Over millennia, epidemics have wielded as much sway over human affairs as have wars, economic crises, and political upheavals. Devastating epidemics in the past have changed the course of history. This article focuses on the yellow fever epidemic of 1802 in St. Domingue to demonstrate how science has deepened our understanding of the epidemic, and hence of the Haitian Revolution. Genetics, affirming epidemiology, demonstrated that the origin of the virus was in Africa, and genomics demonstrated that the vector of yellow (...) fever, the _Aedes aegypti_ mosquito, evolved in the context of the ecological creation of the Sahara and the Sahel. The vector fed on humans and reproduced in man-made water containers, allowing transport to the Caribbean during the African slave trade. Serological studies in Africa later demonstrated that many African-origin slaves would have had adaptive immunity. French fighters did not, and they were decimated. The French withdrew, Haiti was created, and the Louisiana Purchase was executed. (shrink)

Of the many far-reaching implications of Fincher & Thornhill's (F&T's) theory, we focus on the consequences of parasite stress for mating strategies, marriage, and the differing roles and restrictions for men and women. In particular, we explain how examination of cultures of honor can provide a theoretical bridge between effects of parasite stress and disproportionate emphasis on female purity.

Heather Battaly has argued that vice-epistemology has a Responsibility Problem. From analysing the ‘card-carrying feminist’ committing testimonial injustice due to implicit gender bias, Battaly argues that non-voluntarist vice-epistemologists are committed to either (1) counting some vices as blameworthy yet not reprehensible, or (2) holding agents equally responsible for cognitive defects as for implicit bias. This in turn implies that (2a) epistemic vices include certain cognitive defects or (2b) that implicit bias is excluded as epistemic vice. This paper (...) aims to deflate the Responsibility Problem, by arguing that vice-epistemologists can embrace route (2b) without problematic implications. In applying Miranda Fricker’s ‘no-fault responsibility’ to the card-carrying feminist case, I defend the following three claims: First, Battaly’s analysis of the card-carrying feminist case is flawed, because it fails to acknowledge that the vice of testimonial injustice and implicit prejudice are conceptually distinct. Second, excluding implicit prejudice as a vice is actually compatible with Fricker’s theoretical commitments. Third, contrary to what much of the literature seems to assume, it isn’t that problematic to exclude (individual) implicit bias as a vice, or to assign equal responsibility for implicit prejudice as for cognitive defects like impaired vision. (shrink)

In Bias: A Philosophical Study, Thomas Kelly posits a distinction between two senses of the word ‘bias’, one pejorative, the other non-pejorative, and he puts this distinction to work in two crucial portions of the book: first, when he defends his central account of the nature of bias against would-be counterexamples; and, second, when he develops a new way of replying to external-world skepticism which hinges on conceding to the skeptic that we are biased against skeptical hypotheses. (...) It is argued here that in neither of these places does Kelly’s distinction succeed in doing the work he needs is to do, and more generally that we should be suspicious of the very idea that ‘bias’ has a non-pejorative sense. (shrink)

The development and implementation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) health systems represent a great power that comes with great responsibility. Their capacity to improve and transform healthcare involves inevitable risks. A major risk in this regard is the propagation of bias throughout the life cycle of the AI system, leading to harmful or discriminatory outcomes. This paper argues that the European medical device regulations may prove inadequate to address this—not only technical but also social challenge. With the advent of new (...) regulatory remedies, it seems that the European policymakers also want to reinforce the current medical device legal framework. In this paper, we analyse different policies to mitigate bias in AI health systems included in the Artificial Intelligence Act and in the proposed European Health Data Space. As we shall see, the different remedies based on processing sensitive data for such purpose devised by the European policymakers may have very different effects both on privacy and on protection against discrimination. We find the focus on mitigation during the pre‐commercialisation stages rather weak, and believe that bias control once the system has been implemented in the real world would have merited greater ambition. (shrink)

It is an obvious fact of history that human beings have always entertained and continue to entertain different conceptions of the good and lead very different lives both individually and collectively. This raises two questions. First, why do ways of life differ? And second, how should we respond to their differences? The first is an explanatory, and the second a normative question, and the two are closely related. The first question has been answered differently by different writers, of which I (...) shall mention three by way of illustration. (shrink)

This book presents and deconstructs the existing explanations for the differential career development of qualified men and women. It reframes the problem of discrimination in the workplace as a matter of organizational ethics, social responsibility and compliance with existing equal opportunity laws. Sensitive points are identified where social biases, decision-makers' individual economic interests and shortcomings of organizational incentive policies may lead to discrimination against qualified women. The ideas put forward are empirically tested in an original laboratory experiment that examines personnel (...) selection in the male-dominated field of science and technology. It contrasts the selection of applicants with gendered and gender-blind applications available to subjects under controlled conditions. 30% of participants were high-level decision-makers, which is unprecedented in this field of research. The results, highly relevant for organizational practice, are explained and discussed in detail. (shrink)

Humans have now amassed a sizable knowledge of widespread, nonconscious cognitive biases which affect our behavior, especially in social and economic contexts. I contend that a democratic government is uniquely justified in using knowledge of cognitive biases to promote pro-democratic behavior, conditionally justified in using it to accomplish ends traditionally within the scope of government authority, and unjustified in using it for any other purpose. I also contend that the government ought to redesign institutional infrastructure to avoid triggering cognitive biases (...) where it is not permitted intentionally to manipulate such biases and to optimize the effects of such biases where permissible. I shall use the United States of America as an example throughout, but my conclusions apply equally to any democracy which values the political autonomy of its populace. (shrink)

In Liberalism's Troubled Search for Equality, Robert P. Jones asks why these concerns were dismissed by liberal philosophers and argues that this contradiction exposes a blind spot within liberal political theory.

The aim of this study was threefold: First, to examine the dimensionality of the construct of General Academic Ability at the subscale level providing additional insights over and above on the conceptualization of the construct. Second, to explore different degrees of measurement invariance of the GAA across gender using more recent advancements in the examination of Measurement Invariance. Third, to examine gender differences across the different facets of the GAA at the latent mean level. The sample consisted of 1,800 high (...) school graduates who applied for higher education in Saudi Arabia. The results from the analysis indicated that the hierarchical model with one higher-order factor and four lower-order cognitive factors exhibited an excellent fit to the data. In terms of the measurement invariance hypothesis, it was found that the hierarchical model exhibits full configural and metric invariance and partial scalar invariance. Finally, using the Latent Mean Difference procedure, the results showed gender differences in the Verbal and GPA domains. Although significant differences were also found in the Scholastic aptitude domain, this finding is not stable due to several non-invariant items within the domain. In both cases, females scored higher than males. Finally, regarding the higher-order factor, the results showed that females scored higher than males. There were no significant differences in the Quantitative domain. (shrink)

In this study, we investigated whether control of the conflict between incongruent heuristic and analytical answer options in a reasoning task is modulated by the presence of conflict on previous trials. In two experiments, we found that the incongruency of the previous trial has a significant effect on the control exhibited on the current trial. Our data also showed that this adaptation effect is modulated by the incongruency of the previous series of trials. These results demonstrate the same control adaptation (...) effects for a reasoning task as observed for standard response interference tasks. Coinciding control effects in the two research areas suggest that cognitive control might be an important mechanism underlying performance on reasoning tasks. Based on these results we argue that the study of cognitive control in reasoning could potentially facilitate the refinement of empirical predictions and provide a new tool to explore the exertion of top-down control in human thinking. (shrink)

Implicit bias interventions, qua attempts to decrease implicit bias measures, are often indirect prejudice interventions. As such, they face a number of potential problems. In particular, implicit bias interventions are more susceptible to generate unforeseen side-effects, are more prone to overcompensation, and less clearly decrease prejudicial behaviour, than at least some direct prejudice interventions. These particular problems are not widely recognized (even though other problems with these interventions are well known, e.g. those raised by Oswald et al. (...) in J Personal Soc Psychol 105:171–192, 2013; Lai et al. in J Exp Psychol Gen 145(8):1001–1016, 2016; Forscher et al. in J Personal Soc Psychol 117(3):522–559, 2019). In this paper I describe the three problems in detail, and explain why they result from indirectness. I thereby hope to show that the problems beset an entire approach to deprejudicing, and point towards deeper problems than unfortunate empirical results found for particular implicit measures. The problems do not point towards finding new indirect measures and interventions to replace old ones, but away entirely from indirect measures, toward direct measures and interventions. (shrink)

Consider these three positions about physician-assisted suicide:Physician-assisted suicide should be illegal for everyone.Physician-assisted suicide should be legal for only the terminally ill.Physician-assisted suicide should be legal for all competent adults.So far, the debate in America has been primarily between positions 1 and 2. I think it should be between positions 1 and 3. Both those positions embody reasonable viewpoints, and I will not try to decide between them in this chapter. But I will argue that the double standard embodied in (...) position 2 is morally untenable. (shrink)

In defeasible reasoning, initially drawn conclusions can be withdrawn in light of new information. In this paper, we examine how the conclusions drawn from conditionals describing positive or negative situations can be defeated by subsequent negative or positive information, respectively. Participants were confronted with conditionals of the form “If [situation], then I am happy/sad” which were either followed by no additional information or by additional information describing situations of the same or the opposite valence. The participant's task was to decide (...) on a question asking for a possible conclusion (“Am I happy?” vs. “Am I sad?”). We found a negativity bias in defeasible reasoning: negative information defeated positively charged conclusions more strongly than positive information defeated negatively charged conclusions. We discuss our results in relation to the new psychology of reasoning. (shrink)

_Anthropic Bias_ explores how to reason when you suspect that your evidence is biased by "observation selection effects"--that is, evidence that has been filtered by the precondition that there be some suitably positioned observer to "have" the evidence. This conundrum--sometimes alluded to as "the anthropic principle," "self-locating belief," or "indexical information"--turns out to be a surprisingly perplexing and intellectually stimulating challenge, one abounding with important implications for many areas in science and philosophy. There are the philosophical thought experiments and paradoxes: (...) the Doomsday Argument; Sleeping Beauty; the Presumptuous Philosopher; Adam & Eve; the Absent-Minded Driver; the Shooting Room. And there are the applications in contemporary science: cosmology ; evolutionary theory ; the problem of time's arrow ; quantum physics ; game-theory problems with imperfect recall ; even traffic analysis. _Anthropic Bias_ argues that the same principles are at work across all these domains. And it offers a synthesis: a mathematically explicit theory of observation selection effects that attempts to meet scientific needs while steering clear of philosophical paradox. (shrink)

At the University of Sheffield between 2011 and 2012, a leading group of philosophers, psychologists, and others gathered to explore the nature and significance of implicit bias. The two volumes of Implicit Bias and Philosophy emerge from these workshops. Each volume philosophically examines core areas of psychological research on implicit bias as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy. Volume II: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics is comprised of three parts. (...) “Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias” contains chapters examining the relationship of implicit biases to concepts that are central to moral responsibility, including control, awareness, reasons-responsiveness, and alienation. The chapters in the second part—“Structural Injustice”—explore the connections between the implicit biases held by individuals and the structural injustices of the societies in which they are situated. And finally, the third part—“The Ethics of Implicit Bias: Theory and Practice”—contains chapters examining strategies for implicit attitude change, the ramifications of research on implicit bias for philosophers working in ethics, and suggestions for combating implicit biases in the fields of philosophy and law. (shrink)

Philosophers have long noted, and empirical psychology has lately confirmed, that most people are “biased toward the future”: we prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. At least two explanations have been offered for this bias: belief in temporal passage and the practical irrelevance of the past resulting from our inability to influence past events. We set out to test the latter explanation. In a large survey, we find that participants exhibit significantly (...) less future bias when asked to consider scenarios where they can affect their own past experiences. This supports the “practical irrelevance” explanation of future bias. It also suggests that future bias is not an inflexible preference hardwired by evolution, but results from a more general disposition to “accept the things we cannot change”. However, participants still exhibited substantial future bias in scenarios in which they could affect the past, leaving room for complementary explanations. Beyond the main finding, our results also indicate that future bias is stake-sensitive and that participants endorse the normative correctness of their future-biased preferences and choices. In combination, these results shed light on philosophical debates over the rationality of future bias, suggesting that it may be a rational response to empirical realities rather than a brute, arational disposition. (shrink)

It has been argued that implicit biases are operative in philosophy and lead to significant epistemic costs in the field. Philosophers working on this issue have focussed mainly on implicit gender and race biases. They have overlooked ideological bias, which targets political orientations. Psychologists have found ideological bias in their field and have argued that it has negative epistemic effects on scientific research. I relate this debate to the field of philosophy and argue that if, as some studies (...) suggest, the same bias also exists in philosophy then it will lead to hitherto unrecognised epistemic hazards in the field. Furthermore, the bias is epistemically different from the more familiar biases in respects that are important for epistemology, ethics, and metaphilosophy. (shrink)

To arrive at their final evaluation of a manuscript or grant proposal, reviewers must convert a submission’s strengths and weaknesses for heterogeneous peer review criteria into a single metric of quality or merit. I identify this process of commensuration as the locus for a new kind of peer review bias. Commensuration bias illuminates how the systematic prioritization of some peer review criteria over others permits and facilitates problematic patterns of publication and funding in science. Commensuration bias also (...) foregrounds a range of structural strategies for realigning peer review practices and institutions with the aims of science. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: The term ‘publication bias’ usually refers to the tendency for a greater proportion of statistically significant positive results of experiments to be published and, conversely, a greater proportion of statistically significant negative or null results not to be published. It is widely accepted in the fields of healthcare and psychological research to be a major threat to the validity of systematic reviews and meta-analyses. Some methodological work has previously been undertaken, by the author and others, in the field (...) of educational research to investigate the extent of the problem. This paper describes the problem of publication bias with reference to its history in a number of fields, with special reference to the area of educational research. Informal methods for detecting publication bias in systematic reviews and meta-analyses of controlled trials are outlined and retrospective and prospective methods for dealing with the problem are suggested. (shrink)

Many philosophers appeal to intuitions to support some philosophical views. However, there is reason to be concerned about this practice as scientific evidence has documented systematic bias in philosophically relevant intuitions as a function of seemingly irrelevant features (e.g., personality). One popular defense used to insulate philosophers from these concerns holds that philosophical expertise eliminates the influence of these extraneous factors. Here, we test this assumption. We present data suggesting that verifiable philosophical expertise in the free will debate-as measured (...) by a reliable and validated test of expert knowledge-does not eliminate the influence of one important extraneous feature (i.e., the heritable personality trait extraversion) on judgments concerning freedom and moral responsibility. These results suggest that, in at least some important cases, the expertise defense fails. Implications for the practice of philosophy, experimental philosophy, and applied ethics are discussed. (shrink)