1.  50
    Axiomatic Characterizations of Solutions for Bayesian Games.Robert van Heumen, Bezalel Peleg, Stef Tijs & Peter Borm - 1996 - Theory and Decision 40 (2):103-129.
  2.  27
    A Note on Manipulability of Large Voting Schemes.Bezalel Peleg - 1979 - Theory and Decision 11 (4):401-412.
  3. Game Theoretic Analysis of Voting in Committees.Bezalel Peleg - 2008 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a theoretical and completely rigorous analysis of voting in committees that provides mathematical proof of the existence of democratic voting systems, which are immune to the manipulation of preferences of coalitions of voters. The author begins by determining the power distribution among voters that is induced by a voting rule, giving particular consideration to choice by plurality voting and Borda's rule. He then constructs, for all possible committees, well-behaved representative voting procedures which are not distorted by strategic (...)
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