Results for 'Bayesian confirmation theory'

998 found
Order:
  1.  42
    Why is Bayesian Confirmation Theory Rarely Practiced?Robert W. P. Luk - 2019 - Science and Philosophy 7 (1):3-20.
    Bayesian confirmation theory is a leading theory to decide the confirmation/refutation of a hypothesis based on probability calculus. While it may be much discussed in philosophy of science, is it actually practiced in terms of hypothesis testing by scientists? Since the assignment of some of the probabilities in the theory is open to debate and the risk of making the wrong decision is unknown, many scientists do not use the theory in hypothesis testing. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. Is There a Place in Bayesian Confirmation Theory for the Reverse Matthew Effect?William Roche - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1631-1648.
    Bayesian confirmation theory is rife with confirmation measures. Many of them differ from each other in important respects. It turns out, though, that all the standard confirmation measures in the literature run counter to the so-called “Reverse Matthew Effect” (“RME” for short). Suppose, to illustrate, that H1 and H2 are equally successful in predicting E in that p(E | H1)/p(E) = p(E | H2)/p(E) > 1. Suppose, further, that initially H1 is less probable than H2 (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3.  93
    Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1992 - MIT Press.
    There is currently no viable alternative to the Bayesian analysis of scientific inference, yet the available versions of Bayesianism fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirmation of scientific hypotheses. Bayes or Bust? provides the first balanced treatment of the complex set of issues involved in this nagging conundrum in the philosophy of science. Both Bayesians and anti-Bayesians will find a wealth of new insights on topics ranging from Bayes’s original paper to contemporary formal (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   179 citations  
  4. Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison
    According to Bayesian confirmation theory, evidence E (incrementally) confirms (or supports) a hypothesis H (roughly) just in case E and H are positively probabilistically correlated (under an appropriate probability function Pr). There are many logically equivalent ways of saying that E and H are correlated under Pr. Surprisingly, this leads to a plethora of non-equivalent quantitative measures of the degree to which E confirms H (under Pr). In fact, many non-equivalent Bayesian measures of the degree to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  5. Explanatoriness is Evidentially Irrelevant, or Inference to the Best Explanation Meets Bayesian Confirmation Theory.W. Roche & E. Sober - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):659-668.
    In the world of philosophy of science, the dominant theory of confirmation is Bayesian. In the wider philosophical world, the idea of inference to the best explanation exerts a considerable influence. Here we place the two worlds in collision, using Bayesian confirmation theory to argue that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  6. Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John D. Norton - 2011 - In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm R. Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier B.V.. pp. 391-440.
    Proponents of Bayesian confirmation theory believe that they have the solution to a significant, recalcitrant problem in philosophy of science. It is the identification of the logic that governs evidence and its inductive bearing in science. That is the logic that lets us say that our catalog of planetary observations strongly confirms Copernicus’ heliocentric hypothesis; or that the fossil record is good evidence for the theory of evolution; or that the 3oK cosmic background radiation supports big (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  7. Bayesian Confirmation Theory and The Likelihood Principle.Daniel Steel - 2007 - Synthese 156 (1):53-77.
    The likelihood principle (LP) is a core issue in disagreements between Bayesian and frequentist statistical theories. Yet statements of the LP are often ambiguous, while arguments for why a Bayesian must accept it rely upon unexamined implicit premises. I distinguish two propositions associated with the LP, which I label LP1 and LP2. I maintain that there is a compelling Bayesian argument for LP1, based upon strict conditionalization, standard Bayesian decision theory, and a proposition I call (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  8.  35
    Heuristic Novelty and the Asymmetry Problem in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Richard Nunan - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):17-36.
    Bayesian confirmation theory, as traditionally interpreted, treats the temporal relationship between the formulation of a hypothesis and the confirmation (or recognition) of evidence entailed by that hypothesis merely as a component of the psychology of discovery and acceptance of a hypothesis. The temporal order of these events is irrelevant to the logic of rational theory choice. A few years ago Richmond Campbell and Thomas Vinci offered a reinterpretation of Bayes' Theorem in defense of the view (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9.  49
    Eliminative Induction and Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Susan Vineberg - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):257-66.
    In his recent book The Advancement of Science, Philip Kitcher endorses eliminative induction, or the view that confirmation of hypotheses proceeds by the elimination of alternatives. My intention here is to critically examine Kitcher's eliminativist view of confirmation, and his rejection of the widely held Bayesian position, according to which an hypothesis H is confirmed by evidence E just in case the probability of H conditional on E is greater than the simple unconditional probability of H [i.e. (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10.  57
    A Solution to a Problem for Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Richard Otte - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):764-769.
    Charles Chihara has presented a problem he claims Bayesian confirmation theory cannot handle. Chihara gives examples in which he claims the change in belief cannot be construced as conditionalizing on new evidence. These are situations in which the agent suddenly thinks of new possibilities. I propose a solution that incorporates the important ideas of Bayesian theory. In particular, I present a principle which shows that the change of belief in Chihara's example is due to simple (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  5
    Eliminative Induction and Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Susan Vineberg - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):257-266.
    In his recent book The Advancement of Science, Philip Kitcher endorses eliminative induction, or the view that confirmation of hypotheses proceeds by the elimination of alternatives. My intention here is to critically examine Kitcher's eliminativist view of confirmation, and his rejection of the widely held Bayesian position, according to which an hypothesis H is confirmed by evidence E just in case the probability of H conditional on E is greater than the simple unconditional probability of H [i.e. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12.  17
    Non-Bayesian Confirmation Theory, and the Principle of Explanatory Surplus.Donald A. Gillies - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:373 - 380.
    This paper suggests a new principle for confirmation theory which is called the principle of explanatory surplus. This principle is shown to be non-Bayesian in character, and to lead to a treatment of simplicity in science. Two cases of the principle of explanatory surplus are considered. The first (number of parameters) is illustrated by curve-fitting examples, while the second (number of theoretical assumptions) is illustrated by the examples of Newton's Laws and Adler's Theory of the Inferiority (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13. Bayesian Confirmation Theory: Inductive Logic, or Mere Inductive Framework?Michael Strevens - 2004 - Synthese 141 (3):365 - 379.
    Does the Bayesian theory of confirmation put real constraints on our inductive behavior? Or is it just a framework for systematizing whatever kind of inductive behavior we prefer? Colin Howson (Hume's Problem) has recently championed the second view. I argue that he is wrong, in that the Bayesian apparatus as it is usually deployed does constrain our judgments of inductive import, but also that he is right, in that the source of Bayesianism's inductive prescriptions is not (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  14.  32
    Accommodation, Prediction and Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Colin Howson - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:381 - 392.
    This paper examines the famous doctrine that independent prediction garners more support than accommodation. The standard arguments for the doctrine are found to be invalid, and a more realistic position is put forward, that whether evidence supports or not a hypothesis depends on the prior probability of the hypothesis, and is independent of whether it was proposed before or after the evidence. This position is implicit in the subjective Bayesian theory of confirmation, and the paper ends with (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  15. Probabilistic Confirmation Theory and Bayesian Reasoning.Timothy McGrew - manuscript
    This brief annotated bibliography is intended to help students get started with their research. It is not a substitute for personal investigation of the literature, and it is not a comprehensive bibliography on the subject. For those just beginning to study probabilistic confirmation theory and Bayesian reasoning, I suggest the starred items as good places to start your reading.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. pp. 247--275.
    The Paradox of the Ravens (a.k.a,, The Paradox of Confirmation) is indeed an old chestnut. A great many things have been written and said about this paradox and its implications for the logic of evidential support. The first part of this paper will provide a brief survey of the early history of the paradox. This will include the original formulation of the paradox and the early responses of Hempel, Goodman, and Quine. The second part of the paper will describe (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  17.  89
    Notes on Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Michael Strevens - manuscript
    Bayesian confirmation theory—abbreviated to in these notes—is the predominant approach to confirmation in late twentieth century philosophy of science. It has many critics, but no rival theory can claim anything like the same following. The popularity of the Bayesian approach is due to its flexibility, its apparently effortless handling of various technical problems, the existence of various a priori arguments for its validity, and its injection of subjective and contextual elements into the process of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  18. The Bayesian Theory of Confirmation, Idealizations and Approximations in Science.Erdinç Sayan - 1998 - The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 37:281-289.
    My focus in this paper is on how the basic Bayesian model can be amended to reflect the role of idealizations and approximations in the confirmation or disconfirmation of any hypothesis. I suggest the following as a plausible way of incorporating idealizations and approximations into the Bayesian condition for incremental confirmation: Theory T is confirmed by observation P relative to background knowledge B iff Pr&B) > PrandB), where I is the conjunction of idealizations and approximations (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. A Classic of Bayesian Confirmation Theory: Paul Horwich: Probability and Evidence . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, 147pp, £14.99 PB. [REVIEW]Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Metascience 26 (2):237-240.
    Book review of Paul Horwich, Probability and Evidence (Cambridge Philosophy Classics edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, 147pp, £14.99 (paperback).
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  19
    Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Alan Hájek & Brian Skyrms - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):707-711.
    A battered old philosophy of science vehicle heads west towards the Bayesian gold fields. Odd bits of junk are tied to the roof. In the rear window is a sign that reads “Bayes or Bust!” So far the story is not new. But at the wheel is a famous race car driver who has accelerated out of Newtonian space-time and decelerated back again.. Who could resist going along for the ride? We couldn’t—and you shouldn’t either.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21.  9
    Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Alan Hajek - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):707-711.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  22.  7
    Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Paul Castell - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):377-379.
  23. Some Problems for Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Charles S. Chihara - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):551-560.
  24. Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory.J. D. Norton - 2011 - In Philosophy of Statistics: Volume 7 in Handbook of the Philosophy of Science 7:391-439.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  25.  8
    Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Ludwig Fahrbach - 1997 - Erkenntnis 46 (1):127-131.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  26.  29
    John Earman's 'Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory' (Book Review). [REVIEW]David Christensen - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (2):345-347.
  27.  50
    Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. John Earman.John Worrall - 1994 - Philosophy of Science 61 (4):672-673.
  28.  46
    Old Evidence, New Theories: Two Unresolved Problems in Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1989 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (4):323-340.
  29.  78
    Probabilistic Support, Probabilistic Induction and Bayesian Confirmation Theory.Andres Rivadulla - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):477-483.
  30. Some Results in Bayesian Confirmation Theory with Applications.David Jehle - 2009 - Dissertation, Cornell University
  31.  17
    Book Reviews : John Earman, Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992. Pp. Xvi, 272. $35.00 (Cloth. [REVIEW]H. I. Brown - 1994 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (3):383-385.
  32.  10
    Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.L. J. Cohen - 1994 - Philosophical Books 35 (1):45-47.
  33.  7
    Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory by John Earman. [REVIEW]Peter Urbach - 1993 - Isis 84:621-621.
  34.  2
    Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. John Earman.Peter Urbach - 1993 - Isis 84 (3):621-621.
  35. "Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory", by John Earman. [REVIEW]Harold I. Brown - 1994 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (3):383.
  36. Confirmation, Increase in Probability, and the Likelihood Ratio Measure: A Reply to Glass and McCartney.William Roche - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (4):491-513.
    Bayesian confirmation theory is rife with confirmation measures. Zalabardo focuses on the probability difference measure, the probability ratio measure, the likelihood difference measure, and the likelihood ratio measure. He argues that the likelihood ratio measure is adequate, but each of the other three measures is not. He argues for this by setting out three adequacy conditions on confirmation measures and arguing in effect that all of them are met by the likelihood ratio measure but not (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  32
    A Problem for Confirmation Theoretic Accounts of the Conjunction Fallacy.Martin Jönsson & Elias Assarsson - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):437-449.
    This paper raises a principled objection against the idea that Bayesian confirmation theory can be used to explain the conjunction fallacy. The paper demonstrates that confirmation-based explanations are limited in scope and can only be applied to cases of the fallacy of a certain restricted kind. In particular; confirmation-based explanations cannot account for the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered form of the conjunction fallacy. Once the problem has been set out, the paper explores (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  39
    A Graded Bayesian Coherence Notion.Frederik Herzberg - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (4):843-869.
    Coherence is a key concept in many accounts of epistemic justification within ‘traditional’ analytic epistemology. Within formal epistemology, too, there is a substantial body of research on coherence measures. However, there has been surprisingly little interaction between the two bodies of literature. The reason is that the existing formal literature on coherence measure operates with a notion of belief system that is very different from—what we argue is—a natural Bayesian formalisation of the concept of belief system from traditional epistemology. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Bayesian Confirmation: A Means with No End.Peter Brössel & Franz Huber - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):737-749.
    Any theory of confirmation must answer the following question: what is the purpose of its conception of confirmation for scientific inquiry? In this article, we argue that no Bayesian conception of confirmation can be used for its primary intended purpose, which we take to be making a claim about how worthy of belief various hypotheses are. Then we consider a different use to which Bayesian confirmation might be put, namely, determining the epistemic value (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  40.  94
    Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber &Lsqb;2005&Rsqb;: Articles.Vincenzo Crupi, Roberto Festa & Tommaso Mastropasqua - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):201-211.
    Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber's criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take as some new and appealing features of Bayesian confirmation theory. Introduction Uncertain (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  21
    Bayesian Confirmation or Ordinary Confirmation?Yongfeng Yuan - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (3):425-449.
    This article reveals one general scheme for creating counter examples to Bayesian confirmation theory. The reason of the problems is that: in daily life the degree of confirmation is affected not only by probability but also by some non-probabilistic factors, e.g., structural similarity, quantity of evidence, and marginal utility, while Bayesian confirmation theory considers only probabilities to measure the degree of confirmation. This article resolves these problems after some detail analyses, and proposes (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Probabilistic Confirmation Theory and the Existence of God.Kelly James Clark - 1985 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    A recent development in the philosophy of religion has been the attempt to justify belief in God using Bayesian confirmation theory. My dissertation critically discusses two prominent spokesmen for this approach--Richard Swinburne and J. L. Mackie. Using probabilistic confirmation theory, these philosophers come to wildly divergent conclusions with respect to the hypothesis of theism; Swinburne contends that the evidence raises the overall probability of the hypothesis of theism, whereas Mackie argues that the evidence disconfirms the (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  37
    Intersubjective Probability and Confirmation Theory.Donald Gillies - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (4):513-533.
    This paper introduces what is called the intersubjective interpretation of the probability calculus. Intersubjective probabilities are related to subjective probabilities, and the paper begins with a particular formulation of the familiar Dutch Book argument. This argument is then extended, in Section 3, to social groups, and this enables the concept of intersubjective probability to be introduced in Section 4. It is then argued that the intersubjective interpretation is the appropriate one for the probabilities which appear in confirmation theory (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  44. The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity.Branden Fitelson - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):378.
    Contemporary Bayesian confirmation theorists measure degree of (incremental) confirmation using a variety of non-equivalent relevance measures. As a result, a great many of the arguments surrounding quantitative Bayesian confirmation theory are implicitly sensitive to choice of measure of confirmation. Such arguments are enthymematic, since they tacitly presuppose that certain relevance measures should be used (for various purposes) rather than other relevance measures that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature. I present (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   169 citations  
  45. The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux.Peter Brössel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.
    Fitelson (1999) demonstrates that the validity of various arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory depends on which confirmation measure is adopted. The present paper adds to the results set out in Fitelson (1999), expanding on them in two principal respects. First, it considers more confirmation measures. Second, it shows that there are important arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory and that there is no confirmation measure that renders them all valid. Finally, the paper (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  46.  66
    Predictivism and Old Evidence: A Critical Look at Climate Model Tuning.Mathias Frisch - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):171-190.
    Many climate scientists have made claims that may suggest that evidence used in tuning or calibrating a climate model cannot be used to evaluate the model. By contrast, the philosophers Katie Steele and Charlotte Werndl have argued that, at least within the context of Bayesian confirmation theory, tuning is simply an instance of hypothesis testing. In this paper I argue for a weak predictivism and in support of a nuanced reading of climate scientists’ concerns about tuning: there (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  47. Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings.Antony Eagle (ed.) - 2010 - Routledge.
    _Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings_ is the first anthology to collect essential readings in this important area of philosophy. Featuring the work of leading philosophers in the field such as Carnap, Hájek, Jeffrey, Joyce, Lewis, Loewer, Popper, Ramsey, van Fraassen, von Mises, and many others, the book looks in depth at the following key topics: subjective probability and credence probability updating: conditionalization and reflection Bayesian confirmation theory classical, logical, and evidential probability frequentism physical probability: propensities and objective (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  48.  32
    Bayesian Measures of Confirmation From Scoring Rules.Steven J. van Enk - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):101-113.
    I show how scoring rules, interpreted as measuring the inaccuracy of a set of degrees of belief, may be exploited to construct confirmation measures as used in Bayesian confirmation theory. I construct two confirmation measures from two particular standard scoring rules. One of these measures is genuinely new, the second is trivially ordinally equivalent to the difference measure. These two measures are tested against three well-known measures of confirmation in a simple but illuminating case (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49.  62
    Confirmation Via Analogue Simulation: A Bayesian Analysis.Radin Dardashti, Stephan Hartmann, Karim P. Y. Thébault & Eric Winsberg - unknown
    Analogue simulation is a novel mode of scientific inference found increasingly within modern physics, and yet all but neglected in the philosophical literature. Experiments conducted upon a table-top ‘source system’ are taken to provide insight into features of an inaccessible ‘target system’, based upon a syntactic isomorphism between the relevant modelling frameworks. An important example is the use of acoustic ‘dumb hole’ systems to simulate gravitational black holes. In a recent paper it was argued that there exists circumstances in which (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50.  23
    Dissolving the Star-Tree Paradox.Bengt Autzen - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (3):409-419.
    While Bayesian methods have become very popular in phylogenetic systematics, the foundations of this approach remain controversial. The star-tree paradox in Bayesian phylogenetics refers to the phenomenon that a particular binary phylogenetic tree sometimes has a very high posterior probability even though a star tree generates the data. I argue that this phenomenon reveals an unattractive feature of the Bayesian approach to scientific inference and discuss two proposals for how to address the star-tree paradox. In particular, I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 998