Moral distress is complex and has received varied definitions, and its distinctiveness is consequently often unclear when placed alongside related concepts like moral injury or moral stress. Buchbi...

Representing a spectrum of intellectual concerns and methodological commitments in religious ethics, the contributors to this focus issue consider and assess the advantages and disadvantages of the shift in recent comparative religious ethics away from a rootedness in moral theory toward a model that privileges the ethnography of moral worlds. In their own way, all of the contributors think through and emphasize the meaning, importance, and place of normativity in recent comparative religious ethics.

Enck and Condley (2025) draw welcome attention to clinician experiences of “agent-regret.” They define agent-regret broadly as a person’s regret over their “harmful but not wrongful actions,” that...

Pierson et al. document the lack of diversity in bioethicists’ normative commitments and argue that bioethicists should be more “mindful of the gaps between the positions they endorse and those end...

What are “human rights” supposed to protect? According to most human rights doctrines, including most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights , human rights aim to protect “human dignity.” But what this concept amounts to and what its source is remain unclear. According to Glenn Hughes , human rights theorists ought to consider human dignity as an “intrinsically heuristic concept,” whose content is partially understood but is not fully determined. In this comment, I criticize Hughes's account. On my view, (...) understanding inherent human dignity as an intrinsically heuristic concept tethers it to an “indeterminateness of sense,” which leaves it open to exploitation from theorists unsympathetic to the moral salience of rights and what rights are supposed to protect. (shrink)

In The Anticipatory Corpse: Medicine, Power, and the Care of the Dying, Jeffrey Bishop argues that contemporary medicine has (among other things) reduced the patient from a ‘subject’ to an ‘object’. He extends this charge to all corners of contemporary medicine. But in his book’s concluding chapter, ‘Anticipating Life’, he turns toward a constructive proposal, asking, in closing, ‘[m]ight it not be that only theology can save medicine?’ Toward answering Bishop’s query, I turn to the thought of Paul Ramsey. Ramsey (...) is helpful because, in thinking through and responding to contemporary moral dilemmas, he begins with his theological commitments and thereby may avoid the reductive tendencies that Bishop argues affect contemporary medicine. Specifically, Ramsey’s account of the ‘patient as person’, I will argue, delimits what the medical endeavor may do and might offer resources to help save medicine. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Egalitarian Liberalism Revisited: On the Meaning and Justification of Social Justice by Per SundmanBharat RanganathanEgalitarian Liberalism Revisited: On the Meaning and Justification of Social Justice Per Sundman uppsala, sweden: uppsala universitet, 2016. 242 pp. $72.50Across a range of contemporary disciplines, discussions about justice abound. Despite the prevalence of these discussions, however, there is little consensus about what justice is and whether (and, if so, how) appeals to it (...) should be made. Moreover, if the interconnectedness and pluralism that obtain in our rapidly globalizing world are taken seriously, concerns about the content, meaning, and use of justice are amplified. Against this backdrop, Per Sundman aims to explicate and evaluate one particular form of justice: egalitarian liberalism. On his definition, egalitarian liberalism is "best understood as a triune conjunction of equality of opportunity, desert and self-ownership" (10). Over the course of eight substantive chapters, Sundman labors to show how these criteria both reinforce and don't contradict each other, aiming to clarify the meaning of social justice while considering known alternatives.To develop this argument, Sundman covers a truly impressive range of topics in contemporary debates about justice, including consequentialism and deontology, equality of opportunity and equality of resources, capabilities and rights, corrective and distributive policies, the natural and social lotteries, status in moral and political communities, and the politics of recognition and misrecognition. On the whole, covering such a range of topics proves to be a strength. Sundman introduces the reader to a number of important topics and how several important thinkers have treated those topics, and his discussion of these topics and thinkers is evenhanded and insightful. If you're familiar with (and interested in) one or more of these debates, you will be delighted to find a theological ethicist engaging in them. There's also a further reason for delight: Sundman enters and engages in these debates without bringing the all-too-frequent (and oftentimes empty) charge that liberalism is "impoverished"—a point to which I'll return. But depending on your level of familiarity with recent debates in moral and political philosophy, you may be left unsatisfied with some aspects of Sundman's discussion. Specifically, some of these topics and thinkers deserve further attention and scrutiny than Sundman provides, especially important given Sundman's stated desire to navigate alternative understandings. [End Page 189]I do want to draw the reader's attention to the penultimate chapter of Sundman's book, "Save Us from Liberalism." But first I want to make a larger point. I mentioned what I think is an all-too-frequent charge made in theological ethics: namely, that liberalism is impoverished. Sometimes, this charge is entirely warranted. But oftentimes, at least in my experience, it is empty: the person bringing the charge neither distinguishes among the diversity that obtains within liberalism nor charitably reads and represents the thinker with whom they are trying to engage. Given this disciplinary shortcoming, Sundman is to be commended for turning to Christian critiques of liberalism only after he's carefully worked (and guided the reader) through the myriad topics and thinkers that constitute egalitarian liberalism writ large.So what about this chapter in particular? Focusing on Christian communitarians—for example, Stanley Hauerwas and John Milbank—Sundman explores whether authentic Christian ethics contradicts and is superior to egalitarian liberalism. In the first half of the chapter, he examines the different ways in which Christian communitarians understand obedience to God's commands and have criticized the putative liberal obsession with "autonomy." Following an important discussion where he contrasts Christian and liberal understandings of the circumstances of justice, the second half of Sundman's chapter argues briefly but persuasively against Christian exclusivity (e.g., the recently popular Benedict Option) and for Christians to act out of love, for justice, and in the world.There is much to recommend about this book. Both substantively and structurally, it is admirable and instructive.Bharat RanganathanUniversity of Notre DameCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Few people doubt that severe poverty is a pressing moral issue. But what sorts of obligations, if any, do affluent people have toward the severely poor? If one accepts the idea that one has some obligations to the severely poor there still remains disagreement about the magnitude of this obligation and when it obtains. I consider Peter Singer's influential "shallow pond" argument, which holds that affluent people have greater obligations toward the severely poor than ordinary moral judgments suggest. Critics hold (...) that Singer's view is excessively demanding and therefore untenable. I thus turn to the parable of the Good Samaritan and Christian accounts of neighbor-love to help attenuate this criticism. Drawing from Christian conversations on neighbor-love, I attempt to demonstrate that accepting an obligation to assist does not necessarily result in one abandoning one's special relations, abnegating self-regard, or no longer pursuing other non-moral strivings. (shrink)

Drawing creatively upon religious ethics and moral and political philosophy, Ranganathan argues here that affluent people have demanding and immediate obligations, through institutional reform and interpersonal giving, to assist severely impoverished people. An essential book for scholars of religion, ethics, developmental studies, and theology.

This volume brings together emerging and established religious ethicists to investigate how those in the field carry forward the practice and tradition of social criticism and, at the same time, how social criticism informs the scholarly values of their field. Contributors reflect on the nature of the moral subject and the ethical weight of human dignity and consider the limits and possibilities of religious humanism in orienting the work of social criticism. They compare religious sources and forms of research in (...) religious ethics to secular sources and the tradition of liberal social criticism. And they offer proposals for how religious ethics can help humanists navigate our complex and multicultural moral landscape and what this field reveals about the ultimate ends of humanistic scholarship. (shrink)