This collective paper on radicalization and violent extremism part of the ‘Philosophy of education in a new key’ initiative by Educational Philosophy and Theory brings together some of the leading contemporary scholars writing on the most pressing epistemological, ethical, political and educational issues facing post-9/11 scholarship on radicalization and violent extremism. Its overall aim is to move beyond the ‘conventional wisdom’ associated with this area of scholarly research best represented by its many slogans, metaphors and other thought-terminating clichés. By providing (...) conceptual lenses on issues previously compartmentalized primarily [or even exclusively] in security and intelligence studies or at the fringes of scholarly interest, radicalization and violent extremism turn out to be much more complex than ‘radicalization studies’ has been eager to acknowledge. (shrink)

Gregory Vlastos je v svoji znani rekonstrukciji argumenta »tritos anthropos« menil, da je regres tretjega človeka usodna napaka platonske teorije idej, saj vpeljuje najmanj dve protislovni logični značilnosti tega nauka: predpostavlja namreč dve načeli, samopripis in neistovetnost. Argument tretjega človeka zato obravnavam na podlagi upoštevanja omenjenih načel in njune veljavnosti v dveh inačicah, ki ju je podal Aleksander Afrodizijski. V prvi, ki je tradicionalno pripisana Aristotelu pod imenom O idejah in jo najdemo v Aleksandrovem komentarju k Metafiziki, in nato še (...) v Evdemovi inačici, kakršno domnevno ta navaja pri svoji aristotelski kritiki Platonove teorije idej. V drugem delu prispevka je narejena primerjava med Aristotelovima inačicama tretjega človeka in Platonovim pripoznanjem neskončnega regresa v obeh verzijah iz njegovega Parmenida: regres iz ideje velikega in regres iz idej kot vzorov, ki prav tako končujeta v neskončnem regresu novih idej: te po svojem bistvu ne bodo več ene, ampak brezmejno mnoge. (shrink)

V domnevno Platonovem dialogu Alkibiadu I je postavljena trditev, da je del duše, ki skriva naše pravo sebstvo, naš jaz, podoben Bogu: nekdo, ki ga uvidi in je spoznal božansko – boga in razumnost, bo tako najbolje dojemal tudi samega sebe. Vprašanje sebstva v dialogu nastopi kot smiselno nadaljevanje poprejšnjih izpeljav, po katerih se določa, da mi nismo ne telo, ne naše lastne stvari, temveč duša. S tem, ko sebstvo poistovetimo z Bogom, nekako uidemo problemu samonanašanja in postavimo vprašanje samovédenja (...) v novo dimenzijo. Članek obravnava nekatere nejasnosti definicije sebstva , torej vključujočega telo in dušo, ali le kot duše, kot v Alkibiadu Prvem , ki uporablja telo in mu vlada , v odnosu do božanskega.In Alcibiades I, for many interpreters still a spurious dialogue, Plato claims that our true self resembles the divine. Someone who looked at it and grasped everything divine, God and intelligence, would have the best grasp of himself as well. The question of the self comes as the natural consequence of previous claims showing we are neither our possessions nor our bodies, but our souls. By making the self similar to God, we can tackle the problem of reflexivity differently, putting the question of self-knowledge into new perspective. The article discusses some unclear questions concerning the definition of the self, defined as »the whole man« in Charmides , i.e. including body as integral part, or as excluding it in Alcibiades I, where the self is the soul , since the soul uses the body and rules it , and its relations to the divine. (shrink)

In Alcibiades I, for many interpreters still a spurious dialogue, Plato claims that our true self (the part of the soul) resembles the divine. Someone who looked at it and grasped everything divine, God and intelligence, would have the best grasp of himself as well. The question of the self comes as the natural consequence of previous claims showing we are neither our possessions nor our bodies, but our souls. By making the self similar to God, we can tackle the (...) problem of reflexivity differently, putting the question of self-knowledge into new perspective. The article discusses some unclear questions concerning the definition of the self, defined as "the whole man" in Charmides (156e7-8), i.e., including body as integral part, or as excluding it in Alcibiades I, where the self is the soul (130ct), since the soul uses the body (130al) and rules it (130ae), and its relations to the divine. (shrink)

Thought experiments by ancient philosophers are often open to debate: in what sense did their reasoning really concern thought experimentation? For instance, in Plato's Republic, Glaucon uses the myth of Gyges to demonstrate why people who practice justice do so unwillingly. A challenge, posed to Socrates and provided through some sort of thought experiment by imagining the effects of using the ring of invisibility, was intended to answer the question of human nature and our basis for the inclination towards justice (...) or injustice. This collection expands the current, but rare, topic of whether it is possible to articulate a discussion about thought experiments and their arguments from the historical perspective of philosophy and science. It may sometimes seem that, in a loose sense, any philosophical reflection can already be interpreted as some form of thought experiment. Although the functions of it are very diverse and complex, and often closely linked to other cognitive tools, such as visualization, imagination or idealization, the contributions in this book provide new insights into how the concept of a thought experiment coincides with more modern perceptions. The purpose of the book is to show how philosophers, already in antiquity, began to use thought experiments and argumentation to convey theories in an accessible manner and how philosophical hypotheses, often being subjective and impossible to prove through empirical evidence, helped to promote scientific knowledge and discoveries. Different authors develop several lines of argumentation, claiming that philosophical thinking can be understood by comparing it to scientific experimenting, or vice versa: if empirical evidence is usually necessary for science, thought experiments may be used to develop a hypothesis or to prepare for experimentation. The analysis of historical examples of thought experiments might also contribute to a better understanding of philosophical endeavour in antiquity as a whole. (shrink)