It is argued that Nuyen's objectivist perspective on the method of the natural sciences is misleading, failing to capture its primary feature: maintaining a separation between two levels--a level takes as observations and data and a level taken as conceptually integrated theory--and at the same time working between these two levels in a manner that draws them together. Appropriately articulated this feature gives a perspective that (i) sees in the natural sciences an essential relation between knower and known similar to (...) that attributed by Nuyen to the human sciences; and (ii) specifies the function of generalization in the natural sciences in a manner that specifies crucial questions challenging Nuyen's contrast of the natural and human sciences. (shrink)

Causal models have proven extremely useful in offering formal representations of causal relationships between a set of variables. Yet in many situations, there are non-causal relationships among variables. For example, we may want variables LDL, HDL, and TOT that represent the level of low-density lipoprotein cholesterol, the level of lipoprotein high-density lipoprotein cholesterol, and total cholesterol level, with the relation LDL+HDL=TOT. This cannot be done in standard causal models, because we can intervene simultaneously on all three variables. The goal of (...) this paper is to extend standard causal models to allow for constraints on settings of variables. Although the extension is relatively straightforward, to make it useful we have to define a new intervention operation that disconnects a variable from a causal equation. We give examples showing the usefulness of this extension, and provide a sound and complete axiomatization for causal models with constraints. (shrink)

Scientific models describe natural phenomena at different levels of abstraction. Abstract descriptions can provide the basis for interventions on the system and explanation of observed phenomena at a level of granularity that is coarser than the most fundamental account of the system. Beckers and Halpern (2019), building on work of Rubenstein et al. (2017), developed an account of abstraction for causal models that is exact. Here we extend this account to the more realistic case where an abstract causal model offers (...) only an approximation of the underlying system. We show how the resulting account handles the discrepancy that can arise between low- and high-level causal models of the same system, and in the process provide an account of how one causal model approximates another, a topic of independent interest. Finally, we extend the account of approximate abstractions to probabilistic causal models, indicating how and where uncertainty can enter into an approximate abstraction. (shrink)

As autonomous systems rapidly become ubiquitous, there is a growing need for a legal and regulatory framework to address when and how such a system harms someone. There have been several attempts within the philosophy literature to define harm, but none of them has proven capable of dealing with with the many examples that have been presented, leading some to suggest that the notion of harm should be abandoned and "replaced by more well-behaved notions". As harm is generally something that (...) is caused, most of these definitions have involved causality at some level. Yet surprisingly, none of them makes use of causal models and the definitions of actual causality that they can express. In this paper we formally define a qualitative notion of harm that uses causal models and is based on a well-known definition of actual causality (Halpern, 2016). The key novelty of our definition is that it is based on contrastive causation and uses a default utility to which the utility of actual outcomes is compared. We show that our definition is able to handle the examples from the literature, and illustrate its importance for reasoning about situations involving autonomous systems. (shrink)

We consider a sequence of successively more restrictive definitions of abstraction for causal models, starting with a notion introduced by Rubenstein et al. (2017) called exact transformation that applies to probabilistic causal models, moving to a notion of uniform transformation that applies to deterministic causal models and does not allow differences to be hidden by the "right" choice of distribution, and then to abstraction, where the interventions of interest are determined by the map from low-level states to high-level states, and (...) strong abstraction, which takes more seriously all potential interventions in a model, not just the allowed interventions. We show that procedures for combining micro-variables into macro-variables are instances of our notion of strong abstraction, as are all the examples considered by Rubenstein et al. (shrink)

Anti-luck epistemology is an approach to analyzing knowledge that takes as a starting point the widely-held assumption that knowledge must exclude luck. Call this the anti-luck platitude. As Duncan Pritchard (2005) has suggested, there are three stages constituent of anti-luck epistemology, each which specifies a different philosophical requirement: these stages call for us to first give an account of luck; second, specify the sense in which knowledge is incompatible with luck; and finally, show what conditions must be satisfied in order (...) to block the kind of luck with which knowledge was argued to be incompatible. What I’ll show here is that the modal account of luck offers a plausible story at the first stage and leads naturally to equally plausible lines to take at the second and third stages, at which a safety condition on knowledge is squarely motivated. There are, however, recent challenges—advanced by Jonathan Kvanvig (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77: 272–281, 2008); Kelly Becker (2007); and Jennifer Lackey (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86(2):255–267, 2008), among others—to the plausibility of the safety-based anti-luck project I’ve sketched here at each of its three stages of development. Once I’ve made precise the challenges, I’ll show why none implies that we abandon the commitments of the safety-based anti-luck project at any of its stages. What we should conclude, then, is that a safety-condition on knowledge is motivated by independently defensible accounts of (1) what luck is; and (2) just how knowledge should be thought incompatible with it. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics is humanity's finest scientific achievement. It explains why the sun shines and how your eyes can see. It's the theory behind the LEDs in your phone and the nuclear hearts of space probes. Every physicist agrees quantum physics is spectacularly successful. But ask them what quantum physics means, and the result will be a brawl. At stake is the nature of the Universe itself. What does it mean for something to be real? What is the role of consciousness (...) in the Universe? And do quantum rules apply to very small objects like electrons and protons, but not us? In What is Real?, Adam Becker brings to vivid life the brave researchers whose quest for the truth led them to challenge Bohr: David Bohm, who picked up Einstein's mantle and sought to make quantum mechanics deterministic, all while being hounded by the forces of McCarthyism; Hugh Everett, who argued that everything, big and small, must be governed by the same rules; and John Bell, who went to great lengths to eradicate the power of the god-like observer from the core of quantum physics. And they paid dearly, their reputations, careers, and sometimes lives ruined completely. But history has been kinder to them than their contemporaries were. As Becker shows, the brave intellectual giants have inspired a growing army of physicists and philosophers intent both on making a philosophically more satisfying theory of the universe and a more useful one as well. A gripping story of some of humanity's greatest ideas and the high cost with which many have pursued them, What is Real? is intellectual history at its passionate best. (shrink)

SummaryChallenging the common conception of Jean Bodin as an ‘anti-Aristotelian’ thinker, this article places Bodin's political thought in the context of oeconomics—the science, or art of the household—as it had developed in medieval and Renaissance commentaries on Aristotle's practical philosophy. The article argues that he thereby took part in a longstanding discussion in European political thought which saw the household as possessing a political dimension. Bodin's thought on the family is central to both his universal claims pertaining to his notion (...) of the political and his more particular interest in sovereignty and the origins of absolutism. The article explores Bodin's analysis of the household as the starting point of his inquiry into the nature of a commonwealth and the foundation of his conception of the state; it examines the relationship of la police and l'oeconomie in detail, and argues that the conjugal relationship is the determinant for Bodin's conception of absolute rule and of the origins of supreme power. (shrink)

Der Band untersucht rhetorische Strategien der emotionalen Kommunikation in Partnerwerbungsgesprächen. Ausgehend von der Annahme, dass eine bewusste Steuerung emotionaler Gesprächsprozesse durch einen strategischen Kommunikator die Erreichung des angestrebten Ziels wahrscheinlicher macht, geht er der Frage nach, welche Möglichkeiten sich in solchen Gesprächen bieten, mit Hilfe sprachlich-textlicher Mittel emotional zu überzeugen. Dabei konzentriert er sich - in Abgrenzung zu Studien emotionaler Körpersprache - ganz auf die verbale Seite der Kommunikation. Als Datenbasis dienen die Transkripte eines Korpus aus Face-to-Face-Gesprächen. Basierend auf einem (...) methodisch innovativen Ansatz zur Untersuchung des Verhältnisses von Sprache und Emotion, liefert der Band zahlreiche neue Erkenntnisse für die Rhetorik-, Emotions- und Gesprächsforschung. Dr. Lisa Becker promovierte im Fach Allgemeine Rhetorik an der Universität Tübingen. (shrink)

Das Buch bietet eine systematische Aufarbeitung der Forschung zum moralpsychologischen Ansatz von Lawrence Kohlberg und insbesondere seiner zahlreichen Kritiker.

Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world's top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers – often implicitly – assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these “standard subjects” are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is (...) substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species – frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior – hence, there are no obviousa priorigrounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions ofhumannature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges. (shrink)

Kierkegaard understood his thinking as philosophy confronting its own end. In campaigning against the existential amnesia of the 19th century, he revived the intellectual figure of a kind of philosophizing with roots in both the Socratic method and the apophatic reflections of Meister Eckhart. The Young Hegelians philosophy of action thereby became action of the text. The aim: existentially to move the reader.".

This book adds impetus to the nexus between human rights, human rights education and material reality. The dissonance between these aspects is of growing concern for most human rights educators in various social contexts. The first part of the book opens up new discourses and presents new ontologies and epistemologies from scholars in human rights, human rights education and human rights literacies to critique and/or justify the understandings of human rights' complex applications. Today's rapidly changing social contexts and new languages (...) attempting to understand ongoing dehumanization and violations, put enormous pressure on higher education, educators, individuals working in social sciences, policy makers and scholars engaged in curricula making. The second part demonstrates how global interactions between citizens from different countries with diverse understandings of human rights (from developed and developing democracies) question the link between human rights and it's in(ex)clusive Western philosophies. Continuing inhumane actions around the globe reflect the failure of human rights law and human rights education in schools, higher education and society at large. The book shows that human rights education is no longer a blueprint for understanding human rights and its universal or contextual values presented for multicomplexial societies. The final chapters argue for new ontologies and epistemologies of human rights, human rights education and human rights literacies to open-up difficult conversations and to give space to dissonant and disruptive discourses. The many opportunities for human rights education and literacies lies in these conversations. (shrink)

This book describes how people can help animals in their community.

"Mancher, der am Film interessiert ist, hat vielleicht schon vor dem Problem gestanden,,analytisch' mit Filmen umgehen zu mussen - sei es, daj3 er einfach auf eine genauere Erkliirung neugierig war, sei es, daj3 er die Filme anderen erkliiren muj3te. Er mag sich dann vielerorts umgesehen haben, in der Vielfalt von methodischen Hinweisen zur Filmanalyse, moglicherweise auch in sogenannten,exemplarischen' Einzelanalysen, urn schliej3lich - einigermaj3en verwirrt - zu der Einsieht gelangt zu sein, daj3 Filmanalyse ein schwieriges Unterfangen sei. In dieser (resignierten) Ein­ (...) sieht druckt sieh aber nicht zuletzt die Sehwierigkeit aus, unter dem viel­ fiiltigen methodisehen Angebot eine Auswahl zu treffen. " Mit dieser Bemerkung haben wir vor gut drei Iahren zwei Aufsatze in der 1 Zeitschrift medien + erziehung eingeleitet, die in durchaus auch polemischer Absicht nachweisen sollten, "daB ein gut Teil der Schwierigkeiten daran liegt, daB die Methoden unterschiedliche Aussagen tiber das implizieren, was der Film sei. " An verschiedenen Einftihrungen in die Methoden der Film­ analyse, sowie an den methodologischen Implikationen und Vorgaben ausgewahlter Filmtheorien, sollte nachgewiesen werden, daB dort der Gegen­ stand der Filmanalyse je nach Methodologie, je nach Theorie in jeweils divergenten Formen erscheint (Film "als Ware", "als Sprache", "als Massen­ kommunikation", "als Kunst" etc. ), was es dann in der Tat schwierig macht, einen Film zu analysieren; zumindest fUr einen Leser, der sich tiber Filmana­ lyse informieren will und nicht einer bestimmten,Schule' anhangt. (shrink)

Syntax of displacing predicates -- Argument hierarchies -- Animacy and adult sentence processing -- Animacy and children's language -- Modeling displacing predicates -- Conclusions and origins.

The Routledge Handbook of Nostalgia serves as a guide to the complex and often contradictory concept of nostalgia, as well as the field of "nostalgia studies" more broadly. Nostalgia is an area of intense interest across several disciplines as well as within society and culture more generally. This handbook brings together an international, interdisciplinary team of researchers to survey the current landscape and identify common trends, achievements and gaps in existing literature. Comprising forty-five chapters, the volume covers the following topics: (...) Disciplinary perspectives of nostalgias including philosophy, history, literature, and psychology. Conceptual aspects of nostalgia including homesickness, temporality, affectivity, and memory. Historical and political dimensions such as afro-nostalgia, populism, feminism, and queer nostalgia. Spatial and material aspects of nostalgia including ruins, regionalism, and objects. Media related nostalgia such as analogue and digital nostalgia, reboots, revivals, gaming, and graphic novels. Essential reading for students and researchers working in nostalgia studies, this book will also be beneficial to related disciplines such as philosophy, anthropology, geography, history and literature; cultural, media, heritage, museum and film studies courses; and more generally for readers interested in how the past is represented and used in the present. (shrink)

"First published by Oxford University Press, 1916."--Title page verso.

Does all conscious experience essentially involve self-consciousness? In his Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person, Dan Zahavi answers “yes”. I criticize three core arguments offered in support of this answer—a well-known regress argument, what I call the “interview argument,” and a phenomenological argument. Drawing on Sartre, I introduce a phenomenological contrast between plain experience and self-conscious experience. The contrast challenges the thesis that conscious experience entails self-consciousness.