Results for 'Belief contexts'

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  1. Scientific and Religious Belief.Paul Weingartner, Elena Klevakina-Uljanov, Gerhard Schurz & International Conference on Scientific and Religious Belief - 1994
     
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  2. Belief Contexts and Epistemic Possibility.Hylarie Kochiras - 2006 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 10 (1):1-20.
    Although epistemic possibility figures in several debates, those debates have had relatively little contact with one another. G. E. Moore focused squarely upon analyzing epistemic uses of the phrase, ‘It’s possible that p’, and in doing so he made two fundamental assumptions. First, he assumed that epistemic possibility statements always express the epistemic position of a community, as opposed to that of an individual speaker. Second, he assumed that all epistemic uses of ‘It’s possible that p’ are analyzable in terms (...)
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    Reliability, Reasons, and Belief Contexts.R. Bruce Freed - 1988 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):681 - 696.
  4.  24
    The Stubborn Opacity of Belief Contexts.Joseph Margolis - 1977 - Theoria 43 (1):41-46.
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  5.  21
    Chisholm on the Indiscernibility of Identicals in Belief Contexts.John G. Stevenson - 1970 - Philosophical Studies 21 (1-2):3 - 5.
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    Sellars on Proper Names and Belief Contexts.Keith Lehrer - 1978 - In Joseph Pitt (ed.), The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions. D. Reidel. pp. 217--227.
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  7. Reasoning in Belief Contexts.Paul Gochet - 2012 - Semiotica 2012 (188).
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  8.  58
    Linking Culture and Ethics: A Comparison of Accountants' Ethical Belief Systems in the Individualism/Collectivism and Power Distance Contexts[REVIEW]Aileen Smith & Evelyn C. Hume - 2005 - Journal of Business Ethics 62 (3):209 - 220.
    This study uses accounting professionals from an international setting to test the individualism and power distance cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede [Culture’s Consequences (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, CA) 1980]. Six countries, which appropriately represented high and low values on the Hofstede dimensions, were chosen for the survey of ethical beliefs. Respondents (n = 249) from the six countries were requested to supply their agreement/disagreement with eight questionable behaviors associated with the work environment. Each of these behaviors contained an individualism and/or (...)
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  9.  17
    Linking Culture and Ethics: A Comparison of Accountants’ Ethical Belief Systems in the Individualism/Collectivism and Power Distance Contexts.Aileen Smith & Evelyn C. Hume - 2005 - Journal of Business Ethics 62 (3):209-220.
    This study uses accounting professionals from an international setting to test the individualism and power distance cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede [Culture's Consequences 1980]. Six countries, which appropriately represented high and low values on the Hofstede dimensions, were chosen for the survey of ethical beliefs. Respondents from the six countries were requested to supply their agreement/disagreement with eight questionable behaviors associated with the work environment. Each of these behaviors contained an individualism and/or power distance cultural component for the responding accountants (...)
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  10.  13
    What Kind of Faith is Possible in Our Contexts?: Or “Don’T Talk of Love. Show Me. Show Me.... Show Me Now.” Responses Reflecting on Richard Lennan, “Faith in Context: Rahner on the Possibility of Belief ”. [REVIEW]Terrence W. Tilley - 2005 - Philosophy and Theology 17 (1/2):259-277.
    This essay responds to Richard Lennan, “Faith in Context: Rahner on the Possibility of Belief ”. It suggests that some of the ills of religious belief in the United States were not those for which Rahner had prescriptions. The essay utilizes the fiction of Graham Greene, born in the same year as Rahner, and who had read much of Rahner’s work, to mobilize a critique of Lennan’s views.
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  11. Consistency of Belief.Howard Darmstadter - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (10):301-310.
    A rational man’s beliefs are not logically consistent, and he does not believe all the logical consequences of his beliefs. This is because in any situational context, we only accept certain believed sentences. Within that context, we insist that sentences be logically consistent, and we accept the logical consequences of the other sentences we accept in that context. But such sentences do not have to be consistent with sentences we accept in other contexts, nor will we always accept in (...)
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  12. Kypris, Aphrodite, and Venus: More Puzzles About Belief.Heidi Savage - manuscript
    My aim in this paper is to show that the existence of empty names raise problems for the Millian that go beyond the traditional problems of accounting for their meanings. Specifically, they have implications for Millian strategies for dealing with puzzles about belief. The standard move of positing a referent for a fictional name to avoid the problem of meaning, because of its distinctly Millian motivation, implies that solving puzzles about belief, when they involve empty names, do in (...)
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  13. On Beliefs.Frode Bjørdal - 1996 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 1:79-94.
    The paper provides some observations that support the view, such as with Nathan Salmon, that we have full substitutivity of coextensional names in belief contexts. Further, the paper notes some consequences for doxastic modalites in an induced Millian logic of belief.
     
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  14. A Test for Theories of Belief Ascription.B. Frances - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):116-125.
    These days the two most popular approaches to belief ascription are Millianism and Contextualism. The former approach is inconsistent with the existence of ordinary Frege cases, such as Lois believing that Superman flies while failing to believe that Clark Kent flies. The Millian holds that the only truth-conditionally relevant aspect of a proper name is its referent or extension. Contextualism, as I will define it for the purposes of this essay, includes all theories according to which ascriptions of the (...)
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  15. Some Metaphysical Implications of a Credible Ethics of Belief.Nikolaj Nottelmann & Rik Peels - 2013 - In New Essays on Belief: Structure, Constitution, and Content. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 230-250.
    Any plausible ethics of belief must respect that normal agents are doxastically blameworthy for their beliefs in a range of non-exotic cases. In this paper, we argue, first, that together with independently motivated principles this constraint leads us to reject occurrentism as a general theory of belief. Second, we must acknowledge not only dormant beliefs, but tacit beliefs as well. Third, a plausible ethics of belief leads us to acknowledge that a difference in propositional content cannot in (...)
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  16.  40
    Constructive Belief Reports.Bartosz Więckowski - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):603-633.
    The paper develops a proof-theoretic semantics for belief reports by extending the constructive type-theoretical formalism presented in Więckowski with a specific kind of set-forming operator suited for the representation of belief attitudes. The extended formalism allows us to interpret constructions which involve, e.g., iteration of belief, quantifying into belief contexts, and anaphora in belief reports. Moreover, constructive solutions to canonical instances of the problem of hyperintensionality are suggested. The paper includes a discussion of Ranta’s (...)
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  17. No Norm Needed: On the Aim of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.
    Does transparency in doxastic deliberation entail a constitutive norm of correctness governing belief, as Shah and Velleman argue? No, because this presupposes an implausibly strong relation between normative judgements and motivation from such judgements, ignores our interest in truth, and cannot explain why we pay different attention to how much justification we have for our beliefs in different contexts. An alternative account of transparency is available: transparency can be explained by the aim one necessarily adopts in deliberating about (...)
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  18. Weighing the Aim of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395-405.
    The theory of belief, according to which believing that p essentially involves having as an aim or purpose to believe that p truly, has recently been criticised on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not interact with the wider aims of believers in the ways we should expect of genuine aims. I argue that this objection to the aim theory fails. When we consider a wider range of deliberative contexts concerning beliefs, it becomes obvious (...)
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  19. Seeing and Believing: Perception, Belief Formation and the Divided Mind.Andy Egan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):47 - 63.
    On many of the idealized models of human cognition and behavior in use by philosophers, agents are represented as having a single corpus of beliefs which (a) is consistent and deductively closed, and (b) guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all the time. In graded-belief frameworks, agents are represented as having a single, coherent distribution of credences, which guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all of the time. It's clear that actual human beings don't live (...)
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  20. Weighing the Aim of Belief Again.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):141-145.
    In his influential discussion of the aim of belief, David Owens argues that any talk of such an ‘aim’ is at best metaphorical. In order for the ‘aim’ of belief to be a genuine aim, it must be weighable with other aims in deliberation, but Owens claims that this is impossible. In previous work, I have pointed out that if we look at a broader range of deliberative contexts involving belief, it becomes clear that the putative (...)
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  21. Deliberation and Pragmatic Belief.Brad Armendt - 2019 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    To what extent do our beliefs, and how strongly we hold them, depend upon how they matter to us, on what we take to be at stake on them? The idea that beliefs are sometimes stake-sensitive (Armendt 2008, 2013) is further explored here, with a focus on whether beliefs may be stake-sensitive and rational. In contexts of extended deliberation about what to do, beliefs and assessments of options interact. In some deliberations, a belief about what you will do (...)
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  22. The Kinematics of Belief and Desire.Richard Bradley - 2002 - Synthese 156 (3):513-535.
    Richard Jeffrey regarded the version of Bayesian decision theory he floated in ‘The Logic of Decision’ and the idea of a probability kinematics—a generalisation of Bayesian conditioning to contexts in which the evidence is ‘uncertain’—as his two most important contributions to philosophy. This paper aims to connect them by developing kinematical models for the study of preference change and practical deliberation. Preference change is treated in a manner analogous to Jeffrey’s handling of belief change: not as mechanical outputs (...)
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  23. Logical Foundations for Belief Representation.William Rapaport - 1986 - Cognitive Science 10 (4):371-422.
    This essay presents a philosophical and computational theory of the representation of de re, de dicto, nested, and quasi-indexical belief reports expressed in natural language. The propositional Semantic Network Processing System (SNePS) is used for representing and reasoning about these reports. In particular, quasi-indicators (indexical expressions occurring in intentional contexts and representing uses of indicators by another speaker) pose problems for natural-language representation and reasoning systems, because--unlike pure indicators--they cannot be replaced by coreferential NPs without changing the meaning (...)
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  24. Belief and Contextual Acceptance.Eleonora Cresto - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):41-66.
    I develop a strategy for representing epistemic states and epistemic changes that seeks to be sensitive to the difference between voluntary and involuntary aspects of our epistemic life, as well as to the role of pragmatic factors in epistemology. The model relies on a particular understanding of the distinction between full belief and acceptance , which makes room for the idea that our reasoning on both practical and theoretical matters typically proceeds in a contextual way. Within this framework, I (...)
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  25. Jorge Garcia and the Ordinary Use of "Racist Belief".Alberto G. Urquidez - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (2):223-248.
    Wittgenstein’s “grammatical method” analyzes multiple uses of language across contexts of use, with the aim of identifying differences and dissolving conceptual confusion. This paper uses Wittgenstein’s method to undermine Jorge L. A. Garcia’s volitional account of racism. Garcia claims that his theory accommodates the ordinary use of terms like “racist belief.” However, he did not consider whether such terms might have multiple uses/meanings. My paper identifies three uses of “racist belief” that escape Garcia’s analysis. Consequently, philosophers should (...)
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  26.  81
    Belief and Self-Deception.Amelie Oksenberg Rorty - 1972 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 15 (1-4):387-410.
    In Part I, I consider the normal contexts of assertions of belief and declarations of intentions, arguing that many action-guiding beliefs are accepted uncritically and even pre-consciously. I analyze the function of avowals as expressions of attempts at self-transformation. It is because assertions of beliefs are used to perform a wide range of speech acts besides that of speaking the truth, and because there is a large area of indeterminacy in such assertions, that self-deception is possible. In Part (...)
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  27. Confronting Language, Representation, and Belief: A Limited Defense of Mental Continuity.Kristin Andrews & Ljiljana Radenovic - 2012 - In Todd Shackelford & Jennifer Vonk (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Evolutionary Psychology. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 39-60.
    According to the mental continuity claim (MCC), human mental faculties are physical and beneficial to human survival, so they must have evolved gradually from ancestral forms and we should expect to see their precursors across species. Materialism of mind coupled with Darwin’s evolutionary theory leads directly to such claims and even today arguments for animal mental properties are often presented with the MCC as a premise. However, the MCC has been often challenged among contemporary scholars. It is usually argued that (...)
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    Why to Believe Weakly in Weak Knowledge: Goldman on Knowledge as Mere True Belief.Christoph Jäger - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):19-40.
    In a series of influential papers and in his groundbreaking book Knowledge in a Social World Alvin Goldman argues that sometimes “know” just means “believe truly” (Goldman 1999; 2001; 2002b; Goldman & Olsson 2009). I argue that Goldman's (and Olsson's) case for “weak knowledge”, as well as a similar argument put forth by John Hawthorne, are unsuccessful. However, I also believe that Goldman does put his finger on an interesting and important phenomenon. He alerts us to the fact that sometimes (...)
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  29. Belie the Belief? Prompts and Default States.Neil Levy - forthcoming - Religion, Brain and Behavior.
    Sometimes agents sincerely profess to believe a claim and yet act inconsistently with it in some contexts. In this paper, I focus on mismatch cases in the domain of religion. I distinguish between two kinds of representations: prompts and default states. Prompts are representations that must be salient to agents in order for them to play their belief-appropriate roles, whereas default states play these roles automatically. The need for access characteristic of prompts is explained by their vehicles: prompts (...)
     
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  30.  31
    Belief, Apparitions, and Rationality: The Social Scientific Study of Religion After Wittgenstein. [REVIEW]Edward Berryman - 2005 - Human Studies 28 (1):15 - 39.
    The goal I pursue is to redefine the study of religious epistemology on the basis of an ethnomethodological extension of Wittgenstein. This approach shows that the nature of religious belief and its relation to facts, proofs, and empirical reality are matters that are dealt with by ordinary members of society. The examination of this lay epistemology reveals that – far from being a settled and established entity – religious belief is a polymorphous phenomenon. Religious belief is a (...)
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  31.  81
    Belief Attribution in Science: Folk Psychology Under Theoretical Stress.J. D. Trout - 1991 - Synthese 87 (June):379-400.
    Some eliminativists have predicted that a developed neuroscience will eradicate the principles and theoretical kinds (belief, desire, etc.) implicit in our ordinary practices of mental state attribution. Prevailing defenses of common-sense psychology infer its basic integrity from its familiarity and instrumental success in everyday social commerce. Such common-sense defenses charge that eliminativist arguments are self-defeating in their folk psychological appeal to the belief that eliminativism is true. I argue that eliminativism is untouched by this simple charge of inconsistency, (...)
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  32.  70
    Presuppositions and Anaphors in Attitude Contexts.Bart Geurts - 1998 - Linguistics and Philosophy 21 (6):545-601.
    This paper consists of two main parts and a coda. In the first part I present the ''binding theory'' of presupposition projection, which is the framework that I adopt in this paper (Section 1.1). I outline the main problems that arise in the interplay between presuppositions and anaphors on the one hand and attitude reports on the other (Section 1.2), and discuss Heim''s theory of presuppositions in attitude contexts (Section 1.3).In the second part of the paper I present my (...)
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  33. Indexical Propositions and De Re Belief Ascriptions.Mark Balaguer - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):325-355.
    I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional (...)
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  34.  92
    Kripke's Puzzle About Belief.Carlo Penco - 1998 - teaching material.
    A traditional argument is often used against Mill's theory of names (the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent). Mill's theory implies transparency of proper names (coreferring proper names are substitutable salva veritate); but examples like Frege's and Quine's show that proper names are not transparent in belief contexts. This could be thought to be a reductio ad absurdum of Mill's theory. In " A puzzle about Belief" (1979; 1988) Kripke builds up an argument which (...)
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  35. Bertrand Russell on Perception and Belief: His Development From 1913--1918.Rosalind Carey - 2000 - Dissertation, Boston University
    My thesis traces Russell's development of his theory of belief from 1913 to 1918 under the impact of his student, Ludwig Wittgenstein. ;In chapter one I focus on Russell's multiple relation theory of belief from 1910 to early 1913 and on Russell's view of perception as a relation between minds and objects. I show that, on Russell's theory, acts of believing or judging are intended to explain the different types of judgments and to account for how propositions acquire (...)
     
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  36. Pragmatics and the Semantics of Belief.Jonathan Berg - 1983 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    It is shown how the discussion of the semantics of sentences attributing belief, central to the philosophy of language since Frege, may benefit from consideration of pragmatic features of the context of utterance. ;The dissertation begins with a historical introduction to the problem of substitutivity in belief contexts. Traditional solutions advanced by Frege, Russell, and Carnap are reviewed, along with traditional objections to such solutions. It is then suggested that the traditional Quinian approach of declaring belief (...)
     
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  37.  21
    On the Church Frege Analysis of Belief Sentences.Robert W. Beard - 1966 - Logique Et Analyse 9:252-262.
    The author attempts to show how an adequate theory of belief sentences can be formulated within the church-frege framework. it is argued that ordinary substitution of identicals is adequate within belief contexts provided that certain criteria for identity of senses are not adopted. a criterion that avoids these difficulties is then put forward.
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  38. Essays on Meaning and Belief.Paul Artin Boghossian - 1987 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    The dissertation is in two parts. ;The first part consists of an extended essay on Saul Kripke's recent reflections on Wittgenstein's discussion of the concepts of meaning and following a rule. It is principally concerned to argue for the following claims: That Kripke is correct in claiming that there is an important sense in which any content property is a normative property. That, contrary to Kripke, recognition of this fact need not lead us to conclude that content properties are metaphysically (...)
     
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  39. Belief and Synonymy.Takashi Yagisawa - 1981 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    My general contention is to defend the compositional principle of meaning--that the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of its parts --with respect to belief contexts, which do not always appear to allow salva veritate substitutivity of synonyms. I argue that this appearance is an illusion which results from confusing beliefs that are not about linguistic expressions with beliefs that are about linguistic expressions. In doing so, I invoke and elaborate the Gricean distinction (...)
     
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  40. Reliance, Trust, and Belief.Peter Railton - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):122-150.
    An adequate theory of the nature of belief should help us explain the most obvious features of belief as we find it. Among these features are: guiding action and reasoning non-inferentially; varying in strength in ways that are spontaneously experience-sensitive; ‘aiming at truth’ in some sense and being evaluable in terms of correctness and warrant; possessing inertia across time and constancy across contexts; sustaining expectations in a manner mediated by propositional content; shaping the formation and execution of (...)
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  41.  91
    Belief in Discourse Representation Theory.Nicholas Asher - 1986 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 15 (2):127 - 189.
    I hope I have convinced the reader that DR theory offers at least some exciting potential when applied to the semantics of belief reports. It differs considerably from other approaches, and it makes intuitively acceptable predictions that other theories do not. The theory also provides a novel approach to the semantics of other propsitional attitude reports. Further, DR theory enables one to approach the topic of anaphora within belief and other propositional attitude contexts in a novel way, (...)
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  42.  5
    Lucky Belief in Science Education.Richard Brock - 2018 - Science & Education 27 (3-4):247-258.
    The conceptualisation of knowledge as justified true belief has been shown to be, at the very least, an incomplete account. One challenge to the justified true belief model arises from the proposition of situations in which a person possesses a belief that is both justified and true which some philosophers intuit should not be classified as knowledge. Though situations of this type have been imagined by a number of writers, they have come to be labelled Gettier cases. (...)
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  43.  62
    Presuppositions and Local Contexts.P. Schlenker - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):377-391.
    In the last thirty years, the problem of presupposition projection has been taken to provide a decisive argument for a dynamic approach to meaning, one in which expressions are not evaluated with respect to the ‘global’ context of utterance, but rather with respect to a ‘local context’ obtained by updating the global one with expressions that occur earlier in the sentence. The computation of local contexts is taken by dynamic analyses to follow from a generalization of the notion of (...)
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  44.  9
    What is the Role of Experience in Children's Success in the False Belief Test: Maturation, Facilitation, Attunement or Induction?Marco Fenici - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (3):308-337.
    According to a widely shared view, experience plays only a limited role in children's acquisition of the capacity to pass the false belief test: at most, it facilitates or attunes the development of mindreading abilities from infancy to early childhood. Against the facilitation—and also the maturation—hypothesis, I report empirical data attesting that children and even adults never come to understand false beliefs when deprived of proper social and linguistic interaction. In contrast to the attunement hypothesis, I argue that alleged (...)
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  45.  67
    When We Think About Thinking: The Acquisition of Belief Verbs.Anna Papafragou - 2007 - Cognition 105 (1):125.
    Mental-content verbs such as think, believe, imagine and hope seem to pose special problems for the young language learner. One possible explanation for these diYculties is that the concepts that these verbs express are hard to grasp and therefore their acquisition must await relevant conceptual development. According to a diVerent, perhaps complementary, proposal, a major contributor to the diYculty of these items lies with the informational requirements for identifying them from the contexts in which they appear. The experiments reported (...)
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  46.  93
    Sentences, Belief and Logical Omniscience, or What Does Deduction Tell Us?Rohit Parikh - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):459-476.
    We propose a model for belief which is free of presuppositions. Current models for belief suffer from two difficulties. One is the well known problem of logical omniscience which tends to follow from most models. But a more important one is the fact that most models do not even attempt to answer the question what it means for someone to believe something, and just what it is that is believed. We provide a flexible model which allows us to (...)
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  47. Propositional Clothing and Belief.Neil Sinclair - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):342-362.
    Moral discourse is propositionally clothed, that is, it exhibits those features – such as the ability of its sentences to intelligibly embed in conditionals and other unasserted contexts – that have been taken by some philosophers to be constitutive of discourses that express propositions. If there is nothing more to a mental state being a belief than it being characteristically expressed by sentences that are propositionally clothed then the version of expressivism which accepts that moral discourse is propositionally (...)
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  48. Belief, Assertion and Moore’s Paradox.Timothy Chan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395-414.
    In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually contradictory claims about Moore's Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief, the functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion, the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that (...)
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  49. Knowledge Across Contexts. A Problem for Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Peter Baumann - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (2):363-380.
    The possibility of knowledge attributions across contexts (where attributor and subject find themselves in different epistemic contexts) can create serious problems for certain views of knowledge. Amongst such views is subject—sensitive invariantism—the view that knowledge is determined not only by epistemic factors (belief, truth, evidence, etc.) but also by non—epistemic factors (practical interests, etc.). I argue that subject—sensitive invariantism either runs into a contradiction or has to make very implausible assumptions. The problem has been very much neglected (...)
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  50.  11
    Belief, Knowledge and Action.Jie Gao - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    In this thesis, I explore a number of epistemological issues concerning the relations between knowledge, belief and practical matters. In particular, I defend a view, which I call credal pragmatism. This view is compatible with moderate invariantism, a view that takes knowledge to depend exclusively on truth-relevant factors and to require an invariant epistemic standard of knowledge that can be quite easily met. The thesis includes a negative and a positive part. In the negative part I do two things: (...)
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