Results for 'Biological intentionality'

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  1. Symmetry Between the Intentionality of Minds and Machines? The Biological Plausibility of Dennett's Position.Bence Nanay - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (1):57-71.
    One of the most influential arguments against the claim that computers can think is that while our intentionality is intrinsic, that of computers is derived: it is parasitic on the intentionality of the programmer who designed the computer-program. Daniel Dennett chose a surprising strategy for arguing against this asymmetry: instead of denying that the intentionality of computers is derived, he endeavours to argue that human intentionality is derived too. I intend to examine that biological plausibility (...)
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  2.  16
    Whose Purposes? Biological Teleology and Intentionality.Salas Javier González de Prado - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    Teleosemantic theories aspire to develop a naturalistic account of intentional agency and thought by appeal to biological teleology. In particular, most versions of teleosemantics study the emergence of intentionality in terms of biological purposes introduced by Darwinian evolution. The aim of this paper is to argue that the sorts of biological purposes identified by these evolutionary approaches do not allow for a satisfactory account of intentionality. More precisely, I claim that such biological purposes should (...)
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  3. Parallels Between Joint Action and Biological Individuality.Cedric Paternotte - 2015 - In Thomas Pradeu & Alexandre Guay (eds.), Individuals Across The Sciences. Oxford University Press.
    There exist many definitions of human joint action, or of what makes a group similar to an individual. However, they do not agree and are not directly reducible to each other. This multiplicity is due to a lack of constraints on them. I argue that they should at least meet an efficiency constraint: any account of joint action has to justify how it reliably leads agents to cooperation. One avenue consists in exploring the analogy between definitions of joint action and (...)
     
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  4.  3
    The Biosemiotic Glossary Project: Intentionality.Donald Favareau & Arran Gare - 2017 - Biosemiotics 10 (3):413-459.
    In 2014, Morten Tønnessen and the editors of Biosemiotics officially launched the Biosemiotic Glossary Project in the effort to: solidify and detail established terminology being used in the field of Biosemiotics for the benefit of newcomers and outsiders; and to by involving the entire biosemiotics community, to contribute innovatively in the theoretical development of biosemiotic theory and vocabulary via the discussions that result. Biosemiotics, in its concern with explaining the emergence of, and the relations between, both biological ‘end-directedness’ and (...)
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  5.  49
    Approaches to Intentionality.William Lyons - 1995 - Oxford University Press UK.
    What is intentionality? Intentionality is a distinguishing characteristic of states of mind : that they are about things outside themselves. About this book: William Lyons explores various ways in which philosophers have tried to explain intentionality, and then suggests a new way. Part I of the book gives a critical account of the five most comprehensive and prominent current approaches to intentionality. These approaches can be summarised as the instrumentalist approach, derived from Carnap and Quine and (...)
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  6.  47
    Intentionality, Normativity, and a Problem for Searle.Michael Gorman - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (4):703-714.
    At the heart of the philosophy of John Serale there is found a comprehensive biology of the spirit. But there is a tension in his position. On the one hand, modern biology, such as he understands it, requires a certain conception of normativity. On the other hand, the fashion in which Searle himself understands intentionality requires a very different conception of normativity. To resolve the difficulty, Searle must at the same time modify his understanding of biology and nuance his (...)
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  7.  24
    The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection and its Implications for Psychology: A Critique of the Biological Self.Michael W. Barclay - 1994 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):41-57.
    Critiques G. Edelman's Theory of Neuronal Group Selection , from the perspectives of social constructionism, contemporary theory of metaphor, and existential-phenomenological psychology. This theory provides a contemporary biological view of consciousness and the self. Edelman's notion of consciousness as purely biological, and his attempt to ground intentionality in the body, are reductionistic. It is suggested that phenomenological descriptions must be taken into the center of the problem of consciousness. An understanding of the relation of the experiential basis (...)
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  8.  51
    Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Intentionality.Alex Morgan & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (1):119-139.
    We situate the debate on intentionality within the rise of cognitive neuroscience and argue that cognitive neuroscience can explain intentionality. We discuss the explanatory significance of ascribing intentionality to representations. At first, we focus on views that attempt to render such ascriptions naturalistic by construing them in a deflationary or merely pragmatic way. We then contrast these views with staunchly realist views that attempt to naturalize intentionality by developing theories of content for representations in terms of (...)
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  9.  93
    Nano-Intentionality: A Defense of Intrinsic Intentionality.W. Tecumseh Fitch - 2008 - Biology and Philosophy 23 (2):157-177.
    I suggest that most discussions of intentional systems have overlooked an important aspect of living organisms: the intrinsic goal-directedness inherent in the behaviour of living eukaryotic cells. This goal directedness is nicely displayed by a normal cell’s ability to rearrange its own local material structure in response to damage, nutrient distribution or other aspects of its individual experience. While at a vastly simpler level than intentionality at the human cognitive level, I propose that this basic capacity of living things (...)
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  10.  13
    Teleosemantics: Intentionality, Productivity, and the Theory of Meaning.Brian Leahy - 2014 - Language and Linguistics Compass 8 (5).
    Since the publication of Ruth Millikan's Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories in 1984, a great deal of literature has discussed her so-called teleosemantic or biosemantic solution to the problem of intentionality. Only recently, though, has much attention been paid to her co-ordinated solution to the problem of productivity. This article, first, clearly describes the problems of intentionality, productivity, and compositionality, and describes their relationships and their relevance for the theory of meaning. It then describes Millikan's proposal (...)
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  11.  78
    Imagining a Non-Biological Machine as a Legal Person.David J. Calverley - 2008 - AI and Society 22 (4):523-537.
    As non-biological machines come to be designed in ways which exhibit characteristics comparable to human mental states, the manner in which the law treats these entities will become increasingly important both to designers and to society at large. The direct question will become whether, given certain attributes, a non-biological machine could ever be viewed as a legal person. In order to begin to understand the ramifications of this question, this paper starts by exploring the distinction between the related (...)
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  12. Language: A Biological Model.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Guiding the work of most linguists and philosophers of language today is the assumption that language is governed by prescriptive normative rules. Many believe that it is of the essence of thought itself to follow rules, rules of inference determining the intentional contents of our concepts, and that these rules originate as internalized rules of language. However, exactly what it is for there to be such things as normative rules of language remains distressingly unclear. From what source do these norms (...)
     
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  13.  13
    Intentionality and the Inside/Outside Distinction in Sensitive Systems.H. de Preester - 2002 - Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):65-79.
    Working from both a phenomenological and a biological background, the conditions under which the emergence of intentionality occurs, are approached. This is done via two particularities of biological systems: the inside/outside distinction they exhibit and the fact that they are sensitive. The phenomenon of boundaries turns out to be a crucial issue in such an account. To start from a biological level is an indispensable preparation for a proper understanding of intentionality, phenomenologically conceived.
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  14.  15
    Operative Intentionality: : Notes on Merleau-Ponty's Approach to Mental Activities That Are Not the Exclusive Product of the Conscious Mind.Adam Freeman - 1993 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 24 (1):78-89.
    This article is meant to give psychotherapists a glimpse of the clinical implications of Merleau-Ponty's approach to unconscious thought and insight. Freud found evidence of consciousness and intentionality in processes that were understood in terms of coincidence or biological automata. Phenomenology has demonstrated that intentionality is an attribute of the entire embodied subjectivity. Both approaches point to the fact that the sphere of lived intentions is much larger than that of conscious thought. The article includes clinical examples.
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  15.  4
    Intentionality and Its Place in Nature.John R. Searle - 1984 - Dialectica 38 (2-3):87-99.
    SummaryAttributions of intrinsic Intentionality must be distinguished from other kinds. Intrinsic Intentionality is a natural biological phenomenon, caused by processes in the brain and realized in the structure of the brain. This view makes it possible to see how both naive mentalism and naive physicalism can be true. Intentional causation is crucial to the production and explanation of actions. This form of causation has special logical features not common to other kinds of causation. Teleology is an intrinsic (...)
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  16.  11
    A Critical Overview of Biological Functions.Justin Garson - 2016 - Dordrecht: Springer.
    This book is a critical survey of and guidebook to the literature on biological functions. It ties in with current debates and developments, and at the same time, it looks back on the state of discourse in naturalized teleology prior to the 1970s. It also presents three significant new proposals. First, it describes the generalized selected effects theory, which is one version of the selected effects theory, maintaining that the function of a trait consists in the activity that led (...)
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  17. Rational Animals: The Teleological Roots of Intentionality.Mark Okrent - 2007 - Ohio University Press.
    _Rational Animals: The Teleological Roots of Intentionality_ offers an original account of the intentionality of human mental states, such as beliefs and desires. The account of intentionality in _Rational Animals_ is broadly biological in its basis, emphasizing the continuity between human intentionality and the levels of intentionality that should be attributed to animal actions and states. Establishing the goal-directed character of animal behavior, Mark Okrent argues that instrumentally rational action is a species of goal-directed behavior (...)
     
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  18. The Biological Turn.Graham F. Macdonald - 1995 - In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
     
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  19.  67
    Interaction and Bio-Cognitive Order.C. A. Hooker - 2009 - Synthese 166 (3):513-546.
    The role of interaction in learning is essential and profound: it must provide the means to solve open problems (those only vaguely specified in advance), but cannot be captured using our familiar formal cognitive tools. This presents an impasse to those confined to present formalisms; but interaction is fundamentally dynamical, not formal, and with its importance thus underlined it invites the development of a distinctively interactivist account of life and mind. This account is provided, from its roots in the interactivist (...)
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  20.  99
    Thinking Things and Feeling Things: On an Alleged Discontinuity in Folk Metaphysics of Mind.Mark Phelan, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):703-725.
    According to the discontinuity view, people recognize a deep discontinuity between phenomenal and intentional states, such that they refrain from attributing feelings and experiences to entities that do not have the right kind of body, though they may attribute thoughts to entities that lack a biological body, like corporations, robots, and disembodied souls. We examine some of the research that has been used to motivate the discontinuity view. Specifically, we focus on experiments that examine people's aptness judgments for various (...)
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  21.  90
    A Brief Introduction to the Guidance Theory of Representation.Gregg H. Rosenberg & Michael L. Anderson - unknown
    Recent trends in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science can be fruitfully characterized as part of the ongoing attempt to come to grips with the very idea of homo sapiens--an intelligent, evolved, biological agent--and its signature contribution is the emergence of a philosophical anthropology which, contra Descartes and his thinking thing, instead puts doing at the center of human being. Applying this agency-oriented line of thinking to the problem of representation, this paper introduces the Guidance Theory, according to (...)
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  22.  75
    Life and Mind.Margaret A. Boden - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):453-463.
    It’s sometimes said, and even more often assumed, that life is necessary for mind. If so, and if A-Life promises to throw light on the nature of life as such, then A-Life is in principle highly relevant to the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. However, very few philosophers have attempted to argue for the relation between life and mind. It’s usually taken for granted. Even those (mostly in the Continental tradition, including some with a following in A-Life) who have (...)
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  23.  51
    Intentionality and the Neurobiology of Pleasure.Peter Hadreas - 1999 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 30 (2):219-236.
  24. Ontological Subjectivity.Thomas Natsoulas - 1991 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 175 (2):175-200.
    Addressed here are certain relations among intentionality, consciousness, and subjectivity which Searle has lately been calling our attention, while arguing that certain brain-occurrences possess irreducibly subjective features - in the sense that no amount of strictly objective, third-person information about the animal and his or her brain and behavior could result in a description of any such features, except by inference based on the first-person perspective. In his relevant discussions, Searle has focused on the aspectual shapes of conscious mental (...)
     
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  25.  10
    Intencionalidad sin naturalismo biológico.Ivar Hannikainen - 2011 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 36 (1):139-153.
    The Chinese Room argument is a variant of Turing’s test which enables Searle to defend his biological naturalism, according to which computation is neither sufficient nor constitutive of the mind. In this paper, I examine both strands of his anticomputationalist stance, argue that computation is constitutive of natural language understanding and suggest a path toward the physicalist reduction of intentionality for propositional speech acts.
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  26.  4
    Manipulating Representations.Angelo Nm Recchia-Luciani - 2012 - Biosemiotics 5 (1):95-120.
    The present paper proposes a definition for the complex polysemic concepts of consciousness and awareness (in humans as well as in other species), and puts forward the idea of a progressive ontological development of consciousness from a state of ‘childhood’ awareness, in order to explain that humans are not only able to manipulate objects, but also their mental representations. The paper builds on the idea of qualia intended as entities posing regular invariant requests to neural processes, trough the permanence of (...)
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  27. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
    John Searle's Speech Acts and Expression and Meaning developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third (...)
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  28. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Perception/Cognition Divide.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York: Routledge.
    One of Brian Loar’s most central contributions to contemporary philosophy of mind is the notion of phenomenal intentionality: a kind of intentional directedness fully grounded in phenomenal character. Proponents of phenomenal intentionality typically also endorse the idea of cognitive phenomenology: a sui generis phenomenal character of cognitive states such as thoughts and judgments that grounds these states’ intentional directedness. This combination creates a challenge, though: namely, how to account for the manifest phenomenological difference between perception and cognition. In (...)
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  29.  19
    What is a Mode Account of Collective Intentionality?Michael Schmitz - 2017 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peters (eds.), Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality: Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with his Responses. Cham: Springer. pp. 37-70.
    This paper discusses Raimo Tuomela's we-mode account in his recent book "Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents" and develops the idea that mode should be thought of as representational. I argue that in any posture – intentional state or speech act – we do not merely represent a state of affairs as what we believe, or intend etc. – as the received view of 'propositional attitudes' has it –, but our position relative to that state of affairs and (...)
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  30.  74
    Non-Propositional Intentionality: An Introduction.Alex Grzankowski & M. Montague - forthcoming - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
    Book synopsis: Our mental lives are entwined with the world. There are worldly things that we have beliefs about and things in the world we desire to have happen. We find some things fearsome and others likable. The puzzle of intentionality — how it is that our minds make contact with the world — is one of the oldest and most vexed issues facing philosophers. Many contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists have been attracted to the idea that our minds (...)
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  31. Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization.John Searle - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    The purpose of this book -- Intentionality -- Collective intentionality and the assignment of function -- Language as biological and social -- The general theory of institutions and institutional facts: -- Language and social reality -- Free will, rationality, and institutional facts -- Power : deontic, background, political, and other -- Human rights -- Concluding remarks : the ontological foundations of the social sciences.
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  32. Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality.Graham Priest - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
    Graham Priest presents a ground-breaking account of the semantics of intentional language--verbs such as "believes," "fears," "seeks," or "imagines." Towards Non-Being proceeds in terms of objects that may be either existent or non-existent, at worlds that may be either possible or impossible. The book will be of central interest to anyone who is concerned with intentionality in the philosophy of mind or philosophy of language, the metaphysics of existence and identity, the philosophy of fiction, the philosophy of mathematics, or (...)
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  33.  48
    Biological Theory and the Metaphysics of Race: A Reply to Kaplan and Winther. [REVIEW]Quayshawn Spencer - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (1):114-120.
    In Kaplan and Winther’s recent article they argue for three bold theses: first, that “it is illegitimate to read any ontology about ‘ race ’ off of biological theory or data”; second, that “using biological theory to ground race is a pernicious reification”; and, third, that “ race is fundamentally a social rather than a biological category.” While Kaplan and Winther’s theses are thoughtful, I show that the arguments that their theses rest on are unconvincing. In order (...)
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  34. Husserl's Theory of Intentionality.Napoleon M. Mabaquiao - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (1):24-49.
    This essay is a critical examination of how Edmund Husserl, in his appropriation of Franz Brentano’s concept of intentionality into his phenomenology, deals with the very issues that shaped Brentano’s theory of intentionality. These issues concern the proper criterion for distinguishing mental from physical phenomena and the right explanation for the independence of the intentionality of mental phenomena from the existence or non-existence of their objects. Husserl disagrees with Brentano’s views that intentionality is the distinguishing feature (...)
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  35. Cognitive Modularity, Biological Modularity and Evolvability.Claudia Lorena García - 2007 - Biological Theory: Integrating Development, Evolution and Cognition (KLI) 2 (1):62-73.
    There is an argument that has recently been deployed in favor of thinking that the mind is mostly (or even exclusively) composed of cognitive modules; an argument that draws from some ideas and concepts of evolutionary and of developmental biology. In a nutshell, the argument concludes that a mind that is massively composed of cognitive mechanisms that are cognitively modular (henceforth, c-modular) is more evolvable than a mind that is not c-modular (or that is scarcely c-modular), since a cognitive mechanism (...)
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  36. The Multiple Realizability of Biological Individuals.Ellen Clarke - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (8):413-435.
    Biological theory demands a clear organism concept, but at present biologists cannot agree on one. They know that counting particular units, and not counting others, allows them to generate explanatory and predictive descriptions of evolutionary processes. Yet they lack a unified theory telling them which units to count. In this paper, I offer a novel account of biological individuality, which reconciles conflicting definitions of ‘organism’ by interpreting them as describing alternative realisers of a common functional role, and then (...)
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  37. Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental.Tim Crane - 1998 - In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 229-251.
    ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the (...)
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  38. Stepping Beyond the Newtonian Paradigm in Biology. Towards an Integrable Model of Life: Accelerating Discovery in the Biological Foundations of Science.Plamen L. Simeonov, Edwin Brezina, Ron Cottam, Andreé C. Ehresmann, Arran Gare, Ted Goranson, Jaime Gomez‐Ramirez, Brian D. Josephson, Bruno Marchal, Koichiro Matsuno, Robert S. Root-­Bernstein, Otto E. Rössler, Stanley N. Salthe, Marcin Schroeder, Bill Seaman & Pridi Siregar - 2012 - In Plamen L. Simeonov, Leslie S. Smith & Andreé C. Ehresmann (eds.), Integral Biomathics: Tracing the Road to Reality. Springer. pp. 328-427.
    The INBIOSA project brings together a group of experts across many disciplines who believe that science requires a revolutionary transformative step in order to address many of the vexing challenges presented by the world. It is INBIOSA’s purpose to enable the focused collaboration of an interdisciplinary community of original thinkers. This paper sets out the case for support for this effort. The focus of the transformative research program proposal is biology-centric. We admit that biology to date has been more fact-oriented (...)
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  39. Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.
    This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal (...) theories over tracking theories. (shrink)
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  40. The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion.Michelle Montague - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.
    My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional (...)
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  41.  73
    Neo-Pragmatism, Primitive Intentionality and Animal Minds.Laura Danón - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-20.
    According to Hutto and Satne, 521–536, 2015), an “essential tension” plagues contemporary neo-Pragmatist accounts of mental contents: their explanation of the emergence and constitution of intentional mental contents is circular. After identifying the problem, they also propose a solution: what neo-Pragmatists need to do, to overcome circularity, is to appeal to a primitive content-free variety of intentionality, different from the full-blown intentionality of propositional attitudes. In this paper, I will argue that, in addition to the problem of circularity, (...)
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  42. The Sources of Intentionality by Uriah Kriegel. [REVIEW]Sean Crawford - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):190-193.
    This is a review of Uriah Kriegal's book on intentionality, The Sources of Intentionality.
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  43. Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1999 - Oxford University Press UK.
    In Context and Content Robert Stalnaker develops a philosophical picture of the nature of speech and thought and the relations between them. Two themes in particular run through these collected essays: the role that the context in which speech takes place plays in accounting for the way language is used to express thought, and the role of the external environment in determining the contents of our thoughts. Stalnaker argues against the widespread assumption of the priority of linguistic over mental representation, (...)
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  44. Brentano's Mature Theory of Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (2):1-15.
    The notion of intentionality is what Franz Brentano is best known for. But disagreements and misunderstandings still surround his account of its nature. In this paper, I argue that Brentano’s mature account of the nature of intentionality construes it, not as a two-place relation between a subject and an object, nor as a three-place relation between a subject’s act, its object, and a ‘content,’ but as an altogether non-relational, intrinsic property of subjects. I will argue that the view (...)
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  45.  66
    Motivation and Horizon: Phenomenal Intentionality in Husserl.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):410-435.
    This paper argues for a Husserlian account of phenomenal intentionality. Experience is intentional insofar as it presents a mind-independent, objective world. Its doing so is a matter of the way it hangs together, its having a certain structure. But in order for the intentionality in question to be properly understood as phenomenal intentionality, this structure must inhere in experience as a phenomenal feature. Husserl’s concept of horizon designates this intentionality-bestowing experiential structure, while his concept of motivation (...)
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  46. Is Intentionality Dependent Upon Consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.
    It is often assumed thatconsciousness and intentionality are twomutually independent aspects of mental life.When the assumption is denounced, it usuallygives way to the claim that consciousness issomehow dependent upon intentionality. Thepossibility that intentionality may bedependent upon consciousness is rarelyentertained. Recently, however, John Searle andColin McGinn have argued for just suchdependence. In this paper, I reconstruct andevaluate their argumentation. I am in sympathyboth with their view and with the lines ofargument they employ in its defense. UnlikeSearle and McGinn, (...)
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  47. Heidegger on Kant, Time and the 'Form' of Intentionality.Sacha Golob - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2):345 - 367.
    Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted almost one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger by providing a fresh analysis of two central texts: Heidegger’s 1927/8 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his 1929 monograph Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I argue that to make sense of Heidegger’s reading of Kant, one must resolve two (...)
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  48. Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Phenomenal intentionality is a kind of intentionality, or aboutness, that is grounded in phenomenal consciousness, the subjective, experiential feature of certain mental states. The phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT), is a theory of intentionality according to which there is phenomenal intentionality, and all other kinds of intentionality at least partly derive from it. In recent years, PIT has increasingly been seen as one of the main approaches to intentionality.
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    The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Some mental states seem to be "of" or "about" things, or to "say" something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this book is to explain this phenomenon. -/- Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in principle difficulties (...)
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    Ethical and Philosophical Consideration of the Dual-Use Dilemma in the Biological Sciences.Seumas Miller & Michael J. Selgelid - 2007 - Science and Engineering Ethics 13 (4):523-580.
    The dual-use dilemma arises in the context of research in the biological and other sciences as a consequence of the fact that one and the same piece of scientific research sometimes has the potential to be used for bad as well as good purposes. It is an ethical dilemma since it is about promoting good in the context of the potential for also causing harm, e.g., the promotion of health in the context of providing the wherewithal for the killing (...)
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