This paper argues that Mencius is a eudaimonist, and that his eudaimonism plays an architectonic role in his thought. Mencius maintains that the most satisfying life for a human being is the life of benevolence, rightness, wisdom, and ritual propriety, and that such a life fulfills essential desires and capacities of the human heart. He also repeatedly appeals both to these and to morally neutral desires in his efforts to persuade others to develop and exercise the virtues. Classical Greek eudaimonists (...) similarly regarded the life of virtue as both objectively good and subjectively desirable, and appealed to the desire for eudaimonia or happiness to motivate a commitment to the virtues. Mencius offers a carefully crafted, teleological account of human nature that appears designed in part to support his eudaimonism. In contrast with proposals by other scholars, I argue that Mencius’ notion of happiness, analogous to the Greek eudaimonia, is expressed by the construction jìn xìng 盡性, “fulfilling human nature” or the nearly equivalent jìn xīn 盡心, “fulfilling one’s heart.”. (shrink)

Mencius maintains that the most satisfying life for a human being is the life of benevolence, rightness, wisdom and ritual propriety. He also repeatedly appeals to happiness in his efforts to persuade others to develop and exercise the virtues. Mencius is therefore a eudaimonist. He offers a carefully crafted, teleological account of human nature that appears designed in part to support his eudaimonism. In contrast with proposals by other scholars, I argue that Mencius’ distinctive conception of happiness is best expressed (...) by the construction jin xing 盡性, “fulfilling human nature” or the nearly equivalent jin xin 盡心, “fulfilling one’s heart.” The fact that human nature includes the sprouts of the four chief virtues allows Mencius to resolve common concerns about happiness as a motive for virtue. In addition to supporting his eudaimonism, Mencius’ conception of human nature also conceptually unifies his vision for human flourishing, including its emotional, material, social, moral, and cosmic dimensions. (shrink)

For beings that have a beginning in time, free will seems impossible, because our choices seem to be a result of past events over which we had no control. Latter-day Saint theology offers what seems a simple solution: the idea that human beings have always existed in the form of spirits or “intelligences.” While this idea solves some key puzzles, contemplating an infinite past also brings the recognition that causal autonomy is not enough for freedom. A crucial feature of humanity (...) is the ability to move beyond past choices and versions of ourselves. Human freedom involves a dynamic process of identification, alienation, and re-identification through which we develop, improve, and mature as agents. Thinking about freedom over the long run, with attention to both the past and the future, casts the traditional debate over free will in a distinctive light, suggesting fresh possibilities. (shrink)

Classical Confucian thought is deeply concerned, on the one hand, with individual moral self-cultivation and, on the other, with the widespread establishment of a moral social order. These twin aspirations find expression in the legends of Yao, Shun, King Wen, and other sage-kings who achieved perfection in both realms. Yet a serious tension arises, because despite Confucius’s and Mencius’s moral purity and devotion, their political impact is marginal. They consistently teach that humaneness and rightness will transform the world, and work (...) energetically to put this principle into action. Yet their own experience is an uneasy fit with this principle, as moral decay remains the norm among the rulers of their.. (shrink)