31 found
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  1. A Defense of Stable Invariantism.Baron Reed - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):224-244.
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  2. Self-Knowledge and Rationality.Baron Reed - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):164-181.
    There have been several recent attempts to account for the special authority of self-knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent's intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states. This constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue of the rationality of the subject. I argue, however, that there are two ways in which we have self-knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first-order intentional states and the second-order judgments about them. Recognition of this (...)
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  3. How to Think About Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):143-157.
    Almost every contemporary theory of knowledge is a version of fallibilism, yet an adequate statement of fallibilism has not yet been provided. Standard definitions cannot account for fallibilistic knowledge of necessary truths. I consider and reject several attempts to resolve this difficulty before arguing that a belief is an instance of fallibilistic knowledge when it could have failed to be knowledge. This is a fully general account of fallibilism that applies to knowledge of necessary truths. Moreover, it reveals, not only (...)
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  4.  75
    Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Epistemic Agency.Baron Reed - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):40-69.
  5. The Long Road to Skepticism.Baron Reed - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (5):236-262.
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  6.  49
    Resisting Encroachment. [REVIEW]Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):465-472.
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  7. Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.
    Although recent epistemology has been marked by several prominent disagreements – e.g., between foundationalists and coherentists, internalists and externalists – there has been widespread agreement that some form of fallibilism must be correct. According to a rough formulation of this view, it is possible for a subject to have knowledge even in cases where the justification or grounding for the knowledge is compatible with the subject’s being mistaken. In this paper, I examine the motivation for fallibilism before providing a fully (...)
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  8. A New Argument for Skepticism.Baron Reed - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):91 - 104.
    The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario: because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is in fact a relevant difference—the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is another sort of comparison available—one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true—that makes possible a new argument (...)
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  9.  15
    How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge, by Stephen Hetherington: Malden, MA: Routledge, 2011, Pp. Xii + 260, $51.95. [REVIEW]Baron Reed - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):616-619.
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  10.  65
    Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism About Common Sense.Baron Reed - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):186–197.
    Epistemic circularity occurs when a subject forms the belief that a faculty F is reliable through the use of F. Although this is often thought to be vicious, externalist theories generally don't rule it out. For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject externalism. However, Michael Bergmann defends externalism by drawing on the tradition of common sense in two ways. First, he concedes that epistemically circular beliefs cannot answer a subject's doubts about her cognitive faculties. But, he argues, subjects (...)
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  11.  97
    Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless.Baron Reed - 2006 - Synthese 148 (2):303-308.
    One of the main strands of the Cartesian tradition is the view that the mental realm is cognitively accessible to us in a special way: whenever one is in a mental state of a certain sort, one can know it just by considering the matter. In that sense, the mental realm is thought to be a cognitive home for us, and the mental states it comprises are luminous. Recently, however, Timothy Williamson has argued that we are cognitively homeless: no mental (...)
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  12.  27
    Accidental Truth and Accidental Justification.Baron Reed - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):57-67.
    The Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2000): 57-67.
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  13.  38
    Epistemic Agency and the Intellectual Virtues.Baron Reed - 2001 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):507-526.
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  14.  91
    Accidentally Factive Mental States.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
    Knowledge is standardly taken to be belief that is both true and justified (and perhaps meets other conditions as well). Timothy Williamson rejects the standard epistemology for its inability to solve the Gettier problem. The moral of this failure, he argues, is that knowledge does not factor into a combination that includes a mental state (belief) and an external condition (truth), but is itself a type of mental state. Knowledge is, according to his preferred account, the most general factive mental (...)
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  15. The Stoics' Account of the Cognitive Impression.Baron Reed - 2002 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 23:147-80.
  16.  44
    Practical Matters Do Not Affect Whether You Know.Baron Reed - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 2--95.
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  17.  51
    Knowledge, Doubt, and Circularity.Baron Reed - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):273-287.
    Ernest Sosa's virtue perspectivism can be thought of as an attempt to capture as much as possible of the Cartesian project in epistemology while remaining within the framework of externalist fallibilism. I argue (a) that Descartes's project was motivated by a desire for intellectual stability and (b) that his project does not suffer from epistemic circularity. By contrast, Sosa's epistemology does entail epistemic circularity and, for this reason, proves unable to secure the sort of intellectual stability Descartes wanted. I then (...)
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  18.  20
    Certainty.Baron Reed - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  19.  8
    Self-Knowledge and Rationality.Baron Reed - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):164-181.
    There have been several recent attempts to account for the special authority of self-knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent's intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states. This constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue of the rationality of the subject. I argue, however, that there are two ways in which we have self-knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first-order intentional states and the second-order judgments about them. Recognition of this (...)
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  20.  54
    Fallibilism and the Lottery Paradox.Baron Reed - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:217-225.
    Any theory of knowledge that is fallibilist—i.e., that allows for one to have knowledge that could have been false or accidentally true—faces the lottery paradox. The paradox arises from the combination of two plausible claims: first, no one can know that one’s lottery ticket will lose prior to learning that it in fact has lost, and, second, the justification one has for the belief that one’s ticket will lose is just as good as the justification one has for paradigmatic instances (...)
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  21.  36
    Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. [REVIEW]Baron Reed - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (1):159-162.
  22. Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism About Common Sense.Baron Reed - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):186-197.
    Epistemic circularity occurs when a subject forms the belief that a faculty F is reliable through the use of F. Although this is often thought to be vicious, externalist theories generally don't rule it out. For some philosophers, this is a reason to reject externalism. However, Michael Bergmann defends externalism by drawing on the tradition of common sense in two ways. First, he concedes that epistemically circular beliefs cannot answer a subject's doubts about her cognitive faculties. But, he argues, subjects (...)
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  23.  31
    Reasons for Reasons.Baron Reed - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):241-247.
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  24.  11
    The Price of Doubt.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):735-739.
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  25.  12
    Review of Bryan Frances, Scepticism Comes Alive[REVIEW]Baron Reed - 2006 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (4).
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  26.  5
    Historical Reflections: Sosa's Perspective on the Epistemological Tradition.Baron Reed - 2013 - In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. pp. 205--224.
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  27. Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present.Diego E. Machuca & Baron Reed (eds.) - 2018 - Bloomsbury Academic.
  28. Knowledge, Agency, and Personhood.Baron Reed - 2002 - Dissertation, Brown University
    Fallibilism is the philosophical view that reconciles our ability to have knowledge with our constant vulnerability to error: we know even though our basis for knowledge might have failed to be adequate. In the central chapter, I trace a parallel between fallibilism and compatibilism. Recent work in the philosophy of free agency has drawn attention to a connection between freedom and personhood . I suggest that a similar connection is crucial in epistemology: only persons can know, and knowledge must be (...)
     
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  29. Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere.Baron Reed & A. K. Flowerree (eds.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
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  30. Who Knows?Baron Reed - 2016 - In Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas (ed.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications. Oxford University Press UK.
    This chapter traces the significance of a common feature of action and knowledge. A successful analysis of action must capture the sense in which there is someone who is acting. Similarly, it is argued, a successful analysis of knowledge must capture the sense in which there is someone who knows. Explicitly recognizing this fact helps to explain the importance of epistemic agency in understanding what knowledge is. This chapter explores the connections between knowledge, agency, and personhood and argues that some (...)
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  31. Philosophical Issues: Epistemic Agency.Ernest Sosa, Enrique Villanueva & Baron Reed - 2013 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    This book collects cutting edge essays on epistemic agency and related topics by distinguished senior contributors to epistemology, as well as rising figures in the field. The assembly of scholars is impressive, as is reflected by the quality and range of their contributions.
     
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