34 found
Order:
  1. A New Logic of Technical Malfunction.Bjørn Jespersen & Massimiliano Carrara - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (3):547-581.
    Aim of the paper is to present a new logic of technical malfunction. The need for this logic is motivated by a simple-sounding philosophical question: Is a malfunctioning corkscrew, which fails to uncork bottles, nonetheless a corkscrew? Or in general terms, is a malfunctioning F, which fails to do what Fs do, nonetheless an F? We argue that ‘malfunctioning’ denotes the modifier Malfunctioning rather than a property, and that the answer depends on whether Malfunctioning is subsective or privative. If subsective, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  2. Two Conceptions of Technical Malfunction.Bjørn Jespersen & Massimiliano Carrara - 2011 - Theoria 77 (2):117-138.
    The topic of this paper is the notion of technical (as opposed to biological) malfunction. It is shown how to form the property being a malfunctioning F from the property F and the property modifier malfunctioning (a mapping taking a property to a property). We present two interpretations of malfunctioning. Both interpretations agree that a malfunctioning F lacks the dispositional property of functioning as an F. However, its subsective interpretation entails that malfunctioning Fs are Fs, whereas its privative interpretation entails (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  3.  15
    Anatomy of a Proposition.Bjørn Jespersen - forthcoming - Synthese:1-40.
    This paper addresses the mereological problem of the unity of structured propositions. The problem is how to make multiple parts interact such that they form a whole that is ultimately related to truth and falsity. The solution I propose is based on a Platonist variant of procedural semantics. I think of procedures as abstract entities that detail a logical path from input to output. Procedures are modeled on a function/argument logic, but are not functions. Instead they are higher-order, fine-grained structures. (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4.  37
    Transparent Quantification Into Hyperintensional Objectual Attitudes.Bjørn Jespersen & Marie Duží - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):635-677.
    We demonstrate how to validly quantify into hyperintensional contexts involving non-propositional attitudes like seeking, solving, calculating, worshipping, and wanting to become. We describe and apply a typed extensional logic of hyperintensions that preserves compositionality of meaning, referential transparency and substitutivity of identicals also in hyperintensional attitude contexts. We specify and prove rules for quantifying into hyperintensional contexts. These rules presuppose a rigorous method for substituting variables into hyperintensional contexts, and the method will be described. We prove the following. First, it (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  5.  39
    Recent Work on Structured Meaning and Propositional Unity.Bjørn Jespersen - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):620-630.
    Logical semantics includes once again structured meanings in its repertoire. The leading idea is that semantic and syntactic structure are more or less isomorphic. A key motive for reintroducing sensitivity to semantic structure is to obtain fine‐grained meanings, which are individuated more finely than in possible‐world semantics, namely up to necessary equivalence. Just getting the truth‐conditions right is deemed insufficient for a full semantic analysis of sentences. This paper surveys some of the most recent contributions to the program of structured (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  6.  26
    Structured Lexical Concepts, Property Modifiers, and Transparent Intensional Logic.Bjørn Jespersen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):321-345.
    In a 2010 paper Daley argues, contra Fodor, that several syntactically simple predicates express structured concepts. Daley develops his theory of structured concepts within Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic . I rectify various misconceptions of Daley’s concerning TIL. I then develop within TIL an improved theory of how structured concepts are structured and how syntactically simple predicates are related to structured concepts.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7.  39
    Predication and Extensionalization.Bjørn Jespersen - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):479 - 499.
    In his 2000 book Logical Properties Colin McGinn argues that predicates denote properties rather than sets or individuals. I support the thesis, but show that it is vulnerable to a type-incongruity objection, if properties are (modelled as) functions, unless a device for extensionalizing properties is added. Alternatively, properties may be construed as primitive intensional entities, as in George Bealer. However, I object to Bealer’s construal of predication as a primitive operation inputting two primitive entities and outputting a third primitive entity. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  8.  3
    Left Subsectivity: How to Infer That a Round Peg is Round.Bjørn Jespersen - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (4):531-547.
    A property modifier is a function that takes a property to a property. For instance, the modifier short takes the property being a Dutchman to the property being a short Dutchman. Assume that being a round peg is a property obtained by means of modification, round being the modifier and being a peg the input property. Then how are we to infer that a round peg is a peg? By means of a rule of right subsectivity. How are we to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  9.  47
    Should Propositions Proliferate?Bjørn Jespersen - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):243-251.
    Soames's cognitive propositions are strings of acts to be performed by an agent, such as predicating a property of an individual. King takes these structured propositions to task for proliferating too easily. King's objection is based on an example that purports to show that three of Soames's propositions are really just one proposition. I translate the informally stated propositions King attributes to Soames into the intensional λ-calculus. It turns out that they are all β-equivalent to the proposition King claims Soames's (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10.  30
    Explicit Intensionalization, Anti-Actualism, and How Smith's Murderer Might Not Have Murdered Smith.Bjørn Jespersen - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (3):285–314.
    The purpose of this article is to provide a non‐contradictory interpretation of sentences such as “Smith's murderer might not have murdered Smith”. An anti‐actualist, two‐dimensional framework including partial functions provides the basis for my solution. I argue for two claims. The modal profile of the proposition expressed by “The F might not have been an F” is complex: at any world where there is a unique F the proposition is true; at any world without a unique F the proposition has (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  11.  68
    Why the Tuple Theory of Structured Propositions Isn't a Theory of Structured Propositions.Bjørn Jespersen - 2003 - Philosophia 31 (1-2):171-183.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  12.  25
    Are Wooden Tables Necessarily Wooden?Bjørn Jespersen & Pavel Materna - 2002 - Acta Analytica 17 (1):115-150.
    This paper defendsintensional essentialism: a property (intensional entity) is not essential relative to an individual (extensional entity), but relative to other properties (or intensional entities). Consequently, an individual can have a property only accidentally, but in virtue of having that property the individual has of necessity other properties. Intensional essentialism is opposed to various aspects of the Kripkean notion of metaphysical modality, eg, varying domains, existence as a property of individuals, and its category of properties which are both empirical and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  13.  7
    Introduction: Primitivism Versus Reductionism About the Problem of the Unity of the Proposition.Manuel García-Carpintero & Bjørn Jespersen - forthcoming - Synthese.
    We present here the papers selected for the volume on the Unity of Propositions problems. After summarizing what the problems are, we locate them in a spectrum from those aiming to provide substantive, reductive explanations, to those with a more deflationary take on the problems.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  36
    An Intensional Solution to the Bike Puzzle of Intentional Identity.Bjørn Jespersen - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):297-307.
    In a 2005 paper Ólafur Páll Jónsson presents a puzzle that turns on intentional identity and definite descriptions. He considers eight solutions and rejects them all, thus leaving the puzzle unsolved. In this paper I put forward a solution. The puzzle is this. Little Lotta wants most of all a bicycle for her birthday, but she gets none. Distracted by the gifts she does receive, she at first does not think about the bike. But when seeing her tricycle, she is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  15.  1
    Teaching & Learning Guide For: Recent Work on Structured Meaning and Propositional Unity.Bjørn Jespersen - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):943-945.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  23
    Transparent Quantification Into Hyperpropositional Contexts de Re.Duží Marie & Bjørn Jespersen - 2012 - Logique & Analyse 55 (220):513-554.
    This paper is the twin of (Duží and Jespersen, in submission), which provides a logical rule for transparent quantification into hyperprop- ositional contexts de dicto, as in: Mary believes that the Evening Star is a planet; therefore, there is a concept c such that Mary be- lieves that what c conceptualizes is a planet. Here we provide two logical rules for transparent quantification into hyperpropositional contexts de re. (As a by-product, we also offer rules for possible- world propositional contexts.) One (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  22
    The Phone Booth Puzzle.Bjørn Jespersen - 2006 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 13 (4):411-439.
    In a 1997 paper Jennifer Saul adduces various examples of simple sentences in which the substitution of one co-referential singular term for another appears to be invalid. I address the question of whether anti-substitution is logically justified by examining the validity and soundness of substitution of co-referential singular terms in three simple-sentence arguments each exhibiting a different logical structure. The result is twofold. First, all three arguments are valid, provided Leibniz’s Law is valid with respect to simple sentences . Thus, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  18.  43
    Introduction.Marie Duží & Bjørn Jespersen - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):525-534.
    The topic of this special issue of Synthese is hyperintensionality. This introduction offers a brief survey of the very notion of hyperintensionality followed by a summary of each of the papers in this collection. The papers are foundational studies of hyperintensionality accompanied by ample philosophical applications.Hyperintensionality concerns the individuation of non-extensional entities such as propositions and properties, relations-in-intension and individual roles, as well as, for instance, proofs and judgments and computational procedures, in case these do not reduce to any of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Hyperintensions and Procedural Isomorphism: Alternative (½).Bjørn Jespersen - 2010 - In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications. pp. 301--322.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  20.  6
    Iterated Privation and Positive Predication.Bjørn Jespersen, Massimiliano Carrara & Marie Duží - 2017 - Journal of Applied Logic 25:S48-S71.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Points of View From a Logical Perspective.Marie Duží, Pavel Materna & Bjørn Jespersen - 2006 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 13 (3):277-305.
    In the paper we offer a logical explication of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of point of view. We show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of partial characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a P and at the same time a non-P , because it is a P only relative to some point of view and a non-P from another point of view. But there (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  22.  19
    Traditionally, I Am Entitled to a Last Meal.Bjørn Jespersen - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (1):5-13.
    Nunberg maintains that there are cases like “I am traditionally entitled to a last meal”, as uttered by a condemned prisoner facing the firing squad, which suggest that an indexical like ‘I’ does double duty as a vehicle of singular and general reference. I argue against this claim. My position is that the sentence should be factored out into two: “Traditionally, a condemned prisoner is entitled to a last meal” and “I am a condemned prisoner”. Nunberg’s sentence is generated by (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  21
    Post-Fregean Thoughts on Propositional Unity.Bjørn Jespersen - 2012 - In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor.
    This note sketches how a theory of procedural semantics may offer a solution to the problem of the unity of the proposition. The current revival of the notion of structured meaning has made the problem of propositional unity pressing. The problem, stated in its simplest form, is how an individual a and a property F combine into the proposition P that a is an F; i.e. how two different kinds of objects combine into a third kind of object capable of (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  27
    Tractarian Sätze, Egyptian Hieroglyphs, and the Very Idea of Script as Picture.Bjørn Jespersen & Chris Reintges - 2008 - Philosophical Forum 39 (1):1–19.
  25.  10
    The Non-Italian Pope1.Bjørn Jespersen - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1):58-65.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Pavel Materna, Concepts and Objects. Acta Philosophica Fennica, Vol. 63 Reviewed By.Bjørn Jespersen - 2002 - Philosophy in Review 22 (2):130-131.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  7
    Teaching & Learning Guide For:Recent Work on Structured Meaning and Propositional Unity.Bjørn Jespersen - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):943-945.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Points of View from a Logical Perspective.Marie Duží, Pavel Materna & Bjørn Jespersen - 2007 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (1):5-31.
    In the paper we offer a logical explication of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of point of view. We show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of partial characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a P and at the same time a non-P, because it is a P only relative to some point of view and a non-P from another point of view. But there is (...)
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Detail príspevku/publikácie.Bjørn Jespersen - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1):58-65.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Explicit Intensionalization, Anti‐Actualism, and How Smith's Murderer Might Not Have Murdered Smith.Bjørn Jespersen - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (3):285-314.
    The purpose of this article is to provide a non‐contradictory interpretation of sentences such as “Smith's murderer might not have murdered Smith”. An anti‐actualist, two‐dimensional framework including partial functions provides the basis for my solution. I argue for two claims. The modal profile of the proposition expressed by “The F might not have been an F” is complex: at any world where there is a unique F the proposition is true; at any world without a unique F the proposition has (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Knowing That P Rather Than Q.Bjørn Jespersen - 2008 - Sorites 20:125-134.
    I offer a two-tiered critique of epistemological contrastivism as developed by Jonathan Schaffer. First, I investigate the cornerstone of contrastivism, the notion of knowing the selected proposition p rather than the eliminated, or contrast, proposition q. Contrastivism imposes the ternicity constraint that the knowledge relation should span a knower and two propositions. However, contrastivism has yet to explain how to square this constraint with the required contrast between the selected and the eliminated propositions, and it is not immediately obvious how (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. Pavel Materna, Concepts and Objects. Acta Philosophica Fennica, Vol. 63. [REVIEW]Bjørn Jespersen - 2002 - Philosophy in Review 22:130-131.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. Proper Proper Names.Bjørn Jespersen & Marián Zouhar - 1999 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 6 (2):4-153.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Substitution in Simple Sentences: Validity Versus Soundness.Bjørn Jespersen - 2008 - Epistemologia 31 (2):241-262.