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Profile: Bart Streumer (University of Groningen)
  1. Can We Believe the Error Theory?Bart Streumer - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (4):194-212.
    According to the error theory, normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, even though such properties do not exist. In this paper, I argue that we cannot believe the error theory, and that this means that there is no reason for us to believe this theory. It may be thought that this is a problem for the error theory, but I argue that it is not. Instead, I argue, our inability to believe the error theory undermines many objections that (...)
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  2. Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.
    Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that (...)
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  3. Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?Bart Streumer - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):537-561.
    Frank Jackson has argued that, given plausible claims about supervenience, descriptive predicates and property identity, there are no irreducibly normative properties. Philosophers who think that there are such properties have made several objections to this argument. In this paper, I argue that all of these objections fail. I conclude that Jackson's argument shows that there are no irreducibly normative properties.
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  4. Practical Reasoning.Bart Streumer - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Wiley-Blackwell.
    To be able to say what practical reasoning is, we first need to say what reasoning is and what the conclusion of a process of reasoning is. I shall do this in sections 1 and 2. We can then make a distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning. There are three main ways to do this, which I shall survey in sections 3 to 5. I shall end by suggesting that there are different kinds of practical reasoning.
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  5.  9
    Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory.Bart Streumer - forthcoming - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. Routledge.
    According to the error theory, normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but these properties do not exist. I have argued elsewhere (in "Can We Believe the Error Theory?") that we cannot believe this theory. Several philosophers have replied to this argument. In this chapter, I respond to their replies.
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  6. Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?Daan Evers & Bart Streumer - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:1-9.
    Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-Landau have recently proposed a new version of moral nonnaturalism, according to which there are nonnatural moral concepts and truths but no nonnatural moral facts. This view entails that moral error theorists are conceptually deficient. We explain why moral error theorists are not conceptually deficient. We then argue that this explanation reveals what is wrong with Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s view.
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  7. Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties?Bart Streumer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):325 - 348.
    Some philosophers think that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. In this paper, I argue that this entails that it is possible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I argue that Frank Jackson's argument to show that this is possible fails, and that the objections to this argument show that it is impossible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I conclude that normative properties are not identical to descriptive properties. I then (...)
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  8. Does 'Ought' Conversationally Implicate 'Can'?Bart Streumer - 2003 - European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):219–228.
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that 'ought' does not entail 'can', but instead conversationally implicates it. I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong is actually committed to a hybrid view about the relation between 'ought' and 'can'. I then give a tensed formulation of the view that 'ought' entails 'can' that deals with Sinnott-Armstrong's argument and that is more unified than Sinnott-Armstrong's view.
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  9.  2
    Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.
    Many philosophers claim that it cannot be the case that a person ought to perform an action if this person cannot perform this action. However, most of these philosophers do not give arguments for the truth of this claim. In this paper, I argue that it is plausible to interpret this claim in such a way that it is entailed by the claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that (...)
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  10.  35
    Procedural and Substantive Practical Rationality.Brad Hooker & Bart Streumer - 2004 - In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 57--74.
    This chapter surveys the debate between philosophers who claim that all practical rationality is procedural and philosophers who claim that some practical rationality is substantive.
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  11.  94
    Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?Bart Streumer - 2013 - Ratio 26 (4):450-470.
    Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. I argue that this shows that normative judgements do aim to represent the world.
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  12.  87
    Reasons, Impossibility and Efficient Steps: Reply to Heuer.Bart Streumer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (1):79 - 86.
    Ulrike Heuer argues that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action that this person cannot perform, as long as this person can take efficient steps towards performing this action. In this reply, I first argue that Heuer's examples fail to undermine my claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then argue that, on a plausible interpretation of (...)
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  13.  26
    No, We Cannot.Bart Streumer - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):537-546.
    Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini argues that we can believe the error theory. In this reply, I explain why I still think we cannot.
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  14. Can Consequentialism Cover Everything?Bart Streumer - 2003 - Utilitas 15 (2):237-47.
    Derek Parfit, Philip Pettit and Michael Smith defend a version of consequentialism that covers everything. I argue that this version of consequentialism is false. Consequentialism, I argue, can only cover things that belong to a combination of things that agents can bring about.
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  15.  75
    Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either.Bart Streumer - manuscript
    According to Jonas Olson, "a plausible moral error theory must be an error theory about all irreducible normativity". I agree. But unlike Olson, I think that we cannot believe this error theory. I first argue that Olson is wrong to think that reasons for belief need not be irreducibly normative. I then argue that if reasons for belief are irreducibly normative, we cannot believe an error theory about all irreducible normativity. I then show that if we cannot believe this error (...)
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  16.  69
    Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning.Streumer Bart - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):1-29.
    It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. However, it is not entirely clear what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. In this paper, I try to answer the question what this difference is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that this (...)
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  17.  57
    Reasons and Entailment.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):353 - 374.
    What is the relation between entailment and reasons for belief? In this paper, I discuss several answers to this question, and I argue that these answers all face problems. I then propose the following answer: for all propositions p 1,…,p n and q, if the conjunction of p 1,…, and p n entails q, then there is a reason against a person’s both believing that p 1,…, and that p n and believing the negation of q. I argue that this (...)
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  18. Why There Really Are No Irreducibly Normative Properties.Bart Streumer - 2013 - In David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 310-336.
    Jonathan Dancy thinks that there are irreducibly normative properties. Frank Jackson has given a well-known argument against this view, and I have elsewhere defended this argument against many objections, including one made by Dancy. But Dancy remains unconvinced. In this chapter, I hope to convince him.
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  19. Semi-Global Consequentialism and Blameless Wrongdoing: Reply to Brown.Bart Streumer - 2005 - Utilitas 17 (2):226-230.
    Campbell Brown is right that my argument against semi-global consequentialism relies on the principle of agglomeration. However, semi-global consequentialists cannot rescue their view simply by rejecting this principle.
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  20.  1
    Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - unknown
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  21.  2
    Reasons and Entailment.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):353-374.
    What is the relation between entailment and reasons for belief? In this paper, I discuss several answers to this question, and I argue that these answers all face problems. I then propose the following answer: for all propositions p1,...,pn and q, if the conjunction of p1,..., and pn entails q, then there is a reason against a person's both believing that p1,..., and that pn and believing the negation of q. I argue that this answer avoids the problems that the (...)
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  22.  12
    Review of Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value[REVIEW]Bart Streumer - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005.
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  23.  49
    Review of David Sobel and Steven Wall, Reasons for Action[REVIEW]Bart Streumer - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):200-202.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  24.  3
    Reasons, Impossibility and Efficient Steps: Reply to Heuer.Bart Streumer - unknown
    Ulrike Heuer argues that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action that this person cannot perform, as long as this person can take efficient steps towards performing this action. In this reply, I first argue that Heuer’s examples fail to undermine my claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then argue that, on a plausible interpretation of (...)
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  25.  44
    Review of Ingmar Persson, The Retreat of Reason: A Dilemma in the Philosophy of Life[REVIEW]Bart Streumer - 2007 - Times Literary Supplement (9 November).
    Analytic philosophers are often accused of ignoring the large questions that philosophy should be about and of concentrating instead on small technical questions that no one else is interested in. This accusation is not entirely unfounded. However, in order to answer large philosophical questions, we often need to answer many smaller and more technical ones first, whether or not anyone is interested in the answers to them. In his excellent new book The Retreat of Reason: A Dilemma in the Philosophy (...)
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  26.  13
    Review of Joshua Gert, Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons. [REVIEW]Bart Streumer - 2014 - Ethics 124 (3):608-612.
  27.  2
    Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties?Bart Streumer - unknown
    Some philosophers think that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. In this paper, I argue that this entails that it is possible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I argue that Frank Jackson’s argument to show that this is possible fails, and that the objections to this argument show that it is impossible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I conclude that normative properties are not identical to descriptive properties. I then (...)
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  28.  8
    I. Normative and Descriptive Properties.Bart Streumer - 2011 - In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 310.
    Some philosophers think that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. In this paper, I argue that this entails that it is possible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I argue that Frank Jackson’s argument to show that this is possible fails, and that the objections to this argument show that it is impossible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I conclude that normative properties are not identical to descriptive properties. I then (...)
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  29.  1
    Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):1-29.
    It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. However, it is not entirely clear what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. In this paper, I try to answer the question what this difference is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that this (...)
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  30.  1
    Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning.Bart Streumer - unknown
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  31.  1
    Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - unknown
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  32.  1
    Reasons, Impossibility and Efficient Steps: Reply to Heuer.Bart Streumer - unknown
    Ulrike Heuer argues that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action that this person cannot perform, as long as this person can take efficient steps towards performing this action. In this reply, I first argue that Heuer’s examples fail to undermine my claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then argue that, on a plausible interpretation of (...)
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  33.  1
    Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - unknown
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  34.  2
    Review: Ingmar Persson, The Retreat of Reason. [REVIEW]Bart Streumer - unknown
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  35.  1
    Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?Bart Streumer - unknown
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  36.  1
    Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - unknown
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  37.  1
    Reasons, Impossibility and Efficient Steps: Reply to Heuer.Bart Streumer - unknown
    Ulrike Heuer argues that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action that this person cannot perform, as long as this person can take efficient steps towards performing this action. In this reply, I first argue that Heuer’s examples fail to undermine my claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then argue that, on a plausible interpretation of (...)
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  38.  1
    Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning.Bart Streumer - unknown
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  39.  1
    Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?Bart Streumer - unknown
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  40.  1
    Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?Bart Streumer - unknown
    Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. I argue that this shows that normative judgements do aim to represent the world.
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  41.  1
    Semi-Global Consequentialism and Blameless Wrongdoing: Reply to Brown.Bart Streumer - unknown
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  42.  1
    Procedural Versus Substantive Practical Reason.Bradford Hooker & Bart Streumer - unknown
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  43.  1
    Review: Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton University Press, 2004. [REVIEW]Bart Streumer - unknown
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  44. Are Normative Properties Descriptive Properties?Bart Streumer - unknown
    Some philosophers think that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. In this paper, I argue that this entails that it is possible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I argue that Frank Jackson’s argument to show that this is possible fails, and that the objections to this argument show that it is impossible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I conclude that normative properties are not identical to descriptive properties. I then (...)
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  45. Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?Bart Streumer - unknown
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  46. Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?Bart Streumer - unknown
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  47. Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?Bart Streumer - unknown
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  48. Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?Bart Streumer - unknown
    Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. I argue that this shows that normative judgements do aim to represent the world.
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  49. Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?Bart Streumer - unknown
    Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. I argue that this shows that normative judgements do aim to represent the world.
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  50. Do Normative Judgements Aim to Represent the World?Bart Streumer - unknown
    Many philosophers think that normative judgements do not aim to represent the world. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with the thought that when two people make conflicting normative judgements, at most one of these judgements is correct. I argue that this shows that normative judgements do aim to represent the world.
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