Although Charles S. Peirce, strictly speaking, never formulated a ‘full-blown’ normative theory—a single over-all architectonic system—we believe that there lies within his work a valuable sketch of the ideal for feeling, action, and thought, and how this ideal should be followed, and in connection to this, Peirce offered a model for rational behaviour, including self-control. In the following essay we will try, modestly, to draw a rough outline of this sketch. Firstly, we will focus on the three normative sciences, their (...) relationship and their task of finding out how feeling, action and thought ought to be controlled. Then, we will take a look at the sign-universe. The very universe is a sign-universe and within this evolutionary universe feeling, matter and thought incessantly melt together into ‘concrete reasonableness’; according to Peirce, rendering the world more reasonable. This is the Summum Bonum that man can and indeed should pursue. Hence it makes absolutely no sense to speak of the three normative sciences out of this metaphysical or cosmological context. Finally, we will try to see in what way rationality can be said to fall within the spheres of self-control, bearing in mind that self-control is directly related to conditional purpose. (shrink)
1. Setting the Scene Despite of or maybe because of much activity and numerous Danish scholars working with Peircean ideas, concepts, and methodology, there does not exist one single current concerning the reception of Peirce in Denmark. However, it seems safe to assume that the majority of Danish scholars working with Peirce – in one way or the other – initially came and to some degree still come to Peirce with an interest in his doctrine of signs or semeiotic, and (...) then maybe from there, no... (shrink)
: C. S. Peirce had no theory of metaphor and provided only few remarks concerning the trope. Yet, some of these remarks seem to suggest that Peirce saw metaphor as fundamental to consciousness and thought. In this article we sketch a possible connection between metaphor and cognition; we understand Peircean metaphor as rooted in abduction; it is part of an intricate relation between experience, body, sign and guessing instinct as a semeiotic mechanism which can convey new insights.
The aim of the article is to present and discuss the concept of semeiotic constructivism, which is a pragmaticistic inspired method. Semeiotic constructivism has nothing to do with social constructivism but is a method that can construct meaning of concepts by implanting a telos in the concept or a certain quality in the artifact, in order to develop the object in a certain direction. The article touches on different elements in Charles Peirce’s philosophy e.g. hyperbolic philosophy and pragmaticism and combines (...) these elements with thoughts about how scientific concepts and brands become meaningful. (shrink)
The paper presents the concept significance-effect outlined in a Peircean inspired communication model, named DynaCom. The significance effect is a communicational effect; the formal conditions for the release of the significance-effect are the following: (1) Communication has to take place within a universeof discourse; (2) Utterer and interpreter must share collateral experience; and (3) The cominterpretant must occur. If these conditions are met the meaning of thecommunicated sign is likely to be correctly interpreted by the interpreter. Here, correctly means in (...) accordance with the intentions of the utterer. The scope of thesignificance-effect has changed from knowledge effects caused by technical terms to emotional effects caused by lifestyle values in brands, for example. (shrink)
Peirce’s category of Firstness is first and fundamental. Without Firstness, we can say, nothing can be – no time, no space, no things, no processes, no growth, no regularities, and no thoughts – hence, nothing of which we can ever conceive. However, despite the fundamentality of Peirce’s category of Firstness, we still do not believe that it has received the attention that it rightly deserves; not by Peirce himself, nor by his commentators. In the following we will, therefore, look at (...) the category of Firstness and try to give a modest glimpse of its fundamentality in relation to four other of Peirce’s central concepts: namely, evolution, consciousness, icon, and, finally, abduction. (shrink)
Charles Peirce provided a few, but interesting we believe, remarks about metaphor. Aristotle on the other hand developed a theory of metaphor that, to this day has been, and still is, influential. Factor, Lance R. 1996. Peirce’s definition of metaphor and its consequences. In Vincent Colapietro & Thomas Olshewsky, Peirce’s doctrine of signs: Theory, applications, and connections, 229–235. Berlin/new York: Mouton De Gruyter, as one of very few scholars, makes a comparison between Peirce and Aristotle. Factor claims that Peirce’s definition (...) of metaphor and its consequences undermine and overturn Aristotle’s theory. We do not believe that Factor is right; and this is due to Factor’s misinterpretation of key elements within Aristotle’s theory. We rather believe that Peirce and Aristotle, in fact, have central ideas in common concerning metaphor; perhaps, in particular, when it comes to the function of metaphor. Hence, both see, for example, metaphor as a cognitive mechanism. The article tries to develop this argument. (shrink)
I sin udmærkede kommentar til vores artikel «En etisk diskussion af screening for kræftsygdomme» beskriver Geir Hoff den udtalte mangel på evidens vedrørende nytteværdien af screeningsprogrammer for kræftsygdomme baseret på randomiserede studier. Ydermere fremhæver Geir Hoff misforholdet mellem den manglende evidens ved screening og de strenge krav, der er til evidensen i den farmaceutiske industri. Dette er en velkommen kritik, pga. en udtalt ukritisk og uvidenskabelig tilgang til anvendelse af screening for denne eller hin sygdom eller risikofaktor.
This study investigates the prevalence of ‘Seeking God's Help’, its relation to time since diagnosis, and its association with Life Satisfaction for all cancer types. This study also investigates Disease-Specific Quality of Life for patients with breast, prostate, and colorectal cancers. Data were obtained from the third wave of the Nord-Trøndelag Health Study of Norway, with 2,086 cancer patients identified by the Cancer Registry of Norway and 6,258 cancer-free controls. Our results indicate a higher prevalence of ‘Seeking God's Help’ after (...) a shorter time since diagnosis among men. No association was observed in multivariate analyses between ‘Seeking God's Help’ and ‘Life Satisfaction’ or ‘Disease-Specific QoL’ in long-term cancer survivors. Longitudinal investigations are needed to elucidate the relationship between the ‘Seeking God's Help’ variable and Life Satisfaction and Disease-Specific QoL among cancer patients in a Norwegian context. (shrink)
There is a simple technique, due to Dragalin, for proving strong cut-elimination for intuitionistic sequent calculus, but the technique is constrained to certain choices of reduction rules, preventing equally natural alternatives. We consider such a natural, alternative set of reduction rules and show that the classical technique is inapplicable. Instead we develop another approach combining two of our favorite tools—Klop’s ι-translation and perpetual reductions. These tools are of independent interest and have proved useful in a variety of settings; it is (...) therefore natural to investigate, as we do here, what they have to offer the field of sequent calculus. (shrink)
The philosophical situation at Copenhagen University in the 1960’s was dominated by two positivists. Th elogical positivist Jørgen Jørgensen – who had written the history of the “movement” – and the legal positivistAlf Ross. There were also two “outsiders”: Peter Zinkernagel, who did more analytical philosophy of language in the British style, and K. Grue Sørensen who was working in the traditions of neo-Kantianism. In 1955 Grue-Sørensen was hired as the first professor in education – after a long controversy about (...) the scientific status ofeducation as a discipline – but with a focus on the history of education. He had received a doctoral degree in philosophy in 1950 with a dissertation on refl exivity as a philosophical concept and a thesis about the reflexivity of consciousness. He was also an objectivist in ethics, and had been critical of the prevalent moral relativism and subjectivism found in recent philosophy. Jørgensen and Ross had done important work on moral argumentation with more technical work on the logic of imperatives and norms. Moral objectivism was not only wrong but in a way also “immoral” because it undermined their belief in democracy. Especially Jørgensen also thought that the idea of reflexivity was wrong when applied to consciousness. Neither statements nor consciousness could be reflexive – that is refer to themselves/itself. The reflexivity of consciousness is – according to Jørgensen – simply not an empirical psychological fact. Grue-Sørensen tried to establish the foundation of a theory of education based both on conceptions of consciousness and of the relation between scientific knowledge – facts – and moral values – in a neo-Kantian fashion. For him the interplay between ethics and knowledge was a central part of a theory of education – a belief due to which he never became a professor of philosophy – having tried many times. These debates in philosophy and in education were superseded in the 1970’s by the rise in influence of the German inspiration from Critical Theory and the demise of logical positivism. (shrink)
There is a simple technique, due to Dragalin, for proving strong cut-elimination for intuitionistic sequent calculus, but the technique is constrained to certain choices of reduction rules, preventing equally natural alternatives. We consider such a natural, alternative set of reduction rules and show that the classical technique is inapplicable. Instead we develop another approach combining two of our favorite tools—Klop's l-translation and perpetual reductions. These tools are of independent interest and have proved useful in a variety of settings; it is (...) therefore natural to investigate, as we do here, what they have to offer the field of sequent calculus. (shrink)
In Capitalism, Alienation and Critique Asger Sørensen offers a wide-ranging argument for the classical Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, thus endorsing the dialectical approach of the original founders (Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse) and criticizing suggested revisions of later generations (Habermas, Honneth). Being situated within the horizon of the late 20th century Cultural Marxism, the main issue is the critique of capitalism, emphasizing experiences of injustice, ideology and alienation, and in particular exploring two fundamental subject matters within this horizon, namely economy (...) and dialectics. Apart from in-depth discussions of classical political economy and Hegelian dialectics, the explorative and inclusive argument also takes issues with Émile Durkheim’s theory of value, the general economy of Georges Bataille and the dialectics of Mao Zedong. -/- - See below External Links to the book's homepage at the publisher Brill and to the Introduction. - See also External Links to a Youtubevideo from a seminar on the book in Belgrade, November 2019 and two Author Meet Critics sections from 2020 and 2021. (shrink)
In Capitalism, Alienation and Critique, part of the development of Asger S?rensen?s overall argument is a disagreement with Georges Bataille. The crux of the argument is that Bataille?s thinking - especially his conception of subjectivity - is?apolitical?. The aim of this paper is to investigate the force of this claim. What does it mean for a position - albeit a philosophical one - to be?apolitical??
This is a comment to Graham Harman’s 2019 response to an article by Þóra Pétursdóttir and Bjørnar Olsen in which they propose that a materially grounded, archaeological perspective might complement Harman’s historical approach in Immaterialism. Harman responds that his book is indeed already more archaeological than historical, stipulating that history is the study of media with a high density of information, whereas archaeology studies media with a low density of information. History, Harman holds, ends up in too much detail, while (...) archaeology has the advantage of lending itself to the imagination. Hence, his reading of history had the aim of tempering the historical information overload, in effect making the book a work of archaeology. In this comment, I want to do three things: critique the idea that archaeological and historical media are inherently different with regard to their densities of information, discuss how archaeology and history approach their media, and reflect on conceptualisations of “archaeology” outside the discipline itself. (shrink)
When K. Grue-Sørensen became a professor of pedagogy at the University of Copenhagen in 1955, he was inline with the dominant historical-hermeneutical approach to humanities. From the late 1960s until retirementin 1974, his approach was challenged by both technical and critical alternatives. Both these alternative havesince grown steadily, while the historical-hermeneutical view has been in the defensive. But Grue-Sørensenand the tradition he represented have three signifi cant points for today’s pedagogy, whether it is technicalor critical: pedagogy can and should not (...) deliver effi ciency technology, pedagogy should as far as possible useeveryday language, and fi nally that the educational history can make us wiser. (shrink)
Grue-Sørensen’s concept of ’educational teaching’ is traced back to an original infl uence from Herbart and Kant. On this background the article attempts to interpret, how one can understand a concept of educationalteaching today. With that, the concept is shown to have its root in a tradition of general education and Grue-Sørensen is shown to be a Danish representative of this. However, in research programs as well as educational programs this tradition has generally been under increasing pressure the last approximately (...) 30 years. Grue-Sørensen and his possible relevance today is discussed in connection with a potential revitalization of a general educational thinking in our current postmodern epoche of higher education. (shrink)