Essays by Jurgen Habermas on truth, objectivity, normativity, naturalism, and realism after the linguistic turn.

A rare systematic thinker, Habermas has furthered our understanding of modernity, social interaction and linguistic practice, societal institutions, rationality, morality, the law, globalization, and the role of religion in multicultural societies. He has helped shape discussions of truth, objectivity, normativity, and the relationship between the human and the natural sciences. This volume provides an accessible and comprehensive conceptual map of Habermas' theoretical framework and its key concepts, including the theory of communicative action, discourse ethics, his social-political philosophy and their applications (...) to contemporary issues. It will be an invaluable resource for both novice readers of Habermas and those interested in a more refined understanding of particular aspects of his work. (shrink)

A rare systematic thinker, Habermas has furthered our understanding of modernity, social interaction and linguistic practice, societal institutions, rationality, morality, the law, globalization, and the role of religion in multicultural societies. He has helped shape discussions of truth, objectivity, normativity, and the relationship between the human and the natural sciences. This volume provides an accessible and comprehensive conceptual map of Habermas' theoretical framework and its key concepts, including the theory of communicative action, discourse ethics, his social-political philosophy and their applications (...) to contemporary issues. It will be an invaluable resource for both novice readers of Habermas and those interested in a more refined understanding of particular aspects of his work. (shrink)

In 1971 Jürgen Habermas delivered the Gauss Lectures at Princeton University. These pivotal lectures, entitled "Reflections on the Linguistic Foundation of Sociology," anticipate The Theory of Communicative Action and offer an excellent introduction to it. They show why Habermas considers the linguistic turn in social philosophy to be necessary and contain the first formulation of formal pragmatics, including an important discussion of truth.In these lectures and two additional essays, Habermas outlines an intersubjective approach to social theory that takes the concepts (...) of meaning and communication to be central. In doing so, he situates his project relative to other influential accounts of how meaning is constituted, in particular those of Edmund Husserl, Wilfrid Sellars, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. He examines the nature of social interaction and its connection to communication, developing a linguistic conception of convention and intentionality. He also offers an account of social and individual pathologies using the concept of systematically distorted communication. Taken together, these analyses contribute significantly to current debates in the philosophy of action and language. (shrink)

A juxtaposition of Frege’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of reference (Bedeutung and Verweisung) shows them to be complementary. The thesis that meaning determines reference has been attributed to both Frege and Heidegger. Contrary to the view that this commits them to linguistic idealism, I defend a weak version of the determination thesis according to which both Fregean and Heideggerian reference allow for the possibility of error and for the objectivity of discourse. Thus, what we refer to is accessible to us only (...) by our grasping its sense of meaning; sense is a way of fixing reference, but does not constitute the referent as what it is. (shrink)

This paper examines the role of Habermas's concept of the lifeworld in processes of reaching mutual understanding. This concept is shown to be ultimately too amorphous to bear the theoretical weight Habermas places on it. He conceives the lifeworld both as diffuse and holistic, yet also as structured; as a set of taken-for-granted and counterfactual presuppositions, yet also as a kind of knowledge. In the end, he presupposes what the lifeworld is supposed to explain: mutual intelligibility of subjects in interaction. (...) These conceptual tensions affect the explanatory power of the lifeworld and the usefulness of the theory of communicative action for conflict resolution. Where conflict resolution is aimed at mediating radical disagreements with minimal concord between parties, presuming consensus may not be possible or optimal. The present analysis argues for the need to develop other means of establishing a sufficient level of background consensus against which communicative action can take place. (shrink)

Abstract Jürgen Habermas has proposed a tripartite classification of analytic philosophy of language into formal semantics, intentionalistic semantics, and use?theories of meaning. Here, I focus on the relationship between formal semantics and Habermas? own account of meaning and truth. I argue against his early ?consensus theory of truth?, according to which truth is defined as idealized warranted assertibility and explained by the ?discursive redemption? of validity claims. A claim is discursively redeemed if it commands rationally motivated consensus of all discursive (...) partners. I argue that this is not so much a theory of truth as of justification. As an account of truth, it is unsatisfactory because warrants can be lost in light of new arguments, and because consensus is seen as criterial for truth only if it is in principle defeasible ? hence there remains a gap between truth and even idealized warranted assertibility. In The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas? views undergo a shift. Following Dummett, he cashes out meaning in terms of assertibility conditions. While Habermas continues to insist on an epistemically conditioned notion of truth, he no longer explicitly defines truth as idealized warranted assertibility; nor does his meaning?theoretic framework require him to do so. I argue that truth is an irreducible and ineliminable regulative idea. In particular, it can be explicated in terms of justification only indirectly. Contrary to some commentators, I do not believe that the regulative function of truth is merely negative. Fallibilism does not exhaust the meaning of truth. For we do not make truth claims provisionally, that is, with the understanding that they may turn out to be wrong. Rather, we gamble that we will not turn out to be wrong. Therefore, the concept of truth has not only a critical, but also a positive function in our discourse. (shrink)

Swindal seeks to incorporate temporality into the formal-pragmatic analysis of discourse by developing what he calls ‘event-determining’ reflection. After outlining his motivations for introducing this new form of reflection, I offer a critique, first, of his appeal to meta-discourse about when to engage in discourse and, second, of the function of truth in his account. Finally, I suggest that Swindal’s theory of reflective acceptability fruitfully complements Robert Brandom’s normative pragmatics.

Swindal seeks to incorporate temporality into the formal-pragmatic analysis of discourse by developing what he calls ‘event-determining’ reflection. After outlining his motivations for introducing this new form of reflection, I offer a critique, first, of his appeal to meta-discourse about when to engage in discourse and, second, of the function of truth in his account. Finally, I suggest that Swindal’s theory of reflective acceptability fruitfully complements Robert Brandom’s normative pragmatics.

Brandom's inferentialism provides a semantics that complements Habermas's theory of communicative action without sacrificing its intersubjectivist insights. Pace Habermas, Brandom's conception of communication is robustly intersubjective. At the pragmatic level, interlocutors inherit each other's commitments and entitlements and must justify their claims when challenged; at the semantic level, anaphora show how the web of meaning is knit together, connecting expressions of the language as well as interlocutors. Finally, Habermas's thesis that there are three irreducible types of validity claim is preserved (...) by linking claims to truth and rightness with mutually irreducible patterns of inference. (shrink)

Representing, and Discursive Commitment (reviewed by Barbara Fultner).

A juxtaposition of Frege’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of reference shows them to be complementary. The thesis that meaning determines reference has been attributed to both Frege and Heidegger. Contrary to the view that this commits them to linguistic idealism, I defend a weak version of the determination thesis according to which both Fregean and Heideggerian reference allow for the possibility of error and for the objectivity of discourse. Thus, what we refer to is accessible to us only by our grasping (...) its sense of meaning; sense is a way of fixing reference, but does not constitute the referent as what it is. (shrink)

A rare systematic thinker, Habermas has furthered our understanding of modernity, social interaction and linguistic practice, societal institutions, rationality, morality, the law, globalization, and the role of religion in multicultural societies. He has helped shape discussions of truth, objectivity, normativity, and the relationship between the human and the natural sciences. This volume provides an accessible and comprehensive conceptual map of Habermas' theoretical framework and its key concepts, including the theory of communicative action, discourse ethics, his social-political philosophy and their applications (...) to contemporary issues. It will be an invaluable resource for both novice readers of Habermas and those interested in a more refined understanding of particular aspects of his work. (shrink)

A rare systematic thinker, Habermas has furthered our understanding of modernity, social interaction and linguistic practice, societal institutions, rationality, morality, the law, globalization, and the role of religion in multicultural societies. He has helped shape discussions of truth, objectivity, normativity, and the relationship between the human and the natural sciences. This volume provides an accessible and comprehensive conceptual map of Habermas' theoretical framework and its key concepts, including the theory of communicative action, discourse ethics, his social-political philosophy and their applications (...) to contemporary issues. It will be an invaluable resource for both novice readers of Habermas and those interested in a more refined understanding of particular aspects of his work. (shrink)

A rare systematic thinker, Habermas has furthered our understanding of modernity, social interaction and linguistic practice, societal institutions, rationality, morality, the law, globalization, and the role of religion in multicultural societies. He has helped shape discussions of truth, objectivity, normativity, and the relationship between the human and the natural sciences. This volume provides an accessible and comprehensive conceptual map of Habermas' theoretical framework and its key concepts, including the theory of communicative action, discourse ethics, his social-political philosophy and their applications (...) to contemporary issues. It will be an invaluable resource for both novice readers of Habermas and those interested in a more refined understanding of particular aspects of his work. (shrink)

Pace Dummett, the issue between molecularism and holism does not turn on whether a meaning theory is compositional, but on how successful communication is conceived. Given a notion of partial understanding, molecularism escapes the two most prevalent objections against holism (learnability and communication). Holism, too, can escape these objections, provided we also grant the holist a notion of partial understanding and suitably amend our conception of successful communication.

I focus on holism in philosophy of language, particularly in Donald Davidson's truth-conditional semantics and Jurgen Habermas's formal pragmatics. An adequate semantics must take account of three dimensions: the subjective, the social, and the objective. It must, in this sense, be holistic. All three aspects are mutually irreducible and interdependent. Yet holistic approaches lack a clear sense of how they are related. Both Habermas and Davidson recognise that language is spoken by individuals whose intentions it expresses, that it is social (...) , and that it makes claims about the objective world. Habermas places paramount importance on speakers' mutual recognition of norms, whereas Davidson maintains that conventions play no essential role in interpretation. I argue that Davidson's idiolectic conception of language overemphasises the achievements of individuals. Distinguishing between a public and a social theory of meaning, I argue that meaning is social and depends on communities of language users who share a lifeworld. Habermas, however, fails to recognise that if the background knowledge of the lifeworld is holistic, this holism extends to the theory of meaning. Davidson's principle of charity and Habermas's lifeworld are both transcendental notions: they refer to the conditions of possibility--the pragmatic presuppositions--of interpretation. Habermasian transcendentalism, correctly understood, is much closer to Davidson than might initially appear. An important complementarity between them concerns the relation between truth and justification. While Habermas aptly articulates the connection between meaning and justification, Davidson's conception of truth as a semantic primitive avoids problems associated with accounts of truth as idealised warranted assertibility. Nonetheless, it is compatible with taking truth to be a regulative idea. Finally, I argue in favour of an assertibilist semantics in order to accommodate the holistic relation of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and objectivity. Considerations of meaning holism and the fact that both Davidson and Habermas acknowledge a contextual element in meaning, however, continue to fuel scepticism concerning such a theory. (shrink)