14 found
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  1. Collectivity And Circularity.Björn Petersson - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):138-156.
    According to a common claim, a necessary condition for a collective action (as opposed to a mere set of intertwined or parallel actions) to take place is that the notion of collective action figures in the content of each participant’s attitudes. Insofar as this claim is part of a conceptual analysis, it gives rise to a circularity challenge that has been explicitly addressed by Michael Bratman and Christopher Kutz.1 I will briefly show how the problem arises within Bratman’s and Kutz’s (...)
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  2.  14
    Over-Determined Harms and Harmless Pluralities.Björn Petersson - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):841-850.
    A popular strategy for meeting over-determination and pre-emption challenges to the comparative counterfactual conception of harm is Derek Parfit’s suggestion, more recently defended by Neil Feit, that a plurality of events harms A if and only if that plurality is the smallest plurality of events such that, if none of them had occurred, A would have been better off. This analysis of ‘harm’ rests on a simple but natural mistake about the relevant counterfactual comparison. Pluralities fulfilling these conditions make no (...)
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  3.  58
    Co-Responsibility and Causal Involvement.Björn Petersson - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):847-866.
    In discussions of moral responsibility for collectively produced effects, it is not uncommon to assume that we have to abandon the view that causal involvement is a necessary condition for individual co-responsibility. In general, considerations of cases where there is “a mismatch between the wrong a group commits and the apparent causal contributions for which we can hold individuals responsible” motivate this move. According to Brian Lawson, “solving this problem requires an approach that deemphasizes the importance of causal contributions”. Christopher (...)
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  4.  38
    Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality.Björn Petersson - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):199-218.
    Different versions of the idea that individualism about agency is the root of standard game theoretical puzzles have been defended by Regan 1980, Bacharach, Hurley, Sugden :165–181, 2003), and Tuomela 2013, among others. While collectivistic game theorists like Michael Bacharach provide formal frameworks designed to avert some of the standard dilemmas, philosophers of collective action like Raimo Tuomela aim at substantive accounts of collective action that may explain how agents overcoming such social dilemmas would be motivated. This paper focuses on (...)
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  5. Collective Omissions and Responsibility.Björn Petersson - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (2):243-261.
    Sometimes it seems intuitively plausible to hold loosely structured sets of individuals morally responsible for failing to act collectively. Virginia Held, Larry May, and Torbj rn T nnsj have all drawn this conclusion from thought experiments concerning small groups, although they apply the conclusion to large-scale omissions as well. On the other hand it is commonly assumed that (collective) agency is a necessary condition for (collective) responsibility. If that is true, then how can we hold sets of people responsible for (...)
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  6.  67
    The Second Mistake in Moral Mathematics is Not About the Worth of Mere Participation.Björn Petersson - 2004 - Utilitas 16 (3):288-315.
    ‘The Second Mistake’ (TSM) is to think that if an act is right or wrong because of its effects, the only relevant effects are the effects of this particular act. This is not (as some think) a truism, since ‘the effects of this particular act’ and ‘its effects’ need not co-refer. Derek Parfit's rejection of TSM is based mainly on intuitions concerning sets of acts that over-determine certain harms. In these cases, each act belongs to the relevant set in virtue (...)
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  7.  12
    Bratman, Searle, and Simplicity : Comments on Bratman, Shared Agency, Planning Theory of Acting Together.Björn Petersson - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):27–37.
    Michael Bratman’s work is established as one of the most important philosophical approaches to group agency so far, and Shared Agency, A Planning Theory of Acting Together confirms that impression. In this paper I attempt to challenge the book’s central claim that considerations of theoretical simplicity will favor Bratman’s theory of collective action over its main rivals. I do that, firstly, by questioning whether there must be a fundamental difference in kind between Searle style we-intentions and I-intentions within that type (...)
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  8.  5
    On an Apparent Asymmetry in Attitude Desert.Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Björn Petersson - 2007 - In J. Josefsson D. Egonsson (ed.), Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
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  9. Den moraliska asymmetrin mellan lycka och lidande.Björn Petersson - 1993 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 1993 (4).
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  10.  9
    Review of Justin Gosling: Weakness of the Will. [REVIEW]Björn Petersson - 1992 - Theoria 58 (2-3):219-223.
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  11.  4
    Four Types of Altruism.Björn Petersson - unknown
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  12.  31
    Belief & Desire the Standard Model of Intentional Action : Critique and Defence.Björn Petersson - 2000 - Björn Petersson, Dep. Of Philosophy, Kungshuset, Lundagård, Se-222 22 Lund,.
    The scheme of concepts we employ in daily life to explain intentional behaviour form a belief-desire model , in which motivating states are sorted into two suitably broad categories. The BD model embeds a philosophy of action, i.e. a set of assumptions about the ontology of motivation with subsequent restrictions on psychologising and norms of practical reason. A comprehensive critique of those assumptions and implications is offered in this work, and various criticisms of the model are met. The model’s predictive (...)
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  13. Hjärnklyvning – ett tveeggat argument.Björn Petersson - 1993 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 1993 (1).
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  14. Om begreppet ’disposition’ och dispositionella analyser av önskningar.Björn Petersson - 1999 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 1999 (1).
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