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Bartek Chomanski
University of Miami (PhD)
  1.  98
    Cognitive Penetrability and High‐Level Properties in Perception: Unrelated Phenomena?Berit Brogaard & Bartek Chomanski - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):469-486.
    There has been a recent surge in interest in two questions concerning the nature of perceptual experience; viz. the question of whether perceptual experience is sometimes cognitively penetrated and that of whether high-level properties are presented in perceptual experience. Only rarely have thinkers been concerned with the question of whether the two phenomena are interestingly related. Here we argue that the two phenomena are not related in any interesting way. We argue further that this lack of an interesting connection between (...)
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  2.  34
    What Makes Up a Mood Experience.Bartek Chomanski - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (5-6):104-127.
    In this paper I argue that the phenomenal character of a mood experience wholly depends on affective modifications (appropriate for the mood in question) to the phenomenal characters of one's non-mood experiences. I argue that this view accounts for all distinctive aspects of mood phenomenology, in contrast to currently existing accounts of moods, each of which faces trouble accounting for some distinctive aspect of mood experience. I also explain how my view allows for holding both that moods seemingly lack intentional (...)
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  3.  20
    How Perception Generates, Preserves, and Mediates Justification.Bartek Chomanski & Elijah Chudnoff - 2018 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):559-568.
    “The Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Learning” defends the view that perceptual experiences generate justification in virtue of their presentational phenomenology, preserve past justification in virtue of the influence of perceptual learning on them, and thereby allow new beliefs formed on their basis to also be partly based on that past justification. “The Real Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Learning” mounts challenges to these three claims. Here we explore some avenues for responding to those challenges.
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  4.  18
    Balint’s Syndrome, Visual Motion Perception, and Awareness of Space.Bartek Chomanski - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    Kant, Wittgenstein, and Husserl all held that visual awareness of objects requires visual awareness of the space in which the objects are located. There is a lively debate in the literature on spatial perception whether this view is undermined by the results of experiments on a Balint’s syndrome patient, known as RM. I argue that neither of two recent interpretations of these results is able to explain RM’s apparent ability to experience motion. I outline some ways in which each interpretation (...)
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  5.  6
    On the Relation Between Visualized Space and Perceived Space.Bartek Chomanski - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
    In this paper, I will examine the question of the space of visual imagery. I will ask whether in visually imagining an object or a scene, we also thereby imagine that object or scene as being in a space unrelated to the space we’re simultaneously perceiving or whether it is the case that the space of visual imagination is experienced as connected to the space of perceptual experience. I will argue that the there is no distinction between the spatial content (...)
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  6.  9
    Moods, Colored Lenses, and Emotional Disconnection: A Comment on Gallegos.Bartek Chomanski - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-8.
    In “Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods” Francisco Gallegos presents a challenge to popular view about the phenomenology of being in a mood that he calls “perceptualism”. In this essay, I offer a partial defense of perceptualism about moods and argue that perceptualism and Gallegos’s preferred Heideggerian alternative need not be viewed as in opposition to one another.
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