This introduces the symposium on judgment aggregation. The theory of judgment aggregation asks how several individuals' judgments on some logically connected propositions can be aggregated into consistent collective judgments. The aim of this introduction is to show how ideas from the familiar theory of preference aggregation can be extended to this more general case. We first translate a proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem into the new setting, so as to motivate some of the central concepts and conditions leading to analogous (...) impossibilities, as discussed in the symposium. We then consider each of four possible escape-routes explored in the symposium. (shrink)

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we discuss whether an intrinsic information lover (say, an anxious person) is likely to be dynamically consistent.

本书选辑了作者自1982年以来公开发表的学术论文和学术评论50余篇。学术论文部分主要是围绕重大现实课题,探讨了马克思主义哲学历史观、真理观、价值观和文化研究的方法论等问题;学术评论部分主要针对社会上和 学术理论界存在的思想路线、思维方式、思想作风、学风、文风等方面的问题及其实质和根源,作了分析和评论。.

Consequentialists typically think that the moral quality of one's conduct depends on the difference one makes. But consequentialists may also think that even if one is not making a difference, the moral quality of one's conduct can still be affected by whether one is participating in an endeavour that does make a difference. Derek Parfit discusses this issue – the moral significance of what I call ‘participation’ – in the chapter of Reasons and Persons that he devotes to what he (...) calls ‘moral mathematics’. In my paper, I expose an inconsistency in Parfit's discussion of moral mathematics by showing how it gives conflicting answers to the question of whether participation matters. I conclude by showing how an appreciation of Parfit's error sheds some light on consequentialist thought generally, and on the debate between act- and rule-consequentialists specifically. (shrink)

Издание содержит: Есть ли ошибка в формуле мира?; Бегство от смысла; Секрет формулы мира - закон притяжения?

Jednym z wymiarów wielkiej zmiany społecznej i kulturowej zapoczątkowanej w roku 1989 pod hasłem modernizacji Polski i jej okcydentalizacji jest zmiana tożsamości religijnej i narodowej Polaków. Przez ostatnie dwa wieki kształtowania się nowoczesnego narodu były one tak splecione, iż traktowano je synonimicznie. Problem ma wymiar historyczny i teoretyczny zarazem. Historyczny bo splątana tożsamość Polaka-katolika odnosi do szczególnej sytuacji narodu, jak wobec upadku swej państwowości szukał możliwości narodowego samookreślenia i tożsamości w kulturze. Teoretyczny, ponieważ należy odnieść się do tych teorii socjologicznych, (...) które postrzegają religię jako korelat narodowej tożsamości i jako wartość rdzenną narodowej kultury. A także takich, które kładą nacisk na nieuchronność procesów sekularyzacji i laicyzacji jako swoistych progów nowoczesności. (shrink)

Well-Being and Death addresses philosophical questions about death and the good life: what makes a life go well? Is death bad for the one who dies? How is this possible if we go out of existence when we die? Is it worse to die as an infant or as a young adult? Is it bad for animals and fetuses to die? Can the dead be harmed? Is there any way to make death less bad for us? Ben Bradley defends the (...) following views: pleasure, rather than achievement or the satisfaction of desire, is what makes life go well; death is generally bad for its victim, in virtue of depriving the victim of more of a good life; death is bad for its victim at times after death, in particular at all those times at which the victim would have been living well; death is worse the earlier it occurs, and hence it is worse to die as an infant than as an adult; death is usually bad for animals and fetuses, in just the same way it is bad for adult humans; things that happen after someone has died cannot harm that person; the only sensible way to make death less bad is to live so long that no more good life is possible. (shrink)

We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations for network-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience. Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cells are summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. These inputs come from diverse sources and provide a context within which the transmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal and perisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apical amplification (...) enables conscious perceptual experience and makes it more flexible, and thus more adaptive, by being sensitive to context. Apical amplification provides a possible mechanism for recurrent processing theory that avoids strong loops. It makes the broadcasting hypothesized by global neuronal workspace theories feasible while preserving the distinct contributions of the individual cells receiving the broadcast. It also provides mechanisms that contribute to the holistic aspects of integrated information theory. As apical amplification is highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, it relates the specific contents of conscious experience to global mental states and to fluctuations in arousal when awake. We conclude that apical dendrites provide a cellular mechanism for the context-sensitive selective amplification that is a cardinal prerequisite of conscious perception. (shrink)

In this collection of essays, experts in the field of consciousness research shed light on the intricate relationship between conscious and unconscious states of mind. Advancing the debate on consciousness research, this book puts centre stage the topic of commonalities and differences between conscious and unconscious contents of the mind. The collection of cutting-edge chapters offers a breadth of research perspectives, with some arguing that unconscious states have been unjustly overlooked and deserve recognition for their richness and wide scope. Others (...) contend that significant differences between conscious and unconscious states persist, highlighting the importance of their distinct characteristics. Explorations into the nature of the transition from unconscious to conscious mind further complicate the picture, with some authors questioning whether a sharp divide between unconscious and conscious states truly exists. Delving into ontological, epistemological, and methodological issues, this thought-provoking text challenges established paradigms and paves the way for a reimagining of consciousness research. It does so in an understandable and accessible way, making this a perfect companion to both experts and students of philosophy, psychology, and related fields. (shrink)

Ben Fine traces the origins of social capital through the work of Becker, Bourdieu and Coleman and comprehensively reviews the literature across the social sciences. The text is uniquely critical of social capital, explaining how it avoids a proper confrontation with political economy and has become chaotic. This highly topical text addresses some major themes, including the shifting relationship between economics and other social sciences, the 'publish or perish' concept currently burdening scholarly integrity, and how a social science interdisciplinarity requires (...) a place for political economy together with cultural and social theory. (shrink)

This essay highlights Ben-Ami Scharfstein’s major philosophical projects: first, philosophizing that includes nonwestern philosophies, especially Chinese and Indian, and that creates a dialogue between philosophers and philosophical traditions without prioritizing any of them, and without taking western philosophy as the point of departure. Second, a similar, inclusive move in the field of art, art without borders if you wish. Here the inclusivity applies not just to east and west, north and south, but even to animal-made art. Just as he wrote (...) about philosophy in China and India, attempting to say something broader about humanity and humanism, so too does Scharfstein’s argument about animals and art have far-reaching implications, above and beyond the question of the demarcation of art. He aims to tell us something about the human-animal relationship, about lack of solidarity between fellow inhabitants of planet earth, not just humans, and about cruelty and exploitation and blindness to the other, whichever other. And finally, I touch on Scharfstein’s work The Philosophers, beautifully translated into Hebrew as Philosophers as Human Beings, where “he dares to imply that philosophizing is in fact a sublimated expression of the unconscious,” as Yoav Ariel—sinologist and much more—puts it. Such a move, Ariel continues to argue, “dethrones philosophy of its unique position of honor and supremacy, and disperses the atmosphere of conceptual terror that philosophy created generation after generation.”. (shrink)

Uma interpretação corrente do fenômeno social ensina que todos os bens coletivos são bens convergentes. As concepções bem-estarista e utilitarista na economia e na filosofia, respectivamente, são os seus principais expoentes. A tese consiste em aceitar que “totalidades sociais” são inexoravelmente compostas de “partes” e que, por isso, na base de cada bem público ou social se encontrariam sempre os indivíduos, os quais seriam, em última análise, responsáveis pela sua existência. Assim, os bens públicos seriam bens para os quais convergem (...) interesses e escolhas dos agentes sociais. O presente estudo mostra, em primeiro lugar, segundo a compreensão de Taylor, que nem todos os bens coletivos são bens convergentes. Alguns bens sociais podem ser considerados bens irredutivelmente sociais, cuja justificativa se encontra na reflexão sobre o significado. Em segundo lugar, aborda a contribuição que a noção hegeliana de eticidade teve sobre a formulação desse argumento. (shrink)

One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing the notion of the neural correlate of (...) consciousness, we argue (in section 2) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept; more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled. (shrink)

One prominent argument in international law and religious thought for abolishing capital punishment is that it violates individuals’ right to life. Notably, this _right-to-life argument_ emerged from normative and legal frameworks that recognize deadly force against aggressors as justified when necessary to stop their unjust threat of grave harm. Can capital punishment be necessary in this sense—and thus justified defensive killing? If so, the right-to-life argument would have to admit certain exceptions where executions are justified. Drawing on work by Hugo (...) Bedau, I identify a thought experiment where executions are justified defensive killing but explain why they cannot be in our world. A state’s obligations to its prisoners include the _obligation to use nonlethal incapacitation_ (ONI), which applies as long as prisoners pose no imminent threat. ONI precludes executions for reasons of future dangerousness. By subjecting the right-to-life argument to closer scrutiny, this article ultimately places it on firmer ground. (shrink)