The essays in this collection were written by an international body of scholars in memory of Professor Bimal K. Matilal. They discuss Vedanta, Nyaya, and Buddhism; thematically they deal with problems of relativism, evil, suffering, emotions, and value judgement.
This book is the second volume of The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal and both should be on the shelf of any serious student of Indian philosophy and religion. I was especially pleased to review this volume because, in my thirty years of teaching Indian philosophy, I focused far too much on metaphysics and epistemology and not enough on ethics. Working back from Gandhi’s ethics of nonviolence, I have been able to repair this deficiency somewhat, but Matilal has (...) now helped me make a substantial improvement in my knowledge of Hindu ethics. (shrink)
In this collection of essays in memory of Professor Bimal K. Matilal, an international body of scholars discuss Vedanta, Nyaya and Buddhism; thematically they deal with problems of relativism, evil, suffering, emotions and value judgement.
I have always admired the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy for its public commitment to intellectual equality. I will gloss it as a headnote for this article by way of some words from Mary Rawlinson's new book, Just Life: "Critical phenomenology starts from the idea that universality appears in multiplicity and difference. More than one narrative will be necessary to do justice to life. Women's experience is just as much an opportunity for the appearance of the universal as is (...) Man's. Critical phenomenology resists both abstract universalism and cultural relativism."1Let me cite here part of the abstract that I sent ahead of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential... (shrink)
A scholar of eminence in the field of Indian philosophy, Bimal K. Matilal was one of the leading exponents of Indian logic and epistemology. Painstakingly compiled from Matilal's huge body of work, this collection of essays includes a set of previously unpublished essays and reveals the extraordinary depth of Matilal's philosophical interests.
A scholar of eminence in the field of Indian Philosophy, Bimal K. Matilal was one of the leading exponents of Indian logic and epistemology. Painstakingly compiled from Matilal's huge body of work, this collection of essays includes a set of previously unpublished essays and reveals the extraordinary depth of Matilal's philosophical interests.
formerly, All Souls College Oxford University, Oxford) Bimal Krishna Matilal was Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics at the University of Oxford until his untimely death in 1991. The text is the inaugural address delivered at the opening of the Centre for Indian and Inter-Religious Studies, Rome, on 15th September 1977.
This book is a defence of a form of realism which stands closest to that upheld by the Nyãya-Vaid'sesika school in classical India. The author presents the Nyãya view and critically examines it against that of its traditional opponent, the Buddhist version of phenomenalism and idealism. His reconstruction of Nyãya arguments meets not only traditional Buddhist objections but also those of modern sense-data representationalists.
Recent interest in the epistemology of testimony can be traced to C. A. J. Coady's Testimony: A Philosophical Study (1992) and then a collection of papers edited by Bimal Krishna Matilal and Arindam Chakrabarti, Knowing from Words (1994). These two volumes framed several issues in the epistemology of testimony and largely set the agenda for work in that area over the next two decades. -/- One major issue in this literature is whether testimonial knowledge can be "reduced" to some (...) other kind of knowledge: Is testimonial knowledge sui generis, requiring its own distinctive treatment, or is testimonial knowledge merely an instance of, for example, inductive knowledge, requiring no special epistemology over and above that required for inductive knowledge in general? One way that testimonial knowledge might be special is that it involves social elements that make it distinctive. This possibility raises further issues that have been prominent in the literature: In what ways is testimonial knowledge a social phenomenon, and what are the consequences of this for the epistemology of testimony and for epistemology more generally? (shrink)
The paper discusses peculiarity of the comparative method applied in philosophysince 1920s. It presents its basic foundations and objectives, as well as the early and most recent definitions of “comparative philosophy”. The author aims at reconsidering in terms of philosophy both the reasons for bias against this method and its advantages in the context of cross-cultural comparative studies. The crucial question is whether various incommensurate schemata of thought, including these which are determined by distinct cultural milieus, may be the subject (...) of comparison at all. To answer this question, she refers, among others, to Ludwik Fleck’s conception of a socially constructed “thought style” and“the truth”, being completely determined within a thought style. The author also consults the conceptions of Stanisław Schayer, Daya Krishna, Bimal K. Matilal and Jitendra NathMohanty who recommend the comparative method as highly useful for the on-going philosophical debates as long as it is not confined to tracing merely similarities between different intellectual traditions, i.e. analogical ideas and equivalent arguments. What seems to the present author the most valuable philosophical contribution to the comparative studies is the perspective of polilogue suggested by Franz M. Wimmer, and the metacomparative self-reference recognized by Wilhelm Halbfass and Robert W. Smid as precious enhancement and challenge for profound philosophical inquiry as such. (shrink)