culture.

To give priority to the young over the elderly has been labelled ‘ageism’. People who express ‘ageist’ preferences may feel that, all else equal, an individual has greater right to enjoy additional life years the fewer life years he or she has already had. We shall refer to this as egalitarian ageism. They may also emphasise the greater expected duration of health benefits in young people that derives from their greater life expectancy. We may call this utilitarian ageism. Both these (...) forms of ageism were observed in an empirical study of social preferences in Australia. The study lends some support to the assumptions in the QALY approach that duration of benefits, and hence old age, should count in prioritising at the budget level in health care. (shrink)

Daniel Hausman’s book ‘Valuing Health’ is a valuable contribution to our understanding of QALYs and DALYs and to moving health economics to adopting a broader perspective than that taken in conventional cost-effectiveness analysis. Hausman’s attempt at constructing a public value table for health states without having recourse to data from population preferences studies is also a fascinating read. But I have serious concerns about his resulting table. Hausman’s views on which dimensions of health a benevolent liberal state should care about (...) are essentially not different from what has long been emphasized in health economists’ work on valuations of health outcomes. His table would have been helpful as a sketch if it was the first attempt in health economics to quantify numerically the societal value of different types and degrees of health improvement. But research in the field has gone far beyond that. Multi-attribute utility instruments with much more accurate health classification systems than Hausman’s sketch are now at hand. Available also are models of societal valuations of QALYs that are broadly consistent with general population values, incorporate wider concerns than Hausman’s table does and do not have the questionable numerical properties that characterize Hausman’s sketch. (shrink)

To give priority to the young over the elderly has been labelled ‘ageism’. People who express ‘ageist’ preferences may feel that, all else equal, an individual has greater right to enjoy additional life years the fewer life years he or she has already had. We shall refer to this asegalitarian ageism. They may also emphasise the greater expected duration of health benefits in young people that derives from their greater life expectancy. We may call thisutilitarian ageism. Both these forms of (...) ageism were observed in an empirical study of social preferences in Australia. The study lends some support to the assumptions in the QALY approach that duration of benefits, and hence old age, should count in prioritising at the budget level in health care. (shrink)

The New Evil Demon problem has been hotly debated since the case was introduced in the early 1980’s (e.g. Lehrer and Cohen 1983; Cohen 1984), and there seems to be recent increased interest in the topic. In a forthcoming collection of papers on the New Evil Demon problem (Dutant and Dorsch, forthcoming), at least two of the papers, both by prominent epistemologists, attempt to resist the problem by appealing to the distinction between justification and excuses. My primary aim here is (...) to critically evaluate this new excuse maneuver as a response to the New Evil Demon problem. -/- Their response attempts to give us reason to reject the idea that victims of the New Evil Demon have justification for believing as they do. I shall argue that this approach is ultimately unsuccessful, however much of value can be learned from these attempts. In particular, progress in the debate can be made by following those who advance the excuse maneuver and make explicit the connection between epistemic justification and epistemic norms. By doing so, the questions being debated are clarified, as is the methodology being used to attempt to answer them. (shrink)

There are various equivalent formulations of the Church-Turing thesis. A common one is that every effective computation can be carried out by a Turing machine. The Church-Turing thesis is often misunderstood, particularly in recent writing in the philosophy of mind.

We're better than we think -- The harmony games -- Opening the door to the sanguine -- Bringing telos back -- Critical business ethics -- Why business ethics matters.

"Principe à valeur constitutionnelle en droit français, la sécurité juridique occupe une place centrale dans l'argumentaire du législateur aussi bien national qu'européen et se trouve au coeur de l'activité juridictionnelle. Dans une perspective économique du droit, les systèmes juridiques sont désormais eux-mêmes évalués à l'aune de la sécurité juridique, comme le démontrent les rapports "Doing Business", commandés par la Banque Mondiale depuis une dizaine d'années. Cependant, la crainte d'insécurité juridique semble ne jamais avoir été aussi forte. Elle est notamment révélée (...) par l'appel récurrent à la notion de sécurité juridique. La mondialisation et la "fondamentalisation" du droit amplifient le phénomène dans la mesure où l'exigence de sécurité se manifeste dans des contextes plus complexes de formation et d'application du droit. En parallèle, la notion d'insécurité juridique est évoquée en creux lors des travaux relatifs à la sécurité juridique. Or, cette dernière est le plus souvent envisagée à partir de la dénonciation de son contraire, l'insécurité juridique. Par conséquent, la sécurité juridique est envisagée de manière négative. Pourtant, l'insécurité juridique ne fait l'objet d'aucun travail conceptuel malgré son emploi généralisé. Sous l'égide de la Cour de cassation et de la Société de législation comparée, des juristes de plusieurs horizons se sont réunis à Paris le 22 mars 2021 pour mener une double analyse de cette notion dans un colloque intitulé "Insécurité juridique : l'émergence d'une notion? " Ils ont d'abord apprécié le recours à la notion d'insécurité juridique pour se livrer ensuite à un exercice prospectif, notamment au regard des nouveaux enjeux technologiques.". (shrink)

By describing societal value judgements in health care in numerical terms one may in theory increase the precision of guidelines for priority setting and allow decision makers to judge more accurately the degree to which different health care programs provide societal value for money. However, valuing health programs in terms of QALYs disregards salient societal concerns for fairness in resource allocation. A different kind of numerical valuation of medical interventions, that incorporates concerns for fairness, is described. The usefulness to decision (...) makers of such numerical information remains to be tested. (shrink)

We discuss the evolutionary implications of connections drawn between the authors' learned “secondary modules” and the habit-formation system that appears to be ubiquitous among vertebrates. Prior to any subsequent coevolution with social learning, we suggest that aspects of general intelligence likely arose in tandem with mechanisms of adaptive motor control that rely on basal ganglia circuitry.

This is a largely historical study of Mexican social policy and its 20th century course to social development in such areas as income, education, health, nutrition, social safety, social security, with an emphasis on the motive forces. The overall pattern is examined in terms of affordability, rhetoric generated, and comparisons with other countries in the same stage of enhancement.

Virtuelle Realitäten sind computervermittelte Kommunikationsräume. Man findet sie auch in der Religion. Der Band enthält in einem ersten Teil Beiträge zu einem praktisch-theologischen Verständnis virtueller Realitäten. In einem zweiten Teil geht es um Gottesdienst und Predigt in medientheoretischer Perspektive. Es zeigt sich, wie nah Medien und Religion bzw. Glaube miteinander verwandt sind, wenn es um die Wahrnehmung von Wirklichkeit geht. Christliche Religion und christlicher Glaube pflegen einen konstruktiven Umgang mit der Wirklichkeit.

We define self-control as an individual's efforts to bias the outcome of present or anticipated motivational conflicts in order to increase the likelihood that subsequent behavior serves perceived long-term interests. We suggest suppression and resolve are not “mechanisms” that underlie self-control, but rather are classes of strategies that influence motivations in order to increase the likelihood of successful self-control outcomes.

It is common to account for our senses on the basis of our sensory organs. One way of glossing why Aristotle famously counted five senses—and why his count became common sense in the West and elsewhere—is because there are five rather obvious organs of sense. In more modern accounts, this organ criterion of the senses has transformed into a neurobiological criterion; that is to say, part of what it means to be a sense is to have an associated organ with (...) appropriate physiological properties. For example, part of the claim that humans have a sense of vision is that we have a non-vestigial organ (the eye) that has cells (photoreceptors) especially sensitive to the properties of electromagnetic radiation. However, the nature of this “organ criterion” is a point of some contention. Is it a sufficient criterion? Necessary? To be called “vision” need the organ mediating it give rise to “visual experiences”? This chapter will consider the neurobiological criterion as it was originally presented in Aristotle and later reconceptualized in 19th-century neurophysiologist Johannes Müller’s “Law of Specific Nerve Energies.” By understanding the role of neurobiology in these accounts, we will be able to explore the deficiencies of contemporary accounts that downplay neurobiology in differentiating the senses. We will consider one of these accounts in detail: Alva Noë’s recent arguments in favor of an enactive approach to perceptual psychology. (shrink)