Results for 'Bill Lycan'

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  1.  45
    Perception and Reason. Bill Brewer.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):725-729.
  2. 680 ACKNOWLEDGMENT King, Jeff Klein, Elaine Kobes, Bernie.Angelika Kratzer, Manfred Krifka, Bill Ladusaw, Shalom Lappin, Young-Suk Lee, Harold Levin, Godehard Link, Jan Tore LCnning, Peter Ludlow & Bill Lycan - 1995 - Linguistics and Philosophy 17:679-680.
     
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  3. An Irenic Idea About Metaphor: William G. Lycan.William G. Lycan - 2013 - Philosophy 88 (1):5-32.
    Donald Davidson notoriously rejected ‘metaphorical meaning’ and denied the existence of linguistic mechanisms by which metaphorical significance is conveyed. He contended that the meanings metaphorical sentences have are just their literal meanings, though metaphorical utterances may brute-causally have important cognitive effects. Contrastingly, John Searle offers a Gricean account of metaphor as an elaborated kind of implicature, and defends metaphorical meaning as speaker-meaning. Each of those positions is subject to very telling objections from the other's point of view. This paper proposes (...)
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  4.  31
    Free Will and the Burden of Proof: William G. Lycan.William G. Lycan - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:107-122.
    Here are some things that are widely believed about free will and determinism. Free will is prima facie incompatible with determinism. The incompatibility is logical or at least conceptual or a priori. A compatibilist needs to explain how free will can co-exist with determinism, paradigmatically by offering an analysis of ‘free’ action that is demonstrably compatible with determinism. Free will is not impugned by quantum in determinism, at least not in the same decisive way that it is impugned by determinism. (...)
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  5. Comments on Bill Lycan, "More Layers of Perceptual Content&Quot.Austen Clark - unknown
    I'm very happy here to be sandwiched between Lycan and Millikan, two of the living philosophers from whom I've probably learned the most, and to whom I am the most grateful. Plus the intermediary position is appropriate for someone commenting on intermediary representations in vision. There's much to like in Bill 's account of "layering" in visual representation. For one, it makes explicit and publicizes the notion that there are multiple layers of representation involved even in the seemingly (...)
     
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  6.  68
    Comments on Bill Lycan's Moore Against the New Skeptics.Earl Conee - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (1):55 - 59.
  7. What is the "Subjectivity" of the Mental?William G. Lycan - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:229-238.
  8. Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - MIT Press.
    Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the ..
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  9. Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 1987 - MIT Press.
    In this book, William Lycan reviews the diverse philosophical views on consciousness--including those of Kripke, Block, Campbell, Sellars, and Casteneda--and ..
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  10. Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity.William G. Lycan - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oxford University Press. pp. 293-305.
    Lycan (1985, 1988) defended a “Principle of Credulity”: “Accept at the outset each of those things that seem to be true” (1988, p. 165). Though that takes the form of a rule rather than a thesis, it does not seem very different from Huemer’s (2001, 2006, 2007) doctrine of phenomenal conservatism (PC): “If it seems to S that p , then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p ” (...)
     
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  11.  21
    Slurs and Lexical Presumption.William G. Lycan - 2015 - Language Sciences 52:3-11.
    Grice's cryptic notion of “conventional implicature” has been developed in a number of different ways. This paper deploys the simplest version, Lycan's (1984) notion of “lexical presumption,” and argues that slurs and other pejorative expressions have normal truth-conditional content plus the most obvious extra implicatures. The paper then addresses and rebuts objections to “conventional implicature” accounts that have been made in the literature, particularly those which focus on non-offensive uses of slurs.
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  12. A Simple Point About an Alleged Objection to Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.William G. Lycan - unknown
    For purposes of this paper, a conscious state is a mental state whose subject is directly or at least nonevidentially aware of being in it. (The state does not count as conscious if the subject has only been told about it by a cognitive scientist or psychologist; introspectively would be better, but no one should say that a state is conscious only if its subject actively introspects it.). N.b., this usage is only one among several quite different though of course (...)
     
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  13. On the Correct Treatment of Inverted Earth.Gary Bartlett - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):294-311.
    The Inverted Earth case has seen fierce debate between Ned Block, who says it defeats the causal-covariational brand of wide representationalism about qualia, and Michael Tye and Bill Lycan, who say it does not. The debate has generated more heat than light because of a failure to get clear on who is supposed to be proving what, and what premises can be deployed in doing so. I argue that a correct understanding of the case makes it clear that (...)
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  14.  98
    Judgement and Justification.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.
    Toward theory a homuncular of believing For years and years, philosophers took thoughts and beliefs to be modifications of incorporeal Cartesian egos. ...
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  15. Mind and Cognition: A Reader.William G. Lycan (ed.) - 1990 - Blackwell.
  16. Form, Function and Feel.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (January):24-50.
  17.  32
    Real Conditionals.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book contends that insufficient attention has been paid to the syntax of conditionals, as investigated by linguists.
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  18. The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:17-35.
    Since Twin Earth was discovered by American philosophical-space explorers in the 1970s, the domain of.
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  19. Giving Dualism its Due.William G. Lycan - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
    Despite the current resurgence of modest forms of mind?body dualism, traditional Cartesian immaterial-substance dualism has few, if any, defenders. This paper argues that no convincing case has been made against substance dualism, and that standard objections to it can be credibly answered.
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  20. Belief is Not the Issue: A Defence of Inference to the Best Explanation.Gregory W. Dawes - 2013 - Ratio 26 (1):62-78.
    Defences of inference to the best explanation (IBE) frequently associate IBE with scientific realism, the idea that it is reasonable to believe our best scientific theories. I argue that this linkage is unfortunate. IBE does not warrant belief, since the fact that a theory is the best available explanation does not show it to be (even probably) true. What IBE does warrant is acceptance: taking a proposition as a premise in theoretical and/or practical reasoning. We ought to accept our best (...)
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  21. Moore Against the New Skeptics.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (1):35 - 53.
  22. The Superiority of Hop to HOT.William G. Lycan - 2004 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins. pp. 93–114.
  23. Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism?William G. Lycan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
    It is widely thought that mind–body substance dualism is implausible at best, though mere “property” dualism is defensible and even flourishing. This paper argues that substance dualism is no less plausible than property dualism and even has two advantages over it.
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  24.  61
    Knowing Who.Steven Boër & William Lycan - 1986 - MIT Press.
  25. Introspection and Phenomenal Character.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):247--73.
    […] One view I hold about the nature of phenomenal character, which is also a view about the relation between phenomenal character and the introspective belief about it, is that phenomenal character is “self intimating.” This means that it is of the essence of a state’s having a certain phenomenal character that this issues in the subject’s being introspectively aware of that character, or does so if the subject reflects. Part of my aim is to give an account which makes (...)
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  26. The Trouble with Possible Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1979 - In Michael J. Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual. Cornell University Press.
  27. Consciousness as Internal Monitoring.William G. Lycan - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14.
    Locke put forward the theory of consciousness as "internal Sense" or "reflection"; Kant made it inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state." On that theory, consciousness is a perception-like second-order representing of our own psychological states events. The term "consciousness," of course, has many distinct uses.
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  28. Phenomenal Intentionalities.William Lycan - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (3):233 - 252.
    There is now a considerable literature that goes under the heading of “phenomenal intentionality.” But it features a number of distinct issues. What they have in common is the claim that intentionality bears a closer relation to phenomenology than had previously been recognized. There is a basic thesis, which is controversial, and there are further arguments attempting to draw more exciting morals from the basic thesis. My purpose in this paper is to survey these issues, see what may be at (...)
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  29.  93
    Explanationist Rebuttals (Coherentism Defended Again).William G. Lycan - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):5-20.
    An explanatory coherence theory of justification is sketched and then defended against a number of recent objections: conservatism and relativism; wild and crazy beliefs; reliability; warranted necessary falsehoods; basing; distant, unknown coherences; Sosa's “self- and present-abstracts”; and Bayesian impossibility results.
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  30. Representational Theories of Consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The idea of representation has been central in discussions of intentionality for many years. But only more recently has it begun playing a wider role in the philosophy of mind, particularly in theories of consciousness. Indeed, there are now multiple representational theories of consciousness, corresponding to different uses of the term "conscious," each attempting to explain the corresponding phenomenon in terms of representation. More cautiously, each theory attempts to explain its target phenomenon in terms of _intentionality_, and assumes that intentionality (...)
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  31. Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.
  32. Enactive Intentionality.William G. Lycan - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    Though Noë is concerned to emphasize that perceptual experiences are not per se internal representations, he does not really say why, and he is fairly quiet about what he takes intentionality and representation themselves to be. Drawing on a subsequent paper (Noë (forthcoming)), I bring out and criticize his in fact radically negative view of those fundamental mental capacities.
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  33. Explanation and Epistemology.William G. Lycan - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 413.
    Second, there is a form of ampliative inference that has come to be called ‘inference to the best explanation,’ or more briefly ‘explanatory inference.’ Roughly: From the fact that a certain hypothesis would explain the data at hand better than any other available hypothesis, we infer with some degree of confidence that that leading hypothesis is correct. There is no question but that this inference is often performed. Arguably, every human being performs it many times in a day, perhaps without (...)
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  34. Tacit Belief.William G. Lycan - 1986 - In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press.
     
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  35. Desire Considered as a Propositional Attitude.William G. Lycan - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):201-215.
  36. Knowing Who.Steven E. Boër & William G. Lycan - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (5):299 - 344.
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  37. Have We Neglected Phenomenal Consciousness?William G. Lycan - 2001 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7.
    Charles Siewert's _The Significance of Consciousness_ contends that most philosophers and psychologists who have written about "consciousness" have neglected a crucial type or aspect that Siewert calls "phenomenal consciousness" and tries carefully to define. The present article argues that some philosophers, at least, have not neglected phenomenal consciousness and have offered tenable theories of it.
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  38.  87
    Corporate Image: Employee Reactions and Implications for Managing Corporate Social Performance. [REVIEW]Christine M. Riordan, Robert D. Gatewood & JodiBarnes Bill - 1997 - Journal of Business Ethics 16 (4):401-412.
    Corporate image is a function of organizational signals which determine the perceptions of various stakeholders regarding the actions of an organization. Because of its relationship to the actions of an organization, image has been studied as an indicator of the social performance of the organization. Recent research has determined that social performance has direct effects on the behaviors and attitudes of the organization's employees. To better understand these effects, this study develops and empirically tests a model which links corporate leaders' (...)
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  39. Ideas of Representation.William G. Lycan - 1989 - In David Weissbord (ed.), Mind, Value and Culture: Essays in Honor of E. M. Adams. Ridgeview.
  40.  84
    Layered Perceptual Representation.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:81-100.
  41. A Particularly Compelling Refutation of Eliminative Materialism.William Lycan - 2005 - In D. M. Johnson & C. E. Erneling (eds.), The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. Oxford University Press. pp. 197.
    The 1960s saw heated discussion of Eliminative Materialism in regard to sensations and their phenomenal features. Thus directed, Eliminative Materialism is materialism or physicalism plus the distinctive and truly radical thesis that there have never occurred any sensations; no one has ever experienced a sensation. This view attracted few adherents(!), though to this day some philosophers are Eliminativists with respect to various alleged phenomenal features of sensations.
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  42.  52
    On Two Main Themes in Gutting's What Philosophers Know.William G. Lycan - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):112-120.
    This paper addresses each of two of Gutting's three main contentions: that like anyone else, philosophers are entitled to begin with what they find obvious and that philosophy has produced a distinctive body of knowledge. I emphatically agree with the first contention and expand on it, defending a stronger claim. The second contention I dispute, in spirit if not in letter, on each of several grounds.
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  43.  83
    Epistemic Value.William G. Lycan - 1985 - Synthese 64 (2):137 - 164.
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  44. Serious Metaphysics: Frank Jackson's Defense of Conceptual Analysis.William G. Lycan - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
  45.  80
    Moral Facts and Moral Knowledge.William G. Lycan - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):79-94.
  46. Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning.William G. Lycan - 2010 - Topoi 29 (2):99-108.
    The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed.
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  47. What, Exactly, is a Paradox?W. G. Lycan - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):615-622.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  48.  90
    MPP, Rip.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:411-428.
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  49. Block and the Representation Theory of Sensory Qualities.William G. Lycan - unknown
    In the nearly half a century since its modern inception (Anscombe (1965), Hintikka (1969)), the Representation theory has faced no more implacable enemy than Ned Block. He has offered objection after objection, usually in the form of apparent counterexamples, and as I write this he shows no sign of flagging.
     
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  50. Free Will and the Burden of Proof.William G. Lycan - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 107-122.
    (3) A compatibilist needs to explain how free will can co-exist with determinism, paradigmatically by offering an analysis of ‘free’ action that is demonstrably compatible with determinism. (Here is the late Roderick Chisholm, in defense of irreducible or libertarian agent-causation: ‘Now if you can analyze such statements as “Jones killed his uncle” into event-causation statements, then you may have earned the right to make jokes about the agent as cause. But if you haven’t done this, and if all the same (...)
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