The Ontogenesis can be explained in a double way: historically: it runs from the past to the present. idealistically: it runs from the general to the special. The development of the dimorphism of sex tells against the historical and for the idealistical perception. Therefore the idealistical morphology has to be put in the place of the phylogenetical. Idiogenesis and Morphogenesis are going analogically from the general to the special. There exists parallelism of the order of thinking and being. L'ontogenèse peut (...) être expliquée de deux manières différentes: historiquement; elle se passe du passé au présent. idéalistiquement; elle se passe de l'universel au particulier. Le développement du dimorphisme du sexe est contradictoire à l'interprétation historique et affirme la conception idéalistique. Par conséquent il faut remplacer la morphologie phylogénétique par l'idéalistique. De façon analogue l'idiogenèse et la morphogenèse se passent de l'universel au particulier. Il existe un parallélisme de l'ordre d'existence et de l'ordre des pensées. (shrink)

(Sudhoffs Archiv; Beiheft 61) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 2013. 493 S., zahlr. Abb. u. Tab., kart., € 74,00. ISBN 978‐3‐515‐10468‐5.

This book addresses the perennial question: What is justice?

"Die Gedanken, die ich in diesem Buche mitteile, sollen die Grundstimmung festhalten, die ich in der Weltanschauung Goethes beobachtet habe. Im Lauf vieler Jahre habe ich immer wieder und wieder das Bild dieser Weltanschauung betrachtet. Besonderen Reiz hatte es fur mich, nach den Offenbarungen zu sehen, welche die Natur uber ihr Wesen und ihre Gesetze den feinen Sinnes- und Geistesorganen Goethes gemacht hat. Ich lernte begreifen, warum Goethe diese Offenbarungen als so hohes Gluck empfand, dass er sie zuweilen hoher schatzte (...) als seine Dichtungsgabe. Die Eindrucke, welche Goethe von den Erscheinungen der Natur empfangen hat, muss man kennen, wenn man den vollen Gehalt seiner Dichtungen verstehen will. Die Geheimnisse, die er dem Wesen und Werden der Schopfung abgelauscht hat, leben in seinen kunstlerischen Erzeugnissen und werden nur demjenigen offenbar, der hinhorcht auf die Mitteilungen, die der Dichter uber die Natur macht. Niemand kann in die Tiefen der Goetheschen Kunst hinuntertauchen, dem Goethes Naturbeobachtungen unbekannt sind." [...] Rudolf Steiner war ein osterreichischer Esoteriker und Philosoph. Auf Grundlage seiner Lehre entstand unter anderem die Waldorfpadagogik. Der Verlag der Wissenschaften verlegt historische Literatur bekannter und unbekannter wissenschaftlicher Autoren. Dem interessierten Leser werden so teilweise langst nicht mehr verlegte Werke wieder zugangig gemacht. Das vorliegende Buch ist ein unveranderter Nachdruck der historischen Originalausgabe aus dem Jahr 1897.". (shrink)

How do we evaluate the power and utility of language when it has been made to articulate falsehoods in certain totalitarian regimes or has been charged with vulgarity and imprecision in a mass-consumer democracy? How will language react to the increasingly urgent claims of more exact speech such as mathematics and symbolic notation? These are some of the questions Steiner addresses in this elegantly written book, first published in 1967 to international acclaim.

Rudolf Steiner developed a comprehensive view of social life which he viewed as being made up of three inter-dependent realms: spiritual-cultural, political and economic. Out of this grew his philosophy known as 'associative economics', which in contrast to our global financial systems, is collaborative and serves the real needs of consumers.This book, a companion to Gary Lamb's Associative Economics, is a comprehensive collection of Rudolf Steiner's statements on economics, compiled from all of his works currently available in English. (...) It will be an indispensable resource for anyone interested in alternative approaches to our current financial crises. (shrink)

This book strongly challenges the Western philosophical tradition's assertion that humans are superior to nonhuman animals. It provides a full and direct moral status of nonhuman animals. The book provides basis for a radical critique of the entire trajectory of animal studies over the past fifteen years. The key idea explored is of 'felt kinship' a sense of shared fate with and obligations to all sentient life. It will help to inspire some deep rethinking on the part of leading exponents (...) of animal studies. The book's strong outlook is expressed through an appeal for radical humility on the side of humans rather than a constant reference to the 'human-animal divide'. Historical figures examined in depth include Aristotle; Seneca, and Kant; contemporary figures examined include Christine Korsgaard and Martha Nussbaum. This book presents an account in which the tradition has proceeded based on impartial motivations at all, but instead has made a set of pointedly self-serving assumptions about the proper criteria for assessing moral worth. Readers of this book will gain exposure to a wide variety of thinkers in the Western philosophical tradition, historical as well as contemporary. This book is suitable for professionals working in nonhuman animal studies, students, advanced undergraduates, and practitioners working in the fields of philosophy, environmental studies, law, literature, anthropology, and related fields. (shrink)

Wiederkehr des Raumes?. Topologisches Paradigmen ; Rückkehr zum gelebten Raum ; Raumkonzepte und Raumpraktiken ; Regionale oder fundamentale Räumlichkeit ; Zweideutigkeiten und Paradoxien der Lebenswelt -- Polarität von Ort und Raum. Phänomenologische Topik ; Wo-Frage im Schatten der Was-Frage ; Ortsbestimmung als Antwort auf eine Wo-Frage ; Fremde und eigene Wo-Frage ; Hier als Standort : Grund und Boden ; Woher und Wohin : Wegstrecken ; Worin : offene und geschlossene Räume ; Ringsum : Umgebung, Umwelt und Welt ; Wie (...) weit : Vermessene Räume -- Leibliches Wohnen im Raum. Vielfalt des Raumes ; Verankerung im Hier ; Raumachsen ; Durchmessung, Dehnung und Schrumpfung des Raumes ; Nähe und Ferne ; Drinnen und Draußen ; Interieur und Exterieur im Blickfield der Malerei ; Raumanlage und Raumbühne ; Raumtechniken und Ortskarten ; Lokale Räume und globaler Raum -- Ortsverschiebungen. Hier und Anderswo ; Aktualität, Habitualität und Virtualität der räumlichen Bewegung ; Spuren der Zeit im Raum ; Zersprengter Raum ; Telepräsenz ; Fremdorte und andere Räume ; Gemeinorte und globaler Raum ; Gastlichkeit ; Coda : Topos : Atopie : Heterotopien -- Zeitverdoppelung und Zeitverschiebung. Zwischen Mythos und Logos ; Frage nach der Zeit ; Zeitverdoppelung in der Rede und Zeitverkörperung ; Zeitverschiebung zwischen Pathos und Respons ; Zeitverschiebung und Reaktionszeit ; Der entrückte Anfang im Roman und auf der Bühne ; Zeit der Sinne ; Jenseits von Erinnerung und Erwartung ; Rhythmen und Tempi ; Zwischen Leere und Erfüllung ; Coda : Anderswo enden -- Die verändernde Kraft der Wiederholung. Wiederholungsexperiment ; Sich wiederholdende Erfahrung ; Widerholung als Rettung aus der Zeit ; Altes und Neues im Widerstreit ; Unwiederholbares in der Zeit -- Die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Zukünftigem im Anschluß an Aristoteles. Handlungsperspektive ; Die drohende Seeschlacht ; Wahrscheinlichkeit und Häufigkeit ; Zwischen Gewißheit und Ungewißheit ; Rückzug auf pratische Gewißheit ; Zwischen Entwurf und Erwartung ; Unwahrscheinliche Zukunft -- Kommen und Gehen in der Zeit im Anschluß an Merleau-Ponty. Frühe dialektik der Zeit ; Zeit als bloßes Nacheinander ; Totalität der Zeit : Präsenzfeld ; Riß der Zeit : Selbstaffektion ; Bewegung der Zeit : Vor- und Rückläufigkeit ; Wahrnehmung zwischen Vor- und Rückblick ; Handeln zwischen Vorsatz und Vorschlag ; Kommen und Gehen ; Chiasmus der Zeit -- Epilog : Verquickung von Ort, Raum und Zeit. (shrink)

This chapter covers the traditional role of responsibility, and the possible connections between response and responsibility. These connections are explored through the advance of trust and the surplus of the extraordinary in relation to the Third Party. The idea of responsibility comes from the sphere of juridical law, and has a theological touch. The classical conception presented suffers from a permanent erosion that is reinforced by systemic constraints. Trust is a natural element of every community that is together applied by (...) common aims in life. The phenomenon of trust refers to the bond, the nexus, which holds together the members of a community, creating the requisite solidarity. The term ‘trust’ or ‘confidence’ should not primarily read as a substantive, but as a verb or as the derivative of a verb. Furthermore, it is noted that the responsive ethics proposed could function as a permanent corrective. (shrink)

Historically, liberal political philosophy has had much to say about who is entitled to nationhood. But it has had rather less to say about how to determine the legitimate territorial boundaries of nations and even less to say about what some such nations, so situated, might owe to others. The object of this paper is to show that the foundational principles of liberalism can generate reasonably determinate solutions to these problems. That is, the very same set of basic rights that (...) liberalism ascribes to all persons is itself sufficient to determine which nations they are members of where those nations’ legitimate legal jurisdictions are located, and what amounts of wealth they each owe or are owed by other nations. (shrink)

1. Teilband. Vorwort, Einleitung, Text Band I, Abkürzungen und Stellenkommentar -- 2. Teilband. Text Band II, Stellenkommentar, Literaturverzeichnis und Namenregister.

Without directly addressing the Demarcation Problem for logic—the problem of distinguishing logical vocabulary from others—we focus on distinctive aspects of logical vocabulary in pursuit of a second goal in the philosophy of logic, namely, proposing criteria for the justification of logical rules. Our preferred approach has three components. Two of these are effectively Belnap’s, but with a twist. We agree with Belnap’s response to Prior’s challenge to inferentialist characterisations of the meanings of logical constants. Belnap argued that for a logical (...) constant to exist, its rules must be conservative over a previously given consequence relation and guarantee the uniqueness of the constant. The twist is that we require logical vocabulary to be provably conservative, not over a previously given formal consequence relation, but over a previously given meaningful vocabulary of a language. Uniqueness is also a feature defined in terms of provability: if two syntactically distinguished expressions are governed by the same rules, then formulas with them as main operators are interderivable. Belnap’s criteria are not only those for the existence of a logical constant, but more: they are what distinguishes logical vocabulary from all other expressions. It is the defining mark of a logical constant that it is provably conservative over the fragment of the language which excludes it and that its rules guarantee its uniqueness. The third component is the topic neutrality of logic. The provable conservativeness of logic over a previously given vocabulary of a language is motivated, in part, by appeal to molecularism in the theory of meaning. Molecularity is a feature endorsed by the theory of meaning as a whole, so it does not distinguish logical constants from other expressions. The same is true for conservativeness. We argue that molecularity, and hence conservativeness, are implicit presuppositions of speakers’ use of language: the addition of new vocabulary to a language is presupposed to be conservative. But this presupposition is one that we should be able reflectively to endorse (such as when attempting a rational reconstruction of the use of the vocabulary). Thus, where conservativeness is found to fail, this defect should be remedied and the use of the vocabulary corrected (as in classical negation) or excised altogether (as in pejoratives). We go on to characterise a notion of topic neutrality, which we argue applies to logical vocabulary. We then note that reflective endorsement of the conservativeness of a topic neutral vocabulary requires a proof that the vocabulary is conservative relative to any base vocabulary. Thus we require that logical vocabulary be demonstrably conservative. Allying this requirement, distinctive of logic, to a general consideration about the commitments of assertion yields a mode of justification for logical constants akin to some conceptions of Harmony, i.e., to the idea that the consequences of assertion of a logical complex need to be warranted by the grounds and ought to be the strongest consequences warranted by the grounds. Intuitionistic logic acquires a somewhat familiar justification but emanating from a new motivation. (shrink)

This is a book about the education America owes to its children, why its education system is in poor condition, and what might be done to give that system both energy and quality.

Epistemologists have recently noted a tension between (i) denying access internalism, and (ii) maintaining that rational agents cannot be epistemically akratic, believing claims akin to ‘p, but I shouldn’t believe p’. I bring out the tension, and develop a new way to resolve it. The basic strategy is to say that access internalism is false, but that counterexamples to it are ‘elusive’ in a way that prevents rational agents from suspecting that they themselves are counterexamples to the internalist principles. I (...) argue that this allows us to do justice to the motivations behind both (i) and (ii). And I explain in some detail what a view of evidence that implements this strategy, and makes it independently plausible, might look like. (shrink)

A rational moral code must satisfy the condition of completeness. This same condition applies to a set of moral rights, where it takes the form of requiring that all the rights in that set be compossible: that their respective correlatively entailed duties be jointly fulfillable. Such joint fulfillability is guaranteed only by a set of fully differentiated individual domains. And if moral rights are to play any independent role in moral reasoning - any role logically independent of the values that (...) bring persons into conflict - those domains must be determined by rules which are not derived from those values. (shrink)

This comment deals with some basic elements Searle uses in order to construct social reality, i.e. togetherness, we-intentionality and the distinction between institutional and brute facts. The commentator argues that Searle’s theory tends to a partial biologism because lacking a sufficient concept of embodiment. Consequently ‘pre-institutional facts’ such as eating, copulating, working or torturing are systematically underdetermined. On the deontic level the theory relies on natural processes of conventional power. So the distinction between factual acceptance and acceptability is blurred by (...) a sort of conformism, and one neglects the status of dissidents and victims whose belonging to the predominant ‘we’ remains highly dubious. (shrink)

Bernhard Nickel presents a theory of generic sentences and the kind-directed modes of thought they express. The theory closely integrates compositional semantics with metaphysics to solve the problem that generics pose: what do generics mean? Generic sentences are extremely simple, yet if there are patterns to be discerned in terms of which are true and which are false, these patterns are subtle and complex. Ravens are black, and lions have manes: statistical measures cannot do justice to the facts, but (...) what else is there that has a hope of giving us insight into what we are capturing across so many domains? Nickel argues that generics are the top of a fundamentally explanatory iceberg, and that this explanatory framework is deeply intertwined with the semantics of the language we use to express them. In providing an integrated semantic and metaphysical theory of generics, he aims to solve old puzzles and draw attention to new phenomena. (shrink)

Steiner met Nietzsche's work in 1889. At once fascinated by Nietszche's style and repelled by certain pathological aspects of his consciousness, Steiner recognized Nietzsche's spiritual preeminence as a "fighter for freedom." Six years later, as a result of meeting Nietzsche's sister, Steiner encountered the dying philosopher himself. Thereafter, he spent several weeks in the Nietzsche archives. The result was this book, an essential stepping stone toward an understanding of anthroposophy.

In der vorliegenden Schrift soll Martin Buber als dem scharfen Diagnostiker unserer Zeit und dem Künder ewiger Wahrheiten die ganze Aufmerksamkeit gelten. Kein Denken lässt sich so wenig in billigen Schlagwörtern einfangen, wie das Martin Bubers. Die erste Aufgabe wird sein, die Situation in der wir leben, und die Buber meint, etwas näher zu bestimmen. Dies wird uns in die Lage setzen, jene Fragen zu vernehmen, die die Situation zu uns allen spricht. Sodann werden wir uns der besonderen Gestalt der (...) Buberschen Antwort zuwenden. Erst dann erscheint die Frage nach Herkunft und Inhalt der Antwort sinnvoll. In einem letzten Teil sollen dann gleichsam drei Bewährungsproben von Bubers Denken erörtert werden. (shrink)