1. Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities.Ebbe Groes, Hans Jørgen Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranaes - 1998 - Theory and Decision 44 (1):37-66.
    We generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for strategic form games to allow for ambiguity in the players' expectations. In contrast to other contributions, we model ambiguity by means of so-called lower probability measures or belief functions, which makes it possible to distinguish between a player's assessment of ambiguity and his attitude towards ambiguity. We also generalize the concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate that for certain attitudes towards ambiguity it is possible to explain (...)
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    Testing the Intransitivity Explanation of the Allais Paradox.Ebbe Groes, Hans JØrgen Jacobsen, Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranæs - 1999 - Theory and Decision 47 (3):229-245.
    This paper uses a two-dimensional version of a standard common consequence experiment to test the intransitivity explanation of Allais-paradox-type violations of expected utility theory. We compare the common consequence effect of two choice problems differing only with respect to whether alternatives are statistically correlated or independent. We framed the experiment so that intransitive preferences could explain violating behavior when alternatives are independent, but not when they are correlated. We found the same pattern of violation in the two cases. This is (...)
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    Economic Darwinism.Birgitte Sloth & Hans Jørgen Whitta-Jacobsen - 2011 - Theory and Decision 70 (3):385-398.
    We define an evolutionary process of “economic Darwinism” for playing the field, symmetric games. The process captures two forces. One is “economic selection”: if current behavior leads to payoff differences, behavior yielding lowest payoff has strictly positive probability of being replaced by an arbitrary behavior. The other is “mutation”: any behavior has at any point in time a strictly positive, very small probability of shifting to an arbitrary behavior. We show that behavior observed frequently is in accordance with “evolutionary equilibrium”, (...)
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