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  1. Welches Vertrauen?Bernd Lahno - 2013 - In Alfred Hirsch, Peter Bojanic & Zeljko Radinovic (eds.), Vertrauen und Transparenz – für ein neues Europa. Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade. pp. 139162.
  2.  85
    On the Emotional Character of Trust.Bernd Lahno - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):171-189.
    Trustful interaction serves the interests of those involved. Thus, one could reason that trust itself may be analyzed as part of rational, goaloriented action. In contrast, common sense tells us that trust is an emotion and is, therefore, independent of rational deliberation to some extent. I will argue that we are right in trusting our common sense. My argument is conceptual in nature, referring to the common distinction between trust and pure reliance. An emotional attitude may be understood as some (...)
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  3. Institutional Trust: A Less Demanding Form of Trust?Bernd Lahno - 2001 - Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Avanzados 15:19-58.
    With increasing complexity of the networks of social interaction new and more abstract forms of trust are in need. A conceptual analysis of different forms of trust, namely interpersonal trust, trust in groups and institutional trust is given. It is argued that institutional trust cannot totally replace interpersonal trust. Institutional trust rather builds on more personal forms of trust in that it is primarily formed in personal encounters with salient representatives of the institution and presupposes trust in others trusting in (...)
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  4.  80
    Challenging the Majority Rule in Matters of Truth.Bernd Lahno - 2014 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 7 (2):54-72.
    The majority rule has caught much attention in recent debate about the aggregation of judgments. But its role in finding the truth is limited. A majority of expert judgments is not necessarily authoritative, even if all experts are equally competent, if they make their judgments independently of each other, and if all the judgments are based on the same source of (good) evidence. In this paper I demonstrate this limitation by presenting a simple counterexample and a related general result. I (...)
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  5.  67
    A New Debate on an Old Question. Introductory Note to 'Can the Social Contract Be Signed by an Invisible Hand'.Bernd Lahno - 2013 - RMM 4:39-43.
  6.  61
    Hypothetical Justifications.Bernd Lahno - 2009 - RMM:67-82.
    A basic conviction in moral non-cognitivism is: only hypothetical norms may be justified. Hartmut Kliemt argues for a moderate variant: there are only hypothetical justifications of norms whether the norms are hypothetical or categorical in kind. In this paper the con- cept of ‘hypothetical justification’ is analyzed. It is argued that hypothetical justifications are not of the kind that we should look for in normative ethics.
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  7.  55
    Simple Games of Information Transmission.Bernd Lahno - 2012 - Analyse & Kritik 34 (2):315-338.
    Communication is an inherently strategic matter. This paper introduces simple game theoretic models of information transmission to identify different forms of uncertainty which may pose a problem of trust in testimony. Strategic analysis suggests discriminating between trust in integrity, trust in competence, trust in effort and trust in honesty. Whereas uncertainty about the sender's honesty or integrity may directly influence a rational receiver's readiness to rely on sender's statements, neither uncertainty about the competence of a sender nor uncertainty about his (...)
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  8.  51
    Making Sense of Categorical Imperatives.Bernd Lahno - 2006 - Analyse & Kritik 28 (1):71-82.
    Naturalism, as Binmore understands the term, is characterized by a scientific stance on moral behavior. Binmore claims that a naturalistic account of morality necessarily goes with the conviction “that only hypothetical imperatives make any sense”. In this paper it is argued that this claim is mistaken. First, as Hume’s theory of promising shows, naturalism in the sense of Binmore is very well compatible with acknowledging the importance of categorical imperatives in moral practice. Moreover, second, if Binmore’s own theory of moral (...)
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  9.  45
    In Defense of Moderate Envy.Bernd Lahno - 2000 - Analyse & Kritik 22 (1):98-113.
    In contrast to Axelrod's advice 'don't be envious' it is argued that the emotion of envy may enhance cooperation. TIT FOR TAT does exhibit a certain degree of envy. But, it does so in inconsistent ways. Two variants of TIT FOR TAT are introduced and their strategic properties are analyzed. Both generate the very same actual play as TIT FOR TAT in a computer tournament without noise. However, if noise is introduced they display some greater degree of stability. This is (...)
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  10.  3
    Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - De Gruyter.
  11.  21
    Team Reasoning as a Guide to Coordination.Bernd Lahno & Amrei Lahno - 2014 - Munich Discussion Paper No 2014-8.
    A particular problem of traditional Rational Choice Theory is that it cannot explain equilibrium selection in simple coordination games. In this paper we analyze and discuss the solution concept for common coordination problems as incorporated in the theory of Team Reasoning (TR). Special consideration is given to TR’s concept of opportunistic choice and to the resulting restrictions in using private information. We report results from a laboratory experiment in which teams were given a chance to coordinate on a particular pattern (...)
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  12.  19
    Gottvertrauen.Bernd Lahno - 2003 - Analyse & Kritik 25 (1):1-16.
    Faith in the sense of trust in God is discussed as a somewhat extreme case of trust. Trust in general is understood as an emotional attitude and determined by the way a trusting person perceives the world and the person trusted. Interpersonal trust as the most common form of trust is characterized by connectedness - the trusted person is perceived as acting according to norms, values or goals shared by the trusting person - and by a participant attitude in the (...)
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  13. Rational Choice and Rule-Following Behavior.Bernd Lahno - 2007 - Rationality and Society 19 (4):425-450.
    While Rational Choice Theory (RC) may be understood as a theory of choice, which does not necessarily reflect actual deliberative processes, rule-following behavior is definitely based on a certain form of delibera- tion. This article aims at clarifying the relationship between the two. Being guided by instrumental rules, i.e., rules reducible to the maximiza- tion principle, is perfectly consistent with the fundamental behavioral assumptions of RC. But human individuals use other forms of rules in decision making, especially tie-breaking rules and (...)
     
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  14. Vertrauen, Kooperation Und Große Zahlen.Michael Baurmann & Bernd Lahno - 2001 - In Rainer Schmalz-Bruns (ed.), Politisches Vertrauen. Nomos Verlag. pp. 191-220.
     
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  15. Trust, Reputation, and Exit in Exchange Relationships.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - Journal of Conflict Resolution 39 (3):495-510.
    Unlike the supergame model assumes agents in exchange situations will normally not be perfectly informed on past behaviour of their partners. Also, they will be able to choose their partners to a certain extend. A formal model is presented that attempts to take account of these facts. It is supposed that for any actor the probability of finding a partner for a lucrative exchange depends on his past behaviour. A model of reputation formation is presented as a formal description of (...)
     
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  16.  1
    Norms as Equilibria.Bernd Lahno - 2016 - Analyse & Kritik 38 (2).
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  17.  14
    Olli Lagerspetz: Trust. The Tacit Demand. [REVIEW]Bernd Lahno - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (4):433-435.
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  18.  3
    Spiele mit Zeichen.Bernd Lahno - 2001 - Zeitschrift Für Semiotik 23 (3-4):347-364.
    Kommunikation kann als eine besondere Form der strategischen Interaktion verstanden werden. Die Spieltheorie stellt ein formales Instrumentarium zur Analyse strategischer Probleme zur Verfügung. Einige Grundkonzepte der Spieltheorie werden vorgestellt, und ihre Anwendung auf Probleme der Kommunikation an einfachen Modellen vom Typ des Signalspiels illustriert. Es wird argumentiert, dass Kommunikation durch ein typisches Dilemma individueller Rationalität gefährdet sein kann. Obwohl eine korrekte Anwendung von Regeln, die die Verwendung eines verfügbaren Zeichens festlegen, für alle Akteure vorteilhaft wäre, gelingt es rationalen Akteuren unter (...)
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  19.  2
    Is Trust the Result of Bayesian Learning?Bernd Lahno - 2004 - Jahrbuch Für Handlungs- Und Entscheidungstheorei 3:47-68.
  20.  2
    Ist Vertrauen eine rationale Erwartung?Bernd Lahno - 2000 - In Julian Nida-Rümelin (ed.), Rationalität, Realismus, Revision. Vorträge des 3. internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für analytische Philosophie vom 15. bis zum 18. September 1997 in München. de Gruyter. pp. 308-316.
    Within the rational choice approach trust is usually analysed as a problem of choice under uncertainty. In a standard social situation in which trust plays a role a trustor A has to choose between trusting or mistrusting a trustee B. If he chooses to trust, B can either honour the trust given which will be of some advantage to both or exploit it no matter what the consequences for A are. A can in general protect himself against being exploited by (...)
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  21.  3
    2. Humes Theorie der Versprechen : Die Versprechensnorm hat keinen natürlichen Ursprung.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - In Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend. De Gruyter. pp. 31-61.
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  22.  2
    5. Humes Theorie der Versprechen : Übereinkunft und Selbstsucht.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - In Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend. De Gruyter. pp. 134-174.
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  23.  1
    Anhang I: Iteriertes Versprechensspiel mit unvollständiger Information.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - In Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend. De Gruyter. pp. 287-289.
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  24.  1
    Anhang II: Reputation und Interaktionswahrscheinlichkeit.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - In Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend. De Gruyter. pp. 290-294.
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  25.  1
    Über den quasi-naturrechtlichen Charakter der Pflicht, Versprechen zu halten.Bernd Lahno - 1997 - In Hartmut Kliemt & Rainer Hegselmann (eds.), Moral Und Interesse: Zur Interdisziplinären Erneuerung der Moralwissenschaften. Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag. pp. 47-64.
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  26.  1
    0. Einleitung.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - In Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend. De Gruyter. pp. 1-17.
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  27.  1
    1. Humes Theorie der Versprechen : Die Institution des Versprechens erfüllt einen sozialen Zweck.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - In Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend. De Gruyter. pp. 18-30.
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  28.  1
    8. Humes Theorie der Versprechen : Moralische Norm und Pflichtgefühl.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - In Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend. De Gruyter. pp. 252-286.
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  29.  1
    7. Reputation.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - In Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend. De Gruyter. pp. 207-251.
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  30.  1
    Sachregister.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - In Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend. De Gruyter. pp. 302-316.
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  31. Trust and Community on the Internet.Michael Baurmann, Bernd Lahno, Uwe Matzat & Anton Leist (eds.) - 2004 - Lucius & Lucius (Analyse und Kritik 26(1).
     
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  32. Comment On: Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt, Vittoria Levati and George von Wangenheim: On the Co-Evolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness.Bernd Lahno - 2007 - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 163 (1):163-166.
     
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  33. Can the Social Contract Be Signed by an Invisible Hand?Bernd Lahno & Geoffrey Brennan (eds.) - 2013 - RMM.
    The title of this special topic in RMM is borrowed from a 1978 paper of Hillel Steiner in which he argues against Robert Nozick's invisible hand conception of the emergence of the state. Steiner believes that central institutions of social order such as money and government need some form of conscious endorsement by individuals to emerge and to persist over time. -/- Tony de Jasay's critique (in Philosophy 85, 2010) of Bob Sugden's plea for a Humean version of contractarianism (see (...)
     
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  34. Der Begriff des Vertrauens.Bernd Lahno - 2002 - mentis.
    Auf der Basis einer Klärung des Begriffs des Vertrauens zu klären werden mit dem Vertrauen verbundenen sozialen Probleme analysiert. Es wird argumentiert, dass Vertrauen emotionalen Charakter trägt, dass es eine gemeinsame normative Basis und eine teilnehmende Haltung der sozialen Akteure zueinander voraussetzt. Die Argumentation entwickelt sich ausgehend von einer entscheidungstheoretischen Analyse typischer Situationen, die Vertrauen erfordern, aber in kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit einer Position, die glaubt, Vertrauen sei in einer solchen entscheidungstheoretischen Analyse bereits vollständig zu erfassen. Vertrauen wird als eine emotionale (...)
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  35. 4. Die Versprechensregel.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - In Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend. De Gruyter. pp. 94-133.
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  36. Entwicklung und Evolution.Bernd Lahno & Hartmut Kliemt - 2004 - In Christoph Lütge (ed.), Kaltblütig. Philosophie von einem rationalen Standpunkt.Festschrift für Gerhard Vollmer. Hirzel. pp. 447-470.
  37. Frontmatter.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - In Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend. De Gruyter.
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  38. Inhalt.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - In Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend. De Gruyter.
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  39. Literatur.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - In Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend. De Gruyter. pp. 295-299.
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  40. Norms as Equilibria.Bernd Lahno - 2016 - Analyse & Kritik 38 (2).
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  41. Norms as Reasons for Action.Bernd Lahno - 2009 - Archiv für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie 95 (4):563-578.
    Social norms are based on social standards. The relevant standards come in two forms. Compliance with social standards of evaluation may be understood as goal-oriented behavior under the constraints of external and internal sanctions. Compliance with norms, which directly refer to specific ways of conduct, may not. Therefore, although norm-guided behavior may be consistent with utility maximizing, no satisfying account of norm compliance can be given within a Rational Choice framework or any other framework solely based on instrumental rationality.
     
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  42. Norms of Evaluation Vs. Norms of Conduct.Bernd Lahno - 2010 - In Michael Baurmann, Geoffrey Brennan & Robert Goodin (eds.), Norms and Values. Lucius & Lucius. pp. 95-112.
  43. Personenregister.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - In Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend. De Gruyter. pp. 300-301.
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  44. Praktisch-ethische Entscheidungen unter Unsicherheit und Ungewissheit.Bernd Lahno & Hartmut Klient - 2011 - In Ralf Stoecker, Christian Neuheuser & Marie Luise Raters (eds.), Handbuch Angewandte Ethik. J.B. Metzler. pp. 198-113.
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  45. Perspectives in Moral Science. Contributions From Philosophy Economics, and Politics in Honour of Hartmut Kliemt.Bernd Lahno & Michael Baurmann (eds.) - 2009 - Frankfurt School Verlag.
     
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  46. 3. Strategische Eigenschaften von Situationen, in denen Versprechen gegeben werden.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - In Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend. De Gruyter. pp. 62-93.
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  47. Trust.Bernd Lahno - 2011 - In Keith Dowding (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Power. Thousand Oaks. pp. 675-676.
     
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  48. Trust and Strategic Rationality.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - Rationality and Society 7 (4):442-464.
    The extent to which trust prevails can be measured by the subjective probability with which an agent expects another one to act in desired ways. An agent´s trust in other agents forms in repeated social interactions which typically have the structure of an elementary game of trust. The process of trust formation in such interactions may be described by a reputation function. It is argued that in view of real world processes of trust formation any adequate reputation function must satisfy (...)
     
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  49. Utilitarismus und Wahrhaftigkeit.Bernd Lahno - 2011 - In Christian Müller, Frank Trosky & Marion Weber (eds.), Ökonomik als Theorie menschlichen Verhaltens. Lucius & Lucius. pp. 273-296.
  50. Vorwort.Bernd Lahno - 1995 - In Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend. De Gruyter.
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