Research on bias in peer review examines scholarly communication and funding processes to assess the epistemic and social legitimacy of the mechanisms by which knowledge communities vet and self-regulate their work. Despite vocal concerns, a closer look at the empirical and methodological limitations of research on bias raises questions about the existence and extent of many hypothesized forms of bias. In addition, the notion of bias is predicated on an implicit ideal that, once articulated, raises questions about the normative implications (...) of research on bias in peer review. This review provides a brief description of the function, history, and scope of peer review; articulates and critiques the conception of bias unifying research on bias in peer review; characterizes and examines the empirical, methodological, and normative claims of bias in peer review research; and assesses possible alternatives to the status quo. We close by identifying ways to expand conceptions and studies of bias to countenance the complexity of social interactions among actors involved directly and indirectly in peer review. (shrink)

L'impérieux amour de Pascal. - Discours sur les passions de l'amour. - Lettres de Pascal à Charlotte de Roannez. - Pensées de Pascal sur l'amitié. - Pensées de Pascal sur le coeur. - Pensées de Pascal sur l'amour. - Pensées de Pascal sur la concupisence.

Pascal was a scientist and man of the world who came to be a passionately devout Christian. The fragments of his great defense of Christianity, left unfinished at his death in 1662, survive in the form of the Pensees. This series of brief, dramatic notes on his religious convictions are here translated into English. These thoughts expose Pascal's vision of the world and display powerful reasoning and a profound faith.

The issue of directed donation of organs from deceased donors for transplantation has recently risen to the fore, given greater significance by the relatively stagnant rate of deceased donor donation in the UK. Although its status and legitimacy is explicitly recognized across the USA, elsewhere a more cautious, if not entirely negative, stance has been taken. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Human Tissue Act 2004, and in Scotland the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006, are both silent in this (...) regard. Although so-called conditional donation, donation to (or perhaps withheld from) a specific class, has been outlawed as a product of guidance issued by the Secretary of State for Health issued in the wake of the controversial incident occurring in the North of England in 1998, its intended application to ‘directed’ donation is less certain. Directed and conditional donations challenge the traditional construct of altruistic donation and impartial (equitable) allocation in a very immediate and striking fashion. They implicitly raise important questions as to whether the body or parts of the body are capable of being owned, and by whom. This paper attempts to explore the notion of donor ownership of body parts and its implications for both directed and conditional donation. (shrink)

Living-donor kidney transplantation is the “gold standard” treatment for many individuals with end-stage renal failure. Superior outcomes for the graft and the transplant recipient have prompted the implementation of new strategies promoting living-donor kidney transplantation, and the number of such transplants has increased considerably over recent years. Living donors are undoubtedly exposed to risk. In his editorial “underestimating the risk in living kidney donation”, Walter Glannon suggests that more data on long-term outcomes for living donors are needed to determine whether (...) this risk is permissible and the extent to which physicians and transplant surgeons should promote living-donor kidney transplantation.1 In this paper I argue that it is not clear that medical professionals have underestimated this risk, nor is it clear that more data on long-term outcomes are needed in order to determine whether it is permissible for individual autonomous agents to expose themselves to this or, indeed, any risk. The global shortage of organs available for transplantation ultimately means that every year thousands of individuals who value their life die needlessly. This is an unacceptable loss of human life. Saving life is one of the most wonderful things an individual can do for another. Promoting any strategy that will assist in saving life and preventing human suffering within acceptable moral limits is legitimate. (shrink)

Wilkinson’s discussion of the individual and family consent to organ and tissue donation is to be welcomed because it draws attention to the “incoherent hybrid” of the current position.1 I wish to highlight some areas of his discussion and propose that, in a situation of posthumous organ and tissue donation, the cadaver has no individual rights and family rights should under no circumstances automatically outweigh the potential transplant recipients’ right to a life-saving treatment.Transplant immunobiology and clinical transplantation is a revolutionary (...) area of medicine and has saved thousands of lives. In the UK, between 1 April 2004 and 31 March 2005, organs from 752 people who died were used to save or dramatically improve many people’s lives through 2242 transplants.2 In the US, 23 506 transplants were performed between January and October 2005 from 12 084 donors.3 Information from available databases shows that demand for organs, cells and tissues has outstripped the supply. As of 18 January 2006, 6553 people are still waiting for transplants in the UK and there are 90 636 waiting list transplant candidates in the US.2,3 As of 01 January 2006, there are 15 977 people active on the Eurotransplant waiting list.4 It is likely that non-compulsory posthumous donation of organs has resulted in the loss of many thousands, possibly many …. (shrink)

In the countries with a strong muslim immigration, the practice and the organization of Islam represent a national and international politica! stake. The Belgian state, which recognizes and supports the most important cults financially, recognized Islam in 1974. But this cult doesn't still obtain this state support and the questions concerning its organization are more complex than ever. Thelegislation is insufficient and its application almost non-existent. The debates on 'integrism' and hijab have confronted us with the problem of the integrating (...) role of Islam. The Belgian political world seems today to fear the influence of foreign countries on immigrants. All these factors throw light on the history and the present state of the Belgian legislation on the organization of the islamic cult, which this article analyses. (shrink)

1. The difference between the mathematical and the intuitive mind.- In the one, the principles are palpable, but removed from ordinary use; so that for want of habit it is difficult to turn one's mind in that direction: but if one turns it thither ever so little, one sees the principles fully, and one must have a quite inaccurate mind who reasons wrongly from principles so plain that it is almost impossible they should escape notice. But in the intuitive mind (...) the principles are found in common use and are before the eyes of everybody. One has only to look, and no effort is necessary; it is only a question of good eyesight, but it must be good, for the principles are so subtle and so numerous that it is almost impossible but that some escape notice. Now the omission of one principle leads to error; thus one must have very clear sight to see all the principles and, in the next place, an accurate mind not to draw false deductions from known principles. All mathematicians would then be intuitive if they had clear sight, for they do not reason incorrectly from principles known to them; and intuitive minds would be mathematical if they could turn their eyes to the principles of mathematics to which they are unused. The reason, therefore, that some intuitive minds are not mathematical is that they cannot at all turn their attention to the principles of mathematics. But the reason that mathematicians are not intuitive is that they do not see what is before them, and that, accustomed to the exact and plain principles of mathematics, and not reasoning till they have well inspected and arranged their principles, they are lost in matters of intuition where the principles do not allow of such arrangement. They are scarcely seen; they are felt rather than seen; there is the greatest difficulty in making them felt by those who do not of themselves perceive them. These principles are so fine and so numerous that a very delicate and very clear sense is needed to perceive them, and to judge rightly and justly when they are perceived, without for the most part being able to demonstrate them in order as in mathematics, because the principles are not known to us in the same way, and because it would be an endless matter to undertake it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 51-80 [Access article in PDF] Kant's Politics of Enlightenment Ciaran Cronin THE ENDURING RESONANCE OF Kant's brief essay "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" (henceforth "WE") can be traced in large part to the connection it makes between two ideas central to the self-understanding of European modernity. The first is the idea of autonomy implicit in its famous (...) definition of enlightenment: "Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his self-incurred minority.Minority is the inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another... Sapere aude! Have courage to make use of your own understanding! is thus the motto of enlightenment." 1 Kant's rallying cry to independence of thought resonates with the view that individual autonomy is a central component of modern self-identity. The second is the defense of freedom in the public use of reason: "For this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but freedom, and indeed the least harmful of anything that could even be called freedom: namely freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters." 2 With this emphatic endorsement of freedom of expression as a precondition of enlightenment, Kant appears to situate the project of enlightenment squarely in the tradition of liberal political thought. [End Page 51]Yet the interpretation of the essay as a defense of a liberal model of freedom of expression proves to be problematic on a closer reading. Even Kant's famous definition of enlightenment is not without its puzzling aspects. He employs the legal term "minority" (Unmündigkeit, often translated as "immaturity"), the condition of a child or dependent who has not reached the legal age of adulthood, to describe the condition of human beings before they have achieved enlightenment; but as some of his contemporaries remarked, the idea of a minority that is "self-incurred" makes no legal sense. That their puzzlement was not just a matter of injudicious terminology is shown by Kant's apparent indecision over whether the failure of individuals to make independent use of their reason is due to lack of courage on their part 3 or whether it is because they have been prevented from doing so by constraining social authorities. 4 Even more perplexing is Kant's idiosyncratic distinction between the private and public uses of reason: "by the public use of one's own reason I understand that use which someone makes of it as a scholar before the entire public of the world of readers. What I call the private use of reason is that which one may make of it in a certain civil post or office with which he is entrusted." 5 What is perplexing in this is not so much the restriction of the public use of reason to scholars addressing a public of readers as the characterization of the use of one's reason in exercising a civil or public office as "private." Moreover, liberal sensibilities cannot fail to be ruffled by the authoritarian cast of some of Kant's remarks. Most troubling is the observation that only a ruler who "hasa well-disciplined and numerous army ready to guarantee public peace" can tolerate complete freedom of public expression and that a lesser degree of civil freedom (bürgerliche Freiheit) is conducive to the fullest expansion of "a people's freedom of spirit" (or intellectual freedom, Freiheit des Geistes). 6 This would seem to lend ammunition to those who argue that Kant ultimately embraces a conservative politicalposition in contradiction to the radical implications of his own critical philosophy. 7 [End Page 52]But an examination of the historical context of the essay reveals that it is neither a clear expression of a liberal nor of a conservative position as these are conventionally understood, or so I will argue. The perplexing features of the essay become intelligible when it is seen as part of a larger project of reconciling the ideal requirements of a republican constitution with the political reality of Prussian absolutism in response to contemporary debates concerning... (shrink)

Résumé Dans cet article, il s’agit de montrer que si la machine (co)crée, elle ne (co)énonce pas, si l’on entend par « énonciation » l’acte métadiscursif de définir les conditions de possibilité de la production d’un texte verbal ou visuel, la gestion des modalités qui conduisent des virtualités et potentialités au stade de la réalisation ainsi que l’évaluation du processus a posteriori. D’une part, nous attardant sur la génération texte-image par DALL•E 3, mais aussi analysant des glitches, nous cherchons à (...) montrer que, grâce à l’indétermination inhérente au code, grâce à une dose d’aléatoire, voire grâce à une certaine « organicité » qui n’exclut pas le vague et le flou, la créativité n’est pas seulement humaine: au-delà de l’accident, la machine peut produire du nouveau en « faisant ce qu’elle a à faire ». D’autre part, en ce qui concerne la « (co)énonciation machinique », nous dégageons une séquence énonciative qui atteste la responsabilité de l’humain dans les phases initiale et finale, la phase médiane voyant se multiplier des instances machiniques sous-tendues par des forces anonymes et impersonnelles. (shrink)

"I know of no religious writer more pertinent to our time."—T. S. Eliot, Introduction to Pensees Intended to prove that religion is not contrary to reason, Pascal's Pensees rank among the liveliest and most eloquent defenses of Christianity. Motivated by the seventeenth-century view of the supremacy of human reason, Pascal (1623–1662) had intended to write an ambitious apologia for Christianity in which he argued the inability of reason to address metaphysical problems. His untimely death prevented the work's completion, but the (...) fragments published posthumously in 1670 as Pensees remain a vital part of religious and philosophical literature. W. F. Trotter translation. Introduction by T. S. Eliot. (shrink)

Afin de clarifier la réalité elle-même, Nietzsche rapporte généalogiquement le « conatus » spinoziste à une volonté de statisme à laquelle il oppose la dynamique expansive de la volonté de puissance. Pourtant, on peut montrer que Nietzsche rejette moins la conservation qu’il ne la réinterprète dans l’ordre d’une grandeur à produire, indissociable du tragique.

For much of his life Pascal (1623-62) worked on a magnum opus which was never published in its intended form. Instead, he left a mass of fragments, some of them meant as notes for the Apologie. These were to become known as the Pensées, and they occupy a crucial place in Western philosophy and religious writing. Pascal's general intention was to confound scepticism about metaphysical questions. Some of the Pensées are fully developed literary reflections on the human condition,, some contradict (...) others, and some remain jottings whose meaning will never be clear. The most important are among the most powerful aphorisms about human experience and behaviour ever written in any language. This translation is the only one based on the Pensées as Pascal left them. It includes the principal dossiers classified by Pascal, as well as the essential portion of the important Writings on Grace. A detailed thematic index gives access to Pascal's areas of concern, while the selection of texts and the introduction help to show why Pascal changed the plan of his projected work before abandoning the book he might have written. (shrink)

AESTHETICS OF “PURE SIGN” ADORNO, MERLEAU-PONTY AND ART AS AN ENDLESS REINVENTION OF REALITY Contemporary painting has often dealt with signs, graffiti, calligraphy, and more precisely with aesthetic objects that take the form and appearance of signs, but which do not belong to any existing alphabet. These are forms that imitate signs but are what we might call “pure signs”, i.e. signifiers without a signified. This form of artistic experimentation has elicited parallel and convergent analyses by Merleau-Ponty and Adorno. These (...) authors show the ways in which this kind of artistic experimentation at once renews reflection on language and reflection on art, through a more fundamental reflection on the cognitive actions that they necessarily share, namely deciphering and interpretation. By asking how signs that have no conventional meaning can still be identified as signs–the “decryption” of which is therefore impossible–we re-actualize a question that goes back to Plato and Augustine. How can we begin to investigate and understand what we do not know yet? How does the decryption and interpretation process arise for one who does not yet know if there is something to understand? This type of artwork actually has a meaning, but not in the traditional sense. Although they are unreadable and untranslatable, such works clarifying the meaning of interpretation for us, they free us from a naive and simplistic conception of the process of understanding. They show us that interpretation is always a process of inventing and producing a new meaning, but never of actually finding a pre-existing meaning. In doing so, these kinds of artwork are inseparable from ontological and political issues. Against a conservative view of our relationship to reality, they make us aware that the sense of reality is never simply given nor definitive, and that our relationship to reality contains much more potential than we commonly believe. (shrink)

On associe habituellement Rousseau à la tradition républicaine, opposée schématiquement à la tradition libérale. Sans remettre en cause globalement cette thèse, il peut être intéressant de déplacer les termes de la problématique, en présentant la critique rousseauiste du libéralisme comme une critique menée de l’intérieur, plutôt que de l’extérieur. On peut en effet, à l’exemple de John Pocock, identifier un tronc commun aux pensées républicaine et libérale ou, à l’exemple de Charles Larmore, voir dans le républicanisme « une formulation plus (...) lucide de la théorie libérale ». Cela se traduit chez Rousseau par une stratégie consistant à se réapproprier les promesses contenues dans les prémisses du libéralisme, pour mieux en dénoncer les conséquences dogmatiques. De fait, on trouve chez Rousseau une défense des droits individuels, un souci de l’indépendance individuelle dans les relations économiques et plus généralement dans les rapports sociaux, une justification jusnaturaliste de la propriété privée, et même des emprunts à l’idée selon laquelle la mise en concurrence permettrait de définir les conditions d’un choix optimal. Cependant l’analyse de certains textes de l’Émile montre que Rousseau vise en définitive à dissiper l’illusion d’une autorégulation optimale des rapports sociaux et économiques : l’opacité et les distorsions des rapports économiques ainsi que l’usage spontanément irrationnel de la liberté individuelle impliquent la nécessité de gouverner la liberté, par l’éducation et par la législation. (shrink)

La notion de libéralisme crée un sentiment trompeur de familiarité : sa présence envahissante dans le débat public brouille le plus souvent sa compréhension.

L’Émile met en scène deux leçons de choses visant à initier l’élève à la science économique : l’une concernant le fondement du droit de propriété, l’autre concernant l’échange marchand et la division sociale du travail. Ces deux moments éducatifs donnent un précieux éclairage sur la pensée économique de Rousseau, pensée plus complexe et informée qu’on ne le considère communément. Mais c’est également dans les décisions existentielles d’émile que sont abordées philosophiquement les conditions d’un choix rationnel, la maximisation de la satisfaction (...) et les vertus supposées de la concurrence. Par ces différents biais, Rousseau met à l’épreuve et critique les thèses de la science économique, annonciatrices du libéralisme, qui s’ébauchent à son époque.Two practical lessons, in Émile, aim to introduce the pupil to economics. The first one concerns the foundation of the right to property ; the second one concerns trade and the social division of work. Both of these educational moments show Rousseau’s economic thought to be more complex and informed than we often believe. But Émile’s existential decisions are also occasions for philosophical investigations on the conditions of rational choice, the maximization of satisfaction and the supposed benefits of competition between bids. Through these differents issues, Rousseau puts to the test and critically examines the free market principles which are starting to take shape just then. (shrink)

What is consciousness? Where is it? What happens to our consciousness when we die? We associate consciousness with our material brain yet no one has found it there, or anywhere else. Within a framework of established science, however, the author outlines a compelling new way to think about consciousness and its workings. This first revised edition of Between Space describes our material world construed of tiny bits of space and time ("quantized space"). Each of these bits exist, as only they (...) can, within a field of non-space; an abstract reality outside of space and time... but not outside of Nature. Non-space is a reality of awareness, meanings, concepts, and ideas of every sort, while space-time is a reality of distinct objects such as your brain. The author describes in detail how self-awareness and your mind are the result of interaction between the two realms by means of Simultaneity and quantum Observation. While this little book contains scientific descriptions and speculations, it's written in common language so that it can be enjoyed by most of us who have little or no background in science or math; about a hundred pages plus many appendices and illustrations. (shrink)

This paper engages with debates around transformations in the production and circulation of images and the changes in modes of perception that these offer. Paul Virilio has argued that technological developments have produced a shift in the site of meaning‐production from the material reference space of the image to the time of visual contact by the viewer. I consider what significance these temporalities have in relation to social difference, and I develop debates around the performative to consider how the viewer (...) is constituted in visual performativity. This focus on time and performativity opens up questions of how vision may constitute the agency, intention and responsibility of the viewer. Drawing on an example of visual irony in advertising, I explore how the temporal suspension of meanings allows for a suspension of the terms of intent and responsibility. This visual performative accesses and reworks the terms of social difference and privilege in what I have called ‘retroactive intentionality’. (shrink)

Récit de la rencontre à Port-Royal-des-Champs en janvier 1655 entre Lemaistre de Sacy, théologien janséniste, et Pascal, jeune philosophe et savant reconnu. Sacy, soucieux de préserver la foi, proscrit la lecture et l'usage de la philosophie alors que Pascal trouve chez Epictète la grandeur de l'homme soumis à la volonté de Dieu et, chez Montaigne, la misère de l'homme submergé par l'incertitude.

Excerpt from Selections From Pascal Blaise pascal was born at Clermont - Ferrand, in the center of F rance, on June 19, 1623. Three years later his mother died, and his father, taking the family duties most seriously, decided to be his son's own educator. At this time the father occupied a judicial position of considerable importance, but in 1630 he retired from it, moved the household to Paris, and gave himself up entirely to his work of preceptor. He (...) taught Blaise Latin and Greek, Mathematics and Physics, Logic and Philoso phy. For scientific studies the; boy showed unusual aptitude. At the age of twelve he was so far advanced as to write an essay on acoustics, which was followed at fifteen by treatise on conic sections. At eighteen he invented machine for count ing numbers. So great was his zeal for learning that he over taxed his strength by too steady application. Disorders ap peared, headaches and neuralgia, and his sister, Mme Perier, is authority for the statement that, from this time on, he rarely passed day without pain. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

edited by Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff Since its appearance in English translation in 1996, Jürgen Habermas's Between Facts and Norms has become the focus of a productive dialogue between German and Anglo-American legal and political theorists. The present volume contains ten essays that provide an overview of Habermas's political thought since the original appearance of Between Facts and Norms in 1992 and extend his model of deliberative democracy in novel ways to issues untreated in the earlier work.Habermas's (...) theory of democracy has at least three features that set it apart from competing positions. First, it combines a concern with questions of normative justification with an empirical analysis of the social conditions necessary for the realization of democratic institutions. Second, at the heart of his model is the assertion of an internal relationship between liberalism and democracy. On this account, the rights of the individual that are central to liberalism can be guaranteed only within a constitutional framework that at the same time fosters democratic rights of political participation through the public sphere. Finally, Habermas defends a conception of universal human rights that is not only sensitive to cultural differences but also calls for legal and political institutions that facilitate the cultivation of cultural and religious identities within pluralistic societies.These essays demonstrate the extraordinary power of Habermas's theory of democracy through a further engagement with Rawls's political liberalism and through original contributions to current debates over nationalism, multiculturalism, and the viability of supranational political institutions. (shrink)

Cette étude considére le § 301 du Gai Savoir, à partir du § 98 même ouvrage. Dans le sillage de la «nouvelle justice» brièvement présentée dans le § 289, ce § 301 remaine en profondeur l'opposition traditionelle entre l'actif et le contemplatif; suivre pas à pas ect aphorisme permet ainsi de constituer «l'homme juste» en problime qui est cet «homme juste»? Brutus? Shakespeare? Le «poète»? Et donc: comment appréhender la «nouvelle justice»?Diese Untersuchung befasst sich mit dem § 301 der Fröhlichen (...) Wissenschaft, gestützt auf § 98 desselben Werks. Im Zuge der "neuen Gerechtigkrit", die in § 289 kurz dargestellt worden war, formt dieser § 301 den traditionellen Gegensatz zwischen dem Aktiven und dem Contemplativen grundlegend um. Die schrittweise Betrachtung dieses Aphorismus erlaubt dann, den "gerechten Menschen" zum Problem zu machen: wer ist dieser "gerechter Mensch"? Brutus? Shakespeare? Der "Dichter"? Und somit: wie ist die "neue gerechtigkeit" aufzufassen? This articles considers § 301 of The Gay Science in the light of § 98 of the same work. In the wake of the "new justice" briefly presented in § 289, § 301 is an in-depth reconsideration of the traditional opposition between the active and the contemplative; thus a step by step approach to this aphorism allows one to establish "the just man" as a problem: who is that "just man"? Brutus? Shakespeare? The "poet"? Hence, how is the notion of "new justice" to be grasped? (shrink)